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RHETORIC OF ARISTOT

THE



Cambridge:

PRINTED BY C. J. CLAY, M.A.

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.

THE

RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE

WITH A

COMMENTARY

BY THE LATE

EDWARD MEREDITH COPE, M.A.

FORMERLY SENIOR FELLOW AND TUTOR OF TRINITY COLLEGE;

REVISED AND EDITED FOR
THE SYNDICS OF THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

BY

JOHN EDWIN SANDYS, M.A.

FELLOW AND TUTOR OF ST JOHN'S COLLEGE,
AND PUBLIC GRATOR IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE.

VOLUME I.

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EDITOR'S PREFACE.

IT is just ten years since the lamented Author of this Commentary gave to the world of scholars an Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, containing, amongst other valuable matter, a general outline of the contents of the treatise and paraphrases of the more difficult portions. In the preface to that book, which is an almost indispensable companion to the present edition and renders any special prolegomena to these volumes unnecessary, the Author describes the Introduction as preparatory to the detailed explanation of the work itself in an edition of the Greek text which had been long in preparation and was to appear as soon as it could be got ready. This promise is now at last fulfilled, under circumstances however in which the pathetic interest naturally attending the publication of any posthumous work like the present, is in this particular instance, if I may judge of the feelings of others by my own, intensified into a sense of more than usually deep regret that the labours of a large portion of an eminent scholar's life-time must now see the light without the advantage of his own editorial care.

Mr Cope died in the year 1873, but during the last four years of his life his work on the Rhetoric, though it had nearly approached completion, unhappily but unavoidably remained untouched. He was actively engaged upon it during the two years that succeeded the publication of the *Introduction* in 1867;—a year that was also marked by the appearance of a long-expected edition of the Rhetoric by Spengel, which,

AR. I.

by the critical acumen and maturity of judgment generally displayed in its pages, and in particular by its wealth of illustration from the remains of Greek Oratory and the technical treatises of the later Greek rhetoricians, proved the most important aid to the study of the subject that had been published since the time of Victorius. With Spengel's earlier contributions to the criticism of his author, as also with those of Brandis and Bonitz and Vahlen and other eminent Aristotelian scholars on the continent, Mr Cope was of course familiar, as the pages of these volumes abundantly testify; but while preparing his own Commentary, he appears during the last two years of his active work to have only occasionally consulted and quoted Spengel's edition, refraining purposely from incurring any such indebtedness as would prevent his own edition remaining a perfectly independent work.

In June, 1874, the year after Mr Cope's death, his brothers took into consideration the desirability of publishing his Commentary; and, acting under the advice of two distinguished members of his own College, Mr Munro and Mr Jebb, did me the honour to invite me to undertake its completion and revision. The manuscript, so far as it was finished, consisted of nearly seven hundred closely written pages requiring a certain amount of general revision before they could be sent to press; and, owing to other engagements, I found it impracticable to arrange for the printing of the work to commence till June, 1875. During the progress of the work through the press in the last two years, my duties as reviser have proved more laborious than I had anticipated; as even apart from the necessity of reading several times over at various stages of progress not far from a thousand pages of printed matter, I have found it requisite to consult the reader's convenience by rearranging many of the paragraphs, by recasting many of the more complicated sentences, and by endeavouring to prevent the sense from being obscured by the partiality for parenthesis, which, in this case, happens to be characteristic of the commentator and his author alike. In a work of this compass, accidental repetitions of nearly identical notes in various parts of the Commentary are almost unavoidable, and though I have succeeded in detecting and

striking out some of these repetitions, others still remain unremoved.

It will probably occur to some of those who use this book that, in the way of retrenchment of matter and condensation of style, something might without disadvantage have been done by the original writer; but such correction, I may remark, was the very thing from which he consciously shrank; and as a mere reviser I felt that I had no right to assume the responsibility of abridging, still less of rejecting, what the writer himself clearly intended to leave standing. In the case of verbal alterations, however, which I was morally certain would not have been disapproved by the original writer, I have used such slight discretion as appeared to fall within my province; this kind of revision cannot of course generally appear on the surface, but wherever it is practicable any additional matter for which I am alone responsible is indicated by the use of square brackets with or (as the work proceeded) without my initial. Such insertions are generally very brief, and often take the form of simple reference to important works that have appeared since the Commentary was prepared; as it seemed only due to the readers of this edition and to the writers of the works in question, that I should endeavour to bring it up to date by referring as occasion served to books such as Dr Thompson's edition of the Gorgias of Plato (1871); Grote's Aristotle (1872); Volkmann, die Rhetorik der Griechen und Römer, ed. 2, 1874; Blass, die Attische Beredsamkeit, 1868, '74; and Professor Jebb's Attic Orators, 1876. In testing the references to other parts of Aristotle, I have made frequent use of the great Index Aristotelicus of Bonitz, which appeared in 1870, and was therefore not available when Mr Cope's notes were written; -a fact that only increases one's admiration at the wide and minute acquaintance with all the Aristotelian writings which he had acquired by his own independent reading,

In any trifling additions of my own, I have seldom gone beyond the briefest annotations, but in the case of the third book, which was left in a less finished state, and on which I had happened to have lectured on several occasions during the last ten years, I felt myself somewhat less restricted; and indeed, as Mr Cope's manuscript unfortunately comes to an

abrupt conclusion in the course of Chapter XVII of that book, I was compelled, for the convenience of those who use this edition and in accordance with the wishes of Mr Cope's representatives and the Syndics of the University Press, to endeavour to supply the deficiency in the three concluding Chapters by writing the notes that occupy the last twenty pages of the Commentary.

In so doing, I have tried to follow the general plan of Mr Cope's own work, and in particular have paid attention to such slight indications of his intended treatment of that portion as I could glean from the memoranda in the margin of his own copy of Bekker's Oxford text of 1837. This volume and an interleaved copy of earlier date, and of somewhat less value for this purpose, were kindly placed at my disposal by the authorities of Trinity College, and, as they contain part of the first rough material for the Commentary, they have proved of some use in verifying doubtful references and also in ascertaining Mr Cope's intentions with regard to the text on points of detail such as punctuation and various readings. But, holding as he did that an editor's main duty was explanation in its widest sense and accordingly devoting himself mainly to questions of exegesis, to elucidation of subject matter, to illustration of verbal expression, and to matters of grammatical and lexicographical interest, he was content on the whole to accept the text as he found it in the earlier editions with which he was familiar. Under these circumstances, in the absence of any intention on his part to make an independent recension of the text, I have thought it best to adopt as the text of the present Commentary the last reprint (1873) of Bekker's third edition (octavo, 1859); and instead of impairing the integrity of that text by altering it here and there to suit what I gathered to be Mr Cope's intentions. I have briefly indicated the instances in which the evidence of his translation or notes, or again the memoranda in his own copy of the Rhetoric already mentioned, pointed clearly to some other reading as the one which he deliberately preferred to that of Bekker's third edition, or in which he was at any rate content to acquiesce. In the margin, beside the references to Book, Chapter and Section at the top of each page, is marked the beginning of each page of Bekker's last

octavo edition, and also of that published in quarto in 1831: the former will, it is trusted, make this work easy to refer to side by side with the plain text in ordinary use; the latter, though it involves a cumbersome method of notation, is worth recording, as it is the mode of reference adopted in the *Index Aristotelicus*, in Spengel's edition, and often elsewhere.

In an Appendix to the third volume, I have added Mr Shilleto's Adversaria on the Rhetoric, which I have transcribed almost exclusively from one of his two copies of the book, lately acquired (with a selection of his other books) by the Syndicate of the University Library. I have also constructed what I hope may be found to be a fairly comprehensive Greek index to the text and notes; and to this I have subjoined a supplementary index to the notes and subject matter, including amongst other miscellaneous items, almost all the passages in the rhetorical writings of Cicero and Quintilian referred to in the Commentary; the passages of Homer and other authors quoted in the text, and the illustrations from Shakespeare in the notes, and also (under the head of 'lexicographical notes') a series of references to Mr Cope's incidental contributions to Greek lexicography. the transcription of both these indexes for the press, I have had much assistance from my brother, James Stuart Sandys, one of the undergraduates of St John's College.

I cannot close these few prefatory explanations of what I have attempted to do in discharging however imperfectly the editorial duty with which it has been my privilege to be entrusted, without recording the fact that Mr Cope (as I am assured by his surviving brother) fully intended, had he lived to see his work through the press, to dedicate it to one of his most intimate friends, Mr Munro. The latter, however, has kindly supplied a short biographical notice by which I am glad to feel that he will be as inseparably associated with the crowning work of his friend's career as if it had appeared inscribed by that friend himself with the honoured name of the Editor of Lucretius.

J. E. S.

CORRIGENDA.

(In the notes.)

VOL. I.

- p. 40, line 14, for 'this ἀρετή, this special excellence', and on p. 49, last line, read 'the' for 'this' in all three cases.
- p. 56, line 10, read ἐπανδρθωμα.
- p. 76, line 29, read νενεμημένων.
- p. 93, line I, for 'in' read 'is.'
- p. 105, line 28, read άγχίνοια.
- p. 153, line 30, read δλιγαρχίας.
- p. 161, line 23, read 'fortitude.'
- p. 173, line 31, for 'be' read 'the.'
- p. 190, below text, read βάθυμα.
- p. 239, line 32, insert (3) before διά λόγων.

VOL. II.

p. 56, note 1, l. 3, read 'Gorg. 522 D.'

VOL. III.

- p. 12, line 21, read 'II 4. 9.'
- p. 30, line 1, for 'by' read 'at.'
- p. 62, line 19, read 'writings.

EDWARD MEREDITH COPE.

Many of Cope's friends having expressed an opinion that it would be well if a short memoir of him were prefixed to this posthumous work, and his sole surviving brother having written to me that he and his nieces would rather leave it in my hands than in those of anybody else, I could not hesitate to undertake the task.

Edward Meredith Cope was born in Birmingham on the 28th of July 1818. He was for some time at the Grammar School of Ludlow under Mr Hinde, and then for about five years at Shrewsbury, where he remained until October 1837, when he commenced residence at Trinity College Cambridge.

During the first years of his Shrewsbury life Dr Butler, late Bishop of Lichfield, was Headmaster; for the last year and quarter Dr Kennedy. Cope throughout his school career was always first or among the first of boys of his own age and standing. For to a great natural aptitude for study and scholarship he joined a strong will and a determination to use his best efforts to excel in whatever was given him to do. Not that he was a bookworm by any means: for he enjoyed extremely the society of his friends and loved innocent recreation in almost any form. Thus though he was not made, and never sought, to distinguish himself in any of them, he thoroughly enjoyed nearly all the usual games and amusements of the place. This taste he retained for years after he took his degree at the University, and Mr Essington, Vicar of Shenstone, and many other friends will bear me witness that he was a consistent votary of Hockey up to the time when the Great Western Railway extinguished this pleasant game first at Eton and then at Cambridge.

The last year and quarter of his residence at Shrewsbury was of vital importance for Cope's future career. Greek was the main and favourite study of his life; and in the summer of 1836 Greek scholarship at Shrewsbury was, if not in comparison with other schools of the day, yet absolutely at a very low ebb. Boys were left in great measure to their own natural lights. Now the light of nature seems capable in favourable circumstances of doing a good

deal for Latin; but in the case of Greek it fosters often the conceit of knowledge, but rarely indeed can impart the knowledge itself.

When Dr Kennedy came to Shrewsbury in the autumn of 1836, he proved himself equal to the task that was before him. Knowledge and method, united with kindness and enthusiasm, effected at once a marvellous change; and all who were able and willing to learn felt in a few months that they had gotten such an insight into the language and such a hold of its true principles and idiom, as to render further progress both easy and agreeable. I would appeal to those who were high in the school at the time when the change in question took place, and ask them whether I have at all overstated the facts of the case; I would refer to Henry Thring and John Bather who came next to Cope in the Classical Tripos; to Francis Morse and others of the same year with myself, and to many others.

But none was more conscious of what he owed to Dr Kennedy, or was more ready to acknowledge it, than Cope himself. The judicious training and the well-directed reading of that year and quarter had an incalculable effect on his future career as a scholar; and, when he went to Cambridge in the October of 1837, he was prepared, as few are, to profit by the advantages the place afforded for classical study. There during his undergraduate days he led a blameless, industrious, and, I believe from what I observed myself and what he often told me, a thoroughly contented and happy life, enjoying the esteem and friendship of many of his worthiest contemporaries, some of them his old schoolfellows, others new acquaintances both in Trinity and in other Colleges, whose names are too numerous to mention. All the while his studies were pursued with a constant and uniform diligence; for none knew better than he to make a good and judicious disposition of his time. He became Scholar of his College as soon as the statutes permitted him to be a candidate, and, after taking his degree in the Mathematical Tripos of January 1841, he gained, as was generally expected, the first place in the Classical. For a year or two after this success he read with a few private pupils, though this employment was never very greatly to his taste. He was elected Fellow of Trinity in 1842: this Fellowship he retained till the day of his death. During the summer of 1843 he resided for some months in Jersey with a few pupils; and in the autumn of that year he made a short tour in Normandy, where he first imbibed, or first tried to satisfy, that intense love for Continental travel which exercised so marked an influence on his future tastes and development.

The moment he had been created Master of Arts at the beginning of July 1844, he threw off for a time the trammels of

Academical life and on the 4th of that month started for a continuous tour of more than fourteen months, never setting foot again in England before the 11th of September 1845. At the commencement of this tour he had for companions two friends, both of them now dead, James Hemery, Dean of Jersey, and Richard Pike Mate, Fellow of Trinity. He always dearly loved and would sacrifice much for the companionship of intimate friends in his travels. But for the greater part of the time he was moving about by himself. these fourteen months he traversed Switzerland almost from end to end, being a good and indefatigable walker; saw Italy thoroughly, with its thousand objects of interest, as far South as Naples: made a short excursion to Greece in November 1844, seeing Athens well and visiting a part of the Peloponnese and landing in Malta and in Sicily on his return to Italy. I have before me now a full and precise Journal which he kept of the occurrences of every day during this 14 months' peregrination. The whole would make a goodsized printed volume. Here we find minutely recorded where he slept on each succeeding night; what he ate and drank; how many miles he walked each day and the number of hours spent in walking them. He was passionately fond of mountain scenery, and of mediaeval and Italian architecture and art. In this Journal all the varying phases of Swiss scenery are described; the buildings, the pictures and other works of art of every Italian town, great or small.

Cope possessed in a high degree the happy faculty, which does not by any means always accompany general power of mind, of readily picking up a foreign language by ear and conversation; and in the course of this journey he made himself an excellent Italian scholar, acquiring such a mastery over the idiom, as is seldom possessed by Englishmen who have not resided many years in the country. On this and his many subsequent tours he attained to no less facility in colloquial French. German seemed to give him more trouble, although by continued exertion he gained a sufficient acquaintance with it too. He never appeared to me to care very much for Italian literature, with however the very important exception of Dante; nor did the great French classics seem to have any very absorbing interest for him. German he made large use of for purposes of study and critical research, while at the same time Goethe and the other classics of the language were enjoyed for their own sakes.

This first comprehensive tour imbued him with a passion for foreign travel, which he indulged without stint until permanent ill-health brought it to a close. External circumstances compelled him however to confine and modify it in future years. While he was

on his travels in 1845, he was offered and accepted an Assistant-Tutorship at Trinity, the duties of which formed the main occupation of his subsequent life. These duties compelled him to be in residence for most of the year between October and June, and left only the summer months for travel, a time not the most suitable for some of the countries which he would have most liked to see. Palestine for instance and Egypt he never set his foot in; Greece he saw only for a few weeks in 1844; nor did he ever get again to Rome or Naples after his first visit. Between June and October however he continued to be a most indefatigable traveller, confining himself almost entirely to a few favoured lands, first and foremost his first loves, Switzerland and North Italy, next France, then Belgium, Germany, Austria, and the Tirol. I should calculate that, in the twenty-four years between 1844 and 1868 when he was compelled to give up travelling, he must have spent at least six years in the countries just enumerated. With the exception of 1848, an ominous time for continental travel, during the summer of which he visited the North of England and Scotland; of 1865 when he was again in Scotland, and of one other summer when he travelled in Ireland, he was on the Continent every one of these years.

Thus in 1846 he was abroad from June the 12th to October the 5th, traversing assiduously the South West and South East of France, the Pyrenees from end to end, the Tirol and South Germany, and finally crossing through France to Paris. In 1847 he was on the Continent from June the 25th to October the 6th, passing by the Rhine and Switzerland into North Italy and to Florence, in which place he found me to my delight and profit, and accompanied me home by Bologna, Milan, Como, Switzerland, the Rhine and Belgium. I have now in my hands twenty manuscript volumes of various sizes, filled with the most minute writing, in which he describes at length the proceedings of every day and almost every hour during all these years' travel, with the exception of the six years from 1854 to 1859. That he was abroad all or most of these years I know, and that he kept equally minute journals of them I have no doubt; but whether they are lost or where they now are, I cannot ascertain. In 1855 I well remember I was with him for some time in Germany and France and in Paris, seeing the great Exhibition of that year. The moment he quits the Continent, his Journals come to an end. So far as I know or can learn, he never kept any diary of his life at home. Had he done so on any thing like the scale which he has adopted in his Journals of travel, he would have accounted for almost every hour of his life.

His social disposition greatly enjoyed the companionship of intimate friends in these travels; and this he was sometimes able to have during his earlier journeyings. In the first of them he had for a time the society of the friends who have been already spoken of. In 1847 I can remember how thoroughly happy he was in Florence together with W. G. Clark and myself. He writes in his Journal of September the 10th, the evening before he left that city: 'Altogether I dont think I ever enjoyed a visit to any foreign town more than this last three weeks at Florence. First I had very pleasant society of intimate friends which has rarely been my lot before—men that take an interest in the same things that please me; the weather has been delightful,' and so on. Again in 1851 he had a long tour, from July 2 to October 16, in Switzerland and North Italy with two intimate friends and brother Fellows, H. R. Luard, now Registrary of the University, and C. B. Scott, the present Headmaster of Westminster. I joined them for a time in Venice and found him thoroughly happy.

But as time went on and he continued year after year to pursue his travels with unabated energy, it was not so easy for him to get his old friends for companions. They did not care to walk for twenty or thirty miles over an Alpine pass under pouring rain, or to defy the summer heats of the Pyrenees, or of the sweltering cities and dust-tormented plains of North Italy. For he hated to pass a single day in inaction, looking upon this as a dereliction of duty and an ignoble concession to laziness. His Journals, as years go on, become more and more instructive, as his taste grew more refined and his discrimination keener; and the ordinary guidebooks of the countries he so often visited might gain greatly by a judicious study of these volumes. At the same time I feel convinced that these later journeys overtaxed his strength and energies, created in him an unnatural excitement and irritation, and fostered the seeds of that malady by which he was subsequently struck down.

In October 1845 Cope commenced the work of what might be called his future profession as Lecturer at Trinity, and continued to perform the duties attached to this office, with energy and success and without the intermission of a single term, for twenty-four years, until the failure of his health put a final stop to all intellectual effort in the summer of 1869.

For some years his favourite subjects of lecture were the Greek Tragedians, the two elder of whom he very decidedly preferred to Euripides. In fact until the very end of his career one or other of their plays was almost invariably the subject of his lecture for the Michaelmas term. And thus by constant repetition and careful pre-

paration he gained a thorough insight into the texts themselves and a very extensive acquaintance with the voluminous literature connected with the Greek drama. But often one or other of the two great historians, Herodotus or Thucydides, or else Demosthenes or another of the orators supplied the text on which he discoursed.

If the best scholars in any of the twenty-four generations of Freshmen who listened to his teaching were consulted, I believe they would one and all avow that their knowledge of the language and of its literature was very greatly furthered by his learned and elaborate lectures.

He gradually established his reputation in the College and the University as one of the very best and soundest Greek scholars of his time: I could cite, if it were necessary, many distinguished names to bear me out in this assertion. In his efforts to be thorough, he would collect a great mass of materials, which he did not always take sufficient pains to mould into shape and symmetry. Indeed he often avowed to me that, when he had once put on paper his thoughts and collections on any question—and this he was in the habit of doing with very great rapidity—, he found it quite impossible to rearrange and rewrite what he had prepared. Hence no doubt there was often a great diffuseness and some want of clearness in his work,—defects with which I have most frequently heard him charged by his auditors. He was by nature too very mistrustful of his own powers, and consequently a great stickler for authority. He seemed to think there was something sacred in the printed text, as it presented itself to him, and was sometimes determined to explain the inexplicable and see a meaning in that which had none. with all this he was an admirable Greek scholar and a most valuable and highly valued lecturer.

Sometimes, though rarely, he lectured on a Latin writer; but for Latin literature, especially poetry, he did not greatly care; though he quite felt and freely admitted the surpassing merits of style in the great prose authors. After a time however he almost entirely dropped the Classical Latin writers, except for purposes not connected with the study of the language, and took up a position of benevolent neutrality with regard to the whole literature. He treated the Latin in much the same way as he treated their compeers, the great French Classics.

When he had been Assistant Tutor about ten years, he undertook the College lecture on Plato, and afterwards on Aristotle as well; and these two philosophers he resolved to make the main object of his study henceforth. For a long time his great natural diffidence seemed to give him a disinclination to commit anything to the press. One of his earliest essays in print were his criticisms, in the Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, of Grote's famous dissertation on the Sophists. There is a good deal to be learnt from what he has written; but, if I am not mistaken, he has hardly caught Grote's point of view, which in this country at all events has I believe now gained very general acceptance among the best judges. In 1864 he published a translation of Plato's Gorgias. His translation is strikingly literal and very excellent in its kind; but this kind is peculiar. Mr Henry Jackson in his introductory remarks to Cope's translation of the Phaedo, a posthumous work which Mr Jackson has edited with great skill and diligence, has given a short and trenchant exposition of the principle which Cope has followed out in both these translations. A more elaborate effort is the Introduction to Aristotle's Rhetoric, published in 1867 and designed to serve as a preliminary study to the present edition of that work. We find in this dissertation a very full exposition of Aristotle's principles, set forth with learning and research; but one feels perhaps here too that want of concentration and careful revision, which, as I have said, Cope used himself to acknowledge with regret as a peculiar feature of his style which he was quite unable to remedy. Anyhow I fancy a reader would have liked to have seen it incorporated in the present edition as an essential portion of it, neither of the two being a complete whole without the other. This edition it is not for me to offer an opinion upon: suffice it here to say that it was the main occupation of the latest and most mature years of his working life, and bears witness in every page to unsparing labour and genuine scholarship.

Cope was ordained Deacon in November 1848 and Priest in September 1850 by Dr Turton, late Bishop of Ely. A short experience with his friend Mate, then Vicar of Wymeswold, convinced him that, as he had already for some years devoted himself to a life of study, Parish work was not the sphere for which his tastes and habits were best adapted; and he contented himself afterwards with occasionally assisting one or other of his clerical friends, when he would make them a visit during a vacation.

Perhaps the most important crisis in the even tenour of his laborious College life was occasioned by the Greek Professorship becoming vacant in 1866, when he came forward as one of three candidates for that office. The votes of the electors, the Council of the Senate, having been equally divided between him and Dr Kennedy, the appointment finally devolved by statute on the Chancellor of the University who gave it to Dr Kennedy. There is no doubt that this result was a poignant disappointment to Cope at the time; it is no less certain that his strength and the tone of his mind

were already a good deal affected by ill-health. This I could illustrate from my own knowledge, if many considerations did not counsel silence on matters which neither his friends nor the public would care to know, or see paraded before them.

Every one, they say, has the defects of his virtues; and it cannot be denied that in his later years, when health became uncertain, Cope was too prompt to take offence and conceive causeless suspicions against his most intimate friends. But they could understand that this arose from excess of susceptibility and perversion of tender feeling; and the offence was forgotten as readily as it was conceived.

In August 1869 he was seized with that malady from which he never rallied during the four remaining years of his life. He died on the 5th of August 1873, and on the 14th of that month he was followed to his grave in the Church of England Cemetery at Birmingham by his two brothers, his nephew and a few of his oldest and dearest friends.

I never knew a kinder-hearted or more charitable man than Cope. Suffering of any sort excited in him an uncontrollable longing to relieve it, whether the relief were to be afforded by sympathy and personal attention, or by money. Many indeed are the acts of charity on his part which fell under my own observation; and I am sure that I never learnt but a small portion of them, for he loved to do good by stealth. Whenever a friend needed care and sympathy, none so prompt as he to offer them. When Robert Leslie Ellis, for whom he felt an unbounded admiration, was seized with fever at San Remo in 1849, off hurried Cope at once to render him all the assistance it was in his power to give. So when his poor friend Mate was struck down by crushing disease, Cope hastened at once to lavish on him his affectionate care. It was always among the chief pleasures of his existence to make a round of visits to his old friends who lived away from Cambridge. One of the oldest of them, R. W. Essington, Vicar of Shenstone, writes to me as follows: 'Of all my old friends of King's and Trinity he alone from 1848 to the year of his sad seizure visited me regularly at Shenstone. He preached in my Church, he taught in my schools, and rarely left me without contributing liberally to some Parochial charity, never without wishing to do so'. 'No one living', he adds with good reason, 'is more capable than I am of testifying to the warmth, the steadiness and depth of his friendship'.

ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ

A.

'Ο Βίος Βραχός, Η Δὲ τέχνη μακρή'
ὁ Δὲ καιρός όξός Η Δὲ πεῖρα ςφαλερή Η Δὲ κρίσις χαλεπή.
Η πρροςκατές.

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ΑΡΙΣΤΟΤΕΛΟΥΣ

ΤΕΧΝΗΣ ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α.

ι Η ρητορική έστιν αντίστροφος τῆ διαλεκτικῆ· άμ-

§ 1. 'Η ρητορική ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῆ διαλεκτικῆ is translated by Cicero, ex altera parte respondere dialecticae, Orat. XXXII 114. 'Vox a scena ducta videtur. Chori antistrophe strophae ad assem respondet, eiusque motus ita fit, ut posterior in prioris locum succedat... Significat ex altera parte respondere et quasi ex adverso oppositum esse; id quod etiam in antistrophen cadit.' Trendel. El. Log. Arist. § 14 p. 74: and to the same effect, Comment. ad Arist. de Anima, II II 5 p. 408. 'ἀντίστροφον dicitur quod alius rei quasi partes agit eamque repraesentat;' Waitz, Comm. ad Anal. Pr. I 2, 25 a 6.

The term is borrowed from the manoeuvres of the chorus in the recitation of the choral odes. Στροφή denotes its movement in one direction, to which the ἀντιστροφή, the counter-movement, the wheeling in the opposite direction, exactly corresponds, the same movements being repeated. Müller, Diss. Eumen. p. 41. Hist. Gr. Lit. c. XIV § 4. Mure, Hist. Gk. Lit. Bk. III. c. I § 15. Hence it is extended to the words sung by the chorus during the latter of these evolutions, and signifies a set of verses precisely parallel or answering in all their details to the verses of the στροφή. And thus, when applied in its strict and proper sense, it denotes an exact correspondence in detail, as a fac-simile or counterpart.

Hence in Logic duristiffer is used to express terms and propositions which are convertible, and therefore identical in meaning, precisely similar in all respects. On the various senses of duristiffer and its derivatives in Logic, see Waitz, u. s. In this signification, however, duristiffer does not properly represent the relation actually subsisting between the two arts, the differences between them being too numerous to admit of its being described as an exact correspondence in detail; as I have already pointed out in the paraphrase (Introd. p. 134).

It also represents Rhetoric as an art, independent of, though analogous to, Dialectics, but not growing out of it, nor included under it. The word is of very frequent occurrence in Plato (Gorgias, Republic, Philebus, Timaeus, Theaetetus, Leges), who joins it indifferently with the genitive and dative; and he employs it in this latter sense; as likewise Isocrates, περὶ ἀντιδ. § 182; and Aristotle himself in several places; Polit. VI (IV) 5, 1292 b 7, καὶ ἔστιν ἀντίστροφος (corresponding)

Bekker P. 1354 quarto edition 1831. p. 1 octavo edition 1873. to in 2

ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 1 § 1.

025

φότεραι γάρ περί τοιούτων τινών είσιν, α κοινά

αὖτη ἐν ταῖς ὀλιγαρχίαις ὧσπερ ἡ τυραννὶς ἐν ταῖς μοναρχίαις. c. 6 ult. 1293 a 33. c. 10, 1295 a 18. de part. anim. II 17 ult. ἐν μὲν οὖν τοὖτοις τοῖς ζφοις ἡ γλῶττα τοιαὑτη τὴν φύσιν ἐστίν, ὧσπερ ἀντιστρόφως ἔχουσα τῷ μυκτῆρι τῶν ἐλεφάντων.

Lastly, Waitz, u. s., points out a peculiar signification of it, 'res contraria alteri quam potestate aequiparat,' in de Gen. Anim. II 6, 743 b 28. τὸ ψυχρὸν συνίστησιν ἀντίστροφον (as a balance) τῆ θερμότητι τῆ περὶ τὴν καρδίαν τὸν ἐγκέφαλον. Trendelenburg, Comm. ad de Anima u. s., after defining ἀντιστρέφειν as above, adds, ἀντίστροφος ex eadem chori similitudine significat ex altera parte respondere (this is from Cicero, u. s.) Arist. Rhet. I I; quod non significat, rhetoricam in dialecticae locum succedere (i.e. can be substituted for it, step into its place, as a convertible term), sed quasi ex adverso esse oppositam (stands over against it, as a corresponding opposite in a συστοιχία, two parallel rows of coordinate opposites, like the partners in a country dance). Quintilian, Inst. Orat. II 17, 42, specie magis quam genere differunt.

The term diriotrophos therefore applied to the two arts, seems to represent them as two coordinate opposites, or opposites in the same row (see Spengel on the study of Rhetoric, Munich 1842, p. 21). They are sister arts, with general resemblances and specific differences; two species under one genus, proof: both modes of proof, both dealing with probable materials, but distinguished by the difference of the two instruments of proof employed: the one concluding by the formal syllogism, and by the regular induction, assumed complete; the other drawing its inferences by the abbreviated, imperfect, conversational enthymeme, never complete in form, and by the single example in the place of the general induction.

Rhetoric is afterwards described as παραφυές, μόριον and ὁμοίωμα (infra c. II § 7). παραφυές and μόριον both express in different ways the relation that Rhetoric bears to Dialectics as the off-shoot, branch, or part; a species or variety of the general art of probable reasoning: παραφυές as a subordinate shoot, growing out of the same root with the larger plant or tree,—a term so far corresponding with ἀντίστροφος, but differing from it in making Rhetoric subordinate. μόριον reduces it to a still lower level in comparison with the other. ὁμοίωμα implies no more than a mere general resemblance.

In Sext. Empir. adv. Math. VII 6, occurs an explanation of ἀντίστροφος, quite in character with the ordinary Greek etymologies, ἡητορικήν, ἡς ἀντίστροφον εἶναι τὴν διαλεκτικήν, (not referring apparently to this passage, but most probably to the συναγωγή τεχνῶν) τουτέστιν ἰσόστροφον, διὰ τὸ περὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ὕλην στρέφεσθαι (versari circa), as Homer called Ulysses ἀντίθεον instead of ἰσόθεον. Alexander (infr.) gives the same explanation.

Bacon Adv. of learning Bk. II IX 3, has antistrophe for 'correspondence', "and it hath the same relation or antistrophe that the former hath."

The points of correspondence and difference between the two arts have been already fully explained in the Introduction, p. 90 foll.: I will here give a summary of them from Alexander's Commentary on the

τρόπον τινὰ ἀπάντων ἐστὶ γνωρίζειν, καὶ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐπιστήμης ἀφωρισμένης. διὸ καὶ πάντες τρόπον

Topics, p. 4. They are 1. that both of them are μη περί εν τι γένος άφωρισμένον; that is, that neither of them has any special subject-matter, like the sciences, but argues or perorates upon any thesis or subject whatsoever that can be presented to it. 2. τὸ δι' ἐνδόξων καὶ πιθανών, no proof or conclusion, or principle, that they employ is more than probable; exact demonstration and necessary conclusions are excluded from both alike; πίστις, belief, the result of mere persuasion, and not ἐπιστήμη, the infallible result of scientific demonstration, being the object aimed at. 3. μη δι' ολκείων ἀρχῶν, they have no 'special, appropriate' first principles, such as those from which the special sciences are deduced; though they likewise appeal to the rà κοινά, the κοιναί ἀρχαί, the ultimate axioms and principles common to all reasoning, which are above those of the special sciences, and from which the latter must be deduced. And, 4. they are όμοίως περί τὰ ἀντικείμενα ἀλλήλοις; they argue indifferently the opposite sides of the same question, and conclude the positive or negative of any proposition or problem; unlike science and demonstration, which can only arrive at one conclusion. Where the materials and the method are alike only probable, every question has, or may be made to appear to have," two sides, either of which may be maintained on probable principles; in Dialectics and Rhetoric no certainty is either attained or attainable. The chief points of difference between them are, that Dialectics deals practically as well as theoretically with every kind of problem or question that can be submitted to it; proceeds by question and answer, in the way of debate, and its discussions are of a more general or universal character; whereas the subjects of Rhetoric are practically, though not theoretically, almost absolutely limited to Politics; it follows a method of continuous narration or explanation (διεξοδικώς), and deals in its conclusions rather with individual cases than with general principles or universal rules, maxims and axioms.

Alexander, in a preceding passage, gives the following very extraordinary account of the derivation and original meaning of ἀντίστροφος: τὸ γὰρ ἀντ. ἀντὶ τοῦ ἰσόστροφόν τε καὶ περὶ τὰ αὐτὰ στρεφομένην καὶ καταγινομένην λέγει.

κοινα απάντων | See Introd., p. 87, and the Paraphrase, pp. 134-5.

ἀφωρισμένης] 'marked off, separated by a limit', from every thing else about it; and so 'definite, special' (§ 7). 1, 2, 1 περί τι γένος ἴδιον ἀφωρισμένον, opposed to περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος. Polit. 1 13, 1260 ὁ 1 ἀφωρισμένην τινὰ δουλείαν (a definite, limited, kind of slavery). Ib. IV (VI) 4, 1290 ὁ 25 ἀποδιορίζειν. ἀφορίζεται (ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις) πρὸς τὰς ἄλλας δυνάμεις τῷ ἔργῳ τούτῳ, "this capacity of the soul is marked off, separated, distinguished, from all the rest by this function," de Anima II 4, 9, 416 a 20. The preposition is similarly used in the compound ἀποβλέπειν, which is 'to look away, or off', from all surrounding objects, so as to fix the attention on one particular thing, or turn it in one particular direction. Comp. Lat. definire, determinare.

Parallel passages, in which this same characteristic of Rhetoric and

τινὰ μετέχουσιν ἀμφοῖν πάντες γὰρ μέχρι τινὸς καὶ ἐξετάζειν καὶ ὑπέχειν λόγον, καὶ ἀπολογεῖσθαι καὶ ² κατηγορεῖν ἐγχειροῦσιν. τῶν μὲν οὖν πολλῶν οὶ μὲν εἰκη ταῦτα δρῶσιν, οὶ δὲ διὰ συνήθειαν ἀπὸ έξεως. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀμφοτέρως ἐνδέχεται, δηλον ὅτι εἴη ἂν αὐτὰ καὶ ὁδοποιεῖν δι' ὁ γὰρ ἐπιτυγχάνουσιν οί

Dialectics is noticed, are cited in the Introd. p. 75. See also Quintilian, II 21, 16—19, on the province of the orator.

έξετάζειν...λόγον] Note 1, Introd. p. 135. ή διαλεκτική έξεταστική, Τορ.

A 2, 101 b 3.

§ 2. συνήθειαν] 'habituation, familiarity, practice', acquired by association (prop. that of living or herding together). Top. A 14, 105 b 27 τη διά της ἀπαγωγης συνηθεία πειρατέον γνωρίζειν ἐκάστην αὐτῶν (τῶν προτάσεων). See also on I 10, 18. This συνήθεια is derived from the constant operation or activity, the ἐνέργειαι, of the developed and acquired and settled ἔξις, or mental state (ἔξις from ἔχειν, 'to be in such and such a state or condition', τὸ πῶς ἔχειν): by the constant exercise of the ἔξις, or established confirmed habit, and its ἐνέργειαι, is produced by association that familiarity, or habituation, or practice, which secures success even to the empirical unartistic use of Dialectics or Rhetoric.

εἰκῆ ταῦτα δρᾶν is the use of them antecedent to practice, and without previously acquired familiarity: ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, by a mere spontaneous

impulse, and therefore 'at random.'

'Est autem dialectica,' says John of Salisbury, *Metalogicus*, II 4, 'ut Augustino placet, bene disputandi scientia: quod quidem ita accipiendum est ut vis habeatur in verbis; ne scilicet dialectici credantur, quos casus iuvat artis beneficio destitutos.'

αὖτά] Rhetoric and its processes.

όδοποιείν] 'to make a way'; to trace a path to be followed, which will lead you without unnecessary deviations to the place at which you wish to arrive. odos therefore, in this metaphorical usage, is not merely a way, but the way, the best way; the way which will lead you most surely and expeditiously to the end proposed. Hence it denotes a regular, systematic, or scientific method; the best and easiest way of attaining the end desired in any intellectual pursuit or branch of study. And thus it is that the simple δδός, as well as the compound μέθοδος, come to denote a scientific or systematic procedure in the pursuit of truth as a philosophical 'method', or in any art or study. Hence we find ὁδφ διηρησθαι, Plat. Phaedr. 263 B, of a systematic methodical scientific division; and Rep. VII 533 D: καθ' όδόν, in the same sense, Rep. IV 435 A, and Crat. 425 B. In Aristotle, de gen. et corr. I 8, 2 όδφ δε μάλιστα περί πάντων...διωρίκασι Λεύκιππος καὶ Δημόκριτος. de part. Anim. Ι 4, 9 πως μεν οὖν ἀποδέχεσθαι δεῖ τὴν περί φύσεως μέθυδον, και τίνα τρόπον γένοιτ' αν ή θεωρία περί αὐτῶν όδῷ καὶ ράστα... Anal. Pr. I 30 init., ή μεν οὖν όδὸς κατὰ πάντων ή αὖτή καὶ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν και περι τέχνην οποιανοῦν και μάθημα. Τορ. Β 2, 109 b 14 οδώ γαρ μαλλον και εν ελάττοσιν ή σκεψις. Eth. Nic. I, 2 από των αρχων ή επί τε διὰ συνήθειαν καὶ οἱ ἀπὸ ταὐτομάτου, τὴν αἰτίαν θεωρεῖν ἐνδέχεται, τὸ δὲ τοιοῦτον ἤδη πάντες ἂν 3 ὁμολογήσαιεν τέχνης ἔργον εἶναι. νῦν μὲν οὖν οἱ τὰς τέχνας τῶν λόγων συντιθέντες ὀλίγον πεπορίκασιν αὐτῆς μόριον αἱ γὰρ πίστεις ἔντεχνόν ἐστι μόνον, τὰ δ᾽ ἄλλα προσθῆκαι, οὶ δὲ περὶ μὲν ἐνθυμημάτων οὐδὲν λέγουσιν, ὅπερ ἐστὶ σῶμα τῆς πίστεως, περὶ δὲ

τὰς ἀρχὰς ἡ ὁδός. Dionysius, de Comp. Verb. c. 25, has ἡ ἡητορικὴ ὁδός for the more usual μέθοδος: and again ὁδῷ, de Comp. Verb. c. 4 sub fin. From this usage of the Greek word the Latins seem to have borrowed their via or via et ratione, which frequently occurs in precisely the same sense. See Cicero de Fin. III 5, 18, IV 4, 10; Orat. III 10, XXXIII 116; de Orat. I 25, 113. Quint. II 17, 41 esse certe viam atque ordinem in bene dicendo nemo dubitaverit; and x 7, 6 via dicere.

The verb ὁδοποιεῖν is found in the same sense, Met. A 3, 984 α 18. προϊόντων δ' οὕτως, αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ὡδοποίησεν αὐτοῖς καὶ συνηνάγκασε ζητεῖν, and Rhet. III 12, 3 (according to Ms A° and some others); and the sub-

stantive όδοποίησις, III 14, 1.

προοδοποιεῖν, which occurs several times in Aristotle (as Rhet. II 2, 10, II 13, 7, III 12, 3, Prob. XXX 1, 954 b 12, de part. Anim. II 4, §§ 4, 5, 6, III 9, 8, de gen. anim. IV 4, 9, π ερὶ Μαντικῆς, I II. Polit. II 9, 1270 a 4, IV (VII) 17, 1336 a-32, and V (VIII) 3, 1338 a 35 π ρὸ ὁδοῦ), has a meaning slightly differing from the preceding. The metaphor is now taken from the office of pioneers, who precede an advancing army, and prepare, clear, or 'pave

the way' for them.

δι' ὅ...τὴν αἰτίαν] τὴν αἰτίαν is here grammatically the antecedent to ὅ, the cause, aἰτία, being in the relative pronoun expressed as an abstract notion ('the cause, which thing') in the neuter. A similar change from feminine to neuter, in antecedent and relative, occurs in de Anima 1 3, 407 α 4 τὴν γὰρ τοῦ παντὸς (ψυχὴν) τοιαύτην εἶναι βοῦλεται οἶον ποτ' ἐστὶν ὁ καλούμενος νοῦς, Pol. II 2 init. καὶ δι' ἡν αἰτίαν φησὶ δεῖν νενομοθετῆσθαι... οῦ φαίνεται συμβαῖνον ἐκ τῶν λόγων, and in Eur. Iph. T. 900 (Herm.) ἡ δ' αἰτία τίς ἀνθ' ὅτου κτείνει πόσιν; where ὅτου must be understood as neuter: see Hermann on v. 1038.

§ 3 seq. To the same effect III 14, 8 δεῖ δὲ μὴ λανθάνειν ὅτι πάντα ἔξω τοῦ λόγου τὰ τοιαῦτα' πρὸς φαῦλον γὰρ ἀκροατὴν καὶ τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος ἀκούοντα, ἐπεὶ ἃν μὴ τοιοῦτος ἢ, οὐθὲν δεῖ προοιμίου—as the vehicle for appeals to the feelings and other indirect proofs addressed to the judges

personally, which were usually introduced into the apoolulov.

πίστεις] rhetorical, not demonstrative, proofs; modes of belief, of things probable; all the materials and arguments of Rhetoric being pro-

bable merely, none of them certain. See Introd. p. 136 note.

προσθῆκαι...σῶμα τῆς πίστεως] All kinds of *indirect* proof are secondary, subordinate, non-essential, mere 'adjuncts' or 'appendages', like dress or ornaments to the body: 'the body' being the actual, logical, direct and substantial proof of the case. What is here called 'the body', meaning

τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τὰ πλεῖστα πραγματεύ-

the substance as opposed to accidents, we usually represent by 'the soul' in this same relation; the body in its turn now standing for the accidents and non-essentials of a thing. So the Scholiast on Hermogenes, Proleg. (quoted by Ernesti, Lexicon Technologiae Graecae p. 110, Art. ἐνθύμημα) οἱ παλαιοὶ ιναπέρ τι ζφον τὸν λόγον ὑπέθεντο ἐκ σώματός τε συνεστηκότα καὶ ψυχῆς. ψυχὴν μὲν καλοῦντες τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ τὴν δύναμιν τὴν διὰ τῶν κεφαλαίων συνισταμένην σῶμα δὲ τὴν φράσιν καὶ τὸ ἔξωθεν κάλλος, ὁ ποιεῖν εἰώθασιν αὶ ἰδέαι. And Cicero, Orat. XIV 44 nam et invenire et iudicare quid dicas magna illa quidem sunt et tamquam animi instar in corpore.

Quintilian describes the views of some of those who thus rigorously limit the province of Rhetoric as an art—al πίστεις έντεχνών έστι μόνον to the employment of the 'enthymeme', the rhetorical representative of the logical and demonstrative 'syllogism'; with the exclusion of all that is, strictly speaking, 'beside the subject or real issue', all that is beside the facts of the case and the direct proof of them; all indirect proof, hamely, from the assumed character of the speaker himself, or appeals to the feelings of the judges or audience, and also all ornaments and graces of style and delivery. Aristotle here assumes this to be theoretically the only true and proper method, though he by no means consistently adheres to it in his actual treatment of the subject. Quintilian's description is as follows, though, as the reasons for the exclusion of these indirect proofs are somewhat different from those assigned by Aristotle, he probably does not refer immediately to him: Fuerunt et clari quidem oratores quibus solum videretur oratoris officium docere. Namque et affectus duplici ratione excludendos putabant: primum quia vitium esset omnis animi perturbatio; deinde quia iudicem a veritate depelli misericordia vel ira similibusque non oporteret: et voluptatem audientium petere, quum vincendi tantum gratia diceretur, non modo agenti supervacuum sed vix etiam viro dignum arbitrabantur. Inst. Orat. V. Prooem. 1.

On the general question of appeals to the feelings, Quint. II 17, 26 seq.: and on the prevailing practice, Isocr. $\pi \in \rho i$ durid. § 321.

πραγματεύεσθαι is well explained by Bonitz on Metaph. A 6, 987 α 30.
πραγματεύεσθαι περί τι, vel περί τινος is dicitur ab Aristotele, qui in investiganda et cognoscenda aliqua re via ac ratione procedit; itaque coniunctum legitur cum verbis διαλέγεσθαι, ζητεῖν, θεωρεῖν'. The primary sense of doing business, or occupying oneself about anything, passes into the more limited or special signification of an intellectual pursuit, and thence of 'a special study', 'a systematic treatment of a particular subject of investigation, or practice' (as in this present case, of Rhetoric, comp. § 10). πραγματεία, like μέθοδος, τέχνη, ἐπιστήμη, φιλοσοφία, and many other words, is used to express not only the intellectual process of investigation, but also the resulting science, art, treatise, or written work, or part of such work. See on this point, Introd. p. 17, note 2. Also, on the general meaning of the term, Waitz on Anal. Post. II 13,96 δ 15. Trendel. de Anima p. 199. Elem. Log. Arist. § 58, p. 135.
§ 4. διαβολή from διαβάλλειν 'to sunder or set at variance', and so

τοιαῦτα πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς οὐ περὶ τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν ἀλλὰ πρός τον δικαστήν. ὤστ' εἰ περὶ πάσας ἤν τὰς κρίσεις καθάπερ ἐν ἐνίαις γε νῦν ἐστὶ τῶν πόλεων καὶ μάλιστα ταῖς εὐνομουμέναις, οὐδὲν ἂν 5 εἶχον ὅ τι λέγωσιν ἄπαντες γὰρ οὶ μὲν οἴονται δεῖν οὕτω τοὺς νόμους ἀγορεύειν, οὶ δὲ καὶ χρῶνται καὶ κωλύουσιν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν ᾿Αρείω πάγω, ὀρθῶς τοῦτο νομίζοντες· οὐ

'to make hostile, to engender a mutual dislike between two parties', in its technical application to Rhetoric, of which it is a potent instrument; and with its opposite $d\pi o\lambda \dot{\nu} \epsilon \sigma \theta a \iota$ 'to absolve oneself, clear away from oneself ill-feeling and suspicion', forms one of the principal topics of the $\pi \rho ooi \mu \iota o \nu$ (see Introd. pp. 343, 4). It denotes the exciting of suspicion and ill-will in the minds of the judges or audience, in order to prejudice them against the opponent with whom you are in controversy: and is therefore improperly classed with the $\pi \dot{a} \theta \eta$ or emotions such as $\tilde{\epsilon} \lambda \epsilon o s$ and $\partial \rho \gamma \dot{\eta}$. This has been already noticed by Victorius and Muretus: the latter says, ' $\delta \iota a \beta o \lambda \dot{\eta}$ non est $\pi \dot{a} \theta o s$, sed pertinet ad iudicem ponendum $\dot{\epsilon} \nu \pi \dot{a} \theta \epsilon \iota$.'

Top. Δ 5, 126 a 31. [διάβολον] τον δυνάμενον διαβάλλεων καὶ εχθρούς ποιείν τοὺς φίλους. These words, which seem to be a mere gloss upon διάβολον in the text of the Topics, occur apparently in one Ms only, marked u by Waitz, and inserted by him in the critical notes of his edition, Vol. II p. 144. Bekker altogether omits to notice them. Though of no authority they will equally well answer the purpose for which they are here employed, of helping, namely, to define the meaning of διαβολή.

On πάθος and πάθη, see Introd. pp. 113-118.

οὖ περὶ τοῦ πράγματος δικαστήν] Appeals to the feelings are ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος: they are 'beside the proper subject, the real question, the direct issue', which is the fact and the proof of it; and 'directed to the judge', intended to bias and pervert his judgment, to incline him to our side in the contest, and so to have the effect of a secondary or indirect kind of proof of the justice of our case.

ῶστ' εἰ περὶ πάσας—λέγωσιν] Similarly in Rhet. III 1, 4, it is said of the ornaments of style, and declamation in general, as of appeals to the feelings here, that they are only allowed to be employed διὰ τὴν μοχθηρίαν τῶν πολιτειῶν; in well-governed states they would not be

permitted at all.

§ 5. of μέν...of δέ] 'either...or'. The one only think that the laws ought to be so framed, hold the opinion as a theory; the others, as the Court of Areopagus, actually (καί, also, besides the mere theory) carry it into practice, καὶ χρῶνται.

έν 'Αρείφ πάγφ] Heindorf ad Theaet. § 76. Lycurgus c. Leocr. §§ 12, 13, quoted by Gaisford, καὶ ταῦτα κάλλιστον ἔχοντες τῶν Ἑλλήνων παράδειγμα τὸ ἐν 'Αρείφ πάγφ συνέδριον, ὁ τοσοῦτον διαφέρει τῶν ἄλλων δικαστηρίων, ὧστε

γαρ δει τον δικαστήν διαστρέφειν είς οργήν προά-

καὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς ὁμολογεῖσθαι τοῖς ἀλισκομένοις δικαίαν ποιεῖσθαι τὴν κρίσιν. πρὸς ὁ δεῖ καὶ ὑμᾶς ἀποβλέποντας μὴ ἐπιτρέπειν τοῖς ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγουσιν κ.τ.λ.

Lucian, Hermotimus, c. 64, has something similar about the practice of this court, άλλά κατά τους 'Αρεοπαγίτας αυτό ποιούντα' οι έν νυκτι και σκότω δικάζουσιν, ώς μή els τους λέγοντας άλλ' els τὰ λεγόμενα ἀποβλέποιεν. (Lucian ed. Hemsterh. I p. 805), and again, Anacharsis s. de Gymn. c. 10, (Vol. II p. 898) οἱ δὲ (δικαζόμενοι) ἔς τ' αν μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος λέγωσιν ανέχεται ή βουλή καθ ήσυχίαν ακούουσα. ήν δέ τις ή φροίμιον είπη πρό τοῦ λόγου, ώς εθνουστέρους απεργάσαιτο αθτούς, ή ολκτον ή δείνωσιν έξωθεν έπάγοι τῷ πράγματι, οἶα πολλὰ ῥητόρων παίδες ἐπὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς μηχανώνται, παρελθών ὁ κήρυξ κατεσιώπησεν εὐθύς, οὐκ ἐῶν ληρεῖν πρὸς τὴν βουλήν κ.τ.λ. There are several allusions to the same in Quintilian, II 16, 4, VI 1, 7, X 1, 107, XII 10, 26. Spalding in his note on the first of these passages calls attention to—what indeed is sufficiently apparent on the face of the statements-Quintilian's carelessness in extending to all the lawcourts of Athens, a practice actually prevailing at the most only in one of them; in spite of the direct evidence to the contrary in the extant orations of the Athenian orators, and the story of Hyperides and Phryne which he himself tells in H 15, 9.

διαστρέφειν] to warp, or distort, to wrest out of the straight ('right') line or proper direction, to pervert or 'deprave' the judgment. The same metaphor is repeated in στρεβλόν. The metaphor which compares wrong, the deviation from the 'right' line or path, to the crooked or twisted, the divergence from the straight, and represents wrong judgment as the warping of the moral rule, occurs in various languages; σκολιός, and ὀρθός, εὐθύνει δὲ δίκας σκολιάς, Solon ap. Dem. de F. L. p. 423, σκολιαῖς ὑδοῖς πατῶν, Pind. Pyth. II 156, Pl. Theaet. 173 A &c. &c. So ἐλικτός, Eur. Androm. 448 ἐλικτὰ κοὐδὲν ὑγιὲς ἀλλὰ πῶν πέριξ φρονοῦντες. So Plato of the good and bad horse in the human chariot, Phaedr. 253 D, ὁ μὲν...τό τε εἶδος ὀρθός...ὁ δ' αἴ σκολιός κ.τ.λ.

So also rectum and pravum or varum or curvum, right and wrong (wrung or twisted out of shape, distorted, similarly intortus) tort, Fr. (tortum), torto, Ital. Compare Lucretius, IV 516, denique ut in fabrica, si prava est fabrica prima Normaque si fallax rectis regionibus exit,—Omnia mendose fieri, &-c. Cic. Acad. Pr. II 11, 33, interesse oportet, ut inter rectum et pravum, sic inter verum et falsum. Hor. Ep. II 2, 44, curvo dignoscere rectum, ('virtutem distinguere a vitio'. Orelli). Pers. Sat. III 52, haud tibi inexpertum curvos deprendere mores. IV II, rectum discernis ubi inter curva subit, vel cum fallit pede regula varo. V 38, apposita intortos extendit regula mores.

'Crooked' for perverse, immoral, wrong, is very common in the earlier writers of our own language. Deut. xxxii 5, a perverse and crooked generation. Ps. cxxv 5, Prov. ii 15, whose ways are crooked, and they froward in their paths. Ep. ad Phil. ii 15, and in many other places and authors. For examples of the latter, see Richardson's Dict. Art. 'crooked'.

Very different to this are the principles laid down by the author of

γοντας ή φθόνον ή έλεον όμοιον γάρ κάν εί τις, ώ ρ

the 'Ρητορική πρὸς 'Αλέξανδρον as a guide to the practice of the rhetorician, c. 36 (37) § 4. χρὴ δὲ καὶ τοὺς δικαστὰς ἐπαίνφ θεραπεῦσαι, ὡς δικασταὶ δίκαιοι καὶ δεινοί εἰσιν. συμπαραληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐλαττώσεις, εἴ που τῶν ἀντιδίκων καταδεεστέρως ἔχει πρὸς τὸ λέγειν ἡ πράττειν ἡ ἄλλο τι πρὸς τὸν ἀγῶνα. The judges are to be flattered, and the opponent represented in the darkest colours, whether his alleged defects have or have not any bearing upon the matter at issue. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἐμβλητέον τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ νόμιμον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καὶ τὰ τούτοις ἀκόλουθα; which is the exact contradictory of the course prescribed by Aristotle in § 6 as alike fair and in accordance with the true principles of the art.

προάγοντας είς Comp. III 14, 7, and note.

καν εί τις...ποιήσειε] The process by which αν in this and similar forms of expression—ώς αν εί, ώσπερ αν εί, καθάπερ αν εί, οἰόνπερ αν εί, and the like-has lost its force, become inactive, (consopitum, 'gone to sleep', Buttm.,) in the sentence, is explained by Buttmann in his note on Dem. Mid. § 15, p. 530. The conditional av belongs to some verb in the apodosis, originally expressed, afterwards left to be understood, as in the clause before us. The expression at full length would be, kar, el ris ποιήσειε, ποιήσειε, 'as one would do, if he were to do'. Still, though the particle has lost its direct and active force in this sentence, some latent notion of conditionality always remains, even when the verb which av supposes cannot actually be supplied. This is the case in such phrases as φοβούμενος ώσπερ αν εί παις, Pl. Gorg. 479 A 'fearing as a child would': Ar. parva naturalia περί μαντικής Ι 2, 2 δσων ώσπερ αν εί λάλος ή φύσις έστιν, 'whose natural habit is, as it might be (αν), talkative'; de Anima 1 5. 5, 409 b 27, ώσπερ αν εί την ψυχήν τὰ πράγματα τιθέντες. In such cases the aν is retained by habit and association, when the sense no longer requires it. The phrase accordingly is not found in the earlier forms of the language, and does not become common till the time of Plato and Aristotle, with whom, the latter especially, it is very frequent. The association required time before it was established as a fixed habit. I believe that it does not occur in Thucydides, and that it makes its first appearance in Xenophon; that is, in the forms above given; for as an unnecessary appendage to a participle, or in cases analogous, av is thus used by earlier writers. See Hermann on Soph. Phil. 491, and Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 430, 1, for some instances [Kühner's Ausführliche Grammatik § 398 p. 209 sq. S.].

Aristotle seems to be the earliest writer who assumed the license of joining καν εἰ with the subjunctive mood, as in Pol. II I init. καν εἰ τυγχάνωσιν, c. 2, ὥσπερ ἀν εἰ σταθμῆς πλεῖον ελκύση, and III 8 καν εἰ συμβαίνη, also Poet. I 5, καν εἰ τινες ἔτεραι τυγχάνωσιν. Καν εἰ μή τω δοκῆ is the MSS reading in Plat. Rep. IX 579 D, and defended by Schneider (not. ad loc.); but rejected by Ast, Bek., Stallb. and the Zurich Editors who substitute δοκεῖ. I subjoin a few examples of the usage in its various forms. Soph. Aj. 1078 δοκεῖν πεσεῖν αν καν (it might be even) ἀπὸ σμικροῦ κακοῦ. Xenophon, Symp. II 20, IX 4, Cyrop. I 3, I, Memor. III 6, 4 and 10, 12. Plato, Apol. 23 B, Phaed. 72 C, 109 C, and elsewhere, Men. 97 B, Gorg. 479 A, Rep. VI 493 A, Isocr. Paneg. §§ 69, 148, Aristotle in addition to

μέλλει χρησθαι κανόνι, τοῦτον ποιήσειε στρεβλόν. 6 ἔτι δὲ φανερὸν ὅτι τοῦ μὲν ἀμφισβητοῦντος οὐδέν ἐστιν ἔξω τοῦ δεῖξαι τὸ πρᾶγμα ὅτι ἔστιν ἢ οὐκ ἔστιν ἢ γέγονεν ἢ οὐ γέγονεν εἰ δὲ μέγα ἢ μικρὸν ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ὅσα μὴ ὁ νομοθέτης διώρικεν, αὐτὸν δή που τὸν δικαστὴν δεῖ γινώσκειν καὶ οὐ 7 μανθάνειν παρὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν προσήκει τοὺς ὀρθῶς κειμένους νόμους, ὅσα ἐνδέχεται, πάντα διορίζειν αὐτούς, καὶ ὅτι ἐλάχιστα καταλείπειν ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι, πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι ἕνα

those already quoted, Rhet. II 20, 4, ὅσπερ αν εἴ τις, Eth. N. V 7, 1132, II. Ib. V 12, 1137, 2; VI 13 sub. fin., 1145, 2 and 10; VII 8, 1150, 16, καν εἰ ρέπουσι, Pol. III 6 (sub init.) καν εἰ πλείους, and several more: Hist. Anim. IV 2, 16, IV II, II, VIII 2, 10, de part. Anim. IV 5, 26, de Gen. Anim. III 9, 7. In Aristotle it has become habitual. The analogous use of αν with the participle is exemplified by Pol. II 2, 1261 b 4 ὤσπερ αν ἄλλοι γενόμενοι; and Theophrastus, Hist. Plant. I 5, I, ὡς αν καθόλου λέγοντας, and I 6, 6, ὡς αν κατὰ λόγον, where αν may be considered as redundant. [Vahlen, Βεἰττάgε zu Αν. Ροεί. I p. 35—37; Eucken, de Αν. dicendi ratione I p. 61—64. S.]

§ 6. On the 'legal issues', στάσεις, ἀμφισβητήσεις, which, as Victorius remarks, are here tacitly referred to, see Introd. p. 397, Appendix E to

Bk. III.

§ 7. κειμένους νόμους] κείσθαι and some of its compounds are often convertible with the passive of $\tau\iota\theta$ έναι. κείσθαι itself 'to be placed, fixed, established'= $\tau\iota\theta$ έσθαι; συγκείσθαι 'to be put together or composed'= σ υντίθεσθαι; διακείσθαι 'to be disposed'= δ ιατίθεσθαι; ποκείσθαι (as I 2 13)

'to be assumed' = ὑποτίθεσθαι οτ ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι.

[κείμαι is constantly borrowed as a perfect passive to τίθημι, while τέθειμαι is almost invariably used as a deponent perfect. Thus the usage of the perfect in the best writers would be: ὁ νομοθέτης τέθεικε τὸν νόμον. ἡ πόλις τέθειται τὸν νόμον ὁ νόμος κείται (Dem. Or. 46 § 12 note). infra chap. 15 § 23 τοῖς νόμοις, ἃν μὴ ὀρθῶς κείμενοι ὧσιν ἀλλ' ἐξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, Plato Leg. p. 793 Β(νόμων) τῶν ἐν γράμμασι τεθέντων τε καὶ κειμένων καὶ τῶν ἔτι τεθησομένων. See also Cobet's variae lectiones p. 311. S.]

τοῖς κρίνουσι, κρίσεις, τοὺς κρίνοντας] On the different senses of κρίνειν and κριτής as applied to the different branches of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 137 note 1: and on the necessary imperfections of laws in their application to particular cases, the consequent introduction of ἐπιείκεια to modify them and adapt them to the circumstances of the case, and Plato's opinion, on the authority of laws, see p. 138 note 1.

ent τοις κρίνουσι] èni resting, and so depending, upon ; hence penes, in

the power of, at the discretion of. § 8 enl rois kritais katalelneiv.

This primary, literal, and physical sense of eni, (in this application of it,

λαβεῖν καὶ ὀλίγους ῥᾶον ἢ πολλοὺς εὖ φρονοῦντας P. 1354 b. καὶ δυναμένους νομοθετεῖν καὶ δικάζειν ἔπείθ αἰ μὲν νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκε ψαμένων γίνονται, αἱ δὲ κρίσεις ἐξ ὑπογυίου, ὥστε χαλεπὸν ἀποδιδόναι τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ συμφέρον καλῶς τοὺς κρίνοντοίνους

which represents the object of the preposition as the basis on which something stands or rests, and therefore depends upon), of the half dozen Grammars and Lexicons, which, after forming my own opinion, I have consulted on the point, is to be found distinctly stated only in that of Rost and Palm, where it lurks hardly discoverable, amidst the enormous mass of illustrations of the various usages of $\ell n \ell$ accumulated in Vol. I pp. 1032—1045, in p. 1038, col. 2.

al νομοθεσίαι ἐκ πολλοῦ χρόνου σκεψαμένων γίνονται] 'legislation arises from (is the work of men after) long previous consideration'. Thuc. 1 58,

έκ πολλού πράσσοντες ούδεν εύροντο επιτήδειον.

έξ ὑπογυίου] (retained by Bekker; Gaisford not. var. prefers ὑπογύου, and so L. Dindorf, on Xen. Cyr. VI 1, 43.) ὑπόγυιον πρὸ μικροῦ γεγονός, Hesychius. έξ ύπογύου παρ' αὐτά, ἀπερισκέπτως, έκ τῶν σύνεγγυς, Suidas. By the Scholiast on Arist. Nub. 145, in Suidas v. ἀρτί (Gaisf.), ἐξ ὑπογυίου λέγειν is interpreted by αὐτοσχεδιάζειν; and in Eustath. (ap. eund.) it is said to be derived from you'or in the sense of xelo, (compare Theocr. Idyl. XXII 81 and 121; the 'hand' is the member, par excellence), from which likewise he deduces έγγύη, έγγυᾶν, and έγγυαλίζειν; and ὑπόγυον, δ καὶ ἐξ ὑπογύου λέγεται, τὸ ἐγγύς φασι προσδόκιμου, ἢ παραυτίκα γεγονός, καὶ ώς είπειν πρόχειρον, ή μαλλον ύποχείριον. Examples may be found, all bearing much the same sense, in Koch's note on Moeris Lex. p. 343, and a still larger list in Rost and Palm's Lex. s. v., to which add Rhet. 11 22, 11; Pol. VII (VI) 8, 1321 b 17. ὑπογυιότατον (the readiest way or means) πρός αὐτάρκειαν. Isocr. Paneg. § 13. Menand. ap. Spengel, Rhet. Gr. 111 391. In Isocr. περί ἀντεδ. § 4, and Epist. 6. 2, p. 418 B, it stands for 'close at hand', ήδη ύπογυίου μοι της του βίου τελευτης ούσης, and similarly Ar. Eth. Nic. III 9 (Bekk.) sub fin., όσα θάνατον ἐπιφέρει ὑπογυῖα ὅντα.

It appears from all this that ὑπογυῖον means 'under the hand', as an unfinished or just finished work, fresh and recent, πρόσφατον (so Rhet. II 3, 12) as Moeris explains it: and ἐξ ὑπογυίον, 'from under the hand', corresponds to our 'off-hand', or 'out of hand', and is used to express anything 'sudden and unexpected' or 'unpremeditated', 'extemporaneous' a signification which appears in all the examples. Similarly ἐκ χειρός, ἀπὸ

χειρός, 'off-hand'.

ἀποδιδόναι] a word of very frequent use in Aristotle, has for one of its elementary senses that of 'to give back', reddere; ἀπό as in ἀπονέμειν, ἀπολαμβάνειν, ἀπαιτεῖν, ἀπόπλους, ἀποπλεῖν (see Sturz. Lex. Xenoph.), from which all the other senses in which at least Aristotle employs it may be deduced. Another of the original senses of the word is 'to give forth', or 'produce', as the earth produces her fruits, and this also might be applied to the interpretation of it in several of its various uses. But as this signification is likewise deducible from the other—for production, as

τας. τὸ δὲ πάντων μέγιστον, ὅτι ἡ μὲν τοῦ νομοθέτου κρίσις οὐ κατὰ μέρος ἀλλὰ περὶ μελλόντων

when the earth produces her fruits, may be regarded as a payment or restoration, or 'return' of something as due—it may perhaps be better to refer them all to the one original signification, reddere. So in Eth. N. II I, 1103, a 27, b 22, τὰs ἐνεργείας ἀποδιδόναι is not simply 'to produce', but to produce energies that are due to the system, energies corresponding to the faculties from which they spring. So Trendelenburg, El. Log. Arist. § 55, p. 132, 'ἀποδιδόναι proprie est reddere, unde ex suum cuique tribuendi significatione facile orta est declarandi vis (declarare is the sense which the word bears in the passage specially referred to, Top. A 5, 102 a 3) nihil enim est aliud quam logice suam cuique naturam reddere.'

ἀποδιδόναι is therefore (1) to give back, restore, repay, render, always implying some kind of obligation, (2) to render as a due, 'assign' (which best represents it in the majority of cases in Aristotle); of due distribution, suum cuique; hence (3) of the due fulfilment of any office or duty, as ἀποδιδόναι λόγον, 'to render an account', to explain, or set forth, any statement or doctrine, ἀποφαίνεσθαι, declarare. To one or the other of these

I believe all the multifarious uses of the word may be referred.

I will add a few examples in the way of illustration :- Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 638 \$ 56, τους έγθρα ποιούντας εν έγθρου μέρει κολάζειν απέδωκεν (assigns as a due) o vouos; and elsewhere. Plat. Phaed. 71 E (a good example), ούκ ἀνταποδώσομεν τὴν ἐναντίαν γένεσιν (pay back in return), ἀλλά ταύτη χωλή (mutilated, defective, lopsided, single where all the rest are pairs) έσται ή φύσις; η ανάγκη αποδούναι κ.τ.λ. de Anima I I, 403 b I, τούτων δέ δ μέν την ύλην ἀποδίδωσιν, 'assigns' or 'applies', that is, to the definition, which is the thing in question, to which it assigns matter as the sole element: comp. c. 4, 408 a 3; and ἀπονέμειν, in precisely the same sense, ib. v I, and Pl. Tim. 34 A. ἀποδιδώσι make to correspond, bring into comparison, Rhet. III 11, 13. ἀποδ. λειτουργίαν de part. An. III 14, 9, 'duly to fulfil certain functions (services). Ib. II 14, 5, (ή φύσις) πανταχοῦ ἀποδίδωσι (makes due compensation, duly assigns) λαβοῦσα έτέρωθεν πρὸς ἄλλο μόριον. Τορ. Δ 1, 121 a 15, et passim, τὸ ἀποδοθέν γένος, ἀποδιδόναι γένος. Top. A 18, 108 b 9, την ἀπόδοσιν των ὁρισμών, the rendering, or due preparation, production, of definitions: and so elsewhere. de part. An. 111 7, 18, ἀποδ. τὸ ἔργον of the due performance of the work. Ib. I I, 43 ἀποδ. τὸ οστοῦν τί ἐστι, to state, give a sufficient account or explanation. Phys. I 6, 1, 189 α 16, Ἐμπεδοκλής πάντα ἀποδιδόναι (to produce, effect everything) οΐεται δσαπερ 'Αναξ. εκ των ἀπείρων. Eth. Nic. III I, 110 6 8, ποία δε...ου ράδιον ἀποδοῦναι, to give an account, explain.

So here ἀποδιδόναι is 'duly to assign, distribute, or apportion' and again I 2, 5, ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις 'we render our judgments'. These same applications of the word occur likewise in Plato, as Rep. 379 A, (to represent), Ib. 472 D, VI 508 E, Phaedr. 237 C, Theaet. 175 D, Polit. 295 A. The precise opposite, ἀπολαμβάνειν, occurs with the same sense of ἀπό, I II, 3. ἀπονέμειν is used in exactly the same sense, 'to assign as a due'; see for instance Eth. Nic. IV 7, II23 ὁ 18, ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπο-

νέμομεν, Ib. V 35, τιμή απονέμεται τοις αγαθοίς, Ib. 1124 a 9.

τε καὶ καθόλου έστίν, ὁ δ' ἐκκλησιαστὴς καὶ δικαστὴς ήδη περὶ παρόντων καὶ ἀφωρισμένων κρίνουσιν· πρὸς

πδη...κρίνουσω] by this time, now that we have come to them, 'they actually decide...' So in the next line, τὸ φιλεῖν ἤδη καὶ τὸ μισεῖν 'this time', in theircase, not in the former, of something new, special, and marked. ἤδη therefore in these cases is often translatable by a mere emphasis. The word is repeated so soon after, applied to the same persons, and expressing almost identically the same thing, that it is not improbable that Spengel may be right in his conjecture that the one or the other should be erased. Rhet. Gr. Vol. I. Pref. p. v. 'paulo post alterutrum ἤδη abundat, puto prius.' However there are two still closer together, II 25, 14.

It may be worth while to say a few words on this very common usage of $\eta \delta \eta$ and analogous particles of time, in the way of illustration and exemplification. "H $\delta \eta$ and its analogues $\xi \tau_i$, $o \delta \pi \omega$, are used emphatically to mark a critical point, climax, degree attained, as deserving of special and particular attention, at the moment, and in reference to something else which is not equally remarkable. They are all particles of time, and derive this their secondary sense from the metaphorical application of this notion of 'already', a definite time which we have just reached: 'point', or 'stage', or 'degree' attained being substituted by the

metaphor for 'time' in the original sense of the word.

This will be best illustrated by a few examples. Arist. περί μνήμης καὶ ἀναμνήσεως c. 2. 16, ώσπερ φύσις ήδη τὸ ἔθος, 'habit, already by this time, now that we have reached this point, has become a second nature'. Met. Δ 21, 1022 ὁ 18, ενα δὲ [τρόπον πάθος λέγεται] τούτων ένέργειαι καὶ ἀλλοιώσεις ήδη, 'one sense of πάθος is, the actual energies and changes of these'. non, by the time that they have reached this stage or state, and have actually become what they are. Categ. c. 8, 9, a 4, ην αν τις ἴσως εξιν ήδη προσαγορεύσοι, 'which may now (at this stage) be fairly called a έξις'. περί έρμηνείας c. 9, 19, α 39, και μάλλον μέν άληθη την έτέραν, ου μέντοι ήδη (not yet actually, not quite, not yet arrived at the stage of,) αληθή ή ψευδή. Polit. II 8, 1268 b 20, εκείνος ήδη επιορκεί. III 7, 1279 a 40, πλείους δ' ήδη χαλεπου ήκριβώσθαι. VIII (v) 8, 1308 a 15, εστι γαρ ώσπερ δημος ήδη οἱ δμοιοι, i.e. though this may not be strictly true of all oligarchies, when we come to the ouoso, at this stage, by this time, it is now quite true that they may be regarded as a δημος. Eth. Nic. v 3, 1132 a 2, πρός έτερον καὶ έν κοινωνία ήδη ὁ άρχων, 'when a man has come to be a ruler, he must then...' in the case of others this perhaps is not necessarily true, but the ruler must, actually, live or act in relation to others and in society'. Rhet. I 6, 24, πάντες ήδη όμολογοῦσιν. I 10, 11, ήδη διαφέρει 'it does make a difference'. c. 11 § 3, τὸ εἰθισμένον ώσπερ πεφυκός ήδη γίγνεται. Ib. § 26, έργον ήδη γίγνεται. II 6 § 12, and 25 § 14, bis. I have confined myself in these illustrations to examples from Aristotle; from the ordinary language, in which this usage is at least equally common, I will content myself with citing Herod. III 5, and rains non Αΐγυπτος : and Eur. Hippol. 1195 (Monk) προς πόντον ήδη κειμένον Σαρωνι-

It is found also in French, Italian and German-déjà, gia, schon. C'est

ους και το φιλείν ήδη και το μισείν και το ίδιον συμφέρον συνήρηται πολλάκις, ώστε μηκέτι δύνασθαι

dėjà quelque chose, 'and that's something'. das ist schon etwas. The Italian gia, when used as an expression of assent, may be similarly explained.

The use of demum is precisely similar, and common in most Latin writers. Sallust, Cat. XX idem velle atque idem nolle ea demum (that, and that alone) firma amicitia est. Quint. II 5, I, artemque de qua loquimur bonis demum (to the good, and to them alone) tribui volunt. VII Praef. init. neque enim ea demum quae ad docendum pertinent exsecuti sumus. VII 2, 21, VIII Prooem. 3, IV 5, 7, XI I § 44, 3 § 68, et passim. Cic. Tusc. Disp. I 19, 43, eaque ei demum naturalis est sedes, et seq., de Orat. II 30, 131, hi loci ei demum oratori prodesse possunt. Rarer is the analogous use of denique and tandem: Cic. de Orat. II 30, 131, c. 34, 146, tum denique scrutari locos, c. 75, 304, quantum est in eo tandem mali! c. 77, 315, hisce omnibus rebus consideratis, tum denique id... Hor. Ep. I 17, 2, quo tandem pacto... On iam in this same usage, see Munro, on Lucr. I 600, 613, II 314, 426; add, II 974, and Virg. Aen. V 179, iam senior, VI 304, VII 46, 735.

Similarly in a negative sentence, οὖπω sometimes introduces the notion of time in estimating the amount or degree, Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 a 11, τὸ αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο, ὅταν πραχθῆ, ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι οὖπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. Ib. 23, ἄδικον μὲν ἀδίκημα δὲ οὖπω. Ib. b 24, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι—in the two former cases the unjust habit of mind is distinguished as 'not yet amounting to' the actual crime or unjust act; and in the third case this distinction is applied to the ἀμάρτημα, which, though a wrong in itself, has not yet reached the stage or degree of the vice, confirmed evil habit, of ἀδικία—also VI 10, 1142 b 14, αὖτη γὰρ οὖπω φάσις. Ib. 25, οὐδ' αὖτη πω εὐβουλία, and 28.

So also οὐκέτι, 'no longer; not as before; not, now that we have reached this point'. Pol. v (VIII) 3, 1338 a 6. Rhet. I 2, 21, a^{μ} γ a^{μ} εντύχη ἀρχαῖς οὐκέτι διαλεκτική οὐδὲ ρητορική, II 24, 3, ἀλλ' ἐκείνη κ.τ.λ. Ib. II 9, 3. de gen. et corr. I 2, 3, 315 b 3, πῶς δὲ τοῦτο οὐκέτι, Hist. Anim. I 6, 3, 490 b 16, τῶν δὲ λοιπῶν ζώων οὐκέτι τὰ γένη μέγαλα, Ib. V I 7, 539 a 30, τὰ δὲ θηλέα μέν ἐστιν, ἄρρενα δ' οὐκέτι. Dem. de F. Leg. § 80, δν δ' a^{μ} αὐτοὶ λάβητε μηκέτ' ἐκείνοις περὶ τούτου προστάττετε. Plat. Gorg. 503 A, οὐχ ἀπλοῦν ἔτι τοῦτο ἐρωτῆς. Protag. 312 E. Xen. Oecon. 3. I. Buttm. ad Mid. 13 a p. 528, 'οὐκέτι proprie valet non ut antea, hinc non ut alias, non item, non iam.'

συνήρηται] (Bekker and Spengel. Alii συνήρτηται) 'with whom are connected...' In πρὸς οὖς, πρὸς expresses a mere general reference, 'with respect to whom', 'in whose case'; and συνήρηται 'are often taken into, embraced in, the account', σύν, together with their proper business, the mere facts of the case and the proof of them. I can find no sufficient authority for συναιρεῖν in this sense; the nearest approach to it is in Plat. Phaedr. 249 B, εἰς ἐν λογισμῷ συναιρούμενον, but even this is something different. Vater makes a similar observation. The interpretation also of πρός is certainly rather strained. Probably συνήρτηται is right.

θεωρεῖν ἱκανῶς τὸ ἀληθές, ἀλλ' ἐπισκοτεῖν τῆ κρίσει 8 τὸ ἴδιον ἡδὺ ἢ λυπηρόν. περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἄλλων,
ὥσπερ λέγομεν, δεῖ ὡς ἐλαχίστων ποιεῖν κύριον τὸν
κριτήν περὶ δὲ τοῦ γεγονέναι ἢ μὴ γεγονέναι,
ἢ ἔσεσθαι ἢ μὴ ἔσεσθαι, ἢ εἶναι ἢ μὴ εἶναι,
ἀνάγκη ἐπὶ τοῖς κριταῖς καταλείπειν οὐ γὰρ
9 δυνατὸν ταῦτα τὸν νομοθέτην προϊδεῖν. εἰ δὴ
ταῦθ οὕτως ἔχει, φανερὸν ὅτι τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγ-
ματος τεχνολογοῦσιν ὅσοι τἄλλα διορίζουσιν, οἷον
τί δεῖ τὸ προοίμιον ἢ τὴν διήγησιν ἔχειν, καὶ τῶν
ἄλλων ἕκαστον μορίων οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἄλλο
πραγματεύονται πλὴν ὅπως τὸν κριτὴν ποιόν τινα

τὸ ἀληθές] No one is a fair judge, where his own passions or interests are concerned. Gaisford quotes appositely, Pol. III 16, 1287 a ult. ἀλλὰ μὴν εἰσάγονταί γ' ἐφ' ἐαυτοὺς οἱ ἰατροὶ κάμνοντες ἄλλους ἰατρούς, καὶ οἱ παιδοτρίβαι γυμναζόμενοι παιδοτρίβας, ώς οὐ δυνάμενοι κρίνειν τὸ ἀληθὲς διὰ τὸ κρίνειν περὶ τῶν οἰκείων καὶ ἐν πάθει ὄντες.

ἐπισκοτεῖν] 'to bring darkness, throw a shadow over, overshadow'. Dem. c. Mid. 565, 25, οἰκίαν ἀκοδόμηκεν ἐν Ἐλευσῖνι τοσαύτην ἄστε πᾶσιν ἐπισκοτεῖν τοῖς ἐν τῷ τόπῳ. Infr. III 3, 3. Plat. Euthyd. 274, ὁ Εὐθύδημος ἐπεσκότει τῷ Κτησίππῳ τῆς θέας: an odd and unexplained use of this word. It seems to mean that Euthydemus, by bending forward and getting in the way, obscured or darkened Ctesippus—not however in the ordinary sense of the word, but in that of intercepting the object, and so darkening by throwing a cloud over, and thereby depriving him of his view (τῆς θέας gen. of deprivation, implied in the verb).

In a metaphorical sense it occurs in Dem. Olynth. B 23, 26, Isocr. ad Dem. § 6, and in several fragments of the Comic Poets, (Ind. ad Meineke, Fr. Com. Gr. Vol. v Pt. 1 p. 393,) for instance, Eubul. incert. Fr. 11 (Mein. III 267) του οἶνου τῷ φρουεῖν ἐπισκοτεῖν; and in other authors. See also Victorius: and Gaisford in not. var. p. 18.

§ 9. ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος] ἔξω for ἐκτός. Lobeck, Phryn. p. 128.

τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος τεχνολογοῦσιν] infra § 11; comp. de Anima 1 3, 406 δ 26 καὶ ὁ Τίμαιος (Plato, in the Timaeus) φυσιολογεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν κινεῖν τὸ σώμα.

διορίζειν] to separate by a limit or boundary line. Herodot. IV 42 διουρισάντων 'Ασίην τε καὶ Λιβίην. Hence to separate a thing from others, to mark off as a special province or domain, and so of 'the definition', which includes all that is essential to, or characteristic of, the thing defined, and excludes everything else. The word here of course means something more than a bare definition; it expresses the limitation or 'determination' of the proper contents of the $\pi \rho ool\mu \iota o\nu$.

ποιήσωσιν. περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐντέχνων πίστεων οὐδὲν δεικνύουσιν / τοῦτο δ' ἐστίν ὅθεν ἄν τις γένοιτο το ἐνθυμηματικός. διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο τῆς αὐτῆς οὕσης μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικανικά, καὶ καλλίονος καὶ πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγμα-

17. 3.

ἔντεχνοι πίστεις] are the regular systematic proofs by enthymeme and example, the σῶμα τῆς πίστεως § 3, and opposed here, not merely to the ἄτεχνοι πίστεις of c. 15, the witnesses, documents, torture, oaths and such like, which we do not *invent*, but find ready to our hand to be employed in the support of our case; but also to the irregular appeals to the

feelings ($\pi \dot{a}\theta os$), and to evidence from character ($\dot{\eta}\theta os$).

§ 10. πολιτικωτέρας τῆς δημηγορικῆς πραγματείας] πραγματείας, here applied to the study and practice of one of the departments of Rhetoric; see on § 3.—πολιτικωτέρας: There are three possible senses of this word, firstly, 'more worthy of, more becoming to, a citizen', more agreeable to the position and duties of a citizen, 'better and worthier'; secondly, 'more suitable to a public man, statesman, or politician', larger, more comprehensive, and liberal; as opposed to the comparatively trifling and petty occupations of private citizens: thirdly, more public and common, wider, more general; κοινόν, as opposed to ἴδιον and οἰκεῖον: the second seems to be the most appropriate here, and so I have rendered it in the paraphrase. [p. 141 of the Introduction: "nobler and larger and more liberal (or 'statesmanlike', or 'more worthy of a citizen',) vid. not. ad loc."]

μεθόδου περὶ τὰ δημηγορικὰ καὶ δικανικά] The third kind of Rhetoric, τὸ

έπιδεικτικόν, is here omitted, but afterwards supplied, c. 3 § 1.

της δημηγορικής πραγματείας η της περί τὰ συναλλάγματα] 'The most general expression which the Athenians have for a contract is συναλλάγμα, συνθήκη, συμβόλαιον.' Meier und Schömann der Attische Process p. 494. The difference usually taken between συνθήκη and συνάλλαγμα appears in Rhet. I 15, 22 ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων (ordinary dealings, buying and selling and such like transactions), καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια κατὰ συνθήκας (in the way of, by contracts): we are concerned here

only with the first and third of these, συνάλλαγμα and συμβόλαιου.

The ordinary signification of both of these is a contract, or covenant, or mutual agreement, or interchange (συνάλλαγμα), between two or more parties. They are thence extended to any dealings, especially business transactions, or even any circumstances of ordinary intercourse between man and man, and more particularly any of those which may give rise to a suit at law. These are ίδια συμβόλαια οι συναλλάγματα: see Dem. de Cor. p. 298 § 210, τὰ τοῦ καθ΄ ἡμέραν βίου συμβόλαια, with Dissen's note: Isocr. Paneg. §§ 11, 78, π. ἀντιδ. §§ 3, 38, 40, 42, 79 τὰ κατὰ τὴν πόλιν καὶ τὰ συμβόλαια τὰ γιγνόμενα πρὸς ἡμᾶς αὐτούς. § 309 ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσι τοῖς περὶ τῶν συμβολαίων. The former of these two seems to refer rather to dealings in general, the second to special contracts. Areop. §§ 33, 34. Arist. Eth. N. II 1, 1103 ὁ 15 πράττοντες γὰρ τὰ ἐν τοῖς συναλλάγμασι τοῖς πρὸς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους γιγνόμεθα οἱ μὲν δίκαιοι οἱ δὲ ἀγαθοί. Rhet. I 15, 22 ἔτι δὲ πράττεται πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια κατὰ τὰς συν

τείας ούσης η της περί τα συναλλάγματα, περί μεν έκείνης οὐδεν λέγουσι, περί δε τοῦ δικάζεσθαι πάντες πειρώνται τεχνολογείν, ὅτι ἦττόν ἐστι πρό έργου τὰ έξω τοῦ πράγματος λέγειν έν τοῖς δημηγορικοίς και ήττον έστι κακούργον ή δημηγορία δικο-

θήκας. Rhet. ad Alex. c. I (2 Oxf.) § 2 ταις περί τὰ συμβόλαια δικαιο-

Aoylais.

That the meaning of the terms is not confined to contracts proper, is plain also from Eth, N. v 1131 a 2. (This passage is quoted at length on I 15, 22.) των γάρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μέν ἔκούσια τὰ δ' ἀκούσια (the 'voluntary' being illustrated by buying and selling, lending and borrowing, whereas 'involuntary' are all of them crimes, λαθραΐα or βίαια: all of them cases in which the breach of the supposed contract, private or public, entitles the aggrieved party to a legal remedy). Opposed to these ίδια συμβόλαια or συναλλάγματα are the public (κοινά) international commercial treaties, σύμβολα. See further on σύμβολα, note on c. 4 § 11.

συμβόλαια is also employed in a wider and more general sense, as Rhet. ad Alex. c. 2 (3 Oxf.) § 2 περί τῶν πρὸς ἄλλας πόλεις συμμαχιῶν καὶ συμβολαίων. Other examples may be found in Plat. Gorg. 484 D ἄπειροι τῶν λόγων οἶς δεῖ χρώμενον ὁμιλεῖν ἐν τοῖς ξυμβολαίοις. 333 Α τί δὲ δή; τὴν δικαιοσύνην πρὸς τίνος χρείαν ή κτήσιν ἐν εἰρήνη φαίης αν χρήσιμον είναι; Πρώς τὰ ξυμβόλαια, & Σώκρατες. Συμβόλαια δὲ λέγεις κοινωνήματα, ή τι άλλο; κοινωνήματα δήτα, and several others in Ast's Lexicon. Arist. Polit. IV (VI) 16, 1300 b 22, and 32 περί των μικρών συναλλαγμάτων, δσα δραχμιαΐα καὶ πεντάδραχμα καὶ μικρῷ πλείονος. 1b. 15 ult. 1300 6 12, ἀρχὴ ἡ τῶν περὶ τὴν ἀγόραν συμβολαίων (dealings) κυρία. Comp. c. 8 sub init. ἀρχή περὶ τὰ συμβόλαια. VI (VII) 2, 1317 b 27, III 13, 1283 b 30, and elsewhere.

πρὸ ἔργου] 'to the purpose'; anything 'for', or 'in favour of', and therefore 'likely to promote', any 'work' we may have in hand; and hence generally 'serviceable' or 'profitable' to any purposes. πρὸ ἔργου (which also occurs infra I 4 §§ 3, 7) is the Aristotelian mode of writing what in Xenophon, Plato, Demosthenes, and indeed ordinary Greek in general, appears as προύργου. Some examples in Fritsche ad Eth. Eud. A 3, 1215 a 8.

κακοῦργον] As a special variety of the general conception of dishonesty, fraud, knavery, this adjective is applied in a peculiar sense to sophistical reasoning. Rhet. III 2, 7 τῶν δ' ὀνομάτων τῷ μὲν σοφιστή όμωνυμίαι χρήσιμοι, παρά ταύτας γάρ κακουργεί. Τορίc. I 11, 172 b 21. Plat. Gorg. 483 A. Dem. Lept. 491. Stallb. ad Rep. 1 338 D. Similarly TUKOφαντείν is used for cheating in argument, bringing fallacious objections, Top. 0 2, 157 a 32. I (de Soph. El.) 15, 174 b 9. Both of them represent the knavish tricks and fallacies which may be employed in rhetorical and dialectical reasoning. Plat. Rep. 341 Β προς ταυτα κακούργει καὶ συκοφάντει.

A debate in a political assembly, which turns upon questions of public and national concern (κοινότερον), in which accordingly the audience, who

λογίας, ὅτι κοινότερον. ἐνταῦθα μὲν γὰρ ὁ κριτής περὶ οἰκείων κρίνει, ὥστ οὐδὲν ἄλλο δεῖ πλὴν ἀποδεῖξαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ὡς φησὶν ὁ συμβουλεύων ἐν δὲ τοῖς δικανικοῖς οὐχ ἰκανὸν τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ πρὸ ἔργου ἐστὶν ἀναλαβεῖν τὸν ἀκροατήν περὶ ἀλλοτρίων γὰρ ἡ κρίσις, ὥστε πρὸς τὸ αὐτῶν σκοπούμενοι καὶ πρὸς χάριν ἀκροώμενοι διδόασι τοῖς ἀμφισβη-

are all members of it, have a strong personal interest, and are therefore impatient of anything that would divert them from the direct proof of the expediency or inexpediency of the policy recommended or condemned, affords much less room for these deceptive arts ad captandum, τὰ ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος, than the practice of the law-courts, where the judges who decide the case are usually not personally interested in the issue, and the pleader has therefore to create an interest in them by these irregular methods: this is on the principle so pithily stated by the Corinthian envoys, Thuc. I 120, 3 κακοὺς κριτὰς ὡς μὴ προσηκόντων εἶναι. (This is a more correct mode of stating the argument than that adopted in the paraphrase, Introd. p. 141.)

This contrast of the two kinds of audiences, in respect of their several dispositions to keep the speakers to the point, does not hold of our own law-courts and parliaments. The Athenian dicasts, careless, ignorant, and unprofessional, selected at random from the population of the city, with their sense of responsibility diminished or destroyed by the large number of those who had to decide, might very likely be indifferent to the issue of the case before them, and require a stimulus to their attention from the parties immediately concerned: but this is not true of the professional judges of our courts, who regard the right decision of the case as a business

and a duty.

ό κριτής] applied to the ἐκκλησιαστής in the general sense of 'judge' or 'critic' of the question or arguments employed; supr. § 7. Introd. p. 137,

note T.

ἀναλαβεῖν] is to 'bring back', 'recover'; hence to 'gain over', 'conciliate', as ἀνά in ἀναπείθειν, ἀναδιδάσκειν, ἀναδιδόναι, ἀναδέχεσθαι κ.τ.λ. 'Membranae Balliolenses, captare: Muretus, accurare, excipere: Portus, refieere, recreare, ή μεταφορά ab aegrotis; vel conciliare. Omnes hae notiones a primaria resumendi, ad se recipiendi, facile deducuntur.' Gaisford. The order is, (1) to 'get or bring back'; thence, (2) to 'bring back into the proper and normal state', as of 'recovery' from a disease—the notion of something as due being again implied as in ἀποδιδόναι, note on § 7—and thence again, (3) as here, to 'restore', as it were, the audience to their proper state of mind, conciliate them to your views and interests. Hence, lastly, the senses of reparare, reficere, recreare, and the like; abundantly illustrated in Steph. Thes. ed. Did. Vol. II pp. 431—2.

διδόασιν] (ἐαντούς) sese dant, 'lend themselves', ὁ δ' ἡδονῆ δούς, Eur. Phoen. 21. Valck. Diatr. p. 233. And so, many of its compounds,

τοῦσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ κρίνουσιν. διὸ καὶ πολλαχοῦ, ὢσπερ καὶ πρότερον εἰπομεν, ὁ νόμος κωλύει λέγειν έξω τοῦ πράγματος. ἐκεῖ δ' αὐτοὶ οἱ κριταὶ τοῦτο τηροῦσιν ΙΙ ίκανως. έπει δε φανερόν έστιν ότι ή μεν έντεχνος μέθοδος περί τὰς πίστεις ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς 37 τις (τότε γαρ πιστεύομεν μάλιστα όταν αποδεδείχθαι ὑπολάβωμεν), έστι δ' ἀπόδειξις ἡητορική ἐνθύμημα, καὶ ἔστι τοῦτο ώς εἰπεῖν ἀπλῶς κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων, τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τις, περί δέ συλλογισμοῦ όμοίως άπαντος της διαλεκτικής έστιν

ένδιδόναι, έκδιδόναι, έπιδιδόναι, αποδιδόναι, διαδιδόναι, ύποδιδόναι, παραδιδόναι, (ήδονή παραδούς, Pl. Phaedr. 250 D), προδιδόναι (Herod. bis), ἐκδιδόναι (Herod.). The process is the usual one by which transitive verbs become

intransitive, viz. by the ellipse of the reflexive pronoun.

§ 11. ή δὲ πίστις ἀπόδειξίς τις] ἀπόδειξις, in its strict, proper, and highest senses, is exact scientific demonstrative proof, by syllogism, leading from and to universal and necessary conclusions. And therefore, properly speaking, παραπλήσιον φαίνεται μαθηματικού τε πιθανολογούντος αποδέχεσθαι καὶ ρητορικον αποδείξεις απαιτείν, Eth. Nic. I I. απόδειξις συλλογισμός επιστημονικός, Anal. Post. I 2, 71 δ 18. εξ αναγκαίων αρα συλλογισμός έστιν ή ἀπόδειξις, c. 4, 73 α 24. ἀπόδειξις συλλογισμός δεικτικός αίτίας καὶ τοῦ διά τι, Ib. c 24, 85 b 23. ἀπόδειξις ἐστίν, ὅταν ἐξ ἀληθῶν καὶ πρώτων ὁ συλλογισμὸς ή, ή ἐκ τοιούτων å διά τινων πρώτων καὶ άληθών τῆς περὶ αὐτὰ γνώσεως τὴν ἀρχὴν είληφεν, Topic. A 1, 100 a 27. Waitz, Comm. ad Anal. Post. Vol. 11 p. 293 seq. mloves therefore, whose premisses and conclusions are never more than 'probable', cannot properly be said to be 'a kind of demonstration'. It resembles it however, and may be regarded as a 'sort of demonstration' in this; that probable proof often produces a belief or conviction as strong and certain as that which follows from demonstration. It is therefore to be understood here, as often elsewhere, as a general term including proof of every kind. A similar misapplication of ἀπόδειξις to rhetorical proof is found in Rhet. 11 1, 2, and 11 20, 9. So συλλογίζεσθαι, of reasoning, inference, conclusion in general; Rhet. 1 6§ 17, 10§ 1, 11 § 23 and 11 22 § 4, where συλλογισμοί stands for 'Enthymemes'; Poet. 4, 5, συμβαίνει θεωρούντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί έκαστον. Phys. II I, 193 a 7, συλλογίσαιτο γάρ αν τις έκ γενετής ών τυφλός περί χρωμάτων. Similarly, ἀποδεικτικός of a rhetorical argument or speech, Rhet. II 1, 2, πρός τον λόγον όρᾶν, ὅπως ἀποδεικτικός (conclusive) ή και πιστός. A still more remarkable example of this looseness of expression occurs 1 4, 5, where Dialectics is called ή ἀναλυτική ἐπιστήμη-The rhetorical enthymeme, again 'a kind of ἀπόδειξις', is subsequently and this time correctly, called κυριώτατον τῶν πίστεων. See Introd. p. 92.

τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός τις On the enthymeme, Introd. p. 101-105. On περί δέ συλλογισμοῦ ίδεῖν, and on μέρους τινός, Introd. p. 143, note. ίδεῖν, ἢ αὐτῆς ὅλης ἢ μέρους τινός, δῆλον¹ ὅτι ὁ μάλιστα τοῦτο δυνάμενος θεωρεῖν, ἐκ τίνων καὶ πῶς γίνεται συλλογισμός, οὖτος καὶ ἐνθυμηματικὸς ἄν εἴη μάλιστα, προσλαβών περὶ ποῖά τ' ἐστὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα καὶ τίνας ἔχει διαφορὰς πρὸς τοὺς λογικοὺς συλλογισμούς. τό τε γὰρ ἀληθὲς καὶ τὸ

δήλον δέ] δέ, omitted by one MS, and rejected by Buhle, Schrader, Bekker, and Spengel, is retained and defended by Victorius and Vater. It is justified not only by the common usage of the Greek language (see Buttm. Exc. XII on Dem. c. Mid. de particula de in apodosi, p. 150; the passages which he thus quotes might be multiplied indefinitely), but also by the special usage of Aristotle himself. Waitz, on Organ. 17 b 1, Vol. I p. 335, comp. Zell ad Eth. Nic. I I § 4, Vol. II p. 5, who quotes examples from Aristotle, to which add Rhet, 1 4 § 2, 1 10 § 4, 1 11 § 6 and 11, 11 25 § 10, an exact parallel, the protasis here also commencing with έπεί. Similarly Pol. VII (IV) 13 init. ἐπεὶ δὲ δυ' ἐστιν (a long parenthesis of several clauses intervenes, and the apodosis begins with) δεί δ' έν ταίς τέχναις κ.τ.λ. de Anima I 3, 406 a 4 and 10. Phys. VI 8, 2, εἰ τὸ μέν... τοτασθαι δέ. See also Stallb. on Phædo 78 C. The particle is thus used in the apodosis generally, not always, as a repetition of a preceding &, and in these cases may be translated by "I say". It repeats in order to recal the attention to the connexion of the apodosis with the foregoing protasis, which might be overlooked after a long parenthesis: in cases where this would not be necessary, it may be accounted for by the influence of habit or association. Of the many illustrative passages I had collected from other writers as well as Aristotle, I will content myself with citing two or three apposite ones from Thucydides. I II, sub init., έπειδή δε αφικόμενοι μάχη εκράτησαν, (parenthesis) φαίνονται δε κ.τ.λ. Ι 18 init., ἐπειδή δέ (ten lines) μετά δὲ τὴν τῶν τυράννων κατάλυσιν κ.τ.λ. ΙΙ 65, έπεί τε ὁ πόλεμος κατέστη, ὁ δὲ φαίνεται καὶ ἐν τούτω προγνούς τὴν δύναμιν. IV 132, δ δε Περδίκκας κ.τ.λ. and VIII 29 (three of these are referred to by Arnold, note 2 on 1 11). Paley on Aesch. P. V. 952, 994, 2nd ed. gives some instances from Aeschylus. I may also add Plat. Phaedo 78 C, τὰ δὲ άλλοτ' άλλως καὶ μήδεποτε κατὰ ταὐτά, ταῦτα δὲ είναι τὰ Εύνθετα. A good example may be found in Phaedo 87 A, B, δους δέ-εί δε τούτο...

τοὺς λογικοὺς συλλογισμούς] Waitz on Anal. Post. I 21, 82 b 35, p. 353, 'opponitur τῷ λογικῶς τὸ ἀναλυτικῶς 84 a 8, 86 a 22, 88 a 19, accurata demonstratio, quae veris ipsius rei principiis nititur, ei quae probabili quadam ratione contenta est.... Unde fit ut λογικόν idem fere sit quod διαλεκτικόν.' And this is its usual signification... 'Quamquam' (he adds, referring to the present passage) '1355 a 13, quum λογικὸς συλλογισμός et hic et in iis quæ proxime sequuntur opponatur rhetorico syllogismo (ἐνθυμήματι), veram demonstrationem significare videatur.' To the same effect is what follows, where τὸ ἀληθές exact truth and knowledge, scientific certainty, is represented as the object of the λογικοὶ συλλογισμοί, and τὸ ὅμωιον τῷ ἀληθές (probability, τὰ ἔνδοξα, which has only a resemblance to truth),

δμοιον τῷ ἀληθεῖ τῆς αὐτῆς ἐστὶ δυνάμεως ἰδεῖν, ἄμα δὲ καὶ οἱ ἄνθρωποι πρὸς τὸ ἀληθὲς πεφύκασιν ἱκανῶς καὶ τὰ πλείω τυγχάνουσι τῆς ἀληθείας. διὸ πρὸς τὰ ἔνδοξα στοχαστικῶς ἔχειν τοῦ ὁμοίως ἔχοντος καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἀλήθειάν ἐστιν.

ότι μεν οὖν τὰ εξω τοῦ πράγματος οἱ ἄλλοι τεχνολογοῦσι, καὶ διότι μᾶλλον ἀπονενεύκασι πρὸς

as the object of the enthymeme. And as both are apprehended by the same faculty, this faculty will be cultivated by the study and exercise of both alike, and the processes that lead to them, syllogism and enthymeme; and therefore the knowledge of the materials and modes of constructing syllogisms, and the practical application of them, equally in all their varieties, demonstrative, dialectical, and rhetorical (enthymeme), are serviceable to the rhetorician as a training and preparation for the practice of his art.

πρὸς τὰ ἔνδοξα] 'things probable, matters of opinion, not certainty'; the materials, objects, and results of Rhetoric, as of Dialectics. Top. A 10, 104 α 8, ἔστι δὲ πρότασις διαλεκτικὴ ἐρώτησις ἔνδοξος, κ.τ.λ. Ib. c. 1, 100 b 21, ἔνδοξα δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς σοφοῖς, καὶ τοίτοις ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τοῖς πλείστοις ἢ τοῖς μάλιστα γνωρίμοις καὶ ἐνδόξοις. Cic. de Orat. 1 23, 108, sunt enim varia et ad vulgarem popularemque sensum accommodata omnia genera huius forensis nostrae dictionis.

διότι] 'that', = ὅτι. The earliest instance of this use of διότι appears to be in Herod. II 50. It occurs in Xenophon (add Symp. I II, to the examples in Sturz's Lexicon), Plato, Ep. 1 309 D, Dem. de Cor. §§ 155, 167, 184, but each time in a document. Isocr. Paneg. § 48, Phil. § 1, Archid. § 24, Plat. § 23, Antid. §§ 133, 263. π. τοῦ ζεύγους § 43, πρὸς Καλλίμαχου §§ 1, 31. (Some of these referring to Isocrates are derived from Benseler's note, Praef. p. v note 4, who has the following remark, from Baiter on Paneg. § 48, 'Isocrates ubicunque διότι usurpavit, id fecisse videtur hiatus evitandi causa' [see esp. Isocr. Lochit. § 7, where ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι is followed by καὶ διότι...S.]. It is found several times in the Rhet. ad Alex. as c. 17 p. 1432 a 16, c. 30 p. 1437 a 19, and elsewhere, but it is in Aristotle that it first becomes common; too common to need further illustration. See however Waitz on Anal. Pr. 58 b 7, Comm. 1 p. 495. For diori = ori, Steph. Thes. Vol. 11 1544 cites Crito Com. ap. Athen. 4, p. 173 C, πάντων ἀκούων διότι παρασίτω τόπος οὖτος τρία μόνον ἀγαθὰ κεκτησθαι δοκεί. Its ordinary sense is 'because'.

It has also a third signification, 'why'; the indirect interrogative, corresponding to the direct, διὰ τί, as ὅπως to πῶς, ὅποτε to πότε, ὅσος to πόσος, ὅποτ to ποῦ, &c. In this sense it occurs in Plato, Phaedo 100 C, (four other examples in Ast's Lex.), Xen. Cyrop. VIII 4, 7, ἢ καὶ ἔχοις ἀν εἰπεῖν διότι; Demosth. Phil. A 46, 10; Isocr. Archid. § 16, and in Aristotle, Rhet. II 23, 24, (where it is explained by the preceding τὴν αἰτίαν), Polit. IV (VI) 11, 1296 α 22. Met. A 1, 981 α 29, where again it is explained by τὴν αἰτίαν). περὶ ἀναπνεύσεως 14, ult, and elsewhere, e.g. Ar. de

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12 το δικολογείν, φανερόν χρήσιμος δ' έστιν ή ρητορική διά τε το φύσει είναι κρείττω τάληθη και τα δίκαια τῶν ἐναντίων, ώστε ἐὰν μὴ κατὰ τὸ προσήκον αἰ κρίσεις γίγνωνται, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι· τοῦτο

D. 4.

Anima II 8, 12, 421 α 4, φανερὸν δὲ καὶ διότι οἱ ἰχθὺς ἄφωνοι, οὐ γὰρ ἔχουσι φάρυγγα. In Rhet. III 11, 14, it is explained by τὸ αἴτιον. Cf. Amphis Dith. Fragm. 1 ap. Meineke, Comm. Fragm. III 306; B. διὰ τί δ² οὐκ ἄγεις εἰς τὸν ὅχλον αὐτό; Α. διότι φυλὴν περιμένω.

With διότι 'that', compare ούνεκα and ὁθούνεκα in Sophocles, as Philoct. 634, the reason, the what for, passes into a mere statement of fact;

because, into that. See Ellendt, Lex. Soph. οθούνεκα.

απονεύειν, to bend the head away from something else and turn the attention to a particular object; hence, to incline to, fix the attention upon: ἀπό as in ἀποβλέπειν, (supr. § 1). Plat. Theaet. 165 A, ἐκ τῶν ψιλών λόγων πρός την γεωμετρίαν απενεύσαμεν. In Plat. Legg. VII 815 A, εκνευσις πληγών και βολών, is declinatio, the bending of the head aside to avoid a blow. (In Eur. Iph. T. 1186 v. 1155 Herm. σὐ δ' ές τὸ τῆς θεοῦ γ' έξένευσας εἰκότως, έξένευσας is of doubtful interpretation. Hermann, followed by Paley, derives it from exvew evadere, referring to Valckenaer on Hippol. 469, and 822. It seems however at least equally probable that the agrist belongs to εκνεύειν abnuere, opposed to επινεύειν annuere, and that the meaning of the line is "It was natural, or reasonable, for thee to decline, reject, their offer, els τὸ τῆς θεοῦ γ', looking to, in respect of, in regard of, thy duty to the goddess". This sense of the word seems to be more in conformity with what precedes; and it occurs again in line 1330 Dind., with the same sense and derivation, εξένευσ' ἀποστήναι, beckoned us off, "gave us a sign to stand aloof".)

§ 12. χρήσιμος - ἐντεύξεως] This passage is cited by Dionysius, Epist. ad Amm. 1 c. 6. He reads διά γε for διά τε, and διδασκαλία for

διδασκαλίας (six lines below).

On the defence of Rhetoric, compare Quint. Inst. Orat. II 17, 26, seq. (in II 16 he sums up the arguments against the use of it), Isocr. dvrld. § 251 seq. and Id. Nicocles, §§ 1—9, also Gorgias, in Plato's dialogue, c. XI 456 A—457 C. On the true office and functions of the orator, Cic. de Orat. I 46, 202—a striking passage. Id. de Invent. I 3 and 4.

διά τε] τε is answered by the (irregular) correlative δε in ετι δε at the beginning of the next sentence. de Anima II 4, 7, 416 a 2-6, οῦτε

(parenth.)...πρὸς δὲ τούτοις.

ανάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι] The argument of this clause, χρήσιμος δέἐπιτιμήσεως, is summed up in two lines of Euripides, Alex. Fragm. 55 (12)
Dind. ἀγλωσσία δὲ πολλάκις ληφθείς ἀνὴρ | δίκαια λέξας ἡσσον εὐγλώσσον
φέρει. It is to the effect, that truth and right having a natural superiority
over falsehood and wrong, the proper use of Rhetoric is to enable them to
assert and enforce that superiority; to bring truth to light, and detect
and expose deceit and sophistry. If the opposites of truth and right do
ever prevail over these, it must be the fault of the parties concerned
themselves, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ἡττᾶσθαι, who have failed to avail themselves

δ' έστιν άξιον ἐπιτιμήσεως. ἔτι δὲ πρὸς ἐνίους οὐδ' εἰ τὴν ἀκριβεστάτην ἔχομεν ἐπιστήμην, ράδιον ἀπ' ἐκείνης πεῖσαι λέγοντας· διδασκαλίας γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος, τοῦτο δὲ ἀδύνατον, ἀλλ' ἀνάγκη διὰ τῶν κοινῶν ποιεῖσθαι τὰς πίστεις καὶ / τοὺς λόγους, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς ἔλέγομεν περὶ τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἔντεύξεως. ἔτι δὲ

of this powerful instrument. Rhetoric is therefore 'corrective' or 'remedial' of the perversion of truth and right to which legal decisions are always more or less liable from misrepresentation of facts, fallacious arguments, or the blinding of the judgment by appeals to the feelings.

In the Introd. p. 144 note, Î have referred to Waitz's note on Anal. Pr. 55 a 14, who gives examples of αὐτῶν &c. for the reflexive αὐτῶν &c. The usage is however so constant in Aristotle as hardly to need illustration. A good example is de Anima II 5, 6, 417 b 24, διὸ νοῆσαι μὲν ἐπ' αὐτῷ, ὁπόταν βούληται, αἰσθάνεσθαι δ' οὐκ ἐπ' αὐτῷ. Rhet. I 4, 9, ἐπ' αὐτοῖς, 'in their own power'.

πρὸς ἐνίους] 'in dealing with some '.

διδασκαλίαs] de Soph. El. c. 2, 161 b 1, quoted in Introd. p. 75. Genuine and complete 'instruction' by demonstrative proofs. Τορ. A c. 14, 105 b 30, πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν κατ' ἀλήθειαν (i.e. δι' ἀποδείξεως) περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτέον, διαλεκτικῶς (and therefore also ῥητορικῶς) πρὸς δόξαν.

ό κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος] ἐπιστήμη defined ἔξις ἀποδεικτική, Eth. Nic. VI 3. τὸ δ' ἐπιστητόν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλου καὶ δύ ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δὲ ἀναγκαίον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν,...ἡ δὲ δόξα ἀβέβαιον.

έν τοῖς τοπικοῖς Α 2 101 α 30.

τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐντεύξεως] Τορίο. u. s. Metaph. Γ 5, 1009 α 17, ἔστι δ' οὐχ ὁ αὐτὸς τρόπος πρὸς πάντας τῆς ἐντεύξεως οἱ μὲν γὰρ πειθοῦς δέονται, οἱ δὲ βίας, where in line 20, ἀπάντησις is substituted for ἔντευξις. Isocr. πρὸς Δημόνικον § 20, τὰς ἐντεύξεις μὴ ποιοῦ (hold conversation, intercourse) πυκνὰς τοῖς αὐτοῖς. Alex. ad Top. l. c. ἐντεύξεις λέγει τὰς

τάναντία δεῖ δύνασθαι πείθειν, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς συλλογισμοῖς, οὐχ ὅπως ἀμφότερα πράττωμεν (οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τὰ φαῦλα πείθειν) ἀλλ' ἴνα μήτε λανθάνη πῶς ἔχει, καὶ ὅπως ἄλλου χρωμένου τοῖς λόγοις μὴ δικαίως αὐτοὶ λύειν ἔχωμεν. τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν οὐδεμία τἀναντία συλλογίζεται, ἡ δὲ διαλεκτικὴ καὶ ἡ ρητορικὴ μόναι τοῦτο ποιοῦσιν ὁμοίως γάρ εἰσιν ἀμφότεραι τῶν ἐναντίων. τὰ μέντοι ὑποκείμενα πράγματα οὐχ ὁμοίως ἔχει, ἀλλ' ἀεὶ τάληθῆ καὶ τὰ βελτίω τῆ φύσει εὐσυλλογιστότερα καὶ πιθανώτερα ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ἄτοπον εἰ τῷ σώματι μὲν αἰσχρὸν μὴ δύνασθαι βοηθεῖν ἑαυτῷ, λόγῳ δ' οὐκ αἰσχρὸν - ὁ μᾶλλον ἴδιόν ἐστιν Ρ. 1355 ἐ.

πρός πολλούς συνουσίας, οίς δεί μεν έντυγχάνειν κοινωνικούς όντας και φιλανθρώπους και έντυγχάνειν ώφελίμως.

*ξυτευξι*s is therefore a lighting upon, or, meeting; hence a meeting which leads to a 'conversation'; or, as arising casually out of that, a dialectical 'encounter'.

ἔτι δὲ τἀναντία—λύειν ἔχωμεν] de Soph. El. 1, 165 α 24, ἔστι δ' ώς ἐν πρὸς ἐν εἰπεῖν ἔργον περὶ ἔκαστον τοῦ εἰδότος ἀψευδεῖν μὲν αὐτὸν περὶ ὧν οἰδε, τὸν δὲ ψευδόμενον ἐμφανίζειν δύνασθαι, Rhet. ad Alex. c. 19 (20) 2, τὰ μὲν οὖν αἰτήματα ταῦτά ἐστι, διειλόμεθα δ' αὐτῶν τὰς διαφοράς, ἵν' εἰδότες τό τε δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον χρώμεθα κατὰ τὸν καιρόν, καὶ μὴ λανθάνωσιν ἡμᾶς οἱ ἐναντίοι ἄδικόν τι αἰτοῦντες τοὺς δικάζοντας.

πῶς ἔχει] 'the true state of the case' (how things really are).

λύειν] solvere, diluere, 'to loose, untie, the knot of a fallacy', or difficulty; and so to 'solve' as a problem. ή γὰρ ὕστερον εὖπορία λύσις τῶν προτέρων ἀπορουμένων ἐστί, λύειν δ' οὖκ ἔστιν ἀγνοοῦντας τὸν δεσμόν Met. B I, 995 a 28. λύσις opposed to δέσις, Poet. c. 18, §§ I, 2. On λύσις and λύειν see Introd. on II 25, p. 267, note:

τῶν μὲν οὖν ἄλλων τεχνῶν—τῶν ἐναντίων] Introd. p. 78.

τὰ ὑποκείμενα πράγματα] Comp. I 2, I, subiecta materies, ἡ ὑποκειμένη ὑλη Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 b 12. τὸ ὑποκείμενον, 'the logical subject', of which other things are 'predicated', κατηγορείται. See Waitz, Comm. ad Organ. I a 20, Vol. I p. 274. Trendel. El. Log. Ar. § 1, note p. 52. Id. Categorienlehre § 10, p. 53 seq. Bonitz ad Met. Z 3, 1028 b 36.

τῷ σώματι μέν...λόγω δέ] On this use of μέν and δέ, Buttm. Gr. Gr.

(Engl. Transl.) § 149, p. 396. Id. not. on Mid. § 7 a, 49 c, 56 d.

§ 13. εἰ δ' ὅτι μέγαλα βλάψειεν ἄν (φήσει τις) κ.τ.λ.] On the abuse of arts and natural gifts, and the answers to the argument from the abuse to the use of them, see Quint. Inst. Orat. II 16, 5, Isocr. περὶ ἀντιδόσεως

βλάψειεν ἃν ὁ χρώμενος ἀδίκως τῆ τοιαύτη δυνάμει τῶν λόγων, τοῦτό γε κοινόν ἐστι κατὰ πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν πλην ἀρετῆς, καὶ μάλιστα κατὰ τῶν χρησιμωτάτων, οἶον ἰσχύος ὑγιείας πλούτου στρατηγίας τούτοις γὰρ ἄν τις ώφελήσειε τὰ μέγιστα χρώμενος δικαίως καὶ βλάψειεν ἀδίκως.

14 ὅτι μὲν οὖν οὖκ ἔστιν οὕτε ἐνός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένου ἡ ῥητορική, ἀλλὰ καθάπερ ἡ διαλεκτική, καὶ ὅτι χρήσιμος, φανερόν, καὶ ὅτι οὖ τὸ πεῖσαι

§ 252, Plato, Gorg. u. s., Bacon, Nov. Org. τ 129. Comp. Eth. Nic. III 3 τοιαύτην δέ τινα πλάνην έχει καὶ τάγαθά διὰ τὸ πολλοῖς συμβαίνειν βλάβας ἀπ' αὐτῶν. ἤδη γάρ τινες ἀπόλουτο διὰ πλοῦτον, ἔτεροι δὲ δι' ἀνδρείαν.

τοῦτό γε κοινόν] Ovid. Trist. A 266, Nil prodest quod non laedere

possit idem. Schrader.

πλην ἀρετῆς] Gaisford refers in illustration to Archytas ap. Stob. I p. 15. Xen. Cyrop. IV I, 15. Ph. Meno, 87 E and Isocr. Nicocles, init.

§ 14. οὐκ ἔστιν ένός τινος γένους ἀφωρισμένου ή ρητ., άλλὰ καθάπερ ή

διαλεκτική] See note and reff. on § 1 p. 3.

οὖ τὸ πεῖσαι ἔργον αὐτῆς κ.τ.λ.] on Aristotle's alteration and improvement of the original definition of Rhetoric by the Sophistical school of Rheto-

ricians, see Introd. p. 32 seq.

'Non dubium est quin verba illa dirigantur adversus id quod apud Platonem ait Gorgias, p. 453 Α, την ρητορικήν πειθούς δημιούργον είναι, καὶ τὸ κεφάλαιον αὐτης εἰς τοῦτο τελευταν.' Muretus. Cicero's definition follows that of Aristotle, de Orat. 1 61, 260, accommodate ad persuaden-

dum posse dicere.

The notion of art, or proceeding by rule of art, consists not in the result, or success of the process, which is often unattainable, but in the correctness of the method followed. Top. Z 12, 149 b 25. τοιοῦτος δ' ὁ τοῦ ῥήτορος καὶ ὁ τοῦ κλέπτου ὅρος, εἴπερ ἐστὶ ῥήτωρ μὲν ὁ δυνάμενος τὸ ἐν ἐκάστω πιθανὸν θεωρεῖν καὶ μηδὲν παραλείπειν, κλέπτης δ' ὁ λάθρα λαμβάνων. δῆλον γὰρ ὅτι τοιοῦτος ὡν ἐκάτερος ὁ μὲν ἀγαθὸς ῥήτωρ ὁ δ' ἀγαθὸς κλέπτης ἔσται οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάθρα λαμβάνων ἀλλ' ὁ βουλόμενος λάθρα λαμβάνειν κλέπτης ἐστίν. The art of doing anything is distinguished from the mere fact that the thing is done (as accidentally for instance), by the intention of the agent systematically carried out, but not necessarily realised in success. Comp. de Anima III 9, 8, καὶ ὅλως δὲ ὁρῶμεν ὅτι ὁ ἔχων τὴν ἰατρικὴν οὐκ ἱᾶται, ὡς ἐτέρου τινὸς κυρίου ὅντος τοῦ ποιεῖν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην (of the successful result of the artistic process), ἀλλ' οὐ τῆς ἐπιστήμης. Eth. Nic. III 5, III ½ 12.

Τορία. Α 3, εξομεν δε τελέως την μεθοδον, όταν όμοιως εχωμεν ωσπερ επι ήητορικης και ιατρικης και των τοιούτων δυνάμεων. τούτο δ' έστι τὸ ἐκ των ἐνδεχομένων ποιείν ἃ προιαιρούμεθα. οὕτε γὰρ ὁ ἡητορικὸς ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου πείσει, οἴθ ὁ ἰατρικὸς ὑγιάσει. ἀλλ' ἐὰν τῶν ἐνδεχομένων μηδὲν παραλίπη, ἰκανῶς αὐτὸν ἔχειν την ἐπιστήμην φήσομεν. Comp. Τορ. Ε c. 7, 136 b 57, and 137 a 5.

έργον αὐτῆς, άλλα τὸ ίδεῖν τὰ ὑπάρχοντα πιθανά περί έκαστον, καθάπερ καὶ έν ταῖς άλλαις τέχναις πάσαις οὐδὲ γὰρ ἰατρικῆς τὸ ὑγιᾶ ποιῆσαι, ἀλλὰ μέχρι οὖ ἐνδέχεται, μέχρι τούτου προαγαγεῖν ἔστι γάρ καὶ τούς άδυνάτους μεταλαβεῖν ύγιείας όμως θεραπεύσαι καλώς. πρός δε τούτοις ότι της αύτης τό τε πιθανόν και το Φαινόμενον ίδειν πιθανόν, p. s. ώσπερ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς διαλεκτικῆς συλλογισμόν τε καὶ φαινόμενον συλλογισμόν. ὁ γὰρ σοφιστικὸς οὐκ έν τη δυνάμει άλλ' έν τη προαιρέσει πλην ένταθθα μέν έσται δ μέν κατά την έπιστήμην δ δέ κατά την προαίρεσιν ρήτωρ, έκει δὲ σοφιστής μὲν κατά την προαίρεσιν, διαλεκτικός δε ού κατά την προαίρεσιν άλλα κατά την δύναμιν. περί δε αύτης ήδη της μεθόδου πειρώμεθα λέγειν, πώς τε και έκ τίνων δυνησόμεθα τυγχάνειν των προκειμένων. πάλιν ούν οίον έξ ύπαρχης δρισάμενοι αὐτήν τίς έστι, λέγωμεν τὰ λοιπά.

Quint. II 17, 23 seq. Cic. de Inventione I 5, 6. Bacon, Adv. of learning, Bk. II X 2. 'For almost all other arts and sciences are judged by acts or masterpieces, as I may term them, and not by the successes and events. The lawyer is judged by the virtue of his pleading, and not by the issue of the cause. The master in the ship is judged by the directing his course aright, and not by the fortune of the voyage.'

πρὸς δὲ τούτοις (φανερὸν) ὅτι—κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν] The explanation and

connexion are given in the Paraphrase, Introd. p. 148, and note 3.

Comp. Met. Γ 2, 1004 δ 17, οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταί...ἀλλὰ διαφέρει τῆς μὲν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς δυνάμεως, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βίου τῷ προαιρέσει, and Bonitz' note. Τορ. Δ 5, 126 α 35, πάντες γὰρ οἱ φαῦλοι κατὰ προαίρεσιν λέγονται. Ζ 12, 149 δ 29 u.s. οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάθρα λαμβάνων ἀλλ' ὁ βουλόμενος λάθρα λαμβάνειν κλέπτης ἐστίν. Eth. Nic. IV 13, 1127 δ 15, οὐκ ἐν τῷ δυνάμει δ' ἐστὶν ὁ ἀλαζών, ἀλλ' ἐν τῷ προαιρέσει. Rhet. I 13, 10.

πλήν] 'except that,—only', a reservation. Soph. Oed. Col. 1639 (Herm.), Trach. 41, Arist. Equit. 1397, Dem. de Cor. p. 281 init., Arist. An. Pr. 11 27, 70 a 29, Top. B 8, 114 a 8, Γ 4, 119 b 22, Θ 3, 158 b 37; I (de Soph. El.) c. 4, 166 a 4, Eth. N. IV 12, 1126 b 27, Polit. II 6, 1266 a 16, Rhet.

I 12, 10,

μεθάδου Note on όδοποιείν, § 2.

πάλιν οὖν—λέγωμεν τὰ λοιπά] 'Let us then take as it were a fresh start, and so first define it, and then proceed to the rest'.

Εστω δη ρητορικη δύναμις περὶ έκαστον τοῦ CHAP. II. Θεωρησαι τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον πιθανόν. τοῦτο γὰρ οὐδεμιᾶς ἐτέρας ἐστὶ τέχνης ἔργον τῶν γὰρ ἄλλων ἐκάστη περὶ τὸ αὐτῆ ὑποκείμενόν ἐστι διδασκαλική καὶ πειστική, οἷον ἰατρική περὶ ὑγιεινὸν καὶ νοσερὸν καὶ γεωμετρία περὶ τὰ συμβεβηκότα πάθη τοῖς μεγέθεσι καὶ ἀριθμητική περὶ ἀριθμόν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ αὶ λοιπαὶ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν ἡ δὲ ρητορική περὶ τοῦ δοθέντος ὡς εἰπεῖν δοκεῖ δύνασθαι

§ 1. On this definition of Rhetoric, see Introd. pp. 33—4; and note on paraphrase, p. 149: on the other current definitions of it, Ib. pp. 27—36. On Rhetoric as a δύναμις, Ib. p. 14 seq.

ύποκείμενου] on I I, 12 p. 24 supra.

ύγιεινόν] Three different senses of this word are distinguished, Top. A 15, 106 b 35, τὸ ὑγιεινὸν πλεοναχῶς, τὸ μὲν ὑγιείας ποιητικόν, τὸ δὲ φυλακτι-

κόν, τὸ δὲ σημαντικόν.

τὰ συμβεβηκότα πάθη τοῦς μεγέθεσι These are usually called συμβεβηκότα καθ' αὐτά in Aristotle's terminology, i. e. absolute, necessary consequences (rather than accidents) of the essence or definition of a thing. The ordinary συμβεβηκότα are separable accidents, qualities or properties, which do not form part of this essence of the subject, or consequently of its definition; with or without which the essence of the subject, (that which constitutes its being, or makes it to be what it is,) remains the same. The συμβεβηκότα καθ αύτά are distinguished from the ordinary συμβεβηκότα in this; that although they are not of the essence, and therefore do not enter into the definition, still they are immediately deducible from it, and inseparable from the subject, and are therefore the proper objects of study. They are in fact identifiable with the total or propria of the five predicables. The συμβεβηκότα πάθη τοις μεγέθεσι in the text are accordingly 'the inseparable properties of magnitudes'; as 'the equality of the interior angles of a triangle to two right angles' is a necessary property of the triangle, though not included in the definition, which is 'a plane figure bounded by three straight lines': still the property is deducible from the definition, and thus is inseparable from the notion of it: the triangle cannot exist without this property, though it is not of its essence, and therefore not part of the definition. This example is given in de Anima 1 1 § 8, 402 b 19. See the whole section. And again de part. Anim. Ι 3, 10 συμβεβηκός γάρ τι (καθ' αυτό) τῷ τριγώνω τὸ δυσίν ορθαίς ίσας έχειν τὰς γωνίας. See further in Trend. ad de Anima I I, I, Comm. p. 188 seq. Bonitz ad Metaph. A 30, 1025 a 30. Anal, Post. Ι 7,75 α 42, ἐν ταῖς ἀποδείξεσιν...τρίτον τὸ γένος τὸ ὑποκείμενον, οὖ τὰ πάθη: καὶ τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ συμβεβηκότα δηλοί ή ἀπόδειξις...οὐκ ἔστι τὴν ἀριθμητικὴν απόδειξιν έφαρμόσαι έπὶ τὰ τοῖς μεγέθεσι συμβεβηκότα-

On máth see Introd. p. 114.

θεωρεῖν τὸ πιθανόν. διὸ καί φαμεν αὐτὴν οὐ περί
2 τι γένος ἴδιον ἀφωρισμένον ἔχειν τὸ τεχνικόν. τῶν
δὲ πίστεων αὶ μὲν ἄτεχνοί εἰσιν αὶ δ' ἔντεχνοι.
ἄτεχνα δὲ λέγω ὅσα μὴ δι' ἡμῶν πεπόρισται ἀλλὰ
προϋπῆρχεν, οἶον μάρτυρες βάσανοι συγγραφαὶ καὶ
ὅσα τοιαῦτα, ἔντεχνα δὲ ὅσα διὰ τῆς μεθόδου καὶ
δι' ἡμῶν κατασκευασθῆναι δυνατόν, ὥστε δεῖ τούτων
3 τοῖς μὲν χρήσασθαι τὰ δὲ εὐρεῖν. τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ Ρ. 1356
λόγου ποριζομένων πίστεων τρία εἴδη ἐστίν' αὶ μὲν

§ 2. On ἔντεχνοι and ἄτεχνοι πίστεις, see Introd. p. 150 (paraphrase),

and on the general subject, analysis of I c. 15, pp. 193-207.

τοις μέν χρήσασθαι τὰ δὲ εύρειν] The former lie ready at hand, and require only to be employed; the latter, proofs of all kinds, direct and indirect, πίστεις, ήθος, πάθος, must be 'discovered' or 'invented' for this occasion by the speaker himself. Hence the distinction of inventio from the other parts of Rhetoric by the Latin Rhetoricians. So Cicero, de Inventione (this title is adopted to represent the whole domain of Rhetoric, because 'invention' or proof of one kind or another is the σωμα της πίστεως, I 1 § 3, by far the most prominent and important part of the entire art) VII 9, quare materia quidem nobis rhetoricae videtur ea, quam Aristoteli visam esse diximus; partes autem hae quas plerique dixerunt, inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, pronunciatio (invention, order and arrangement of parts, style, memory, and delivery including action). Inventio est excogitatio rerum verarum aut veri similium quae causam probabilem reddant &c. Similarly Quintilian, Inst. Or. 1 12, 4, Quid? nos agendi subita necessitate deprehensi nonne alia dicimus alia providemus, quum pariter inventio rerum, electio verborum (style in single words), compositio (combination of words in sentences), gestus, pronunciatio, vultus, motusque desiderentur? XII I, 30, bonos nunquam honestus sermo (style) deficiet, nunquam rerum optimarum inventio.

§ 3. πίστεων τρία εἴδη] Compare Rhet. III I, I. This threefold division of rhetorical proofs, due to Aristotle, is recognized by Dionysius, de Lys. jud. c. 19, ἄρξομαι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν καλουμένων ἐντέχνων πίστεων, καὶ χωρὶς ὑπὲρ ἐκάστου μέρους διαλέξομαι. τριχῷ δὲ νενεμημένων τοὑτων, εἴς τε τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸ πάθος καὶ τὸ ἦθος κ.τ.λ.: and by Charmadas, in Cic. de Orat. 1 19, 87, where only the ἤθος and πάθος are directly mentioned, but the other, which is absolutely indispensable, must of course be assumed as a third division: by Cicero himself, de Orat. II 27, 115, ita omnis ratio dicendi tribus ad persuadendum rebus est nixa; ut probemus vera esse quae defendimus; ut conciliemus nobis eos qui audiunt; ut animos eorum ad quemcunque causa postulabit motum vocemus. This is repeated in §§ 121 and 128 and the ἦθος and πάθος described at length in c. 43 and the following. These two latter are again referred to Orat, XXXVII 128; and again in Partitiones Oratoriae XIII 46 the three πίστεις are thus ingeniously distinguished in a twofold division. Argumentandi duo

γάρ εἰσιν ἐν τῷ ἤθει τοῦ λέγοντος, αὶ δὲ ἐν τῷ τὸν ἀκροατὴν διαθεῖναί πως, αὶ δὲ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λόγῳ, διὰ 4 τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι. διὰ μὲν οὖν τοῦ

sunt genera, quorum alterum ad fidem directe spectat, alterum se inflectit ad motum. (These are the 'direct' and 'indirect' proofs and arguments.) Dirigitur cum proposuit aliquid quod probaret, sumpsitque ea quibus niteretur; atque his confirmatis ad propositum se retulit atque conclusit. Illa autem altera argumentatio, quasi retro et contra, prius sumit quae vult eaque confirmat, deinde id quod proponendum fuit permotis animis iacit ad extremum.

Quintilian touches on this subject in many places of his work; the most detailed account of ήθος and πάθος is given in the second chapter of his sixth book: the description and distinction of them occur in §§ 18, 19. They are both referred, as subordinate species, to the general head of 'affectus', § 8, comp. § 12; and these are again distinguished from the direct and logical arguments, § 3. In this and the following section he compares these two classes of arguments together in respect of their rhetorical value and importance, and comes to a conclusion precisely opposite to that of Aristotle. For Aristotle holds that these indirect proofs, though necessary to the orator by reason of the deficiencies and infirmities of his audience, διὰ τὴν τοῦ ἀκροατοῦ μοχθηplay, III 1 § 5, and therefore not to be excluded from the theory or practice of Rhetoric, yet are to be regarded as merely auxiliary and subordinate, standing in the same relation to the direct proofs as dress and personal ornaments to the body, serviceable but not essential. Quintilian on the contrary pronounces that these in comparison with the overpowering force of the appeals to the feelings are only not contemptible in respect of their power of persuasion; quos equidem non contemno, sed hactenus utiles. credo ne quid per eos iudici sit ignotum; atque ut dicam quod sentio, dignos a quibus causas diserti docerentur § 3: that those that use them therefore are only fit to lay before the judges the facts of the case, not to influence their decision, and to instruct the real advocate, who can sway their minds and feelings at his will, and force them to decide in favour of his client: ubi vero animis iudicum vis afferenda est, et ab ipsa veri contemplatione abducenda mens, ibi proprium oratoris opus est § 5.

It may be observed in concluding this note, that there is a somewhat important difference, which I have already pointed out in the Introduction, between Aristotle's view of the use to be made of ήθος in the practice of Rhetoric, and that of the Latin Rhetoricians, as well as the author of the Rhet. ad Alex.; see c. 39 (38) 2. Quintilian's auctoritas—and compare Cicero in de Oratore, II 43—expresses the influence of character upon opinion, in general: but in Aristotle's system the ήθος means something more; the effect must be produced immediately by the speech δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τὸ προδεδόξασθαι ποῖάν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα, Rhet. I 2, 4; and hence it finds a place in Rhetoric as in Art: whereas in the other view the auctoritas exercised may have been previously acquired, and altogether ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος, acting independ-

ήθους, ὅταν οὕτω λεχθη ὁ λόγος ὤστε ἀξιόπιστον ποιησαι τὸν λέγοντα· τοῖς γὰρ ἐπιεικέσι πιστεύομεν μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον, περὶ πάντων μὲν ἀπλῶς, ἐν οῖς

ently of any artistic or systematic process, in the way of reasoning or proving.

§ 4. On ήθος, as auctoritas, see Introd. p. 151 note.

τοῖς ἐπιεικέσι] 'worthy and respectable people'. Eth. Nic. v. 14 sub init. καὶ ὅτε μὲν τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἐπαινοῦμεν καὶ ἄνδρα τὸν τοιοῦτον, ὥστε καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἐπαινοῦντες μεταφέρομεν ἀντὶ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, τὸ ἐπιεικέστερον ὅτι βέλτιον δηλοῦντες. The primary sense of ἐπιεικής is therefore 'equitable', one who has a leaning to the merciful side and of an indulgent disposition, as opposed to one who takes a strict and rigorous view of an offence, puts a harsh construction on men's motives and actions, is inclined to enforce on all occasions the letter of the law. From this, and because we think this the better disposition of the two, ἐπιεικής is 'transferred' by metaphor (i.e. the μεταφορὰ ἀπὸ τοῦ εἴδους ἐπὶ τὸ γένος, the second of the four species of metaphors, Poet. XXI 7) to the general (or generic) signification of 'good'.

άπλῶς] has various usages. It may for instance mean (1) 'simply', opposed to συνθέσει or κατὰ συμπλοκήν: and this appears to be the primary sense of the word, in accordance with the derivation. Thus as the elements of nature are often called ἀπλᾶ σώματα in their simple, uncombined state, so we have ἀπλῶς, de Anima II 14, 8, to denote 'singly, or simply, by itself' (καθ' ἐαυτήν Themistius), without the admixture of any other element; δοκεί δέ τισιν ή τοῦ πυρὸς φύσις ἀπλῶς αἰτία τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τῆς αὐξήσεως εἶναι. Similarly when applied in a moral sense to human character, it denotes 'simplicity' (of composition), 'singleness' of heart and purpose, as opposed to 'duplicity', (Plat. Rep. III 397 E, οὐ διπλοῦς ἀνὴρ οὐδὲ πολλαπλοῦς. VIII 55, 4 D, Rhet. I 9, 29, Eur. Rhes. 395 φιλῶ λέγειν τὰληθὲς ἀεὶ κοῦ διπλοῦς πέφυκ' ἀνήρ. Ruhnk. Tim. p. 86).

The commonest signification however is that of (2) simpliciter et sine exceptione 'generally' or 'universally', as opposed to καθ' ἔκαστον, 'specially', 'particularly', 'individually', Eth. N. 1 1, 1095 α 1, or to ἔσταν ώς 'partially', or κατὰ μέρος, de Anima II 5, 4, νῦν γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἐλέγομεν περὶ αὐτῶν, in general terms—we must now come to particulars. Hence it signifies 'altogether', 'absolutely', omnino, as σὐδὲν ἀπλῶς 'none at all', de Part. An. IV 13, 9, ἀδύνατον ὅλως 'absolutely impossible'. Plato will supply abundance of examples of this usage. See also Waitz, Comm. on Organ.

Vol. 1 p. 354, who exemplifies it from Aristotle.

From this again may be distinguished a third sense (3), in which it is equivalent to καθ' αὐτόν, and opposed to πρός τι, 'the relative'. In this sense it is defined, Top. B 11, 115 b 33, δ ᾶν μηδενὸς προστιθεμένου δοκῆ εἶναι καλὸν ἡ αἰσχρὸν ἡ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων, ἀπλῶς ῥηθήσεται. de Soph. El. c. 5, 166 b 22 and b 37, where τὸ ἀπλῶς and μὴ ἀπλῶς are opposed as the absolute and relative in a paralogism of the substitution of the one for the other. Anal. Post. I 4, 83 a 15, κατηγορεῖν μὲν μὴ ἀπλῶς κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς δὲ κατηγορεῖν. Eth. N. I 3, 1095 b 3, Polit. IV (VII) 1, 1323 b 17, καὶ ἀπλῶς (absolutely, in itself) καὶ ἡμῶν (relatively to us).

δὲ τὸ ἀκριβὲς μή ἐστιν ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀμφιδοξεῖν, καὶ παντελῶς. δεῖ δὲ καὶ τοῦτο συμβαίνειν διὰ τοῦ λόγου, ἀλλὰ μὴ διὰ τοῦ προδεδοξάσθαι ποιόν τινα εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα· οὐ γὰρ ὤσπερ ἔνιοι τῶν τεχνολογούντων τιθέασιν ἐν τῆ τέχνη καὶ τὴν ἐπιείκειαν τοῦ λέγοντος ὡς οὐδὲν συμβαλλομένην πρὸς τὸ πιθανόν, ἀλλὰ σχεδὸν ὡς εἰπεῖν κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος. 5 διὰ δὲ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν· οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν τὰς κρίσεις λυπούμενοι καὶ χαίροντες ἡ φιλοῦντες καὶ μισοῦντες· πρὸς ὁ καὶ μόνον πειρᾶσθαί φαμεν πραγματεύεσθαι τοὺς νῦν τεχνολογοῦντας. περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων δηλωθήσεται καθ ἕκαστον, ὅταν περὶ τῶν παθῶν λέγω-

From these three may perhaps be distinguished a fourth sense (4) in which it occurs; for instance, in Met. A 6, 987 a 21, οἱ Πυθαγόρειο... λίαν ἀπλῶς ἐπραγματεύθησαν "treated the subject too simply", i.e. too carelessly, without taking sufficient pains with it, with insufficient elaboration; 'negligenter', Bonitz ad loc. q.v. On the various modes in which ἀπλῶς is opposed to the relative and particular see Schrader on 1 9, 17.

κυριωτάτην ἔχει πίστιν τὸ ἦθος] 'is the most authoritative, effective, instrument of persuasion'. On the influence of character on the judgment add to the passages already quoted, Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (39), 2, and Isocr. ἀντίδοσις §§ 276—280.

The oratorical artifice here described is well illustrated by Marc Antony's speech in Julius Caesar, Act III Sc. 2, "I come not, friends, to steal

away your hearts," &c.

κύριος in this and similar cases seems to derive its meaning from the 'authority' or 'influence' exercised by any one or any thing that has the power of doing so, of which general notion it is a special application. It corresponds to our 'sovereign', as when we speak of a sovereign remedy. Trendelenburg, on de Anima II 5, 7, Comm. p. 368, would connect this signification with the κύριος νόμος, 'ratio e iudiciis et foro tracta videtur. κύριος νόμος, qui ἀκύρω oppositus est, lex est quae rata viget &c .- ita hic κύρια ονόματα, quatenus eorum auctoritas valet.' This is perhaps unnecessarily narrowing the signification. Other persons and things, besides laws, exercise authority. A good instance of κύριος in this general sense, implying superiority, authority, mastery, occurs in de Anima II 8, 3, 419 6 19, ούκ έστι δε ψόφου κύριος ὁ άγρ οὐδε τὸ ἔδωρ, where κύριος may be interpreted 'absolute master', the air and water are not absolute masters of sound: some other conditions are required to produce it. Ib. 419 b 33, τὸ δὲ κενὸν ὁρθῶς λέγεται κύριον τοῦ ακούειν.

^{§ 5.} οὐ γὰρ ὁμοίως ἀποδίδομεν κ.τ.λ.] Comp. II 1, 4.

6 μεν· διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων [πιστεύουσιν], ὅταν ἀληθὲς ἡ φαινόμενον (ἀληθὲς) δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἕκαστα 7 πιθανῶν. ἐπεὶ δ' αὶ πίστεις διὰ τούτων εἰσί, φανερὸν

§ 6. διὰ δὲ τῶν λόγων] In § 3 we are told that there are three kinds of πίστεις or rhetorical proofs, which are conveyed through the channel or medium (διά with the genitive) of the speech. These three are then described seriatim. The first, § 4, is διὰ τοῦ ἤθους; the second (§ 5), διὰ τῶν ἀκροατῶν, ὅταν εἰς πάθος ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου προαχθῶσιν; and the third, § 6, διὰ τῶν λόγων, plainly in the sense of the direct πίστεις or arguments proper, ὅταν ἀληθές ἡ φαινόμενον δείξωμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἔκαστα πιθανῶν. διὰ τῶν λόγων is the reading of all the MSS except A*, which has τὸν λόγον: but this, as an unnecessary and unaccountable departure from the construction of the parallel expressions, διὰ τοῦ λόγον, τοῦ ἤθους, τῶν ἀκροατῶν, and afterwards διὰ τοῦτων, seems to be self-condemned.

By these λόγοι we may understand either the actual words which are the instruments or medium of the reasonings, or better the reasonings or arguments themselves which the words convey. This explanation appears to be sufficiently rational and consistent, and in accordance with the ordinary usages of the language. Spengel, however, in his paper iiber die Rhet. des Arist. (Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851) p. 26, and again in his edition of the Rhetoric, Vol. 11 p. 46, thinks that the text requires alteration, and would read δι' αὐτοῦ δὲ τοῦ λόγου, or διὰ δ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ λόγου, which seems to be totally unnecessary. The explanation above given is confirmed by the rendering of the Vetus Translatio 'per orationes autem credimus', where 'orationes' plainly stands for the 'words of the speeches in which these arguments are expressed'.

άληθὲς ἡ φαινόμενον] The second of these terms denotes the fallacious branch of Rhetoric, 'the apparent, unreal, sham' arguments, exemplified in II 24, and corresponding to the spurious branch of Dialectics treated in the Σοφιστικοὶ ἔλεγχοι, and appended to the Topics. The illustration of these is allowed to enter into a scientific treatise only for the purpose of detecting and exposing these fallacies, and enabling the pleader or dialectician to confute them when employed by an adversary. ἔστι γὰρ ἡ σοφιστικὴ φαινομένη σοφία οὖσα δ' οὖ, de Soph. El.

1, 165 a 21.

§ 7. êπεὶ δὲ al πίστεις—καὶ πῶς] "seeing then that these are the channels, or modes of communication of rhetorical proofs, it is plain that to grasp, or get possession, or make himself master of them $(\lambda a\beta \epsilon i\nu)$ is a task for one who has a capacity for logical reasoning, and for the contemplation or study of characters, and thirdly [for the discernment] of the emotions;—and of the latter, what each is in itself, and what are its qualities and properties $(\pi o i \acute{o} v \tau i)$, and from what sources (what motives and impulses, ἐκ τίνων,) it may be excited, and in what modes $(\pi o \acute{o} s)$."— $\tau a \hat{v} \tau a ... \dot{e} \sigma \tau 1 \lambda a \beta \dot{e} i \nu \tau o \hat{v} \sigma \nu \lambda \lambda \alpha \gamma (\sigma a \sigma \theta a \dot{v} \nu a \mu \dot{e} \nu o \nu, lit. 'it belongs to the student of logic to get hold of them'.$

Of these the logical branch belongs to Dialectics, which teaches the habit of reasoning and discussion, the other two to the study of Ethics, ότι ταῦτα τὰ τρία ἐστὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ συλλογίσασθαι δυναμένου καὶ τοῦ θεωρῆσαι περὶ τὰ ήθη καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς καὶ τρίτον τοῦ περὶ τὰ πάθη, τί τε ἕκαστόν ἐστι τῶν παθῶν καὶ ποῖόν τι, καὶ ἐκ τίνων ἐγγίνεται καὶ πῶς. ὤστε συμβαίνει τὴν ῥητορικὴν οἶον παραφυές τι τῆς διαλεκτικῆς εἶναι καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ήθη

which deals with human beings as individuals, and investigates the fixed habits, virtuous or vicious ($\tilde{\epsilon}\xi\epsilon\iota s$), which constitute their characters ($\tilde{\eta}\theta\eta$), and the moral $\pi\dot{\alpha}\theta\eta$ or 'emotions', which when developed by exercise, according to the direction which they take, become virtues and vices. The consequence is, $\tilde{\omega}\sigma\tau\epsilon$ $\sigma\nu\mu\beta\alpha i\nu\epsilon\iota$, that Rhetoric may be considered a scion or offshoot of the study of Dialectics and Ethics, the latter 'which may fairly be called Politics' (because it treats of men in society and therefore includes the science of the individual, $\dot{\eta}$ $\mu\dot{\epsilon}\nu$ $\sigma\dot{\epsilon}\nu$ $\mu\dot{\epsilon}\theta\sigma\dot{\delta}\sigma$ s (Ethics) $\tau\sigma\dot{\nu}\tau\omega\nu$ $\dot{\epsilon}\phi\dot{\epsilon}\tau\alpha\iota$, $\tau\sigma\lambda\iota\tau\iota\kappa\dot{\eta}$ $\tau\iota s$ $\sigma\dot{\epsilon}\sigma a$. Eth. Nic. I I, 1074 b II), standing to them in the relation of the offshoot to the parent plant. Sed idem (Aristoteles) et de arte rhetorica tres libros scripsit, et in eorum primo non artem solum eam fatetur, sed ei particulam civilitatis sicut dialectices assignat. Quint. Inst. Orat. II 17, 4.

συλλογίσασθαι] improperly applied here, as ἀπόδειξες above, I §11 p. 19, to rhetorical reasoning. But as there the rhetorical πίστεις are called a kind of demonstration, 'a sort of', or subordinate variety of, demonstration in a general sense, so here the syllogistic process is allowed to stand for reasoning in general, to which even rhetorical reasoning, though not syllo-

gistic in the strict sense, but enthymematic, of course belongs.

παραφνές] which usually appears under the form παραφνάς in Aristotle and Theophrastus, properly denotes either a branch or a separate plant 'growing alongside' of the parent plant, and proceeding either from the stem or the root, as a scion or offshoot. In the latter of these two senses it certainly occurs in Theophr. Hist. Plant. II 2, 4, ἐὰν ἀπὸ ῥίζης ἡ παραφνὰς ἡ, though here also the hypothetical ἐάν admits the other possibility. Also παραφνέσσθαι, Hist. Plant. III 17, 3, ἀποκοπὲν δὲ καὶ ἐπικανθὲν παραφνέσται (grows from the root) καὶ ἀναβλαστάνει. This word and its cognates, παραφνέσσθαι, παράφνσις, ἀποφνάς (Hist. An. II 1, 53, de part. An. III 5 § 1, 10 § 5, 14 § 14, Theophr. Hist. Plant. I 6, 6, VII 2, 5 and 8, &c.), παραβλαστάνειν, -βλαστή, -βλάστημα, are applied by Aristotle and his pupil Theophrastus primarily to plants, and by analogy to the corresponding parts of animals.

It occurs again as a metaphor in Eth. Nic. I 4, 1096 α 21, παραφνάδι γὰρ τοῦτ' ἔοικε καὶ συμβεβηκότι τοῦ ὅντος; that is, τὸ καθ' αὐτό and ἡ οὐσία stand to 'the relative', τὸ πρός τι, in the same relation as parent plant to offshoot. 'Similitudo, explicante Giphanio, a pullis arborum desumta, qui Graecis dicuntur παραφνάδες'. Zell, ad loc. So that Rhetoric is represented by this metaphor as a scion derived from two stocks or plants, Dialectics and Ethics, not identical with either, but with a general or inherited family resemblance to both. (The analogy will not bear

πραγματείας, ην δίκαιόν έστι προσαγορεύειν πολιτικήν. διὸ καὶ ὑποδύεται ὑπὸ τὸ σχημα τὸ τῆς πολιτικης ἡ ἡητορικὴ καὶ οἱ ἀντιποιούμενοι ταύτης τὰ μὲν δι ἀπαιδευσίαν τὰ δὲ δι ἀλαζονείαν τὰ δὲ καὶ δι ἄλλας αἰτίας ἀνθρωπικάς: ἔστι γὰρ μόριόν τι τῆς δια-

pressing: one does not see, for example, how a young plant can be the scion or offspring of two others, but this general meaning is clear, that it

bears a likeness to both, though differing from each of them.)

υποδύεται ύπὸ τὸ σχήμα] 'creeps under, insinuates itself into, the form or figure'; 'assumes the mask or disguise of (for the purpose of acting a part)', 'personates', Plat. Gorg. 464 C, ή κολακευτική... ὑποδύσα ὑπὸ ἔκαστον τῶν μορίων προσποιείται εἶναι τοῦτο ὅπερ ὑπέδυ... ὑπὸ μὲν οὖν τὴν ἰατρικὴν ἡ ὀψοποιικὴ ὑποδέδυκε... Sopater, ap. Stallb. not. ad loc. ὑποδύεται, τοῦτ' ἔστιν ὑπεισέρχεται, ὑποκρίνεται, ὡς ἐκείνη ταὐτὸν δοκείν εἶναι. Μεtaph. A 2, 1004 b 17, οἱ γὰρ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ σοφισταὶ ταὐτὸν μὲν ὑποδύονται σχήμα τῷ

φιλοσόφω.

άλαζονεία implies both presumption and imposture; either a character between both and a mixture of both (as Theophrastus' ἀλαζών, 'the braggart', of which Pyrgopolinices in the Miles Gloriosus, Thraso in the Eunuchus, and Captain Bobadil in Every Man in his Humour, are the three types, ancient and modern; and probably also the Sophistical Rhetoricians here referred to): or again a character in which either presumption or imposture is characteristic and predominant. For example, the insolent assumption, arrogance, and swagger appear more prominently in this picture of the ἀλαζών drawn by Xenophon, Cyrop. II 2, 12, ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀλαζών ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ ὄνομα κεῖσθαι ἐπὶ τοῖς προσποιουμένοις και πλουσιωτέροις είναι ή είσι, και άνδρειοτέροις, και ποιήσειν α μή ίκανοί είσιν ύπισχνουμένοις και ταυτα φανεροίς γιγνομένοις ότι του λαβείν τι ένεκα καὶ κερδάναι ποιούσιν. This last mercenary element is not found elsewhere in the character of the αλαζών. In Aristotle, Eth. Nic. II 7, IV 13, empty pretension, ostentation and swagger are the leading characteristics of the αλαζών. The vice is one of the extremes of which αλήθεια, the social virtue of frankness, sincerity, and plain dealing is the mean, the opposite extreme being elpovela, 'mock' in conversation, Socrates' habit. It is the extreme in προσποίησις, 'pretension', of which ἀλήθεια is the mean state. Whereas in Aristophanes it usually represents rather the other side of the character, its quackery and imposture; and alacor is 'a quack or a humbug'. Of course Socrates and his brother Sophists are the great representatives of the class. Nubes 102, 1494, et passim. And this is also the side of the character which is generally uppermost in Plato's view of it. See Rep. VI 486 B, 490 A, VIII 560 C, Phaedo 92 D, nδονή... ἀπάντων ἀλαζονέστατον, Phil. 65 C. The definition of it given in the Platonic opol, p. 416, is that of undue pretension, assumption, imposture. έξις προσποιητική άγαθοῦ ἡ άγαθών τών μὴ ὑπαρχύντων. Quackery and imposture are also predominant in the application of it, Rhet. II 6, 11.

δι' ἄλλας alτίας ἀνθρωπικάς] 'incident to humanity', implying the infirmities, imperfections, frailties, miseries, and especially errors to which

λεκτικής καὶ ὁμοίωμα, καθάπερ καὶ ἀρχόμενοι εἴπομεν· περὶ οὐδενὸς γὰρ ώρισμένου οὐδετέρα αὐτῶν ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πῶς ἔχει, ἀλλὰ δυνάμεις τινὲς τοῦ πορίσαι λόγους.

περὶ μὲν οὖν τῆς δυνάμεως αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς ἔχουσι 8 πρὸς ἀλλήλας, εἴρηται σχεδὸν ἰκανῶς. τῶν δὲ διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ φαίνεσθαι δεικνύναι, καθάπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς τὸ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστι τὸ δὲ συλλο- P. 1356 b.

the human condition is exposed, and from which the divine nature, which is tactily opposed to it in this conception, is exempt. 'The other human causes' here referred to are any other defects or imperfections to which the human nature is liable. Thuc. III 40 ἀνθρωπίνως άμαρτάνειν, compared with III 45, πεφύκασί τε απαντες ίδις και δημοσία αμαρτάνειν: 'humanum est errare'. Plato, Soph. 229 A κατά την άνθρωπίνην δόξαν, 'ex humana opinione, quae obnoxia est erroribus. Uti apud Latinos homo fuit frequens erroris vel imbecillitatis humanae excusatio' (Heindorf ad loc. Polit. 279 C, ἀλεξιφάρμακα καὶ θεῖα καὶ ἀνθρώπινα et cet.). Demosth. de Cor. p. 328, § 308, ή παρὰ τῆς τύχης τι συμβέβηκεν εναντίωμα, ή άλλο τι δύσκολον γέγονε—πολλά δὲ τἀνθρώπινα.—Id. c. Lept. p. 506, 15, πάντα δ' ανθρώπινα ήγεισθαι. Bœot. de Nomine p. 998, πολλά γάρ έστι τάνθρώπινα. Ar. Rhet. I 13, 17, καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγινώσκειν έπιεικές. Eth. Nic. IV 11, 1126 a 31, ανθρωπικώτερον (more humane) γαρ τὸ τιμωρείσθαι. VIII 16, sub. fin. χωρίς γὰρ τῆς φυσικῆς φιλίας τὴν ἐπικουρίαν ανθρωπικόν μη διωθείσθαι.

In Rhet. I 5, 10, διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέχεσθαι τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, it has this more general sense of 'all human affairs, business and enjoyments': with which comp. Plat. Theaet. 170 Β καὶ πάντα που μεστὰ τὰνθρώπινα (all human society or affairs in general) ζητούντων διδασκάλους κ.τ.λ. So Virgil, Æn. I 462, sunt lacrimae rerum; et mentem mortalia tangunt: and in the second sense, Ecl. VIII 35, nec curare deum credis mortalia

quemquam.

§ 8. The eighth and ninth and part of the tenth sections of this chapter are quoted by Dionysius, Ep. ad Amm. I c. 7, from τῶν δὲ διὰ to ἐν τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔχει. The variations are, δείκνυσθαι (bis) for δεικνύναι, ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς for ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς, the omission of ἡ ἀντινοῦν, and of αὐτῶν ἐκατέρω; for ἔτερόν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν παρὰ ταῦτα τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι, we have ἔτερόν τε διὰ τ. σ. παρὰ τὸ ταῦτ' εἶναι, also φανερὸν δὲ καὶ ὅτι for ὅτι καὶ, further τὸ omitted before εἶδος, and γάρ after καθάπερ, and lastly ῥητορείας for ῥητορικῆς.

τῶν δὲ] πίστεων.

έν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς] Dionysius has ἀναλυτικοῖς, which Spengel has introduced into the text, with the remark, certe Aristoteles τῷ διαλεκτικῆς scripsisset (Rhetores Graeci p. 5, Praef. p. 5); and again, über die Rhet. des Arist. Trans. Bav. Acad. 1851, p. 44, Aristoteles sagt nur ἐν τῷ διαλεκτικῆς, nicht ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς; in reply to which I will merely quote Rhet. II 22, 14, where ἐν τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς again occurs. Even without this evidence

γισμός τὸ δὲ φαινόμενος συλλογισμός, καὶ ἐνταῦθα ὁμοίως ἔστι γὰρ τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγή, τὸ δ΄ ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμός, τὸ δὲ φαινόμενον ἐνθύμημα φαινόμενος συλλογισμός. καλῶ δ΄ ἐνθύμημα μὲν ρητορικὸν συλλογισμόν, παράδειγμα δὲ ἐπαγωγὴν ρητορικήν. πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται διὰ τοῦ δεικνύναι ἢ παραδείγματα λέγοντες ἢ ἐνθυμήματα, καὶ ρ. γ. παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν τως.

I can see no reason why an author who speaks habitually of others of his works in the plural, as τὰ ἀναλυτικά, ήθικά, πολιτικά, μεθοδικά, should be denied that privilege in the special case of the Topics. Nor do I see why the single testimony of Dionysius should override the authority of all the Aristotelian MSS. I have therefore retained the old reading.

πάντες δὲ τὰς πίστεις ποιοῦνται—καὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδέν πως] Anal. Pr. 11
23, 68 b 9, ὅτι δ' οὐ μόνον οἱ διαλεκτικοὶ καὶ ἀποδεικτικοὶ συλλογισμοὶ διὰ τῶν προειρημένων γίνονται σχημάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ οἱ ἡητορικοὶ καὶ ἀπλοῦς ἡτισοῦν πίστις καὶ καθ' ὁποιανοῦν μέθοδον, νῦν ἄν εἴη λεκτέον. ἄπαντα γὰρ πιστεύομεν ἢ διὰ συλλογισμοῦ ἡ ἐξ ἐπαγωγῆς. Anal. Post, I 18, 81 a 40, εἴπερ μανθάνομεν ἡ ἐπαγωγῆ ἡ ἀποδείξει. Eth. Nic. VI 1139 b 27, ἐκ προγινωσκομένων δὲ πῶσα διδασκαλία, ὥσπερ καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀναλυτικοῖς λέγομεν ἡ μὲν γὰρ δι' ἐπαγωγῆς, ἡ δὲ συλλογισμῷ. The reference here is most unmistakeably to the opening words of the Anal. Post., an additional evidence, against Brandis (see the succeeding note), that the reference in ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν is either directly and exclusively to this passage

of the Analytics or at any rate includes it with the others, ή ὁντινοῦν] is rejected by Spengel on the authority of Dionysius, who omits it, and against that of the Aristotelian MSS, which, as appears from Bekker's revision, all agree in retaining it. It is not merely perfectly intelligible, and absolutely unexceptionable on all critical grounds, but when compared with the commencement of the Anal. Post., to which reference is immediately after made, it seems to tally so precisely with what is there stated, that it might almost be regarded as a necessary addition. In the passage of the Analytics we are told that every kind of instruction and learning, proof scientific and popular, mathematical or dialectical knowledge, is conveyed by way of syllogism or induction: and it is then added, ώς δ' αυτως και οι ρητορικοί συμπείθουσιν' ή γάρ διὰ παραδειγμάτων, δ έστιν έπαγωγή, η δι ένθυμημάτων, δπερ έστὶ συλλογισμός. a statement with which the ἡ ὁντινοῦν of the Rhetoric seems to correspond to a nicety. And for the same reason I hold that this passage is referred to in ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν, as well as Anal. Pr. 11 23, 68 b 9, (quoted in the preceding note,) and the continuation of the subject there suggested in chapters 24 and 27, (which contain the logical description of induction and example, and the enthymeme), though Brandis, in his tract on the Rhetoric in Schneidewin's Philologus IV 1, p. 24, would confine the reference to the latter passage.

συλλογιζόμενον ἢ ἐπάγοντα δεικνύναι ότιοῦν ' (δῆλον δ' ήμιν τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), ἀναγκαῖον ἑκάτερον 9 αὐτῶν ἑκατέρῷ τούτων τὸ αὐτὸ εἶναι. τίς δ' ἐστὶ διαφορὰ παραδείγματος καὶ ἐνθυμήματος, φανερὸν ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν. ἐκεῖ γὰρ περὶ συλλογισμοῦ καὶ ἐπαγωγῆς εἴρηται πρότερον, ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπὶ πολλῶν καὶ ὁμοίων δείκνυσθαι ὅτι οὕτως ἔχει ἐκεῖ μὲν ἐπαγωγή ἐστιν ἐνταῦθα δὲ παράδειγμα, τὸ δὲ τινῶν ὄντων ἕτερόν τι διὰ ταῦτα συμβαίνειν παρὰ ταῦτα τῷ ταῦτα εἶναι, ἢ καθόλου ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἐκεῖ μὲν 10 συλλογισμὸς ἐνταῦθα δὲ ἐνθύμημα καλεῖται. φανερὸν δ' ὅτι καὶ ἑκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς καθάπερ γὰρ καὶ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς εἴρηται,

§ 9. ἐκ τῶν τοπικῶν] On this reference to the Topics see note in Introd. p. 154, and note on II 25, 3, in this Commentary. The reference to the Topics there made is precisely similar to this: that is, it is made to the work in general and its contents, and not to any particular passage: what is stated here may be gathered or inferred from the Topics.

§ 10. φανερὸν δ' ὅτι ἐκάτερον ἔχει ἀγαθὸν τὸ εἰδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς] 'It is plain that either kind of Rhetoric (the παραδειγματῶδες or the ἐνθυμηματικὸν) has good in it', that each of them has its own particular virtue and excellence, or advantage. Buhle construes the words τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥητορικῆς ἔχει ἐκάτερον ἀγαθόν, 'Rhetoricen utroque bono frui, et enthymemate et exemplo'. (He takes τὸ εἶδος τῆς ῥ. for a mere periphrasis. So in fact it does occur in Pol. I 4, 1253 ὁ 28, ἐν ὀργάνον εἴδει " in the shape of an instrument", de gen. et corr. I 3, 10, ἐν ΰλης εἴδει—but εἶδος in this usage does not seem to admit the definite article.) We have a similar use of ἀγαθὸν ἔχειν in Rhet. II 20, 7, εἶσὶ δ' οἱ λόγοι δημηγορικοί, καὶ ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὸν τοῦτο, ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

έν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς] 'Scheint eine mittelstellung swischen analytik und dialektik eingenommen su haben', Brandis, u. s. p. 13. The work is mentioned twice by Dionysius, Ep. ad Amm. I cc. 6 and 8, each time in company with Analytics and Topics. From this circumstance and from the reference here, it is natural to conclude that its subject was connected in some way with Logic. Diogenes Laert. V I, 23, includes in his list of Aristotle's writings μεθοδικά in eight books, and § 25, μεθοδικόν in one: the former comes amongst the logical, the latter amongst the rhetorical works. It appears also in the list of the 'Anonymous' author of the life of Aristotle (in Buhle, Vol. I p. 62), again in near connexion with works on Logic, 'Αναλυτικών, Προβλημάτων, Μεθοδικά. Hesychius Milesius in his life of Aristotle (Buhle, Vol. I p. 72), describes it thus; πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὴν εὖρεσιν, τά τε τοπικὰ καὶ μεθοδικά, παρέδωκε

καὶ ἐν τούτοις ὁμοίως ἔχει· εἰσὶ γὰρ αὶ μὲν παραδειγματώδεις ἡητορεῖαι αὶ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικαί, καὶ ἡήτορες ὁμοίως οὶ μὲν παραδειγματώδεις οὶ δὲ ἐνθυμηματικοί. πιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν οὐχ ἦττον οἱ λόγοι οἰ

προτάσεων πληθος, εξ ων πρὸς τὰ προβλήματα πιθανων ἐπιχειρημάτων οἶόντε εὐπορεῖν: classing it, like Dionysius and Diogenes, with the Topics and Analytics, the latter of which is mentioned immediately after. Simplicius ad Categ. fol. 7 a (quoted by Buhle) speaks of it as one of Aristotle's ὑπομνήματα, commentarii; ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήματιν, καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς μεθοδικοῖς, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήματι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὑπομνήματι. Brandis, u.s., adds a reference to the Schol. in Arist. p. 47 b 40.

ρητορείαι] 'rhetorical exhibitions or displays' Probl. XVIII 3. The word is a rare one, and as distinguished from ρητορική denotes rather the practice and results of Rhetoric, speaking and speeches, than the system and theory of it as embodied in the 'art'. It is found in Plato, Polit. 304 A, where Stallbaum notes, 'vox ρητορεία a Platone ficta videtur ut ars oratoria nobilior et generosior distingueretur a varia illa ρητορική cuius nomen profanaverant qui ad explendas suas cupiditates abusi erant.' The fact, that the word was a Platonic invention, and the ground assigned for the distinction, seem equally unauthenticated. It occurs also in Isocrates, κατὰ τῶν Σοφιστῶν § 21, for 'the practice of rhetoric' in general, also Panath. § 2, Phil. § 26; and amongst the later writers, in Plutarch and Lucian: ρητορεύειν, in Plato, Isocrates, and Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37), 35.

πιθανοὶ μὲν οὖν—οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοί] Anal. Pr. II 23, ult. φύσει μὲν οὖν πρότερος καὶ γνωριμώτερος ὁ διὰ τοῦ μέσου συλλογισμός, ἡμῦν δ' ἐναργέστερος ὁ διὰ τῆς ἐπαγωγῆς. The objects of sense and observation from which we derive our inductions and examples are 'nearer to us', more readily apprehensible by us, than the universals of the syllogism: and therefore, Top. A 12, 105 α 16, ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν ἐπαγωγὴ πιθανώτερον καὶ σαφέστερον καὶ κατὰ τὴν αἴσθησιν γνωριμώτερον καὶ τοῦς πολλοῖς κοινόν, ὁ δὲ συλλογισμὸς βιαστικώτερον καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἀντιλογικοὺς ἐνεργέστερον, 'induction is a mode of reasoning which is clearer (to us) and more persuasive, because its materials are better known to us', the example must be familiar and well known or it will not produce its effect in the way of proof; also some kind of induction is constantly used by every one, τοῖς πολλοῖς κοινόν; the syllogism and enthymeme are more 'cogent' and 'effective' against an adversary in a debate, and are therefore 'more applauded', θορυβοῦνται δὲ μᾶλλον οἱ ἐνθυμηματικοί.

There is no real contradiction between what is here said and in Probl. XVIII 3. In the Problem the question is why people in general are better pleased with examples than with enthymemes, the fact being assumed. The answer is, that they learn more from them, and are therefore more amused, and the facts which are adduced by way of examples are more familiar and interesting; the enthymeme (as the syllogism in the Topics) proceeds from universals, which we are less acquainted with than with particulars. Consequently, examples are more pleasing and therefore plausible $(\pi\iota\theta a\nu\acute{a})$, whilst the conclusive

διά των παραδειγμάτων, θορυβούνται δέ μάλλον οί τι ένθυμηματικοί. την δ' αιτίαν αὐτῶν, καὶ πῶς έκατέρω χρηστέον, έρουμεν ύστερον νυν δέ περί αὐτῶν τούτων μάλλον διορίσωμεν καθαρώς.

έπει γάρ τὸ πιθανὸν τινὶ πιθανόν έστι, καὶ τὸ μὲν εύθυς υπάρχει δι' αυτό πιθανόν και πιστόν τό δέ τω δείκνυσθαι δοκείν δια τοιούτων, ούδεμία δε τέχνη σκοπει τὸ καθ' έκαστον, οίον ή ιατρική τί Σωκράτει τὸ ύγιεινόν έστιν ή Καλλία, άλλα τί τῶ τοιῶδε ή τοῖς τοιοίσδε (τούτο μέν γάρ έντεχνον, τὸ δὲ καθ' έκαστον άπειρον καὶ οὐκ ἐπιστητόν), οὐδὲ ἡ ἡητορική τὸ καθ' έκαστον ένδοξον θεωρήσει, οίον Σωκράτει ή Ίππία, άλλα το τοιοίσδε, καθάπερ και ή διαλεκτική. και γαρ έκείνη συλλογίζεται οὐκ έξ ὧν ἔτυχεν (φαίνεται argument, the enthymeme which leaves the adversary without reply, is more striking, and therefore more applauded.

θορυβείσθαι, 'to be applauded', is a regular formation of the passive. For although the usual construction of θορυβείν is with επί and the dative, many examples of the transitive use of it are found. See the examples of both, and of the passive, in Ast's Lex. Plat. Isocr. Panath. § 233, (δ λόγος) επηνήμενος ήν καὶ τεθορυβημένος: and Rhet. II 23, 30, τών συλλογισμών θορυβείται μάλιστα τοιαύτα όσα κ.τ.λ. Cf. Rhet. I 9, 40,

quoted in Introd. p. 155.

§ 11. έρουμεν υστερον] II chapters 20-24.

πιθανόν] 'plausible', that which readily persuades; πιστόν, 'credible', that which is to be relied on; the latter represents the higher degree of trustworthiness. διὰ τοιούτων, πιθανών καὶ πιστών.

The connexion of the argument of this section is given in the para-

phrase, Introduction p. 155.

Art and science deal with universals, art prescribes rules for classes, not individuals; practice, ἐμπειρία, follows the opposite method. Rhet. ΙΙ 10, 27, τὸ δὲ παρὰ ταῦτά τι ζητείν περὶ μεγέθους ἀπλῶς καὶ ὑπεροχής κενολογείν έστίν κυριώτερα γάρ έστι προς την χρείαν (for use or practice) τὰ καθ έκαστα τών πραγμάτων. Εth. Nic. VI Ε2, 1143 a 32, ἔστι δὲ τών καθ' ἔκαστα καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων πάντα τὰ πρακτά κ.τ.λ. Met. A 1, 981 a 12, πρὸς μέν οὖν τὸ πράττειν έμπειρία τέχνης οὐδεν δοκεί διαφέρειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτυγχάνουτας όρωμεν τους έμπείρους των άνευ της έμπειρίας λόγον έχόντων. αίτιον δ ότι ή μεν εμπειρία των καθ εκαστόν έστι γνώσις, ή δε τέχνη των καθόλου, αί δε πράξεις και αί γενέσεις πάσαι περί τὸ καθ' έκαστόν είσιν.

καὶ γὰρ ἐκείνη συλλογίζεται οὐκ ἐξ ὧν ἔτυχεν κ.τ.λ.] Compare Top. A 10, 104 a 4, 11, 105 a 3-9, οὐ δεῖ δὲ πᾶν πρόβλημα οὐδὲ πᾶσαν θέσιν ἐπισκοπείν, άλλ' ην απορήσειεν αν τις των λόγου δεομένων, καλ μη κολάσεως η αλσθήσεως οί μεν γάρ ἀπορούντες πότερον δεί τοὺς θεούς τιμάν καὶ τοὺς γονείς ἀγαπάν, ή ού,

γὰρ ἄττα καὶ τοῖς παραληροῦσιν), ἀλλ' ἐκείνη μὲν ἐκ P. 1357.
τῶν λόγου δεομένων, ἡ δὲ ῥητορικὴ ἐκ τῶν ἥδη βου12 λεύεσθαι εἰωθότων. ἔστι δὲ τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆς περί τε
τοιούτων περὶ ὧν βουλευόμεθα καὶ τέχνας μὴ ἔχομεν,
καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις ἀκροαταῖς οὰ οὐ δύνανται διὰ πολ- p. 8.
λῶν συνορᾶν οὐδὲ λογίζεσθαι πόρρωθεν. βουλευόμεθα

1 συνοράν infra.

κολάσεως δέονται, οἱ δὲ πότερον ή χιών λευκή αἰσθήσεως, κ.τ.λ., and Eth. Eud.

1 3, quoted in Introd. p. 156, note.

εξ ὧν ἔτυχεν] sc. εξ ἐκείνων ἃ ἔτυχεν: 'any materials, or propositions taken at random, any chance propositions'. So Rhet. I 5, II, διὰ τὸ μη-δὲν ἔχειν ὧν τὸ γῆρας λωβᾶται. On the attraction of the relative from its proper case after the verb to that of its antecedent, see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 473, and note on Rhet. I 5, II.

§ 12. τὸ ἔργον αὐτῆν] The proper office, the special function, business, 'work', ἔργον, of Rhetoric, is exercised in such things as we are obliged to take advice about, where there are no definite rules of art

ready laid down to guide us.

The toyou of anything is that which it is specially appointed (by nature) to do, its proper special work. It is in the execution, the carrying out or fulfilment of this Toyov, that this aperi, this special excellence of everything, resides. Nature always works intelligently with a purpose in view, προς τέλος τι, everything has its own special έργον. This is especially manifest in all 'instruments', opyava (things in which the purpose is apparent); as of an axe or knife the office or purpose is to cut (large and small things), of a horse to run, of an eye to see, of the mind to think, and so on; and the purpose or office being the same in kind and differing only in degree, in doing a thing at all and in doing it well, the apern is shewn in and measured by the performance of this special work; sharpness in the knife to cut well, swiftness in the horse to run well, is the due fulfilment of its. Fpyov. Eth. N. VI 2, 1139 a 16, \$\dagger\$ 8 άρετη προς το έργον το ολκείον. This doctrine is first laid down by Plato. Rep. I 352 E seq. and borrowed by Aristotle, Eth. Nic. I 6, and II 5, where the theory of moral virtue is based upon it. Hence Pol. 1 2, 1253 a 23, πάντα δὲ τῷ ἔργφ ὥρισται καὶ τῆ δυνάμει. Eth. Eud. 11 1, 1218 b 38, περί άρετης, ότι έστιν ή βελτίστη διάθεσις ή έξις ή δύναμις έκάστων, όσων έστί τις χρησις ή έργον, which is there illustrated at length.

διὰ πολλών συνοράν] 'to take in at a glance through the medium, or along the line, of many steps of proof or syllogisms', 'to take in a long

chain of arguments at one view'.

λογίζεσθαι πόρρωβεν] expresses much the same thing as διὰ πολλών συνορῷν, to deduce or string together syllogisms in a chain from a long way off or back, 'to string together a long chain of connected syllogisms'. With πόρρωβεν here, compare the similar use of it in 11 22, 3, and Top. A 11, 105 a 8 οὐδὲ δὴ ὧν σύνεγγυς ἡ ἀπόδειξις, οὐδ᾽ ὧν λίαν πόρρω.

βουλευόμεθα δέ] On the proper objects of deliberation compare Eth.

δέ περί των φαινομένων ενδέχεσθαι αμφοτέρως έχειν περί γαρ των άδυνάτων άλλως ή γενέσθαι ή έσεσθαι 13 ή έγειν ούδεις βουλεύεται ούτως ύπολαμβάνων ούδεν γάρ πλέον. ἐνδέχεται δὲ συλλογίζεσθαι καὶ συνάγειν

Nic. III 5, VI 2 λεγέσθω δὲ τούτων (τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων) τὸ μὲν ἐπιστημονικόν το δέ λογιστικόν, το χάρ βουλεύεσθαι και λογίζεσθαι ταυτόν, ούθεις δὲ βουλεύεται περὶ τῶν μὴ ἐνδεχομένων ἄλλως ἔχειν. C. 5, 1140 a 32, βουλεύεται δ' ούθελς περί των άδυνάτων άλλως έχειν, ούδε των μή ενδεχομένων αυτώ πράξαι. de Anima III 10, 4, 433 α 29, πρακτον δ' έστι το ένδεχόμενον και άλλως έχειν. We deliberate and act only in cases where the event or issue is uncertain (may be in either of two ways, ἀμφοτέρως); where the event is necessarily this or that, i.e. certainly one way, and not the other, or where it is not in our own power, where we have no control over it, no one either deliberates whether or no anything is to be done or tries to do it. τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα ἀμφότερως ἔχειν is usually expressed by τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα αλλως έχειν, things contingent and uncertain in their issue; opposed to τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν, things certain and necessary, which can be only in one way, which have only one possible issue, and cannot be in one way or another, indifferently.

οῦτως ὑπολαμβάνων] 'on that supposition', i.e. if he actually supposes them to be necessary and unalterable: because it is possible that he may have deliberated or even attempted in action things which he did

not know were beyond his control, in mere ignorance:

οὐδέν πλέον 'there is nothing to be gained by it, no advantage in it'. Valckenaer, Diatr. in Eur. Fragm. p. 150(156), supplies numerous examples. In three MSS (Bekker) the words οὐδεν γαρ πλεον are followed immediately by η ούτως ἐνδέχεται συμβουλεύειν. They were first omitted by Bekker, though previously suspected by Muretus. The origin of this interpolation, for such it seems to be, may be thus accounted for. The words συλλογίζεσθαι and συνάγειν being very nearly synonymous, some one may have added in the margin ή οῦτως ἐνδέχεται δὲ συμβουλεύεινmeaning that we might read συμβουλεύειν in place of συλλογίζεσθαι to avoid the tautology, συμβουλεύειν referring to the deliberative branch of Rhetoric, or public speaking: η οῦτως, 'or thus', merely expressing the possibility of a various reading, ενδέχεται δε συμβουλεύειν. The essential stop after οὖτως was then omitted or overlooked, and the words finally introduced into the text as an appendage to πλέον, with the sense, as rendered by Gaisford, 'nihil enim amplius profici potest, quam quod sic deliberatur: i. e. incassum enim instituitur ista (altera) consultatio'.

§ 13. συνάγειν, (ratione) colligere. Rhet. II 22, 3 and 15. The σύν in words of this kind, which denote a process of reasoning or understanding, as συνιέναι, συμβάλλειν, (to comprehend, comprehendere,) and συλλογίζεσθαι itself, denotes the bringing of things together in the mind for the purpose of comparison, upon which either a judgment is founded and a conclusion drawn, or the understanding itself developed or enlightened. συνάγειν and συλλογίζεσθαι are found again together as synonyms, Met. H. init. 1042 a 3, έκ δή των είρημένων συλλογίσασθαι δεί, καὶ συναγαγόντας

τὸ κεφάλαιον τέλος ἐπιτιθέναι.

τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλελογισμένων πρότερον, τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀσυλλογίστων μὲν δεομένων δὲ συλλογισμοῦ διὰ τὸ μὴ
εἶναι ἔνδοξα. ἀνάγκη δὲ τούτων τὸ μὲν μὴ εἶναι
εἰεπακολούθητον διὰ τὸ μῆκος (ὁ γὰρ κριτὴς ὑπόκειται εἶναι ἀπλοῦς), τὰ δὲ μὴ πιθανὰ διὰ τὸ μὴ ἐξ
ὁμολογουμένων εἶναι μηδ' ἐνδόξων, ὥστ' ἀναγκαῖον τό
τε ἐνθύμημα εἶναι καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἔχειν καὶ ἄλλως, τὸ μὲν παράδειγμα ἐπαγωγὴν τὸ δ' ἐνθύμημα συλλογισμόν, καὶ
ἐξ ὀλίγων τε καὶ πολλάκις ἐλαττόνων ἢ ἐξ ὧν ὁ
πρῶτος συλλογισμός ἐὰν γὰρ ἢ τι τούτων γνώριμον,
οὐδὲ δεῖ λέγειν αὐτὸς γὰρ τοῦτο προστίθησιν ὁ
ἀκροατής. ὅἰον ὅτὶ Δωριεὺς στεφανίτην ἀγῶνα νενί-

τὰ μὲν ἐκ συλλελογισμένων πρότερον] 'the conclusions of previous syllogisms', which serve as major premisses to new syllogisms, and so on

through the entire chain of demonstration.

άπλοῦς] 'a simple, uncultivated person', Germ. einfach. This use of the word belongs to the first of the three varieties above distinguished (note on $\delta\pi\lambda\delta$ s, § 4 p. 30). It is opposed here rather to the 'complications' of an advanced stage of civilization and refinement, than to duplicity of character, and expresses 'an elementary state of cultivation'. Similarly Pol. II 8, 1268 b 39, τοὺς γὰρ ἀρχαίους νόμους λίαν ἀπλοῦς εἶναι καὶ βαρβαρικούς 'rude and barbarous'.

ένθύμημα-παράδειγμα] On enthymeme and example see Introd. pp.

99-108.

ό πρώτος συλλογισμός] πρώτος 'in its earliest, most elementary', or 'normal, typical, form'. πλήρωμα τῆς πρώτης (primary, in its original form) πόλεως, Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 α 17. ἀριστοκρατίαν μάλιστα τῶν ἄλλων παρὰ τὴν ἀληθίνην καὶ πρώτην. Ib. c. 8, sub fin. Pol. VII (VI) c. 4, 1319 α 39, τὴν βελτίστην καὶ πρώτην δημοκρατίαν. On this passage, see note on II 21, 6.

οίον (πρός το δηλούν, συλλογίζεσθαι αποδείξαι) ότι. Infr. § 19, οίον ότι

ἐπέβουλευε κ.τ.λ. and c. 1 § 13.

Δωριεύς] the type of an Olympic victor; son of Diagoras of Rhodes, to whom Pindar's seventh Olympian ode is inscribed. See Introd. p. 158, note I.

στεφανίτην ἀγῶνα] This is the title distinctive of the four great games, of which honour was in reality the prize, the garland being merely a symbol or external sign. They were hereby distinguished from ἀγῶνες χρηματῖται οτ ἀργυρῖται (Plut.) in which the prize was money, and in which therefore mercenary motives might possibly enter into the competition. Pausanias X 7, 3 tells us that it was not till the 2nd Pythiad that the Pythian games became an ἀγῶν στεφανίτης. Add to the instances

κηκεν, ἱκανὸν εἰπεῖν ὅτι ᾿Ολύμπια γὰρ νενίκηκεν·
τὸ δ᾽ ὅτι στεφανίτης τὰ ᾿Ολύμπια, οὐδὲ δεῖ προσθεῖ14 ναι· γιγνώσκουσι γὰρ πάντες. ἐπεὶ δ᾽ ἐστὶν ὀλίγα
μὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐξ ὧν οἱ ρητορικοὶ συλλογισμοί
ἐἰσι (τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ περὶ ὧν αἱ κρίσεις καὶ αἱ σκέψεις,
ἐνδέχεται καὶ ἄλλως ἔχειν· περὶ ὧν μὲν γὰρ πράττουσι βουλεύονται καὶ σκοποῦσι, τὰ δὲ πραττόμενα
πάντα τοιούτου γένους ἐστί, καὶ οὐδὲν, ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν ς
ἐξ ἀνάγκης τούτων), τὰ δ᾽ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ συμβαίνοντα καὶ ἐνδεχόμενα ἐκ τοιούτων ἀνάγκη ἐτέρων
συλλογίζεσθαι, τὰ δ᾽ ἀναγκαῖα ἐξ ἀναγκαίων (δῆλον
δ᾽ ἡμῖν καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν), φανερὸν ὅτι ἐξ

from Xen. Mem., Demosth., and Lycurg., Aesch. c. Ctes. § 179, and Isocr. Antid. § 301, τοὺε ἀθλητὰς τοὺε ἐν τοῖε στεφανίταις ἀγῶσι νικῶντας.

[Anon. vita Euripidis, init. ήσκησε δε κατ' δρχάς παγκράτιον ή πυγμήν, τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ χρησμὸν λαβόντος ὅτι στεφανηφόρους ἀγῶνας νικήσει. S.]

'Ολύμπια νενίκηκεν] The accusative in these phrases is an extension or 'equivalent' of a cognate accusative. Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 564.

§ 14. A summary repetition of the contents of the following sections, 14—19, is given in the chapter on λύσις, 11 25, 8—9.

έπεὶ δ' έστὶν ὀλίγα—ώς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ] Comp. II 22, 3, καὶ μὴ μόνον συνά-

γειν έκ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, ἀλλ' καὶ ἐκ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ.

ένδεχόμενα] 'things possible', as opposed to things necessary, not here to things impossible. On ένδέχεσθαι and δύνασθαι, το ένδεχόμενον and το δυνατόν in Aristotle, see Waitz on Anal. Pr. 1 3, 25 a 37, (Vol. 1 p. 375 seq.) and Bonitz on Metaph. 8 3, 1047 a 26, p. 387. δυνατόν according to Waitz, where the two are distinguished, expresses physical, ἐνδεχόμενον logical, possibility: the latter implies the possible truth of an assertion, viz. that when we assert anything we do not contradict ourselves. ¿νδεχόμενα are therefore here 'possibilities' as opposed to certainties; things and events which are only conceived as possible, which may be in one way or in another. In the ordinary language ενδέχεσθαι and ενδεχόμενον have usually some other words, as άλλως έχειν, γένεσθαι ή μή γίγνεσθαι, or something similar, added to them in the way of a definition or limitation. With the absolute use of it in this passage (and the general sense in which it appears in Waitz's and Bonitz's Commentaries) comp. 1 4, 3, οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἀπάντων. Eth. Nic. VI 2, 1139 α 8, εν δὲ ὧ τὰ ένδεχόμενα. Ib. c. 12, 1143 b 2, τοῦ ἐσχάτου καὶ ἐνδεχομένου.

ἐκ τῶν ἀναλυτικῶν.] Anal. Pr. I 8, 29 b 29, ἐπεὶ δ' ἔτερόν ἐστιν ὑπάρχειν τε καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν καὶ ἐνδέχεσθαι ὑπάρχειν (πολλὰ γὰρ ὑπάρχει μέν, οὐ μέντοι ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ δ' οὖτ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης οὖθ' ὑπάρχει δλως, ἐνδέχεται δ' ὑπάρχειν) δῆλον ὅτι καὶ συλλογισμὸς ἐκάστου τούτων ἔτερος ἔσται, καὶ οὐχ

ών τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγεται, τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἔσται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ώς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. λέγεται γὰρ ἐνθυμήματα έξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων, ώστε ἀνάγκη τούτων 15 ἐκάτερον ἐκατέρω ταὐτὸ είναι. τὸ μὲν γὰρ είκός έστιν ώς έπὶ τὸ πολύ γινόμενον, ούχ άπλως δέ, καθάπερ ορίζονταί τινες, άλλα το περί τα ένδεχόμενα άλλως έχειν, ούτως έχον πρός έκεινο πρός δ είκός, ώς Ρ. 1357 δ. 16 το καθόλου πρός το κατά μέρος· τῶν δὲ σημείων τὸ p.9. μέν ούτως έχει ώς των καθ' έκαστόν τι πρός το καθόλου, τὸ δὲ ώς τῶν καθόλου τι πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος. τούτων δέ το μέν αναγκαΐον τεκμήριον, το δέ μή 17 αναγκαΐον ανώνυμόν έστι κατά την διαφοράν. αναγκαΐα μεν οῦν λέγω έξ ων γίνεται συλλογισμός. διὸ καὶ τεκμήριον τὸ τοιοῦτον τῶν σημείων ἐστίν ὅταν γάρ μη ένδέχεσθαι οίωνται λύσαι το λεχθέν, τότε φέρειν οιονται τεκμήριον ώς δεδειγμένον και πεπερασμένον το γάρ τέκμαρ και πέρας ταυτον έστι κατά

όμοίως ἐχόντων τῶν ὅρων, ἀλλ' ὁ μὲν ἐξ ἀναγκαίων, ὁ δ' ἐξ ὑπαρχόντων, ὁ δ' ἐξ ἑνδεχομένων. Anal. Pr. I 13, 32 b 4, where two kinds of possibility, τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον, are distinguished: one, the order of nature, which from its ordinary uniformity makes a near approach to the necessary, and the other, the indefinite, the purely accidental, τὸ ἀπὸ τύχης, in which there is no natural order at all.

τὰ μὲν ἀναγκαῖα ἔσται, τὰ δὲ πλεῖστα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ] 'It is plain that the materials of enthymemes, the propositions or premisses of which they are constructed, though they may be necessary, are most of them no more than probabilities, or things that usually happen'. [On μέν—δέ, see the references above given in note on $1 \S 12 p. 24$.]

λέγεται ἐνθυμήματα έξ εἰκότων καὶ σημείων] Comp. I 3, 7, II 25, 8, where

παραδείγματα are added. Anal. Pr. 11 27, 70 a 10.

On electra and on pela, Introd. p. 160—163. The meaning and connexion of the following sections on the rhetorical instruments of proof are explained in full detail in the paraphrase, to which the reader is referred (Introd. p. 163—168).

§ 17. Αῦσαι τὸ λεχθέν] Οπ λύειν, λύσις, λυτόν, see Introd. on II 25 p. 267

and note 1.

τέκμαρ] Eustathius ad II. H. p. 665, 45. τεκμαίρεσθαι τὸ τελειοῦν, ἀπὸ τοῦ τέκμωρ, ὁ δηλοῖ τὸ τέλος. τὸ μέντοι τεκμαίρεσθαι ἀντὶ τοῦ σημειοῦσθαι, ἀφὸ οὖ καὶ τέκμαρ τὸ σημείον, οἱ μεθ "Ομηρον λέγουσι. 'Antiqua lingua, quam mox commemorat Aristoteles, non erat ab Homeri dialecto diversa.

18 την ἀρχαίαν γλώτταν. ἔστι δὲ τῶν σημείων τὸ μὲν ώς τὸ καθ, έκαστον πρὸς τὸ καθόλου ώδε, οἷον εί τις είπειεν σημείου είναι ότι οι σοφοι δίκαιοι, Σωκράτης γαρ σοφός ην και δίκαιος. τοῦτο μεν οὖν σημεῖόν έστι, λυτον δέ, καν άληθες ή το είρημένον άσυλλό-γιστον γάρ, το δέ, οξον εί τις είπειεν σημεῖον ότι νοσεί, πυρέττει γάρ, η τέτοκεν ότι γάλα έχει, άναγκαΐον. ὅπερ τῶν σημείων τεκμήριον μόνον ἐστίν μόνον γάρ, αν άληθες ή, άλυτον έστίν. τὸ δὲ ώς τὸ καθόλου πρὸς τὸ κατὰ μέρος έχον, οἶον εί τις είπειεν, ότι πυρέττει, σημείον είναι, πυκνον γάρ άναπνεῖ. λυτόν δε καὶ τοῦτο, κᾶν άληθὲς ἢ· ἐνδέχεται γάρ και μή πυρέττοντα πνευστιαν. τί μεν 1 πνευστιών infra.

Vide II. N. 20. Od. &. 373, et alibi. Homeri carmina ea aetate qua vixit Aristoteles propter vetustatem apud vulgus obscuriora fuisse aliunde constat. Ex. gr. Vox ἄποινα invenitur in Iliadis locis minimum viginti et sex: Olympiade tamen CVII qua orationem c. Aristocratem habuit Demosthenes, ea Athenis prorsus obsoleverat. Dignus est Demosthenis locus qui hic proponatur. Vetarat scilicet antiqua lex τους ανδροφώνους -μή λυμαίνεσθαι μηδέ ἀποινάν. Quam sic explicare pergit orator summus p. 630, 25. το μεν δή μή λυμαίνεσθαι, γνώριμον οίδ' ὅτι πᾶσιν-το δέ μή άποιν αν, μη χρήματα πράττεσθαι τὰ γὰρ χρήματα ἄποινα ωνόμαζον οἱ παλαιοί. Adeo universe verum est quod de Homeri tantum geographia scripsit Strabo VIII p. 484 = 513. τὰ δ' Ομήρου σκέψεως δείται κριτικής, ποιητικώς λέγοντος, καὶ οὐ τὰ νῦν, ἀλλὰ τάρχαῖα, ὧν ὁ χρόνος ημαύρωκε τὰ πολλά. Gaisford.

§ 18. τὸ δέ, οἶον εἴ τις...ἀναγκαῖον.] The auctor ad Heren. II 25, 39, gives two 'signs' of an opposite, fallacious, or refutable character, derived from the same sources, Necesse est quoniam pallet aegrotasse: aut, necesse est peperisse, quoniam sustinet puerum infantem. These illustrations had doubtless become traditional, and commonplaces in the rhetorical books.

πνευστιάν] 'to have an affection or disease of the breath'. A large class of verbs in aw and aw are either desiderative (like those in eaw and in Latin in urio) or expressive of an affection, usually some form of disease; the latter can be extended to a 'mental' affection. Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 330, Obs. 3 e and Obs. 4, would separate these into two classes (1) desideratives in aw and aw, and (2) verbs in aw, which express a state of sickness [Kühner's Ausführliche Grammatik § 328. 8]. Buttmann also in his Gr. Gr. § 119 and p. 294 (Engl. Transl.) assumes a distinction between some varieties of them, which is not very clearly made out. They fall under three heads, first desideratives, second imitatives (as

οὖν εἰκός ἐστι καὶ τί σημεῖον καὶ τεκμήριον, καὶ τί διαφέρουσιν, είρηται μεν καὶ νῦν μαλλον δε φανερώς τυραννιάν, to play the tyrant); "but," he adds, "it is improper to rank

verbs denoting diseases (the third), ὀφθαλμιᾶν, ὑδεριᾶν, ψωρᾶν, &c., in the same class (as the imitatives);" these belong rather to a preceding division, viz. verbs in aw formed from nouns, "and expressing, chiefly, the having a thing or quality, and performing an action; as κομᾶν, χολᾶν, βοᾶν,

γοᾶν, τολμᾶν."

A much better and more exact account of these forms of verbs, in respect of the connexion and distinction of their senses, is to be found in Lobeck's learned note on Phrynichus, p. 79-83. "Verbs in av and av," (this is not true of all these verbs and requires qualification; δαμάν, γειτνιάν, περάν, for instance, can hardly be said to denote either a bodily. or mental affection. It should be "some verbs" or "a large class of verbs in aw") "in both forms, are properly used of affections of mind and body. σπληνιάν, του σπλήνα άλγείν, λιθιάν, κριθιάν, μολυβδιάν express bodily ailments; δυσερωτιάν, νυμφιάν, πασχητιάν, and all desideratives (which have either of these terminations) express some affections of the mind, either as a malady, a longing, or in some other form." This is an amplification of what Lobeck actually says: and it is also I think implied that the bodily affection is the primary signification, which is extended by metaphor to the mental. A long list of examples is there given. chiefly of rarer words. I have collected some examples from various Greek writers, which, as most of them do not appear in Lobeck's list,

or in the grammars, I will here add.

In Aristophanes, as was to be expected, they most abound. ¿φθαλμιᾶν Ran. 192, βουβωνιᾶν ib. 1280, ληματιᾶν 494, ώρακιᾶν 481 and Pac. 702. δαιμονιάν, δαιμονάν Thesm. 1054 (and in Aeschylus, Eur., Xenoph.), στρατηγιᾶν (quoted by Schol. on Ran. 965, Xen. Anab. VII c. 33, Dem. de F. L. § 337 "to have an itch or mania for commanding an army"), εὐρωτιậν Nub. 44, λημάν 326, μαθητιάν 183, χεζητιάν 1387, σιβυλλιάν Εq. 81, κορυβαντιάν Vesp. 8, βουλιμιάν Plut. 870, φονάν Soph. Phil. 1209 (Hesych. τὸ έπὶ φόνον μαίνεσθαι), πομάν Αj. 589 (τομής ἐπιθυμεῖν, Schol.), θανατιάν Schol. ad Phil. l. c., θανατᾶν (to long for death) Plut. Phaed. 64 Β, ναυτιᾶν Theaet. 191 A, Legg. 1 639 B, κνησιάν Gorg. 494 E, ψωράν καὶ κνησιάν ib. c. (Arist. Eccles, 919), ποδαγράν Alcib. 11 139 E, 140 A. In Aristotle we have σπουδαρχιᾶν (to be infected with the disease of office-hunting), Pol. VIII (V) 5 sub fin., ἀγωνιᾶν, of mental distress or anxiety, Rhet. I 9, 21. Many in the works on Nat. Hist., as ταυράν, σκυζάν, ὀργάν, καπριάν (or καπράν), all implying a sexual impulse, Hist. An. VI 18 §§ 12, 14, 17, VI 20, 4; ποδαγράν VI 21, 5, σατυριάν de Gen. An. IV 3, 22, ύδρωπιάν ib. v. 8, 13, έξυδρωπιάν ib. v 20, 5, στραγγουριάν (also Arist. Thesm. 616, Plat. Legg. XI 2, 916 A, στραγγουριάν, λιθάν). Theophr. π. άλαζονείας, ώνητιάν, "to have a mania, or itch, for buying", Diog. Laert. vit. Plat. III 18 "οί λόγοι σου, φησίν (ὁ Διονυσιος), γεροντιώσιν" (are infected with, smack of, old age), καὶ ος, (ὁ Πλάτων), "σοῦ δέ γε τυραννιώσιν". (If this is the passage referred to by Buttm. in quoting the verb rupavviĝv in his Grammar, above cited-no reference is given-he is wrong both in attributing to it the sense of "imitation", and in assigning it to a separate class.)

καὶ περὶ τούτων, καὶ διὰ τίν αἰτίαν τὰ μὲν ἀσυλλόγιστά ἐστι τὰ δὲ συλλελογισμένα, ἐν τοῖς ἀνα19 λυτικοῖς διώρισται περὶ αὐτῶν. παράδειγμα δὲ ὅτι
μεν ἐστιν ἐπαγωγὴ καὶ περῖ ποῖα ἐπαγωγή, εἴρηται·
ἔστι δὲ οὕτε ώς μέρος πρὸς ὅλον οὕθ ὡς ὅλον πρὸς
μέρος οὕθ ὡς ὅλον πρὸς ὅλον, ἀλλ ὡς μέρος πρὸς
μέρος, ὅμοιον πρὸς ὅμοιον, ὅταν ἄμφω μὲν ἡ ὑπὸ
τὸ άὕτὸ γένος, γνωριμώτερον δὲ θάτερον ἡ θατέρου,
παράδειγμά ἐστιν. οἷον ὅτι ἐπίβουλεθει τυραννίδι
Διονύσιος αἰτῶν τὴν φυλακήν καὶ γὰρ Πεισίστρατος
πρότερον ἐπιβουλεύων ἤτει φυλακὴν καὶ λαβὼν ἐτυράννευσε, καὶ Θεαγένης ἐν Μεγάροις· καὶ ἄλλοι ὅσους p. 10.
ἴσαστ, παράδειγμα πάντες γίγνονται τοῦ Διονυσίου,

έν τοις αναλυτικοις] Anal. Pr. 11 27.

§ 19. ἄμφω §.] This union of neuter dual with verb singular, following the analogy of neuter plural in the same construction, is illustrated

in Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 384, Obs. 1. [Kühner's Ausf. Gram. § 364.]

οίον ὅτι ἐπιβουλεύει τυρραννίδι Διονύσιος κ.τ.λ.] The stratagem by which Dionysius actually succeeded in obtaining his body-guard (496 B.C.) contrary to the wishes of the majority of the Syracusan citizens is related by Diodorus, XIII 95. See Grote, Hist. Gr. Vol. x. p. 610-614. Aristotle again refers to the attempt, Pol. III 15 ult. On the similar, and equally successful attempt of Pisistratus, Grote, H. G. Vol. III p. 208, 209. This occurred at his first usurpation of government B.C. 560. (Grote, Clinton.) Theagenes of Megara (Grote, H. G. Vol. III p. 59, 60) is mentioned by Aristotle, Pol. VIII (v) 5 sub fin., together with Pisistratus and Dionysius. as one of those who had succeeded in making themselves tyrants of their native countries, by imposing upon the popular party; Aristotle notices the stratagem by which he effected his purpose (τῶν εὐπόρων τὰ κτήνη ἀποσφάξας, λαβών παρά τον ποταμον ἐπινέμοντας). Thucydides also. I 126, mentions him as having assisted Cylon in the attempt which he also made on the tyranny at Athens; Herod. v. 71. Cylon was his sonin-law, Thuc. u.s. Cylon's attempt was made in 620 B.C. (Clint. F. H. sub anno), and Theagenes κατ' έκείνον του χρόνου έτυραννεύει Μεγάρων (Thuc.). Cylon's attempt (and consequently the tyranny of Theagenes) took place, says Herodotus u.s., "before the age of Pisistratus." Theagenes was contemporary with Periander of Corinth, whose reign lasted from B.C. 625-585 (Grote u.s. p. 58).

αίτῶν τὴν φυλακήν] Plat. Rep. VIII 16, 566 B, τὸ δὴ τυραννικὸν αἴτημα τὸ πολυθρύλητον ἐπὶ τούτω πάντες οἱ εἰς τοῦτο προβεβηκότες ἐξευρίσκουσιν, αἰτεῖν τὸν δῆμον φύλακάς τινας τοῦ σώματος, ἴνα σῶς αὐτοῖς ἢ ὁ τοῦ δήμου

Bonθόs. Herod. I 59, of Pisistratus. Infr. ad I 8, 4.

ον οὐκ ἴσασί πω εἰ διὰ τοῦτο αἰτεῖ. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα Υὑπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθοχου, ὅτι ὁ ἐπιβουλεύων τυραννίδι φυλακὴν αἰτεῖ.

έξ ὧν μὲν οὖν λέγονται αἱ δοκοῦσαι εἶναι πίστεις Ρ. 1358. ἀποδεικτικαί, εἴρηται. τῶν δὲ ἐνθυμημάτων μεχίστη 20 διαφορὰ καὶ μάλιστα λεληθυῖα σχεδὸν πάντας ἐστίν ἤπερ καὶ περὶ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν μέθοδον τῶν συλλογισμῶν τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀντῶν ἐστί κάτα τὴν ρητορικὴν ὥσπερ καὶ κατὰ τὴν διαλεκτικὴν [μέθοδον πῶν συλλογισμῶν], τὰ δὲ κάτ ἄλλας τέχνας καὶ δυναμείς, τὰς μὲν οὖσας τὰς δ΄ οὖπω κατειλημμένας διὸ καὶ λανθάνουσί τε [τοὺς ἀκροατάς], καὶ μᾶλλον ἀπτόμενοι

ύπὸ τὸ αὐτὸ καθόλου] "under the same universal", i.e. genus or species; which stand to the species or individuals subordinate to each respectively, in the relation of universal to particular. τὸ καθόλου is that which is universally predicable, or predicable of every member of a class. Metaph. Δ 26, 1023 b 29, το μέν γάρ καθόλου καὶ το όλως λεγόμενου ώς όλον τι ον ούτως έστὶ καθόλου ώς πολλά περιέχον τῷ κατηγορείσθαι καθ' έκάστου καὶ εν άπαντα είναι ώς εκαστου, οίον άνθρωπου, ίππου, θεόν, ότι άπαντα ζώα. Ib. Ζ 13, 1038 δ 11, τὸ δὲ καθόλου κοινόν τοῦτο γὰρ λέγεται καθόλου ὁ πλείοσιν υπάρχειν πέφυκεν. Anal. Post. I 4, 73 b 26, καθόλου δε λέγω δ αν κατά πάντός τε ὑπάρχη καὶ καθ' αὐτὸ καὶ ή αὐτό (see Waitz, Comm. p. 315), of which the triangle is given as an exemplification, as the universal notion of all three-sided figures; applicable to any one of them, το τυχόν, and πρώτον, the highest or primary conception of triangles (the ἰσοσκελές, for example, a subordinate species, being only secondary): τὸ καθόλου δὲ ὑπάρχει τότε, όταν έπὶ τοῦ τυχάντος καὶ πρώτου δεικνύηται. Thus the καθόλου is equivalent to the yévos under which all the species and individuals of the entire class are included, ὁ κοτὰ πάντων κατηγορείται, and is opposed to καθ έκαστον and κατά μέρος.

§ 20. κατειλημμένας] 'fixed, established, settled'. καταλαμβάνειν is 'to lay hold of, to get into one's possession', or 'to occupy', as an army occupies a conquered city or country. See the Lexicon for examples of this, the primary sense of the word. Thence it passes into the signification of 'binding' as by an oath, Herod. IX. 106, πίστι τε καταλαβόντες καὶ ὁρκίοισι ἐμμένειν τε καὶ μὴ ἀποστήσεσθαι. Thuc. V 21 (σπονδάς) εὖρον κατειλημμένας (settled or concluded, 'confirmed', Schol. loχυράς) VIII 63, 3, τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ στρατεύματι ἔτι βεβαιότερον κατέλαβον (they secured, established or confirmed their interest in the army, Arnold). Plat. Legg. VII 23, 823 A, τὰ ταῖς ζημίαις ὑπὸ νόμων κατειλημμένα (comprehensa et firmata, Stallbaum). Arist. Pol. IV (VII) 2, 1324 b 21, τὰ μὲν νόμοις κατειλημμένα τὰ δὲ ἔθεσιν, (fest gesetzt, Stahr). Eth. Nic. X. 10, 1179 b 18, τὰ ἐκ παλαιοῦ τοῖς ἤθεσι

κατειλημμένα λόγφ μεταστήσαι.

ΡΗΤΟΡΙΚΗΣ Α 2 § 21. 49 κατὰ τρόπου μεταβαίνουσιν έξ αὐτῶν. μᾶλλον δὲ 21 σαφες έσται το λεγόμενον δια πλειόνων οηθέν. λέγω γάρ διαλεκτικούς τε και ρητορικούς συλλογισμούς είναι περί ων τους τόπους λέγομεν ούτοι δ' είσιν οι κοινή περί δικαίων και φυσικών και περί πολιτικών καὶ περὶ πολλών διαφερόντων είδει, δοίον ο του μάλλον καὶ ἦττον τόπος. οὐδὲν γὰρ μᾶλλον ἔσται ἐκ τουτου συλλογίσασθαι ή ενθύμημα είπεῖν περί δικαίων

τους ἀκροατάς] should be omitted, with Muretus, Vater, and Spengel. The 'oversight' in question applies only to the rhetoricians, not to the audience.

καὶ μάλλον άπτόμενοι κατά τρόπον μεταβαίνουσεν έξ αὐτών] μάλλον belongs to ἀπτόμενοι and μεταβαίνουσιν, "the more they handle their subject according to the 'appropriate method', the more they pass out of, or stray beyond, transgress the limits of, the true province of Rhetoric". κατὰ τρόπον is equivalent or nearly so to δεόντως, 'duly', 'in the right and proper way'; and is often found in Plato opposed to ἀπὸ τρόπου. πόρρω τοῦ καθήκοντος, Schol. ad Theaet. 143 C. Gaisford from Steph. Thesaurus supplies examples from Plato and Isocrates, and others will be found in Stallbaum's note on Rep. V 16, 470 B. δεόντως itself appears in three MSS after τρόπον, being doubtless, as Gaisford supposes, a gloss on the preceding. I have followed Mr Poste, Introd. to Transl. of Post. Anal. p. 20, n. 3, in translating κατά τρόπον, 'the appropriate method', 'in the right way, or in due order', and it may very well bear that meaning. It will therefore be equivalent to κατά την οlκείαν μέθοδον, the method which confines itself to the peculiar principles, the idias or olkeias apxai, of the special science which it investigates. μάλλον άπτόμενοι κατά τρόπον is equivalent to, and explained by, οσφ τις αν βέλτιον έκλέγηται τας προτάσεις, near the end of the next section, § 21; and the ἀρχαί, which are spoken of immediately afterwards, αν γαρ ἐντύχη ἀρχαῖs, are the ἴδιαι ἀρχαί, the special principles of each particular science above mentioned. Dialectics and Rhetoric have no such special principles, and their method is the 'inappropriate'. Gaisford follows Muretus in inserting ή before κατὰ τρόπον 'by handling them too properly'. The other interpretation seems preferable in itself, and requires no alteration. μεταβαίνειν is μεταβαίνειν είς άλλο γένος, technically used of passing from one science to another, and illicitly transferring its appropriate principles. Comp. 1 4, 6. See Poste, u.s. p. 51, note 1, for examples from the Organon. Add Top. 0 11, 161 a 33. Anal. Post. 1 7 treats of this subject.

On kowai and oikeias apxai see Introd. p. 73 note and the references there given.

§ 21. περί ων τους τόπους λέγομεν] (περί τούτων περί ων); to which we apply the term 'the τόποι', par excellence; the κοινοί τόποι, namely. below, § 22; and for this treatment of them, II 19.

η φυσικών η περί ότουοῦν, καίτοι ταῦτα είδει διαφέρει. ἴδια δέ, ὅσα ἐκ τῶν περί ἔκαστον είδος καί
γένος προτάσεων ἐστίν, ὅιον περί φυσικῶν εἰσὶ προτάσεις ἐξ ὧν οὕτε ἐνθύμημα οὕτε συλλογισμός ἐστι
περί τῶν ἡθικῶν, καὶ περὶ τούτων ἄλλαι ἐξ ὧν οὐκ και
ἔσται περὶ τῶν φυσικῶν (ὁμοίως δὲ τοῦτ ἔχει ἐπὶ
πάντων.) κάκεινα μὲν οὐ ποιήσει περὶ οὐδὲν γένος
ενωτά ἔμφρονα περὶ οὐδὲν γὰρ ὑποκείμενον ἐστίν ταυτά
δέ, ὑσῶν τίς ἀν βέλτιον ἐκλέγηται τὰς προτάσεις,
λήσει ποιήσας ἄλλην ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς καὶ
ρητορικῆς ἀν γὰρ ἐντύχη ἀρχαῖς, οὐκέτι διαλεκτική
οὐδὲ ρητορική ἀλλ ἐκείνη ἔσται ῆς ἔχει τὰς ἀρχάς.

22 ἔστι δὲ τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων ἐκ τούτων τῶν
εἰδῶν λέγδμενα τῶν κατά μερος καὶ ἰδίων, ἐκ δὲ τῶν

τοια δέ, όσα ἐκ τῶν περὶ ἔκαστον είδος καὶ γένος προτάσεων ἐστί] είδος καὶ γένος, species or genus, whichever you please. In any classification the same member may be either genus or species, according as it is regarded from above or below: Physics and Mathematics, for example, are either species in relation to the genus Philosophy, or again genera in relation to the subordinate species, Psychology (so all the ancient philosophers) and Natural History of the one, and Geometry and Arithmetic of the other. Only the summum genus and the infima species are not thus interchangeable.

κἀκεῖνα μὲν—ἔμφρονα] 'The former, the κοινοὶ τόποι, will make no one any the wiser, will convey no intelligence or instruction to any one, about any class of things'. This is the διδασκαλία or genuine instruction that belongs to science, διδασκαλίας γάρ ἐστιν ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐπιστήμην λόγος (I 1, 12; see note on p. 23); comp. I 4, 4, διὰ τὸ μήτε τῆς ὑητορικῆς εἶναι τέχνης, ἀλλ' ἐμφρονεστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς. Plato has employed the word in the same way, Legg. VII 14, 809 D τοὺς δὲ ἀνθρώπους περὶ αὐτὰ μᾶλλον ἔμφρονας ἀπεργάζωνται.—ἔμφρων belongs to the class of adjectives compounded with ἐν, in which the preposition expresses the indwelling or inherence of something in something else, ἔμψυχος (with soul in it, containing life, animated), ἕνθεος, ἔννους, ἔνθηρος, ἔμπνους, ἔμψοφος, ἔγχυμος, ἔντριχος, ἔνδικος, ἔντομα (insects), Ar. Hist. An. IV I, 5, ἔστι δ' ἔντομα ὅσα κατὰ τοὕνομα ἐστὶν ἐντομὰς ἔχοντα κ.τ.λ.

άλλην ἐπιστήμην τῆς διαλεκτικῆς] ἄλλος, a comparative in form as well as in sense, naturally, like ἔτερος, διάφορος, διαφέρων, et sim., takes the same construction, with the genitive. On the comparative form of ἄλλος see Donaldson, New Crat. §§ 165, 166.

οὐκότι] See note on 1 1, 7 on ήδη &c. esp. p. 14.

κοινῶν ἐλάττω. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπίκοῖς, καὶ ἐνταῦθα διαιρετέον τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων τά τε εἴδη καὶ ριττοὺς τόπους ἐξ ὧν ληπτέον. λέγω δ' εἴδη μὲν τὰς καθ' ἕκαστον γένος ἰδιας προτάσεις, τόπους δὲ τοὺς κοινοὺς ὁμοίως πάντων. πρότερον οὖν εἴπωμεν περὶ τῶν εἰδῶν πρώτον δὲ λάβωμεν τὰ γένη τῆς ἡητορικῆς, ὅπως διελόμενοι πόσα ἐστί, περί τούτων χωρὶς λαμβάνωμεν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ τὰς προτάσεις.

έστι δὲ τῆς ρητορικῆς γένη τρία τὸν ἀριθμόν αποτ. Π. τοσοῦτοι γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκροαταὶ τῶν λόγων ὑπάρχουσιν ὅντες. σύγκειται μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τριῶν ὁ λόγος, ἔκ τε τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ περὶ οὖ λέγει καὶ πρὸς ὅν, καὶ τὸ

§ 22. καθάπερ οὖν καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοπικοῖς—ληπτέον] 'Cum tanta formarum (i.e. τῶν εἰδῶν) locorumque differentia sit, quantam ipse supra demonstravit: ut scilicet illae fraudi dialectico et oratori, non recte usurpatae ab ipsis, esse possint, loci nullum tale periculum secum portent: aliaque etiam discrimina sint, affirmat oportere distinguere enthymematum species appellatas ab his qui loci vocantur, ex quibus illa ipsa promuntur: ut in Topicis factum est, ita etiam in his qui oratorem instruunt libris.' Victorius. 'We must here also, as well as in Dialectics, carefully distinguish the sources and materials (ἐξ ὧν ληπτέον) from which the special and the general topics are to be derived'.

πρότασις, a logical or rhetorical premiss or proposition, in syllogism or enthymeme: propositio praemissa; 'est enim προτείνεων (Τορ. Θ Ι, 155 δ 34, 38), vel προτείνεσθαι (ib. c. 14, 164 δ 4 &c.) eas propositiones constituere unde conclusio efficiatur.' Trendel. El. Log. Arist. § 2, p. 53.

τὰ στοιχεῖα] On στοιχεῖα, 'the elements' of rhetorical reasoning, see Introd. p. 127. Add to the illustrations there given Rhet. ad Alex. c. 36 (37) 9, στοιχεῖα κοινὰ κατὰ πάντων, apparently in this sense.

CHAP, III.

The triple division of Rhetoric, συμβουλευτικόν, δικανικόν, ἐπιδεικτικόν, is, as we learn from Quintilian, II 21, 23, III 4, I, and 7, I, due to Aristotle: Anaximenes, his predecessor, had admitted only two genera,

with seven species subordinate to these, III 4, 9.

Almost all writers (prope omnes) on the subject, subsequent to Aristotle, had accepted his division, as proceeding from the 'highest authority' (utique summae apud antiquos auctoritatis) III 4, 1. Quintilian in this fourth chapter mentions, besides Aristotle's division, those which were adopted by Anaximenes, Protagoras, Plato (in the Sophist), and Isocrates. He decides in favour of Aristotle's, as the safest to follow, both because the preponderance of authority is on its side, and also because it is the most reasonable.

τέλος πρός τοῦτόν ἐστι, λέγω δὲ τὸν ἀκροατήν. 2 ἀνάγκη δὲ τὸν ἀκροατήν ἢ θεωρὸν εἶναι ἢ κριτήν, κριτήν δὲ ἢ τῶν γεγενημένων ἢ τῶν μελλόντων. ἔστι δ' ὁ μὲν περὶ τῶν μελλόντων κρίνων οἷον ἐκκλησιαστής, ὁ δὲ περὶ τῶν γεγενημένων οἷον ὁ δικαστής, 3 ὁ δὲ περὶ τῆς δυνάμεως ὁ θεωρός ὅστ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀν εἴη τρία γένη τῶν λόγων τῶν ῥητορικῶν, συμβου-

§ 2. $\theta \epsilon \omega \rho \partial \nu \dot{\eta} \kappa \rho u \tau \dot{\eta} \nu$ This classification of the different kinds of 'audience' is made for the purpose of determining the divisions of Rhetoric; because, the audience being the end and object of the speech, that to which every speech is ultimately referred, and everything being defined or determined by its end $(\tau \epsilon \lambda o s)$, Eth. Nic. III 10, 1115 b 23), the number of the varieties of audiences must fix the number of the divisions or branches of Rhetoric. Audiences are of two kinds; either mere 'spectators', like the $\theta \epsilon a \tau a l$ in a theatre, at the games, or in any exhibition where amusement is the object, or at all events where there is no interest of a practical character or tendency¹; or else 'judges', where some real interest is at stake, and they are called upon to pronounce a decision (pars negotialis, $\pi \rho a \gamma \mu a \tau u v$). But these decisions, and those who pronounce them, again fall into two classes, according as they are referred to questions, (1) of political expediency and look to the future, or (2) of right or wrong in respect of past acts or facts.

So that we have three kinds of audiences, and consequently three branches of Rhetoric. The public or national assembly, to which the deliberative kind of rhetoric is addressed; the law-courts and their 'judges', properly so called, the object of the forensic or judicial branch of the art; and thirdly the 'spectators', those who go to be amused or interested by the show-speeches, or indiffers, the Panegyrics (in two senses), funeral orations, burlesques, or whatever other form may be taken by speeches composed merely to display skill in composition without practical interest (where the display skill in composition without in question); or, if they please, to criticise them, and so become 'critics'.

The term κριτής, 'judge', which belongs properly only to the second of the three branches, may also be extended to the other two, since they all have to 'decide' in some sense, to choose between opposite views, either on questions of expediency in matters of state, or right and wrong in legal questions, or the merits of a composition as 'critics'. Comp. II 18, 1, III 12, 5, and also Rhet. ad Alex. c. 18 (19), 14, where (comp. § 10) κριταί seems to be used in this general sense for all kinds of ἀκροαταί.

¹ Thuc. III. 38 (Cleon to the Athenian assembly), αίτιοι δ' ὁμεῖς κακῶς ἀγωνοθετοῦντες, οἴτινες εἰώθατε θεαταί μὲν τῶν λόγων γίγνεσθαι, ἀκροαταί δὲ τῶν ἔργων, κ.τ.λ. "You go to the public assembly as you go to the theatre, merely in quest of intellectual excitement. You go as θεαταί οτ θεωροί, that is, merely for your amusement; and not as κριταί, that is, carefully weighing the matter of what is said, in order to adopt it in your practice or reject it." Arnold.

λευτικόν, δικανικόν, έπιδεικτικόν. συμβουλής δὲ τὸ μέν προτροπή τὸ δὲ ἀποτροπή αἐὶ γὰρ καὶ οἱ ίδία συμβουλεύοντες και οι κοινή δημηγορούντες τούτων θάτερον ποιούσιν. δίκης δέ το μέν κατηγορία το δ' απολογία τούτων γαρ οποτερονούν ποιείν ανάγκη τούς άμφισβητούντας. ἐπιδεικτικοῦ δὲ τὸ μὲν ἔπαινος 4 τὸ δὲ ψόγος. χρόνοι δὲ ἐκάστου τούτων εἰσὶ τῶ μέν συμβουλεύοντι ὁ μέλλων (περί γάρ τῶν ἐσομένων συμβουλεύει ή προτρέπων ή αποτρέπων), τῶ δὲ δικαζομένω ὁ γενόμενος (περί γὰρ τῶν πεπραγμένων ἀεί ο μέν κατηγορεί ο δέ απολογείται), τω δ' έπιδεικτικώ κυριώτατος μέν ο παρών, κατά γάρ τὰ ὑπάρχοντα έπαινούσιν ή ψέγουσι πάντες, προσχρώνται δὲ πολλάκις καὶ τὰ γενόμενα ἀναμιμνήσκοντες καὶ τὰ μέλλοντα 5 προεικάζοντες. τέλος δὲ ἐκάστοις τούτων ἔτερόν ἐστι, καὶ τρισὶν οὖσι τρία, τῷ μὲ συμβουλεύοντι τὸ συμφέ-

§ 3. ἐπιδεικτικόν] 'ea quae constat laude ac vituperatione. Quod genus videtur Aristoteles, atque eum secutus Theophrastus, a parte negotiali, hoc est πραγματική, removisse, totamque ad solos auditores relegasse; et id eius nominis, quod ab ostentatione ducitur, proprium est.' Quint. III 7, 1.

οί ίδια συμβουλεύοντες] 11 18, 1, αν τε πρὸς ένα τις τῷ λόγφ χρώμενος

προτρέπη ή αποτρέπη, οίον οι νουθετούντες ποιούσιν ή πείθοντες.

όποτερονοῦν] Append. [This Appendix was apparently never written. s.] § 4. χρόνοι—τῷ μὲν συμβουλεύοντι ὁ μέλλων] I have already pointed out, Introd. p. 120, that Demosthenes adds τὸ παρόν, 'present time', to the 'future' of Aristotle, as characteristic of the deliberative branch of Rhetoric; and Aristotle himself, in two subsequent passages of this treatise,

I 6 § I, and 8 § 7.

κυριώτατος] On κύριος, in its secondary and metaphorical application, see note on 1 11 § 4. The kind of 'authority' which this 'present time' is here said to carry with it in the epideictic branch is, that it has of all the three the best right to be there; that it is most 'proper' or appropriate in that place. It has here very much the same sense as in the phrases κυρία ἡμέρα, κυρία ἐκκλησία, a day or assembly which has a special authority, as 'fixed' and 'appointed' for a certain purpose; opposed to all ordinary days, and irregular assemblies, which are σύγκλητοι, called together at a moment's notice on special emergencies.

τὰ γενόμενα-τὰ μελλοντα] The accusatives are here attracted by the

participles, instead of following the principal verb in the dative.

προεικάζοντες] 'with, in the way of, an anticipatory guess or presentiment', of future honours and distinctions of the subject of the encomium,

ρον καὶ βλαβερόν ὁ μὲν γὰρ προτρέπων ὡς βέλτιον συμβουλεύει, ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ὡς χεῖρον ἀποτρέπει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμβάνει, ἢ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, ἢ καλὸν ἢ αἰσχρόν τοῖς δὲ δικαζομένοις τὸ ρ. 12. δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον, τὰ δ' ἄλλα καὶ οῦτοι συμπαραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς ταῦτα τοῖς δ' ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ ψέγουσι τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσχρόν, τὰ δ' ἄλλα καὶ δοῦτοι πρὸς ταῦτα ἐπαναφέρουσιν. σημεῖον δ' ὅτι τὸ εἰρημένον ἐκάστοις τέλος περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων ἐνίοτε οὐκ ᾶν ἀμφισβητήσαιεν, οῖον ὁ δικαζόμενος ὡς οὐ γέγονεν ἢ ὡς οὐκ ἔβλαψεν ὅτι δ' ἀδικεῖ, οὐδέ ποτ ἂν ὁμολογήσειεν οὐδὲν γὰρ ᾶν ἔδει δίκης. ὁμοίως δὲ

§ 5. ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ώς χείρον ἀποτρέπει] 'Fr. A. Wolf's einleuchtende verbesserung ws xelpovos findet einige bestätigung in den ungrammatischen worten der paraphrase: ἐποτρέπει δέ τω χείρονι' (Brandis, ap. Schneid, Philol. p. 45). This alteration seems to me to be totally unnecessary. It is true that the ordinary construction of the verb in the sense here intended is ἀποτρέπειν τινά τινος, or ἀπό τινος, as § 6, 'to divert or dissuade some one from something'. But it is plain it can equally well be adapted to the other form of expression adopted here, 'to divert the thing from the person-in the way of dissuasion-to turn it away from him, as (being) worse', i.e. 'to dissuade him from it (as the Greeks as well as ourselves usually say) as the less expedient course'. An author like Aristotle, always regardless of the ordinary usages of language, may very well be allowed such a liberty of expression. If, however, this be still objected to, we may, without alteration of the text-to be admitted I think, as a general rule, only as a last resource—understand ws xeipov as an absolute case, nomin, or accus., ὁ δὲ ἀποτρέπων ώς χείρον (ον τι), ἀποτρέπει (τινὰ αὐτοῦ). See similar examples in note on II 8, 10.

πρὸς τοῦτο] 'with a view to, with reference to, this'; all the rest (τὰ

άλλα) as supplementary and subordinate to this.

συμπαραλαμβάνει] 'takes in as an adjunct, in aid of, as an auxiliary, subordinate and subsidiary, to his main purpose'; de Anima A 2, 1, τὰς τῶν προτέρων δόξας συμπαραλαμβάνειν ὅσοι τι περὶ αὐτῆς ἀπεφήναντο. Plat. Phaed. 65 A ἐάν τις αὐτὸ (τὸ σῶμα) ἐν τῆ ζητήσει κοινωνὸν συμπαραλαμβάνη. Ib. 84 D, Lach. 179 E. Spengel ad Rhet. ad Alex. XXV 8, p. 192.

τοις δε δικαζομένοις | το τέλος εστί.

ἐπαναφέρουσι] 're-fer' (ἀναφέρειν) 'to' (ἐπί).

§ 6. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ἄλλων κ.τ.λ] On the 'legal issues' here intimated, the ἀμφιβιστήσειε (Aristotle), or στάσειε (subsequent Rhetoricians and Lawyers), comp. I 13, 9; III 15, 2; 16, 6; 17, 1, and Introd. p. 397, Append. E to Bk. III.

καὶ οἱ συμβουλεύοντες τὰ μὲν ἄλλα πολλάκις προΐενται, ὡς δὲ ἀσύμφορα συμβουλεύουσιν ἢ ἀπ' ἀφελίμων ἀποτρέπουσιν οὐκ ἂν ὁμολογήσαιεν ὡς δ' οὐκ
ἄδικον τοὺς ἀστυγείτονας καταδουλοῦσθαι καὶ τοὺς
μηδὲν ἀδικοῦντας, πολλάκις οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. ὁμοίως
δὲ καὶ οἱ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ οἱ ψέγοντες οὐ σκοποῦσιν Ρ. 1359
εἰ συμφέροντα ἔπραξεν ἢ βλαβερά, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν
ἐπαίνω πολλάκις τιθέασιν ὅτι ὀλιγωρήσας τοῦ αὐτῷ
λυσιτελοῦντος ἔπραξέ τι καλόν, οἷον ᾿Αχιλλέα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε τῷ ἐταίρω Πατρόκλω εἰδως ὅτι
δεῖ αὐτὸν ἀποθανεῖν, ἐξὸν ζῆν. τούτω δὲ ὁ μὲν
τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν συμφέρον.
7 φανερὸν δὲ ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀνάγκη περὶ τούτων

ώς δ' οὐκ ἄδικον] (i.e. τοῦ λέγειν ώς, or τοῦ ώς, 'the fact that'), οὐδὲν φροντίζουσιν. On the necessary limitation and qualification of this posi-

tion of Aristotle, see Introd. p. 170.

ἐν ἐπαίνφ πολλάκις τιθέασιν κ.τ.λ.] Isocrates gives credit to the Athenian people, ἐν ἐπαίνφ τίθησιν, for this kind of disinterested policy, in a passage referred to by Victorius. Paneg. § 53 ᾿Αχιλλέα ἐπαινοῦσιν ὅτι ἐβοήθησε κ.τ.λ. Plat. Symp. 179 Ε πεπυσμένος παρὰ τῆς μητρὸς ὡς ἀποθανοῖτο ἀποκτείνας Ἦκτορα, μὴ ποιήσας δὲ τοῦτο οἵκαδ' ἐλθών γηραιὸς τελευτήσοι, ἐτόλμησεν ἐλέσθαι βοηθήσας τῷ ἐραστῆ Πατρόκλφ καὶ τιμωρήσας οὐ μόνον ὑπεραποθανεῖν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπαποθανεῖν τετελευτηκότι. Αροί. 28 C ὁ τῆς Θέτιδος νίος, ὁς τοσοῦτον τοῦ κινδύνου κατεφρόνησε παρὰ τὸ αἰσχρόν τι ὑπομεῖναι, ὤστε ἐπειδὴ εἶπεν ἡ μητὴρ αὐτῷ προθυμουμένῳ Ἔκτορα ἀποκτεῖναι. Θεὸς οὖσα, οὐτωσί πως, ὡς ἐγῷμαι, ὡ παῖ, εἰ τιμωρήσεις Πατρόκλφ τῷ ἐταίρῳ τὸν φόνον καὶ Ἔκτορα ἀποκτενεῖς, αὐτὸς ἀποθανεῖ αὐτίκα γάρ τοι, φησί, μεθ Ἕκτορα πότμος ἐτοῖμος (Hom. Il. Σ 98 et infra αὐτίκα τεθναίην κ.τ.λ. ν. 104) ὁ δὲ ταῦτ ἀκούσας κ.τ.λ. comp. Il. I 410 seq. Aeschines likewise, c. Timarch. §§ 145, 150, refers to (in the one) and quotes (in the other) this same passage of Hom. II. Σ. u. s., but with a totally different purpose.

τούτω δὲ ὁ μὲν τοιοῦτος θάνατος κάλλιον, τὸ δὲ ζῆν (though life) συμφέρον]
Eth. Nic. IX. 8, 1169 a 18, ἀληθὲς δὲ περὶ τοῦ σπουδαίου καὶ τῶν φίλων ἔνεκα πολλὰ πράττειν καὶ τῆς πατρίδος, κἂν δέη ὑπεραποθνήσκειν...τοῖς δ᾽ ὑπεραπο-

θνήσκουσι τουτ' ίσως συμβαίνει αίρουνται δή μέγα καλον έαυτοις.

§ 7. The argument of this and the two following sections of this chapter will be found in a more connected shape in the paraphrase of the Introd. pp. 171—2. The sum of it is simply this: each of the two kinds of τόποι is equally necessary in all the three branches of Rhetoric; (1) the ϵἴδη, or ἴδιοι τόποι, or ἴδιοι τόποι, from which the rhetorical propositions or premisses, the ϵἰκότα, σημϵῖα, and τϵκμήρια are necessarily derived, § 7: and (2) the four κοινοὶ τόποι, here apparently reduced to three, the possible

έγειν πρώτον τὰς προτάσεις τὰ γὰρ τεκμήρια καὶ τὰ εἰκότα καὶ τὰ σημεῖα προτάσεις εἰσὶ ἡητορικαί. όλος μεν γάρ συλλογισμός έκ προτάσεων έστί, τὸ δ' ένθύμημα συλλογισμός έστι συνεστηκώς έκ τών είρη-8 μένων προτάσεων. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὖτε πραχθηναι οἶόν τε ούτε πραχθήσεσθαι τὰ ἀδύνατα άλλὰ τὰ δυνατά, ούδε τὰ μὴ γενόμενα ἡ μὴ ἐσόμενα ούχ οἷόν τε τὰ μέν πεπραχθαι τὰ δὲ πραχθήσεσθαι, ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶ συμβουλεύοντι καὶ τῶ δικαζομένω καὶ τῶ ἐπιδεικτικώ έχειν προτάσεις περί δυνατού και άδυνάτου, ο και εί γέγονεν ή μή, και εί έσται ή μή. έτι δ' έπει άπαντες καὶ ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ ψέγοντες καὶ προτρέποντες καὶ ἀποτρέποντες καὶ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ απολογούμενοι οὐ μόνον τὰ είρημένα δεικνύναι πειρώνται άλλα και ότι μέγα η μικρον το άγαθον η το κακον ή το καλον ή το αίσχρον ή το δίκαιον ή το άδικον, ή καθ' αύτὰ λέγοντες ή πρὸς άλληλα άντιπαραβάλλοντες, δήλον ότι δέοι αν καὶ περὶ μεγέθους καὶ μικρότητος καὶ τοῦ μείζονος καὶ τοῦ ἐλάττονος προτάσεις έχειν, καὶ καθόλου καὶ περὶ ἐκάστου, οἶον τί μεῖζον άγαθον ή έλαττον ή άδίκημα ή δικαίωμα όμοίως δέ

p. 13.

and impossible', 'fact past and future', and 'the great and small (the topic of magnitude or importance) either (1) absolute or (2) comparative

(degree)'. §§ 8, 9.

§ 9. δικαίωμα] is used here and in c. 13 §§ 1, 3, as the opposite to ἀδίκημα, in the sense of 'an act of justice'. So Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 α 8, διαφέρει δὲ τὸ ἀδίκημα καὶ τὸ ἄδικον καὶ τὸ δικαίωμα καὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἄδικον μὲν γάρ ἐστι τῷ φύσει ἡ τάξει' (i. q. νόμφ, natural or of human institution.) τὸ δ' αὐτὸ δὲ τοῦτο ὅταν πραχθῷ ἀδίκημά ἐστι, πρὶν δὲ πραχθῆναι οὕπω, ἀλλ' ἄδικον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ δικαίωμα. καλεῖται δὲ μᾶλλον δικαιοπράγημα τὸ κοινόν, δικαίωμα δὲ τὸ ἐπαρνόρθωμα τοῦ ἀδικήματος: where in the first clause it is used in its ordinary acceptation as 'a just act', = δικαισπράγημα, and contrasted with ἀδίκημα, and afterwards distinguished from it in the more correct sense of 'a rectification of an act of injustice'. It is in this signification that Plato employs it, Legg. IX 8, 864 Ε, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων δικαιωμάτων ἀφείσθω, 'all other penalties', which are as it were 'amendments of a wrong or injustice'. In Thuc. I 41 init. it stands for 'just claims', 'rechtsgründe', Poppo; rechtsanspruch', Heitz, I. c. In Arist. de Caelo,

καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων. περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἐξ ἀνάγκης δεῖ λαβεῖν τὰς προτάσεις, εἴρηται· μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διαιρετέον ἰδία περὶ ἐκάστου τούτων, οἶον περὶ ὧν συμβουλὴ καὶ περὶ ὧν οἱ ἐπιδεικτικοὶ λόγοι, τρίτον δὲ περὶ ὧν αἱ δίκαι.

1 πρώτον μέν οὖν ληπτέον περὶ ποῖα ἀγαθὰ ἢ κακὰ CHAP. IV. ο συμβουλεύων συμβουλεύει, ἐπειδὴ οὐ περὶ ἄπαντα 2 ἀλλ' ὅσα ἐνδέχεται καὶ γενέσθαι καὶ μή. ὅσα δὲ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ἔστιν ἢ ἔσται ἢ ἀδύνατον εἶναι ἢ γενέσθαι, 3 περὶ δὲ τούτων οὐκ ἔστι συμβουλή. οὐδὲ δὴ περὶ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων ἀπάντων' ἔστι γὰρ καὶ φύσει ἔνια

I 10, I, it has a sense either derived from that rectification or amendment, an ἐπανόρθωμα of a wrong view or argument, μᾶλλον ἄν εἴη πιστὰ τὰ μέλλοντα λεχθήσεσθαι προακηκούσι τὰ τῶν ἀμφισβητούντων λόγων δικαιώματα: or rather, as in Thucydides, it denotes a justification or just claim, meaning what the conflicting arguments have each of them to say for themselves. δικαίωμα 'actio iuris, exsecutio iuris, iustificatio, ex qua (per arbitrum) status iustus qui erat violatus restituitur: nam δικαιοῦν est facere ut quid sit δίκαιον'. Fritsche ad Eth. Eudem. Δ 10, 1135 a 13 (p. 109) q. v., Heitz, Verl. Schrift. Arist. p. 253.

olov] 'for example', one of several, is used here, as constantly elsewhere, loosely and carelessly, by Aristotle, in the place of rour' cort, id est.

videlicet, as a more explanatory repetition.

CHAP. IV.

§ 1. On the first of the three branches of Rhetoric, τὸ συμβουλευτικου

or δημηγορικου γένος.

§ 2. είναι ἡ γενέσθαι] This 'fundamental antithesis' and cardinal distinction of ancient philosophy is noticed by Gaisford, incredible as it may appear, for the sole purpose of making merry with it as a sophistical quibble! 'Has Sophistarum ineptias facete ridet Antiphanes apud Athenaeum, III 99 A.'

περί δε τούτων | See note on δήλον δέ, c. I § II p. 20.

§ 3. καὶ φύσεε...καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθά] This same distinction of goods naturally and accidentally accruing to us, is found in Eth. Eud. I 3, 5, 1215 α 12, εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς διὰ τύχην γενομένοις ἡ τοῖς διὰ φύσιν τὸ καλῶς ζῆν ἐστὶν, ἀνέλπιστον ἄν εἴη πολλοῖς. These are opposed to those advantages and objects of desire the acquisition of which depends upon ourselves and our own exertions and studies. οὐ γάρ ἐστι δι' ἐπιμελείας ἡ κτῆσις οὐδὲ ἐπ' αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ τῆς αὐτῶν πραγματείας compared with ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι εἰς ἡμᾶς (to be referred to ourselves), καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστίν. The gifts of nature and the good things that result from accident cannot be included amongst the possible advantages,

καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐνδεχομένων καὶ γίγνεσθαι καὶ μή, περὶ ὧν οὐδὲν πρὸ ἔργου τὸ συμβουλεύειν· ἀλλὰ δῆλον ὅτι περὶ ὅσων ἐστὶ τὸ βουλεύεσθαι. τοιαῦτα δ' ἐστὶν ὅσα πέφυκεν ἀνάγεσθαι
εἰς ἡμᾶς, καὶ ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς γενέσεως ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστίν·
μέχρι γὰρ τούτου σκοποῦμεν, ἔως ἄν εὕρωμεν εἰ ἡμῖν P. 1359 δ.
4 δυνατὰ ἢ ἀδύνατα πρᾶξαι. καθ' ἕκαστον μὲν οὖν
ἀκριβῶς διαριθμήσασθαι καὶ διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἴδη περὶ
ὧν εἰώθασι χρηματίζειν, ἕτι δ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται περὶ

the 'profitable' or 'expedient', which are the object and aim of the deliberative speaker, because they are not attainable by any exertions of our own; and so for the purposes of Rhetoric are just as useless as things necessary and impossible. The subjects of Rhetoric are the subjects of deliberation, and no one deliberates about anything which is beyond the sphere of his influence.

πρὸ ἔργου] Note on c. 1 § 10 p. 17.

άλλα δήλον ότι] (τὸ συμβουλεύειν έστί) περί όσων κ.τ.λ.

§ 4. The following passage, §§ 4—6, descriptive of the rhetorical method and its necessary limitations, and the distinction between it and the method of scientific demonstration, one of the most important in the entire work, will be found almost literally translated in the Introduction, pp. 173—4, to which the reader is referred.

ακριβώs διαριθμήσασθαι] 'to make an exact numerical division', or 'to enumerate in an exact division or analysis'. Plat. Phaed. 273 E, Crat. 437 D, Gorg. 501 A, Legg. I 633 A, et alibi. It is used in a general sense of 'accurate distinction'.

διαλαβεῖν] 'to part, separate, divide, distinguish', is also familiar to Plato, Polit. 147 Ε, τὸν ἀριθμὸν πάντα δίχα διελάβομεν, Symp. 222 Ε, ἵνα χωρὶς ἡμᾶς διαλάβη, Phileb. 23 C, πάντα τὰ νῦν ὅντα...διχῆ διαλάβωμεν, and numerous examples in Ast's Index, s. v.; and still more so διαιρεῖν in the same sense, and διαίρεσις, Sophist. 225 A, διαιρεῖν αὐτὴν δίχα, Polit. 262 D, κατ' εἴδη δύο διαιρεῖν, ib. 283 D, διελωμεν αὐτὴν δύο μέρη, Phaedr. 273 Ε, κατ' εἴδη διαιρεῖνθαι τὰ ὅντα. διαλαβεῖν εἰς εἴδη, 'to classify by genera and species'. Similarly διορίζειν.

περὶ ὧν εἰώθασι χρηματίζειν] 'the subjects of ordinary business, i.e. deliberation (in the assembly)'. χρηματίζειν, which is properly to 'transact χρήματα or business' in general, is here 'transferred' by metaphor (of the class ἀπὸ γένους ἐπὶ εἶδος, Poet. XXI 7), to the special signification of the particular kind of business which is transacted in the general assembly, its debates and consultations; so Pol. VI (IV), 14, 1298 δ 29, καὶ περὶ τούτων χρηματίζειν (of a general assembly as opposed to a βουλή οτ πρό-βουλοι) περὶ ὧν ἄν οὖτοι προβουλεύσωσιν. Ib. c. 15, 1299 δ 39, ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις δημοκρατίαις ἐν αἶς ὁ δῆμος χρηματίζει περὶ πάντων (holds its assemblies and discusses everything). Also to the consultations of the law-courts,

αὐτῶν διορίσαι κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν, οὐ δεῖ κατὰ τὸν παρόντα καιρὸν ζητεῖν διὰ τὸ μήτε τῆς ἡητορικῆς

Demosth. c. Timocr. p. 717, 26, περὶ ὧν ἄν γνῷ τὸ δικαστήριον, πάλιν χρηματίζειν: and again, v. 28, to the deliberations of the assembly. Æschin. c. Timarch. § 23, of the πρόεδροι. Lastly, Demosth. de F. L. p. 430, 24, § 317, applies it to the intrigues of individuals, οὖτοι δ' οὐδὲν ἐπαύσαντο

ίδία χρηματίζοντες.

κατὰ τὴν ἀλήθειαν...ἐμφρονεστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον ἀληθινῆς] of the scientific method which has 'certainty' or necessary truth for its aim and object, as opposed to the popular method of Dialectics and Rhetoric, which has no higher aim than probable opinion, πρὸς δόξαν. Τορ. Α 14, 105 δ 30, πρὸς μὲν οὖν φιλοσοφίαν (true philosophy, science) κατ' ἀλήθειαν περὶ αὐτῶν πραγματευτέον, διαλεκτικῶς δὲ πρὸς δόξαν. See references in Introd. p. 173, note 1. Add, Anal. Post. I 33, 88 b 30, τὸ δ' ἐπιστητὸν καὶ ἐπιστήμη διαφέρει τοῦ δοξαστοῦ καὶ δόξης, ὅτι ἡ μὲν ἐπιστήμη καθόλον καὶ δὶ ἀναγκαίων, τὸ δ' ἀναγκαίον οὐκ ἐνδέχεται ἄλλως ἔχειν κ.τ.λ. Eth. Nic. III 4, 1112 α 8, δοξάζομεν ἃ οὐ πάνν ἴσμεν. On δόξα in general, see Waitz Comm. ad Org. p. 444. On ἐμφρονεστέρας, 'more intelligent, wiser, more

instructive', see above, note on c. 2 § 21 p. 50.

διὰ τὸ μήτε...πολλώ δέ...] Wolf and MS At have πολλώ τε, which is of course the more regular and strictly grammatical usage. On the general question of the meaning and distinctions of καί, δέ, and τε, with and without the negative, see Hermann's excellent dissertation in his Review of Elmsley's Medea, on lines 4, 5. Porson, Elmsley, and their English followers were in the habit of laying down rigorous and inflexible rules of Greek grammar, which were supposed to admit of no exception; any apparent violation of them was to be summarily emended: one of the great services rendered by Hermann to the study of the Greek language is the relaxation of these over exact rules, and the substitution of a rational and logical explanation of these differences of expression, and the analysis of their distinctions, for these often unwarranted alterations of the text. 'Kai particula est coniunctiva', says Hermann; 're adiunctiva; δέ disjunctiva'. In the case of οὐδέ and μηδέ, οὖτε and μήτε, when several things are subordinated to, and included under, one negative conception, the one or the other ($\delta \epsilon$ or $\tau \epsilon$) is used according as the writer had or had not any notion of a difference between them. If the things under the general negative conception are represented merely as subordinate and with no expression of difference or opposition between them, the adnexive τε is employed, and the formula is οὐ...τε...τε, οτ οὐ...οὕτε...οὕτε, and similarly with $\mu \dot{\eta}$: on the other hand, if some difference between any of the subordinate members of the division is to be marked, re must be replaced by de, and the formula will be ov ... ovde, or ovde, ... ovde, or ov ... οὖτε...οὖτε...οὖδέ, and so on for other similar cases. And the change of τε into δέ in the second clause of the sentence before us, represents the sudden occurrence to the writer's mind of the thought that there is an important difference between the two things that are assigned as reasons for not introducing a regular scientific division into the treatment of Rhetoric (viz. its necessarily unscientific character, and the fact that its

είναι τέχνης άλλ' έμφρονεστέρας καὶ μᾶλλον άληθινης, πολλώ τε πλείω δεδόσθαι καὶ νῦν αὐτη τών 5 οἰκείων θεωρημάτων ὅπερ γὰρ καὶ πρότερον εἰρηκότες τυγχάνομεν, ἀληθές ἐστιν, ὕτι ἡ ἐητορικὴ σύγκειται μὲν ἕκ τε τῆς ἀναλυτικης ἐπιστήμης καὶ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πολιτικης, ὁμοία δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν τῆ διαλεκτικη τὰ

province has already been unduly extended by previous professors), which requires to be marked, and accordingly is marked by the change of the particle. This, however, is not the only irregularity in Aristotle's sentence; for, evidently intending at the commencement to include both the subordinate members under the original negative, he introduces in the second clause a positive conception; contributing perhaps to enforce the distinction of the two, but in violation of grammatical accuracy.

πλείω δεδόσθαι...τών οἰκείων θεωρημάτων] far more has been already assigned to it than its own proper subjects of inquiry', refers doubtless to the sophistical professors of Rhetoric, his predecessors and contemporaries; who ὑποδύονται ὑπὸ τὸ σχῆμα τῆς πολιτικῆς, and lay claim to the whole extent of the field of Politics, Rhet. I 2, 7. What this assumption of the Sophists implies is explained in Eth. Nic. X 10, 1181 α 1, τὰ δὲ πολιτικὰ ἐπαγγέλλονται μὲν διδάσκειν οἱ σοφισταί, πράττει δ' αὐτῶν οὐδείς, ἀλλ' οἱ πολιτενόμενοι κ.τ.λ., infr. v. 13, τῶν δὲ σοφιστῶν οἱ ἐπαγγελλόμενοι λίαν φαίνονται πόρρω εἶναι τοῦ διδάξαι ὅλως γὰρ οὐδὲ ποῖόν τι ἐστὶν ἡ περὶ ποῖα ἶσασιν' οὐ γὰρ ἃν τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ ῥητορικῆ οὐδὲ χείρω ἐτίθεσαν κ.τ.λ.

§ 5. της αναλυτικής επιστήμης] See note on c. 1 § 11, p. 19, ή δε πίστις

απόδειξίς έστι.

dναλυτικῶs, opposed to λογικῶs (which is equivalent to διαλεκτικῶs, Waitz on Anal. Post. 82 b 35, p. 353, Poste, u. s., p. 19), properly implies scientific demonstration; and 'analytical' reasoning follows that method: see Anal. Post. 1 22, 84 a 7 seq. It is there said to be exercised ἐν τῶs ἀποδεικτικῶs ἐπιστήμαις...ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀπόδειξίς ἐστι τῶν ὅσα ὑπάρχει καθ' αὐτὰ τοῦs πράγμασιν. On 'Analytics' comp. Trendel. El. Log. Arist. p. 47 sq. Waitz Comm. ad Anal. Pr. p. 366, 7. When Dialectics is here called an 'analytical' science, either 'analytical' stands for 'logical' in general (which is Mr Poste's view, l. c.), or else it represents and includes methodical systematic reasoning of all kinds, which proceeds by way of 'analysis', 'resolving' the objects of knowledge into their ultimate elements, to discover their causes (Trendelenburg, l. c.); and the latter is the explanation that I should prefer.

τῆς περὶ τὰ ἤθη πολιτικῆς] Ethics being a department or branch of the more general and comprehensive science of Politics, Eth. Nic. I I, 1094 6 II, ἡ μὲν οὖν μέθοδος (ἡ ἡθική) τοὐτων ἐφίεται, πολιτική τις οὖσα: the end of both being the same, viz. human good, v. 6. Ib. I 10, 1029 6 29, and c. I3, init. Ib. X 10, 1180 6 3I, μόριον γὰρ ἐδόκει τῆς πολιτικῆς εἶναι. So that the two together make up the 'philosophy of humanity', of man as an individual and in society, ἡ περὶ τὰνθρώπινα φιλοσοφία, X 10,

1181 6 16.

6 δε τοις σοφιστικοίς λόγοις. όσω δ' αν τις ή την διαλεκτικήν ή ταύτην μη καθάπερ αν δυνάμεις άλλ' έπιστήμας πειράται κατασκευάζειν, λήσεται την φύσιν αὐτῶν ἀφανίσας τῷ μεταβαίνειν ἐπισκευάζων p. 14.

§ 6. καθάπερ ἄν] On καθάπερ ἄν (κατασκευάζοι), see above, note on II, 5 p. 9.

δυνάμεις] sc. του πορίσαι λόγους, I 2, 7. On Rhetoric as a practical

faculty, see Introd. pp. 14-19.

It may be as well here to sum up the characteristics of Rhetoric which respectively entitle it to the name of 'art' and 'faculty'. In so far as it is systematic, and follows a method-a logical method-and can look forward to results (implying a knowledge of causes and effects) in persuading its hearers, it is an art; as a practical exercise, not admitting of absolute exactness, or universal conclusions, employing the propositions of all arts and sciences, and the axioms common to them all, only as probable and popular, and having itself no special subject-matter, taking opposite sides of the same question indifferently and arriving at opposite conclusions (so Alexander Aphrodisiensis), it is a δύναμις, a faculty, capable of

development and to be exercised in practice.

μεταβαίνειν] See on I 2, 20. Vater (who seems to have misunderstood the passage), without reason or authority, would omit the words τώ μεταβαίνειν, as not properly applicable to the context άλλα μη μόνον λόγων. And his view is so far supported by the Paraphrast, who also rejects them. Brandis, u. s. p. 46. No one but himself, however, would prefer to connect els επιστήμας with επισκευάζων rather than μεταβαίνειν—a much more natural construction, though this often is certainly admissible-and secondly, the two words, though not absolutely necessary to the sense, are at least in perfect accordance with it when the passage is properly interpreted. 'In proportion as...he will be unconsciously, unintentionally, effacing their real nature by passing over, in his attempt to reconstruct them (alter their formation or system), into sciences of definite special subjects, instead of those (ἐπιστήμας) which deal with mere words', i.e. instead of confining himself to these latter. This is in fact a case of that very common violation of an ordinary grammatical rule which is called the 'figure', (εῦγμα¹ (a mere carelessness of expression dignified by

¹ Of this so-called 'figure', ζεῦγμα, the illicit conjunction of the two heterogeneous notions or expressions under one vinculum, there are in fact two varieties, explained and abundantly illustrated from the works of Tacitus by Bötticher in his Lex. Tacit., Proleg. de Stili Taciti brevitate, p. LXXVIII sq., σύλληψις and ζεύγμα proper. The figure in general is thus described, ' qua aut genere aut personis aut alio quo modo diversa uno eodemque constructionis genere comprehenduntur'; but as I have failed to enter into the distinction which Bötticher makes between the two varieties I will substitute my own explanation of the difference. In σύλληψις the two terms are united in one construction with a third, to which one is referred literally, the other metaphorically, or at all events in different uppears in the instances given, as dissimulationem nox et la vitia incaluisse: praeda famaque onusti: mixti

εἰς ἐπιστήμας ὑποκειμένων τινῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλὰ 7 μὴ μόνον λόγων. ὅμως δ΄ ὅσα πρὸ ἔργου μέν ἐστι

that name), 'a figure of speech', as it is briefly expressed in Liddell and Scott's Lexicon, 'wherein two subjects are used jointly with the same predicate, which strictly belongs only to one, as in Il. A 533, where ἔβη must be supplied with Ζεύς.' So Herod. 1 90, χρηστὰ ἔργα καὶ ἔπεα ποιέειν, where of course λέγειν is required with ἔπεα. Under this head comes the case before us, where to complete the intended sense we must supply ἀλλὰ μὴ μόνον (not τῷ μεταβαίνειν, but τῷ ἐπισκευάζειν ἐπιστήμας) λόγων.

ἐπισκευάζειν, 'to re-construct or re-constitute', is opposed to κατασκευάζειν. The latter is 'to lay down (κατά), settle or establish a system'; the former, 'to construct anew or afresh, to renew'. ἐπί, from the primary sense of direction to, in place, passes into a secondary one of direction or succession in time, 'after'; hence, thirdly, it takes the meaning of repetition, as anew, afresh, re- (in comp.), and of development in the way of growth, as in ἐπιδιδόναι 'to augment or grow'. Hence ἐπισκευάζειν is properly to 'refit', 'renew', 'repair', 'restore', as walls, ships, bridges, roads (Thucyd., Xenoph., Demosth., see the Lexx.), and thence transferred to 'reconstruction' of a science or study. A similar sense of ἐπί appears in the verbs, ἐπειπεῖν 'to say after, or add the words', ἐπανθεῖν, ἐπιβιοῦν (to live after, outlive), ἐπαναθεᾶσθαι (Xen. Cyr. V. 4, 11, to look at repeatedly, over and over again), ἐπαναθεᾶν ibid., ἐπανιέναι, ἐπανέρχεσθαι, ἐπανορθοῦν. Rost. u. Palm, Lex. Art. ἐπί, p. 1046 a.

§ 7. ὅσα πρὸ ἔργου μέν ἐστι διελεῖν, ἔτι δ' ὑπολείπει σκέψιν] Another case of grammatical irregularity and of the 'figure' ζεῦγμα. ὅσα in the first clause is the accus. after διελεῖν: in the second it must be repeated, as

the nomin. to ὑπολείπει.—On πρὸ ἔργου, see supr. c. I § 10 p. 17.

copiis et lactitia. To these I will venture to add from a modern English writer the case of Miss Bolo in Pickwick, who after her defeat at whist in the Bath Assembly Rooms retires 'in a flood of tears and a sedan chair'; to which Eur. Hel. 182, αὐγαῖσιν ἐν ταῖς χρυσέαις ἔν τε δόνακος ἔρνεσιν, is an exact parallel. In ζεῦγμα proper, this third term will not apply in any sense to both of the others, and some other word or phrase must necessarily be supplied to complete the sense; as in the passage of Herodotus quoted above, and in the text of Aristotle.

Add to the examples collected from Tacitus by Bötticher, Hor. Od. III 4. II, ludo fatigatumque somno. Liv. XXVII 46 sub fin. fessi somno ac vigiliis (fessi vigiliis ac propterea somno graves). Hom. II. K 98, καμάτω άδηκότει ήδὲ καὶ ὕπνω. Soph. Oed. R. 271, Electr. 72, 435, 6. Eur. Heracl. 312 Elms. ad loc., 839, 1040. Dem. de F. L. § 93, μη...ἐᾶτε, ἀλλ' ώς κ.τ.λ. Dorvill. ad Charit. p. 394, seq. and Matth. Gr. Gr. 634, Obs. 3, supply examples. Ernesti, in Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v., thus defines ξεῦγμα: in qua figura unum ad verbum plures sententiae referuntur, quarum unaquacque desiderare illud, si sola poneretur. This use of the figure he has not illustrated. It seems to represent something quite different from the other; but what? The ξεῦγμα in fact is a kind of grammatical bracket, under which two heterogeneous expressions are improperly included. Another well-known example of this figure is the truly Irish epitaph on Boyle the Philosopher: 'He was the father of Chemistry, and grand-uncle of the Earl of Cork.'

διελείν, έτι δ' ὑπολείπει σκέψιν τῆ πολιτικῆ ἐπιστήμη, εἰπωμεν καὶ νῦν.

σχεδον γάρ, περί ων βουλεύονται πάντες καί περί α αγορεύουσιν οι συμβουλεύοντες, τα μέγιστα τυγχάνει πέντε τὸν ἀριθμὸν ὄντα· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ περί τε πόρων, καὶ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης, ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακής της χώρας, και των είσαγομένων και έξαγο-8 μένων, καὶ περὶ νομοθεσίας. ώστε περὶ μὲν πόρων τον μέλλοντα συμβουλεύσειν δέοι αν τας προσόδους της πόλεως είδεναι τίνες καὶ πόσαι, όπως είτε τις παραλείπεται προστεθή και εί τις έλάττων αύξηθή, έτι δέ τὰς δαπάνας της πόλεως ἀπάσας, ὅπως εί τις περίεργος άφαιρεθη καί εί τις μείζων έλάττων γένηται ού γάρ μόνον πρός τὰ ὑπάρχοντα προστισχεδον γάρ, περί ων βουλεύονται πάντες κ.τ.λ. The unaccountable difference between the list here given of the principal subjects of Politics with which the deliberative or public speaker will have to deal, viz. (1) πόροι, supplies, ways and means, revenue, finance; (2) war and peace (possibly including alliances); (3) the defence of the country; (4) exports and imports (commerce, trade); and (5) legislation; with that which is found in Polit. VI (IV), 4, has been already pointed out in the Introd. p. 176. In the corresponding chapter of the Rhet. ad Alex. 2 (3 Oxf.) § 2, we have seven such subjects enumerated : religion, περί ἱερῶν ; legislation, περί νόμων, (νόμων συμφερόντων θέσεις, Dem. de Cor. § 309, in a parallel passage); the constitution of the

In Xenophon, Memor. III 6, a conversation is reported between Socrates and Glaucon, whom the former cross-examines on the subject of his political knowledge, with the view of shewing him that he is not yet ripe for a statesman. The principal objects of a statesman's care there enumerated are, the $\pi\rho\delta\sigma\sigma\delta\omega$, Aristotle's $\pi\delta\rho\omega$, the revenue: the state expenses, with the view of reducing them, $\tau\dot{\alpha}$ dvalumata: war, and the means of carrying it on: the enemy's forces, naval and military, and your own: the defence of the country, $\dot{\eta}$ dvalum $\dot{\tau}\dot{\eta}s$ $\chi\dot{\omega}\rho\alpha s$: mines, and the supply of silver (this is from the Athenian point of view): and the supply of corn and other food. These details, and in the same order, are all, with the exception of the mines in Aristotle, and the legislation in Xenophon, enumerated by Aristotle in the following sections, 8-11, so that Gaisford may possibly be right in his suspicion, 'respexit fortasse Aristoteles

state (περὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κατασκευῆς); alliances and commercial treaties (συμβολαίων) with foreign nations; war; peace; and revenue (περὶ πόρου

§ 8. ἀφαιρεθή] 'it may be reduced, curtailed, retrenched'. πρὸς τὰ ὑπάρχοντα προστιθέντες κ.τ.λ.] Not of course=πρὸς τοῖς ὑπάρ-

Xenophontis Mem. III 6.'

θέντες πλουσιώτεροι γίνονται, άλλα και άφαιροῦντες τῶν δαπανημάτων. ταῦτα δ' οὐ μόνον ἐκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἴδια ἐμπειρίας ἐνδέχεται συνορᾶν, άλλ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ τῶν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εὐρημένων ἱστορικὸν εἶναι 9 πρὸς τὴν περὶ τούτων συμβουλήν. περὶ δὲ πολέμου καὶ εἰρήνης τὴν δύναμιν εἰδέναι τῆς πόλεως, ὁπόση τε

χουσιν, 'by adding to present resources', but 'with reference to them', as πρὸς τοῦτο συμπαραλαμβάνει, and συμπαραλαμβάνουσι πρὸς ταῦτα, supr. c. 3, § 5. 'For not only in respect of their existing resources do they become

wealthier by adding to them (προστιθέντες αὐτοῖς)'.

έκ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἴδια ἐμπειρίας] 'from one's own personal experience'. τὰ ἴδια are the facts which have come under one's own personal observation, i.e. the resources of our own country, and the system followed and methods adopted in providing, maintaining, and augmenting them, at home; not these alone are to be 'inquired into', $l\sigma \tau o \rho \iota \kappa \partial \nu$ εἶναι, by the statesman and public speaker, but also the 'inventions', the practices and policy of other nations in regard of these same matters.

συνοραν] 'to take a comprehensive view', 'to look at together', for the

purpose of comparison. See note on συνάγειν, c. 2 § 13 p. 41.

ίστορικόν] The termination -ικος corresponds to the English -ive, and denotes a capacity for, or tendency to. ποιητικός productive, αλαθητικός sensitive, δεκτικός receptive, πρακτικός active, εύρετικός inventive, ἀποδεικτικός demonstrative, and so on: though in some cases there is no corresponding English word actually in use. According to this analogy λστορικός is 'inquisitive', qualified and disposed to inquire into things

in general.

When Herodotus at the opening of his work uses the term lστορίη, he means no more than the 'inquiries' or 'researches' which he is now collecting into a continuous narrative. (Comp. § 13, al περὶ τὰς πράξεις lστορίαι and the note there.) It is not till we come to Polybius that the word assumes its modern signification, a scientific history, a systematic work that can be employed in education, Hist. I 1, 2. It is now defined, and distinguished from other departments of study by the addition of πραγματική, I 2,8, the study of human actions and affairs. Its scientific character, which entitles it to the epithet 'demonstrative', lστορία ἀποδεικτική, II 37, 3, ἀποδ. διήγησις, IV 40, 1, is derived from its method of tracing causes and motives of actions: lστορίας γὰρ ἐὰν ἀφέλη τις τὸ διὰ τἰ, καὶ πῶς, καὶ τίνος χάριν ἐπράχθη, καὶ τὸ πραχθὲν πότερα εὕλογον ἔσχε τὸ τέλος, τὸ καταλειπόμενον αὐτῆς ἀγώνισμα μὲν μάθημα δὲ οὐ γίγνεται' καὶ παραυτίκα μὲν τέρπει, πρὸς δὲ τὂ μέλλον οὐδὲν ὡφελεῖ τὸ παράπαν.

But it is only the term, not the thing, that is new in Polybius' time. Thucydides' History, though not so called, (Thucydides is called a ξυγγραφεύς, see Poppo on 1, 1, 2,) is at least as scientific in all essential points

as that of Polybius, or indeed any other.

On the distinction of λόγιος, λογοποιός, and ἱστορικός, see some good observations in Dahlmann's Life of Herod. c. 6 § 2.

ύπάρχει ήδη καὶ πόσην ἐνδέχεται ὑπάρξαι, καὶ ποία

§ 9. ὑπάρξαι, ἀρκεῖν, Anonymus, ap. Brandis, u. s., p. 44.

The verbs ὑπάρχειν, εἶναι, γίγνεσθαι, stand to one another in the relation of past, present, and future; to be already in existence, to be (simple and absolute being, independent of time), and to become, to come into being from a state (if that be possible) of non-being. The aorist infin. gives ὑπάρξαι here a future sense, 'to become or to be made', which does not naturally, ex vi verbi, belong to it. Hermann, in one of those notes which have thrown so much light upon the niceties of Greek grammar (on Ajax 1061 subsequently referred to without further discussion in the treatise de Part. av IV, 2, Opuscula, Vol. IV), contends against Elmsley (who had condemned as a solecism this use of the agrist infin, without av. after verbs such as δοκείν, νομίζειν, οίεσθαι, φάναι, ελπίζειν, προσδοκάν, in reference to future time) in support of the usage; and distinguishes three modes of expression in which futurity is conveyed by the infinitive: first, the simple future inf. as δοκείν πεσείσθαι, which conveys directly the simple and absolute notion of futurity, without modification or qualification; second, the infin., aorist or present, with αν, πίπτειν αν, πεσείν av, which indicates a merely conditional futurity, might or would fall, under certain circumstances or conditions; and thirdly, the present or aorist infin, without αν, πίπτειν, or πεσείν, which, corresponding to the indefinite (in point of time) present and agrist, πίπτει and ἔπεσε, denote simply the possibility or likelihood of the object falling at some uncertain future time; caducum esse. The distinction between the present and aorist infinitive is this: 'Praesentis autem et aoristi infinitivis, sive accedat αν sive non, ita utuntur, ut aoristus rei transcunti, praesens duranti adhibeatur.'

Without disputing the truth of this, it is yet possible to explain the difference otherwise. Permanence ('duranti') does not seem to me to be in any way connected with the conception of present time, though the perfect often is; as when we say 'this has been' up to the present time, we often imply our belief in its continuance; and I should rather explain the present infin, in these cases as expressing the mere fact of the existence of the thing named, or the abstract notion of it. The present tense, as it is called, I act, I do, to act, to do, is in reality independent of time: the time present is, I am acting, I am doing; and the present infin. 'to do' is the naked conception of 'doing' without any connotation of time (so the present infinit. with the definite article stands for a substantive; to elvas is the mere notion of being). The aorist infin. again may derive its notion of futurity and likelihood, either, as Hermann thinks, from the indefiniteness expressed by the tense, or, in other cases, from the connotation of habit, implying liability, which is also one of its acquired senses. The broad distinction will be, δοκῶ πεσεῖσθαι, 'I think it will fall', at some future time, and nothing more : δοκῶ πίπτειν or πεσεῖν αν, 'I think it could, would, or might fall', under certain conditions; δοκώ πίπτειν, 'I think the notion of falling belongs to it', 'I think it may fall'; that is, that it is liable, or likely, to fall, caducum esse: and δοκῶ πεσείν, implying also the liability or likelihood of the preceding, is distinguished from it (according to Hermann) by

τις ή τε υπάργουσά έστι καὶ ή τις ένδέχεται προσγενέσθαι, έτι δὲ πολέμους τίνας καὶ πῶς πεπολέμηκεν. ού μόνον δε της οίκείας πόλεως άλλα και των ομόρων ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι. ἡ καὶ πρὸς ούς ἐπίδοξον πολεμείν, όπως πρός μεν τους κρείττους είρηνεύηται, Ρ. 1360. πρός δέ τους ήττους έπ' αὐτοῖς ή το πολεμεῖν. καὶ τας δυνάμεις, πότερον όμοιαι ή ανόμοιαι έστι γαρ

representing the act or event as transient and not permanent. But such a distinction as this last, though it be intelligible, is at least untranslatable; as in such a case as νοείς δράσοι (Soph. Phil. 918), 'what dost thou intend to do', where the expression of the liability must needs be omitted, and still more the transient nature of the proposed act. But we can hardly suppose that any distinction can be seriously intended when Sophocles writes voeis δράσαι: and then, three lines afterwards, v. 921, δραν νοείς. The choice between the two seems to be dictated rather by

convenience than by any other motive.

With regard to the distinction of the present and agrist infin., it may be observed, that we are often obliged, as the practice of translation shews, to disregard whatever difference there may be conceived to be between them, as either inappreciable or at all events inexpressible, and to render them by the same English words. Take, for example, the ordinary phrase δεί λαβείν (it occurs, for instance, 11 8, 12). It is quite certain that in this case past time is not directly signified; though it may possibly be included as an accessory in the notion of it in the way of an addition to the abstract conception of 'taking up, acquiring'-as representing the previous formation of the opinion, which has been taken up before. But at all events no one would think of translating dei habeir in any other form than that of the simple verb 'to assume or suppose'.

η τις ἐνδέχεται] ἐνδέχεσθαι is here used, as is customary with other writers, as a personal verb; Aristotle generally employs it as an imper-

sonal. Comp. note on c. 2, 14.

ή καὶ οὖς ἐπίδοξον] 'or indeed of those with whom war may be expected'. Supply for the sense, ή καὶ (δεῖ εἰδέναι τὴν δύναμιν τούτων) πρὸς ους ἐπίδοξον (ήμῶν οτ ήμῶς) πολεμείν. ἐπίδοξος, 'subject to, liable to expectation', ἐπί penes, note on 1 1, 7, ἐπὶ τοῖς κρίνουσι. Similarly ἐπίδικος, subject to a δίκη, ἐπιζήμιος infr. I 14, 7, II 23, 21, ἐπαίτιος liable to blame, έπάξιος, ἐπικίνδυνος, ἐπιθάνατος (Demosth.), ἐπίκληρος, ἐπισφαλές (liable to trip) Pol. 11 5, ἐπίμαχος, ἐπίβατος, ἐπίδρομος. This notion is more directly expressed by ὑπό in composition, ὑπόδικος, ὑπεύθυνος, &c.

εἰρηνεύηται] εἰρηνεύειν, though used as a neuter in Plat. Theaet. 180 B. and in other authors, is properly transitive, 'to bring into a state of peace, pacificate, or reconcile' contending parties, and hence employed

here as a passive.

έπ' αὐτοῖς] Note on I I, 7 p. 10; and on I I, 12 p. 22, δι' αὐτών: I 7, 35, τῶ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλῶς, and note there.

καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις] (τῶν ὁμόρων ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι) πότερον ὅμοιαι ἡ ἀνό-

καὶ ταύτη πλεονεκτεῖν ἢ ἐλαττοῦσθαι. ἀναγκαῖον δὲ καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα μὴ μόνον τοὺς οἰκείους πολέμους τεθεωρηκέναι ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς τῶν ἄλλων, πῶς ἀποβαίνουσιν· ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων τὰ ὅμοια γίγνεσθαι 10 πέφυκεν. ἔτι δὲ περὶ φυλακῆς τῆς χώρας μὴ λανθάνειν πῶς φυλάττεται, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸ πλῆθος εἰδέναι τῆς φυλακῆς καὶ τὸ εἰδος καὶ τοὺς τόπους τῶν φυλακτηρίων (τοῦτο δ' ἀδύνατον μὴ ἔμπειρον ὄντα τῆς p. 15. χώρας), ἵν' εἴτ' ἐλάττων ἡ φυλακὴ προστεθῆ καὶ εἴ τις περίεργος ἀφαιρεθῆ καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τόπους

μοιαι (εἰσι ταῖς οἰκείαις). This rule is well illustrated by Archidamus' comparative estimate of the Athenian and Lacedaemonian forces preparatory

to engaging in the war, Thuc. I 80, 3.

πλεονεκτείν ἡ ἐλαττοῦσθαι] properly contrasted. πλέον ἡ ἔλαττον ἔχειν, 'to have too much or too little', 'more or less than your due'. So in Thucyd. I 77, ἐλασσοῦσθαι and πλεονεκτείσθαι (the irregular passive of πλεονεκτείν) represent the same notion, 'to come by the worse, or to be overreached'. And so here, 'for in this point also we may be at an advantage or disadvantage'.

ἀπὸ γὰρ τῶν ὁμοίων κ.π.λ.] 'for similar circumstances are naturally fol-

lowed by, or naturally give rise to, similar results'.

§ 10. ω είτ ελάττων] (εστίν ή φυλακή), ή φυλ. προστεθή, or perhaps

rather, είτ' ελλάττων (εστίν) ή φυλακή, (αυτη) προστεθή.

περίεργος] is properly said of one 'who troubles himself over much' (περί), either about his own affairs, or those of others; (these two significations will be found illustrated in the Lexicons). Hence it acquires the general sense of 'superfluity', as here. Comp. Plat. Polit. 286 C, περίεργα λέγειν, and Apol. 19 Β, Σωκράτης...περιεργάζεται ζητῶν τά τε ὑπὸ γῆς καὶ τὰ ἐπουράνια (of an idle curiosity). Dem.? Phil. δ΄ 150, 24, ἐξ ὧν ἐργάζη καὶ περιεργάζη τοὺς ἐσχάτους ὅντας κινδύνους. Ib. 143, 17, περίεργον καὶ μάταιον ἀνόλωμα, and elsewhere in Dem. and the other orators. Arist. Eccles. 220, εἰ μή τι καινὸν ἄλλο περιειργάζετο. See also in *Ind. ad Fragm. Com. Graec.* Meineke, Vol. v. Pt. 2.

καὶ τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους τόπους τηρῶσι μᾶλλον] Translate the whole passage, 'in order that whether the defence (defensive preparation) be too little, addition be made to it, or if superfluous, it be retrenched, and their attention be rather directed to the watching or guarding (fortification) of favourable positions'. ἐπιτηδείους τόπους are places favourable, defensible, snitable to the purpose for which they were intended, viz. for protecting the country. Thuc. 11 20, ὁ χῶρος ἐπιτήδειος ἐψαίνετο ἐνστρατοπεδεῦσαι: Herod. IX 2, χῶρος ἐπιτηδεώτερος ἐνστρατοπεδεῦσαι: VI 102, ἐπιτηδεώτατον χώριον ἐνιππεῦσαι, always apparently of a 'favourable' position, and this seems to be here the natural, as it is the usual, sense of ἐπιτήδειος and of the passage in general. And so Victorius, 'et ut relictis parum opportunis

11 τηρώσι μάλλον. ἔτι δὲ περὶ τροφῆς, πόση δαπάνη ἰκανὴ τῆ πόλει καὶ ποία ἡ αὐτοῦ τε γιγνομένη καὶ εἰσαγώγιμος, καὶ τίνων τ' ἐξαγωγῆς δέονται καὶ τίνων εἰσαγωγῆς, ἵνα πρὸς τούτους καὶ συνθῆκαι καὶ συμβολαὶ γίγνωνται πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφυλάττειν ἀναγκαῖον ἀνεγκλήτους τοὺς πολίτας, πρός τε τοὺς κρείτ-12 τους καὶ πρὸς τοὺς εἰς ταῦτα χρησίμους. εἰς δ' ἀσφάλειαν ἄπαντα μὲν ταῦτα ἀναγκαῖον δύνασθαι

locis magis idoneos tueantur.' (There is another possible—but I think not probable—interpretation of ἐπιτηδείους τόπους, viz. loca commoda or opportuna, suitable or convenient to the enemy, easy of access, readily assailable: τηρεῖν, as before, being to guard or defend.)

θεωρείν, ούκ ελάχιστον δε περί νομοθεσίας επαίειν.

§ 11. πρώς τούτους] i.e. παρ' οίς έστιν ων δέονται: those that are capa-

ble of providing them with that they want.

συνθήκαι καὶ συμβολαί] On συμβόλαια and συναλλάγματα see above, note

on I I, 10 p. 16.

συνθήκη is a general term for a treaty, compact, contract, convention, usually of a public nature, between two states, but also all private contracts, covenants, and bargains; see Rhet. I 15, 20-23, περί συνθηκών. σύμβολα-here called συμβολαί, apparently a απαξ λεγόμενον in this sense; in Pol. 111 9, 1280 a 38, συνθήκαι and σύμβολα are contrasted—are technically confined by the grammarians to a particular and special kind of contract, international commercial treaties. Meier ü. Schömann, Att. Process, p. 494, note 49. In the passage referred to, σύμβολα first occurs apparently in its proper sense, πάντες οίς ἔστι σύμβολα προς άλλήλους: and then, as distinguished from συνθήκαι, which here stand for commercial treaties in general, συνθήκαι περί τῶν εἰσαγωγίμων, seems to be applied to those special and subordinate articles of commercial contracts which made provisions against the infliction of mutual damage and wrong, or established a system of compensation which protected the contracting parties against mutual injury, σύμβολα περί τοῦ μή ἀδικείν. In the usual sense, Pol. III I, 1275 a 9, τούτο γάρ ύπάρχει καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ συμβόλων κοινωνούσιν, 'even the members of different states who are connected by international commercial treaties have reciprocal legal rights, so that it cannot be this which constitutes a citizen'. In Thuc. I 77, the ξυμβόλαιαι πρὸς τοὺς ξυμμάχους δίκαι denote the actions at law which arise out of these ξύμθολα. Dem. c. Mid. 570, τὰ σύμβολα συγχέων. See Buttm.'s Ind., s. v.

πρὸς δύο γὰρ διαφυλάττειν κ.τ.λ.] 'for there are two classes of persons between whom and the citizens it is necessary that irreproachable conduct or behaviour, or a thoroughly good understanding, should be steadily,

persistently (&á, thoroughly, throughout), maintained'.

§ 12. περὶ νομοθεσίας ἐπαΐειν] 'to understand the subject of legislation'.

In this section occur several points in common between the Rhetoric

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως, ώστ' ἀναγκαῖον εἰδέναι πόσα τ' ἐστὶ πολιτειῶν εἴδη, καὶ ποῖα συμφέρει ἐκάστη, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνων φθείρεσθαι πέφυκε καὶ οἰκείων τῆς πολιτείας καὶ ἐναντίων. λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι, ὅτι ἔξω τῆς βελτίστης πολιτείας αὶ ἄλλαι πᾶσαι καὶ ἀνιέμεναι καὶ ἐπιτει-

and Politics, which, though they may not be direct references from one to the other, yet serve to illustrate the relation between them. They are noticed by Brandis, in Schneidewin's *Philologus*, u. s. p. 33. I will com-

pare them in the order in which they stand.

ἐν γὰρ τοῖς νόμοις ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία τῆς πόλεως] On legislation comp. I 1, 7. That the laws ought to be supreme in a state, and not any one or several, or the entire body of citizens, is argued and concluded in Polit. III 15, 1286 a 7 seq. and again c. 16, 1287 a 18, τὸν ἄρα νόμον ἄρχειν αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ἡ τῶν πολιτῶν ἐνα τινά κ.τ.λ. The different forms of constitutions, and what is salutary and conservative or destructive of each of them, are treated, for instance, in Pol. III 6, and VIII (V) I et seq. And not only is the substance of the next sentence, λέγω δὲ τὸ ὑπὸ οἰκείων φθεἰρεσθαι κ.τ.λ., found in the discussions of the Politics VIII (V) I, but the very same metaphor, from the tightening and relaxation of the strings of the lyre, is employed there, 1301 δ 17, as here; and in c. 9, 1309 δ 18, the same illustration, derived from the flat and aquiline nose, is used to represent the excessive exaggeration and intensification, or depression and relaxation of the constitution, as of the feature, which altogether effaces its true character.

dni μεναι καὶ ἐπιτεινόμεναι] This metaphor from the screwing up or relaxation of the strings of the lyre, producing a difference of musical pitch or tone, which it raises or lowers, is a very favourite one both with Plato and Aristotle, and is used to represent, as I have already said, exaggeration or intensification on the one hand, (exactly as we speak of 'screwing up our courage' Macbeth 17, 60), and depression or relaxation on the other. If for example the nose is lowered or depressed to excess in the way of flatness as a snub-nose, or exaggerated in the other direction to excessive sharpness and prominence as an aquiline nose, it ends by losing the character of a nose altogether, and is either altogether effaced or becomes a beak: and so with the constitutions of states.

τὸ ὁπὸ οἰκείων φθείρεσθαι therefore means that forms of government are destroyed or change their character by the exaggeration or relaxation of their own proper and peculiar institutions, and it is in the 'mean' state alone between these two excesses that the constitution can be said to maintain its true character. For instance the δροs, definition or principle, of a democracy is equality; if this be intensified or exaggerated, or carried to excess, if the thing be logically carried out, and everybody actually becomes equal, the government degenerates into mob-rule or anarchy and thus loses its true democratic character; if it be relaxed and the equality diminished, the democratic principle and its institutions become

νόμεναι φθείρονται, οἷον δημοκρατία οὐ μόνον ἀνιεμένη ἀσθενεστέρα γίνεται ὥστε τέλος ήξει εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπιτεινομένη σφόδρα, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡ γρυπότης καὶ ἡ σιμότης οὐ μόνον ἀνιέμενα ἔρχεται εἰς τὸ μέσον, ἀλλὰ καὶ σφόδρα γρυπὰ γινόμενα ἣ σιμὰ οὕτω διατίθεται ὥστε μηδὲ μυκτῆρα δοκεῖν εἶναι. χρήσιμον δὲ πρὸς τὰς νομοθεσίας τὸ μὴ μόνον ἐπαἵειν τὶς πολιτεία συμφέρει ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων θεωροῦντι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις εἰδέναι, αὶ

so enfeebled, that the inequalities increase until at last it becomes an oligarchy, ἀνιεμένη ἀσθενεστέρα γίνεται ὥστε τέλος ήξει εἰς ὁλιγαρχίαν.

Plat. Lys. 209 B, Rep. IV 441 E, το μέν επιτείνουσα και τρέφουσα...το δε ανιείσα παραμυθουμένη, VI 498 B, επιτείνειν τα εκείνης γυμνάσια, III 412 A, επιτεινομένω και ανιεμένω, ib. 410 D, μαλλον δ' επιταθέν τοῦ δέοντος σκληρόν τε και χαλεπον γίγνοιτ' αν...μαλλον ανεθέντος αὐτοῦ μαλακώτερον κ.τ.λ. Phacdo 98 C, οἶα ἐπιτείνεσθαι και ανίεσθαι, 86 C, 94 C and elsewhere.

This was transmitted by the master to his disciple. In Aristotle it occurs, Pol. VIII (V) 1, 1301 b 16, η ίνα ἐπιταθώσιν η ἀνεθώσιν. Ib. c. 8, 1308 δ 2, τὰ τιμήματα ἐπιτείνειν ἡ ἀνιέναι, ἐὰν μέν ὑπερβάλλη ἐπιτείνοντας...ἐὰν δέ έλλείπη ἀνιέντας, ib. c. 9, 1309 b 18, u. s., VII (VI) 6, 1320 b 30, VI (IV) 6, 1293 a 26 and 30 unepreiver, Eth. Nic. VI I, 1138 b 23, eore res σκοπός πρός ου αποβλέπων ο του λόγου έχων έπιτείνει και ανίησιν. In Pol. V (VIII) 7 1341 b ult., he says of music as a 'relaxation' προς διαγωγήν, that it is προς ανεσίν τε και προς την της συντονίας (overstraining or exertion) ανάπαυσιν. Comp. Pol. VI (IV) 3, ult. άρμονίας συντονωτέρας and ανειμένας; whence εντονος (intense), σύντονος, ανειμένος, ανειμένως, are applied, the two first to braced nerves, vigorous exertion or character; the latter to relaxation or dissoluteness of life and manners, or to slackness, laxity, and effeminacy. In Pol. IV (VII) 17, 1336 a 30, it is said that children's sports should be neither ἐπιπόνους nor ἀνειμένας; and c. 4, 1326 a 26, that no well-constituted state should be ανειμένην, uncontrolled, slack, loose, relaxed, i. e. allowed to run to excess, in its numbers. Eth. Nic. 11 4 sub. init. δργισθήναι σφοδρώς ή ανειμένως, ib. III 7, 1114 a 5, ανειμένως ζην, open, easy, careless, dissolute life. Comp. Thuc. I 6, II 39 ανειμένη τη διαίτη, ἀνειμένως διαιτώμενοι. The corresponding Latin terms are intendere and remittere, Cic. Orat. § 59, Quint. X 3, 24, doubtless borrowed from the Greek.

οῦτω διατίθεται ώστε κ.τ.λ.] 'it assumes such a condition or shape

that it seems to be no nose at all'.

§ 13. ἐκ τῶν παρεληλυθότων θεωροῦντι] 'by studying out of', i.e. 'drawing conclusions or deriving observations from the study of the past'.

άλλὰ κοὶ τὰς παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις κ.τ.λ.] Aristotle had already probably, when this was written, supplied the deliberative orators of his time with the means of acquainting themselves with this branch of political study, by his work called Πολιτείαι, a collection of the constitutions

ποῖαι τοῖς ποίοις ἀρμόττουσιν. ὥστε δῆλον ὅτι πρὸς μὲν τὴν νομοθεσίαν αὶ τῆς γῆς περίοδοι χρήσιμοι (ἐντεῦθεν γὰρ λαβεῖν ἔστι τοὺς τῶν ἐθνῶν νόμους), πρὸς δὲ τὰς πολιτικὰς συμβουλὰς αὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς οf 158 states existing at that period, and serving apparently as an appendix to the extant Politics. It is included in the lists both of Diogenes, ν 27, and of the Anonymus in Buhle, Arist. Vol. 1 p. 65. Diogenes' title, which is more descriptive than the other, runs thus: Πολιτεῖαι πόλεων δυοῖν δεούσαιν ἐξήκοντα καὶ ἐκατὸν, καὶ ἰδία δημοκρατικαί, ὀλιγαρχικαί, ἀριστοκρατικαί, καὶ τυραννικαί. The extant fragments of this work are collected in Rose's Arist. Pseudepigraphus, Pt. 2, p. 391—537 (this collection is much more complete than that of Neumann, which is printed in the Oxf. ed. of Bekker's text, Vol. x p. 234, as an appendix to the Politics). The latest results of the researches on this subject are given by Heitz, Verlor. Schrift. Arist. p. 230, seq.

al της γης περίοδοι] 'Travels round the world', 'survey of the earth'. These were books of Geography physical and descriptive, containing not only an account of the relative position of cities and countries, but also observations upon the manners and customs of the inhabitants. Hence they are recommended to the study of the Politician. These were founded either upon personal observation, or upon the reports of travellers; whence the name περίοδοι. Ar. Meteor. 1 13, 13, δήλον δ' έστὶ τοῦτο θεωμένοις τὰς τῆς γῆς περιόδους' ταύτας γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ πυνθάνεσθαι παρ' έκάστων ουτως ανέγραψαν, δσων μή συμβέβηκεν αυτόπτας γενέσθαι τούς λέγοντας (quoted by Victorius). For a similar reason books of the same kind were called περίπλοι, 'circumnavigations or nautical surveys', as those of Scylax, Hanno, &c. or περιηγήσεις. (Διονύσιος ὁ περιηγητής. Διόδωρος ὁ περιηγητής, Athen. XIII 591 Ε. Πολέμων ὁ περιηγ., ib. IX 372 A, XXI 552 B.) One of the earliest and best known of them was that of Hecataeus, referred to by Herodotus, IV 36 γελώ δε δρέων Γης περιόδους γράψαντας πολλούς ήδη...οί 'Ωκεανόν τε ρεόντα γράφουσι πέριξ την γην ἐοῦσαν κυκλοτερέα ώς από τόρνου, και την Ασίην τη Ευρώπη ποιεύντας ίσην. Ιη V 49 the term is applied to Aristagoras of Miletus' famous map, (by Strabo assigned to Anaximander), πίνακα έν τῷ γῆς ἀπάσης περίοδος ἐνετέτμητο, καὶ θάλασσά τε πάσα, καὶ ποταμοί πάντες. From the hints in Herod. IV. 36, Ar. Meteor. II 5, διὸ καὶ γελοίως γράφουσι νῦν τὰς περιόδους τῆς γῆς' κ.τ.λ. (where the author proceeds to say, following Herodotus, that the circular shape of the earth assigned to it by these writers is impossible), and from Pol. 11 3, 1262 a 12, sub fin., the general nature of the contents of these works may be gathered. Eudoxus, the mathematician and astronomer, of Cnidos, was the author of one of these works, referred to by Athen, VII 288 C, ἐν ἔκτφ γῆς περίοδου (Victorius), also Ctesias, Dionysius, Diodorus, Polemo. An account of Hecataeus' περίοδος is given by Mure, Hist. Gk. Lit. 1V 144, Bk. 1V ch. 3 § 3.

αὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς πράξεις γραφόντων ἱστορίαι] See note on ἱστορίαι, § 7. The addition 'about men's actions' is still required to define the kind of 'inquiries' in which 'history' engages: ἱστορία has not yet become technical indications.

nical, indicating a special department of study.

πράξεις γραφόντων ιστορίαι άπαντα δε ταῦτα πολιτικῆς άλλ' οὐ ρητορικῆς έργον έστίν.

περὶ ὧν μὲν οὖν ἔχειν δεῖ τὸν μέλλοντα συμβου- P. 1360 b. λεύειν, τὰ μέγιστα τοσαῦτα ἐστίν· ἐξ ὧν δὲ δεῖ καὶ περὶ τούτων καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων προτρέπειν ἢ ἀποτρέπειν, λέγωμεν πάλιν.

σχεδον δὲ καὶ ἰδία ἐκάστω καὶ κοινῆ πᾶσι σκοπός _{CHAP. V.}
τις ἐστίν, οὖ στοχαζόμενοι καὶ αἰροῦνται καὶ φεύγουσιν· καὶ τοῦτ' ἐστὶν ἐν κεφαλαίω εἰπεῖν ἡ τ'

ἔχειν] 'to be informed or furnished'. 'The information' which he must 'have' is left to be supplied. Understand τὰς προτάσεις, which generally stands in Aristotle for the 'materials' of Rhetoric which the

speaker must have at his command.

λέγωμεν πάλιν] 'let us go back, begin again, take a fresh start as it were, and proceed to state...' Compare the end of the first chapter. This form of expression and use of πάλιν are very familiar to Aristotle in commencing a new subject. See, for example, de Anima II I init., c. 2 init.

CHAPTER V.

The analysis of Happiness.

The object of the public or deliberative speaker lies in the future, and is always something attainable; no one deliberates about that which is altogether out of his power. Now happiness or some form or part of it is the universal aim; the complete analysis of happiness, therefore, will include every object of προτροπή and ἀποτροπή which he can suggest to

his audience, and every kind of political expediency.

§ 1. Eth. Nic. I I init. πῶσα τέχνη καὶ πῶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο τἀγαθὸν, οὖ πάντ ἐφίεται. Ib. 1094 b 3, χρωμένης δὲ ταύτης (τῆς πολιτικῆς) ταῖς λοιπαῖς πρακτικαῖς τῶν ἐπιστημῶν, ἔτι δὲ νομοθετούσης τί δεῖ πράττειν καὶ τίνων ἀπέχεσθαι, τὸ ταύτης τέλος περιέχοι ἀν τὰ τῶν ἄλλων, ὥστε τοῦτ ἀν εἴη τἀνθρώπινον ἀγαθόν. Χ 6 init. ἐπειδὴ τέλος αὐτὴν (τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν) τίθεμεν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων. Polit. I I init. ἐπειδὴ πῶσαν πόλιν κοινωνίαν τινὰ οὖσαν καὶ πῶσαν κοινωνίαν ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς ἔνεκεν συνεστηκυῖαν, τοῦ γὰρ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες, δῆλον ὡς πῶσαι ἀγαθοῦ τινὸς στοχάζονται. Plat. Symp. 205 Α καὶ οὐκέτι προσδεῖ ἔρεσθαι ἴνα τὶ δὲ βοίλεται εὐδαίμων εἶναι ὁ βουλόμενος, ἀλλὰ τέλος δοκεῖ ἔχειν ἡ ἀπόκρισις. Phileb. 54 C τό γε μὴν οὖ ἔνεκα τὸ ἔνεκά του γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ γίγνοιτ ἄν, ἐν τῆ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ μοίρα ἐκεῖνὸ ἐστι. Gorg. 499 Ε τὸ ἀγαθὸν τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων, καὶ ἐκείνου ἔνεκεν δεῖν πάντα τἄλλα πράττεσθαι, κ.τ.λ. Euthyd. 278 Ε αἰίδὶ.

έν κεφαλαίω εἰπεῖν] 'to speak summarily', to sum up in one notion, to describe all human ends and aims by the single phrase 'happiness and

its parts'.

2 εὐδαιμονία καὶ τὰ μόρια αὐτης. ὤστε παραδείγματος χάριν λάβωμεν τί ἐστιν ὡς ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν ἡ εὐδαιμονία, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ μόρια ταύτης περὶ γὰρ ταύτης καὶ τῶν εἰς ταύτην συντεινόντων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων ταύτη αἱ τε προτροπαὶ καὶ αἰ ἀποτροπαὶ πᾶσαι εἰσίν τὰ μὲν γὰρ παρασκευάζοντα ταύτην ἡ τῶν μορίων τι, ἡ μεῖζον ἀντ' ἐλάττονος ποιοῦντα, δεῖ πράττειν, τὰ δὲ φθείροντα ἡ ἐμποδίζοντα ἡ τὰ 3 ἐναντία ποιοῦντα μὴ πράττειν. ἔστω δὴ εὐδαιμονία

§ 2. ως ἀπλως εἰπεῖν] speaking broadly and generally, without descending to particulars. Opposed to καθ' ἔκαστον. See note on 1 2, 4,

p. 30.

§ 3. $\tilde{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\omega$ $\delta\dot{\eta}$ $\epsilon\dot{\nu}\delta\alpha\mu\rho\nu\dot{\nu}\dot{\omega}$] Brandis, u. s. p. 48, note 42, (after Spengel) remarks upon this use of $\tilde{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\omega$ as marking the *popular* character of the definitions that follow—as if it were a matter of indifference whether they are right or not, provided that they are so generally acceptable as to be certain to satisfy the audience. The same form is repeated c. 6, 2; 7, 2; 10, 3; 11 2, 1, and throughout the chapters on the $\pi\dot{\alpha}\theta\eta$. On the definition of Rhetoric, see Introd. p. 13; and on *this* definition of happiness, p. 176.

Aristotle's own definition of happiness in the Eth. Nic., the result of his inquiries in that work, is something far different, ἐνέργεια ψυχῆς κατ' ἀρετήν, the fully developed activity or active exercise (implying full consciousness) of the soul in respect of its proper (and therefore highest) excellence: that is contemplation, θεωρία, the exercise of the highest faculty, the νοῦς, or intuitive reason; the highest faculties being the intellectual. This is the theory; but practically a lower view of happiness is admitted (Bk. X), which consists in the exercise of the moral as well as the intellectual virtues. Of the definitions here given, αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς comes nearest to his own: it expresses a self-sufficing life, complete in itself, independent of all external aids and advantages, and is in fact essential to the notion of happiness. See Eth. Nic. 1 5 (quoted below).

The essentials of the three first of these definitions are found all united in the conception of happiness, the ultimate end of all human desire and effort, which forms the conclusion of the tenth book of the Nicomachean Ethics, from the sixth chapter to the end. It contains first, the $\epsilon \vartheta \pi \rho a \xi l a$ $\mu \epsilon \tau' d \rho \epsilon \tau \eta s$, in the exercise of moral and intellectual virtue, the intellectual being the higher and more perfect form of it, and in that the intuitive contemplative energy; secondly, the $a \vartheta \tau \dot{a} \rho \kappa \epsilon \iota a \tau \dot{\eta} s \zeta \omega \eta s$, the self-sufficiency and independence of everything external, which is necessary to perfection and happiness; and thirdly, the life $\mu \epsilon \tau' d \sigma \phi h \lambda \epsilon \iota a s$, the happiness residing in $\theta \epsilon \omega \rho \iota a$ being most secure because it is most independent and the nearest approach to the happiness of the Gods, who have all their wants and faculties satisfied in themselves, and want nothing from without (c. 7); and also $\eta \delta \iota a \tau \sigma s$, because pleasure is the necessary accompaniment of

εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς, ἢ αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς, ἢ ὁ βίος ὁ μετ' ἀσφαλείας ἥδιστος, ἢ εὐθηνία κτημάτων καὶ

every ἐνέργεια (active exercise, realisation in exercise, of any δύναμις or capacity), and θεωρία being the most perfect form of ἐνέργεια, the pleasure that accompanies it must needs be the highest and most complete; and the exercise of the moral faculties in proportion to their comparative excellence. καὶ τῷ ἀνθρώπω δὴ ὁ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν βίος (ἦδιστος καὶ κράτιστος), εἴπερ τοῦτο μάλιστα ἄνθρωπος. οὖτος ἄρα καὶ εὐδαιμονέστατος. Eth. N. x 7 ult. (In the popular and lower sense of the words this definition of happiness would belong to the Epicurean school.) The fourth definition, εὐθηνία κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων is only applicable to a state. The Stoic definition of happiness was εὖροια βίον. Sext. Emp. Pyrrh. Hypot. Γ § 172, πρὸς Ἡθικούς § 30.

εὐπραξία μετ' ἀρετῆς] Comp. Pol. IV (VII) 1, 1323 δ 20, ὅτι μέν οὖν έκάστω της εύδαιμονίας επιβάλλει τοσούτον ήσον περ άρετης και φρονήσεως καὶ τοῦ πράττειν κατὰ ταύτας, έστω συνωμολογημένον ήμίν, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, ος ευθαίμων μέν έστι καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐθεν δε τῶν εξωτερικῶν άγαθων άλλα δι' αύτον αύτος και τω ποιός τις είναι την φύσιν, έπει και την εύτυγίαν της εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταῦτ ἀναγκαῖον ἔτερον είναι κ.τ.λ. Ιb. c. 3, 1326 b 12, αλλ' εί ταῦτα λέγεται καλώς και τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν εὐπραγίαν θετέον, καὶ κοινή πάσης πόλεως αν είη καὶ καθ' έκαστον αριστος βίος ο πρακτικός. By comparing this latter passage with the definition, it would seem that the sense of eimpagia in the latter must be limited to 'well doing', and not extended to 'welfare', which it, like εὖ πράττειν, is capable of including. Pol. IV (VII) 1, καὶ πόλιν εὐδαίμονα τὴν ἀρίστην είναι καὶ πράττουσαν καλώς. άδύνατον δε καλώς πράττειν την μη τα καλά πράττουσαν. Ib. c. 3 sub init. άδύνατον γάρ του μηθέν πράττοντα πράττειν εύ, την δ' εὐπραγίαν καὶ την εὐδαιμονίαν είναι ταὐτόν. Ib. c. 8, εὐδαιμονία...άρετης ἐνέργεια καὶ χρησίς τις τέλειος. C. 13, 1332 α 7.

αὐτάρκεια ζωῆs] Eth. Nic. I 5, 1097 b 7, φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἐκ τῆs αὐταρκείας τὸ αὐτὸ συμβαίνειν (the notion of αὕταρκες leads to the same result, or conception of happiness as that of τέλειον, previously applied to determine it). τὸ γὰρ τέλειον ἀγαθὸν αὕταρκες εἶναι δοκεῖ...τὸ δ' αὕταρκες τίθεμεν ὁ μονούμενον αἰρετὸν ποιεῖ τὸν βίον καὶ μηδενὸς ἐνδεᾶ· τοιούτον δὲ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν οἰόμεθα εἶναι. Comp. X 6, 1176 b 5, οὐδενὸς γὰρ ἐνδεῆς ἡ εὐδαιμονίαν αὐτάρκης. c. 7, 1177 a 28, ἥ τε λεγομένη αὐτάρκεια (which is essential to happiness) περὶ τὴν θεωρητικὴν μάλιστ' ἀν εἴη (and therefore the highest and most perfect happiness must consist in θεωρία). A similar αὐτάρκεια or independence is attributed to the perfect state in the Politics. On the notion of the perfect state or constitution in the second degree, that is, under the necessary limitations incident to a human condition, so far as humanity allows of perfection at all, see Pol. VI (IV) II init. In Pol. IV (VII) 5 init. αὐτάρκεια is thus defined, τὸ πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηθενὸς αὕταρκες.

εὐθηνία] and εὐθηνεῖν are Ionic and also late Greek forms belonging to the κοινὴ διάλεκτος, for the Attic εὐθενεῖν and εὐθενία or εὐθένεια, and denote a 'flourishing state', or 'prosperity' in general. 'εὐθενεῖν enim non tam robur (quod verbo εὐσθενεῖν subjectum est) quam vigorem et vitalitatem declarat, ut v. c. Aiax aliquis aut Hercules εὐσθενεῖν dicatur, sed vel

σωμάτων μετὰ δυνάμεως φυλακτικῆς τε καὶ πρακτικῆς τούτων σχεδὸν γὰρ τούτων εν ἢ πλείω τὴν 4 εὐδαιμονίαν ὁμολογοῦσιν εἶναι ἄπαντες. εἰ δή ἐστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονία τοιοῦτον, ἀνάγκη αὐτῆς εἶναι μέρη εὐγένειαν πολυφιλίαν χρηστοφιλίαν πλοῦτον εὐτεκνίαν πολυτεκνίαν εὐγηρίαν, ἔτι τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς, οἶον ὑγίειαν κάλλος ἰσχὺν μέγεθος, δύναμιν ἀγωνιστιtenerrima planta, quum laeto iuventae flore nitet, εὐθενεῖν dici possit. Et maximi quidem proprie de succo sanitatis et corporis incremento deque uberi proventu et auctu, sed non minus apte de prospero rerum publicarum

maximi quidem proprie de succo sanitatis et corporis incremento deque uberi proventu et auctu, sed non minus apte de prospero rerum publicarum privatarumque successu, deque omni ubertate et affluentia dicitur.' (From an excellent note by Lobeck on these words, ad Phryn. &-c. p. 465—7: Lobeck derives εὐθενεῖν from εὖ and θέω (τίθημι), comparing it with other verbs of similar formation. The MSS of Arist. give sometimes εὐθενεῖα and εὐθενεῖα, but generally εὐθηνεῖα and εὐθηνεῖα. Lobeck's note may be applied as a corrective of Victorius' ad h. l.)

κτημάτων καὶ σωμάτων] 'property' of all kinds, goods and chattels, including especially flocks and herds; and 'population', here estimated by 'bodies', not by 'souls' as Christianity has taught us to reckon it.

§ 4. εὐτεκνία (εὖτεκνος, εὖπαις, εὖπαιδία, εὐτεκνεῖν, Aeschylus and Euripides), and εὖγηρία, εὖτεκνος, and εὐγήρως, 'blessing in children, and in old age', are applied by Aristotle to animals, as well as to the human race, in his works on Natural History: e.g. to birds, in the sense of 'prolific', Hist. An. IX 11, 1; 12, 3; 17, 1; IX 12, 3; εὖγηροι ὄρνιθες.

πολυφιλία, χρηστοφιλία, both defined by Aristotle himself in § 16, 'number of friends, worthiness of friends'. The latter is defined by Liddell and Scott, 'the love of good men or good deeds', [a slip corrected, how-

ever, in a subsequent edition. s.]

τὰς τοῦ σώματος ἀρετάς] The ἀρετή or 'excellence' of anything is determined by its ἔργον or special function or business; that which it was made to do. On this notion of ἔργον, see the reff. given in note on c. 2, § 12. ἀρετή therefore is so far from being confined to moral virtue, though it is applied to this κατ' ἐξοχήν, that it may be extended to everything which has any use or object, animate or inanimate; but in the highest and most appropriate sense is attributed to human faculties

bodily, mental, and moral.

μέγεθος] So Homer and Hesiod reckon size as well as strength and beauty amongst personal advantages. Od. ζ 276, τίς δ' ὅδε Ναυσικάα ἔπεται καλός τε μέγας τε ξεῖνος; Ib. σ 248, περίεσσι γυναικῶν εἶδός τε μέγεθός τε. ω 252, οὐδε τί τοι δούλειον ἐπιπρέπει εἰσοράασθαι εἶδος καὶ μέγεθος. σ 218. ω 373. Il. B 58, &c. Hesiod, Scut. Herc. 3, and Plato, Alc. I p. 123 E, in an enumeration of the personal qualities and other advantages that a young man might be proud of, εἰ οὖν λέγοιμεν ὅτι κάλλει τε καὶ μεγέθει καὶ γένει καὶ πλούτω καὶ φύσει τῆς ψυχῆς... Charmid. 154 C, θαυμαστὸς ἐφάνη τό τε μέγεθος καὶ τὸ κάλλος. So Ovid's Romulus, after his deification, pulcer et humano maior. Arist. Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1323 δ 7, ἐν μεγέθει

κήν, δόξαν τιμήν εὐτυχίαν ἀρετήν. τοὕτω γὰρ ἃν αὐταρκέστατος είη, εἰ ὑπάρχοι αὐτῷ τά τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἄλλα παρὰ ταῦτα. ἔστι δ' ἐν αὐτῷ μὲν τὰ περὶ ψυχήν καὶ τὰ ἐν σώματι, ἔξω δὲ εὐγένεια καὶ φίλοι καὶ χρήματα καὶ τιμή. ἔτι δὲ προσήκειν οἰόμεθα δυνάμεις ὑπάρχειν καὶ τύχην.

1 ή και τὰ μέρη αὐτής, φρόνησιν ἀνδρίαν δικαιοσύνην σωφροσύνην.

γὰρ ἡ μεγαλοψυχία, ὥσπερ καὶ τὸ κάλλος ἐν μεγάλφ σώματι, οἱ μικροὶ ὅ ἀστεῖοι (pretty or neat) καὶ σύμμετροι, καλοὶ δ' οὔ. Pol. IV (VII) 4, 1326 α 33, τό γε καλὸν ἐν πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει εἴωθε γίνεσθαι. Poct. VII 4, τὸ γὰρ καλὸν ἐν

μεγέθει καὶ τάξει ἐστί, ap. Zell, ad loc. Eth.

δόξαν] 'reputation', estimation in men's thoughts or opinion. ('Fame is the spur that the clear spirit doth raise, that last infirmity of noble minds, to scorn delights, &c.' Lycidas).—τιμήν honours, substantial and externally manifested, which are conferred upon a man, offices, titles, προ-εδρίαι, civil privileges, and such like. See further in § 9. On the value of τιμή in general, Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 b 18, μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ ἀν θείημεν ο τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὖ μάλιστ' ἐφιένται οἱ ἐν ἀξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἄθλον. τοιοῦτον δ' ἡ τιμή. μέγιστον γὰρ δὴ τοῦτο τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, 1124 a 17.

εὐτυχίαν] distinguished from εὐδαιμονία, Pol. IV (VII) I, 1323 b 20 seq.,

quoted above in note on § 3.

ή και τὰ μέρη αὐτῆς, φρόνησιν ἀνδρίαν δικαιοσύνην σωφροσύνην] These words are omitted by MS A°, put in brackets as doubtful by Bekker [4to

ed. 1831], and rejected by Spengel.

αὐταρκέστατος] referring to the second definition, § 3. See note on § 3, p. 73. τά τ' ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθά] When Aristotle adds 'besides these there are no others', he includes, as he tells us in the following sentence, the goods of body and mind under the first head, τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ. His usual division of goods, called the Peripatetic division, is into three kinds; goods of 'mind, body, and estate'. This division, however, was not his own invention; as he tells us in Eth. Nic. I 8, 1098 δ 17, ταύτην την δόξαν (the opinion in question) παλαιάν οὖσαν καὶ ὁμολογουμένην ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσοφούντων. Cic. Tusc. V 30, tria genera bonorum, maxima animi, secunda corporis, externa tertia, ut Peripatetici, nec multo veteres Academici secus. Eth. Nic. I 8, sub init. νενημημένων δή τών αγαθών τριχή, καὶ τῶν μὲν ἐκτὸς λεγομένων τῶν δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα, τὰ περὶ ψυχήν κυριώτατα λέγομεν καὶ μάλιστα ἀγαθά. Pol. IV (VII) I Sub init. τριών οθσών μερίδων, τών τε έκτος καλ τών έν τῷ σώματι καλ τών έν τῆ ψυχή, πάντα ταῦτα ὑπάρχειν τοῖς μακαρίοις δεῖ. Zell ad Eth. Nic. I 8, 2. Cic. de Fin. III 13, 43, et alibi. Schrader ad h. l. This division cannot be at all events confined to the Peripatetics or derived from them alone, for it appears in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. I (2 Oxf.) 8, διαιρήσεις δε τούτο (το συμφέρου) τοις μέν ιδιώταις είς σώμα και ψυχήν και τὰ ἐπίκτητα: unless indeed this be taken as an argument of the later authorship of the Rhet. ad Alexandrum. δυνάμεις] either 'power' of various kinds, 'opes ac civilem potentiam', ούτω γάρ αν ασφαλέστατος ὁ βίος είη. λάβωμεν τοίνυν ὁμοίως καὶ τούτων έκαστον τί ἐστιν.

5 εὐγένεια μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἔθνει μὲν καὶ πόλει τὸ αὐτόχθονας ἢ ἀρχαίους εἶναι, καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοὺς πρώτους ἐπιφανεῖς, καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς γεγονέναι ἐξ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ζηλουμένοις ἰδία δὲ εὐγένεια ἢ ἀπ ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ γυναικῶν, καὶ γνησιότης ἀπ ἀμ-

Muretus, Victorius, 'potentiam', Vet. Transl.; or faculties and capacities, bodily and mental, 'facultates', Riccob. The first seems to agree better with edruylar.

aσφαλέστατος referring to the third definition of \$ 3.

§ 5. εὐγένεια] in an individual or family is defined in Pol. VI (1V) 8, 1294 α 21, ή γὰρ εὐγένεις ἐστιν ἀρχαῖος πλοῦτος καὶ ἀρετή, and VIII (V) I, 1301 δ 2, εὐγένεις εἶναι δοκοῦσιν οἶς ὑπάρχει προγόνων ἀρετή καὶ πλοῦτος. Rhet. II 15. 2, 3. Plat. Theaet. 174 Ε, τὰ δὲ δὴ γένη ὑμνοῦντων, ώς γενναῖος τις ἐπτὰ πάππους πλουσίους ἔχων ἀποφῆναι, which seems to have been the current definition of εὐγένεια at Athens in Plato's time.

aὐτόχθονας] Herod. I 171, Thuc. I, 2 and 6, Arist. Vesp. 1076, Eur. Ion 29, 589, 737, of Athens; Isocr. Panath. § 124, also of Athens; Paneg. § 24, 25, Dem. de F. L. § 296, of the Athenians and Arcadians. Quint. III 7, 26, laudantur autem urbes similiter atque homines. Nam pro parente est conditor; et multum auctoritatis affert vetustas, ut iis qui terra-dicuntur orti.

καὶ ἡγεμόνας τοὺς πρώτους ἐπιφανεῖς] 'and to have had for their first

rulers famous men', like Theseus at Athens.

καὶ πολλοὺς ἐπιφανεῖς— ἐπὶ τοῖς ζηλουμένοις] 'and many men sprung from their race renowned for things (personal qualities, feats of arms, noble deeds, and such like) that are esteemed and admired'. ἐπί, 'standing, resting upon', 'upon the basis, terms, or condition of ...'.

ໄδία δὲ εὐγένεια ἢ ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν ἢ ἀπὸ γυναικῶν] 'privately, in a family, it may be derived either from the father's or the mother's side', i.e. from

famous ancestors on either.

γνησιότης ἀπ' ἀμφοῖν] 'legitimacy on both sides', in birth and citizenship. γνήσιος, opposed to νόθος, Il. A 102, νἷε δύω Πριάμοιο νόθον καὶ γνήσιον, Plat. Rep. VII 536 A, τὂν νόθον τε καὶ τὸν γνήσιον, and also to ποιητός, εἰσποίητος, θετὸς νίός, Dem. c. Leoch. 1095, 5, τὸ μὲν γὰρ γνήσιόν ἐστιν ὅταν ἢ γόνω γεγονός, καὶ ὁ νόμος ταῦτα μαρτυρεῖ λέγων, ἢν ἃν ἐγγνήση πατὴρ ἢ ἄδελφος ἢ πάππος ἐκ ταύτης εἶναι παίδας γνησίους...ποιητὸς δ' ὁμολογῶν εἶναι φαίνεται οὐκ εἰσποιηθεὶς ὑπὸ τοῦ τετελευτηκότος αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ. and 1099, 19; and hence metaphorically 'genuine', real, true, as opposed to spurious, fictitious. Plat. Rep. IX 587 B, μιᾶς μὲν (ήδονῆς) γνησίας, δυοῖν δὲ νόθοιν. On the γνήσιος πολίτης, cf. Ar. Pol. III 5. The conditions of citizenship vary according to the form of constitution, and the number of the population. In the normal state no βάνανσοι οτ θῆτες, no mechanics or paid agricultural labourers, still less slaves, should be admitted to the rights of citizenship. When the number of the γνήσιοι πολίται (legitimate by birth) declines, νόθοι are admitted; in the opposite case a more stringent rule

φοῖν, καὶ ώσπερ ἐπὶ πόλεως τούς τε πρώτους γνωρίμους ἢ ἐπ' ἀρετῆ ἢ πλούτω ἢ ἄλλω τω τῶν τιμωμένων, καὶ πολλούς ἐπιφανεῖς ἐκ τοῦ γένους καὶ p. 17. ἄνδρας καὶ γυναῖκας καὶ νέους καὶ πρεσβυτέρους. 6 εὐτεκνία δὲ καὶ πολυτεκνία οὐκ ἄδηλα. ἔστι δὲ τῷ P. 1361. κοινῷ μὲν [εὐτεκνία], νεότης ἄν ἢ πολλὴ καὶ ἀγαθή, ἀγαθὴ δὲ κατ' ἀρετὴν σώματος, οἶον μέγεθος κάλλος ἰσχὺν δύναμιν ἀγωνιστικήν ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία νέου ἀρεταί. ἰδία δὲ εὐτέκνία καὶ πολυτεκνία τὸ τὰ ἴδια τέκνα πολλὰ καὶ τοιαῦτα εἶναι,

prevails; and then, εὐποροῦντες δ' ὅχλου κατὰ μικρὸν παραιροῦνται τοὺς ἐκ δούλου πρῶτον ἡ δούλης, εἶτα τοὺς ἀπὸ γυναικῶν τέλος δὲ μόνον τοὺς ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἀστῶν πολίτας ποιοῦσιν—as was the case at Athens.

καὶ ιοσπερ ἐπὶ πόλεως] 'and as in the case of a city (so in the private family, lδία), the distinction of its founders for virtue or wealth, or anything else that is highly valued, and a number of illustrious members of

the race, men and women, young or advanced in years'.

§ 6. τῷ κοινῷ] 'the community, the commonwealth', respublica. τὸ κοινὸν τῶν 'Ιώνων, Herod. V. 109, τῶν Σαμίων, VI. 14, τῶν Σπαρτιητέων, VI. 58. 'τῷ κοινῷ communi recte vertit Muretus, Latini enim Graecos imitantes gentem, nationem, rempublicam, civitatem appellant commune. Cic. in Verr. II 46, statuae a communi Siciliae, quemadmodum inscriptum videmus, datae. Item, I 28, quomodo iste commune Miliadum vexarit'. Schrader. Comp. Fr. Commune. Germ. Gemeinde.

ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ ἀνδρία νέου ἀρεταί] This is a statement of what young men ought to be; their character, what they actually are, is minutely analysed and described in II 12, under the second head of $\eta\theta\eta$, c. 12—17. ἀνδρία appears as one of their characteristics in § 9: σωφροσύνη, self-control, is not characteristic of this age, and is therefore not

mentioned.

εὐτεκνία] The strong feeling of the blessing of children, implied, though not directly expressed, in εὐτεκνία, especially characteristic of the Jews, appears also in the Greek writers, as Euripides, who uses εὐτυχεῖν and δυστυχεῖν to express the possession and the absence of a family, as though the possession of them were happiness, and the want of them misery. See Ion, 699, 772, 775, Androm. 429 (Paley's note), and 713.

τοιαῦτα] 'such' as above described. On this use of τοιοῦτος, implying a notion suggested by a previous expression, see Stallbaum's note on Plat. Phaed. 80 C, ἐὰν μέν τις καὶ χαριέντως ἔχων τὸ σῶμα τελευτήση καὶ ἐν τοιαύτη (i.e. χαριέσση) ὤρα. Compare, inter alia, 59 A, 67 A. Thuc. III 58, νομίζων ἐν γῆ τε φιλία τιθέναι καὶ παρ' ἀνδράσι τοιούτοις (of the like sort, i.e. φιλίοις). Dem. d. F. L. § 103, ἀλλ' ὅσων οὕτος αἴτιος σκεψάμενοι, καὶ χάριν, ἃν ταύτης ἄξιος ἢ, καὶ τοιὐναντίον ὀργήν, ἃν τοιαῦτα ('of that kind' sc. ἀργῆς ἄξια φαίνηται πεποιηκώς, ποιεῦσθε.) Arist. Pol. I 8, 1256 α 36, οἱ δ'

καὶ θήλεα καὶ ἄρρενα· θηλειῶν δὲ ἀρετὴ σώματος μὲν κάλλος καὶ μέγεθος, ψυχῆς δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ φιλεργία ἄνευ ἀνελευθερίας, όμοίως δὲ καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινῆ καὶ κατὰ ἄνδρας καὶ κατὰ γυναῖκας δεῖ ζητεῖν ἕκαστον ὑπάρχειν τῶν τοιούτων· ὅσοις γὰρ τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας φαῦλα ὥσπερ Λακεδαιμονίοις, σχεδὸν κατὰ τὸ ἥμισυ οὐκ εὐ-7 δαιμονοῦσιν. πλούτου δὲ μέρη νομίσματος πλῆθος,

ἀφ' ἀλιείας, ὅσοι λίμνας καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμοὺς ἡ θάλατταν τοιαύτην (of the same kind, suitable for fishing) προσοικούσων. II 4, 1262 b 2, δεῖ δὲ τοισύτους εἶναι, i. e. (from the preceding) less friendly, VIII (V) 10, 1310 b 12, τοισύτου γένους, 'a similar family' (similar to what had been just described).

φιλεργία ἄνευ ἀνελευθερίας] 'industry, without (mean, sordid, illiberal)

unladylike habits'.

Hist. Gr. Vol. II, p. 516 seq.

τὰ κατὰ γυναῖκας, κ.τ.λ.] 'the character and conduct of the women', Polit. II 9, 1269 ὁ 12, ἔτι δ' ή περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας ἄνεσις (relaxation, laxity of manners) καὶ πρὸς τὴν προαίρεσιν τῆς πολιτείας βλαβερὰ καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν πόλεως...ὧστ' ἐν ὅσαις πολιτείαις φαύλως ἔχει τὸ περὶ τὰς γυναῖκας, τὸ ῆμισυ τῆς πόλεως εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν ἀνομοθέτητον. ὅπερ ἐκεῖ (at Sparta) συμβέβηκεν...ζῶσι γὰρ ἀκολάστως πρὸς πᾶσαν ἀκολασίαν καὶ τρυφερώς. On the condition of the Spartan women, and the difference in the account given of their moral character by Aristotle, here and in the Politics, on the one hand, and by Xenophon and Plutarch on the other, see Grote,

§ 7. πλούτου μέρη νομίσματος πλήθος κ.τ.λ.] In the discussion of wealth, in the more exact and scientific Politics, this is denied of true wealth. Pol. I 9, 1257 b 8, και γὰρ τὸν πλοῦτον πολλάκις τιθέασι νομίσματος πλήθος, διὰ τὸ περὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τὴν χρηματιστικὴν καὶ τὴν καπηλικήν. ὁτὲ (sometimes) δὲ πάλιν λήρος (mere nonsense, a mere joke or farce) εἶναι δοκεῖ τὸ νόμισμα καὶ νόμος παντάπασι (an absolute convention, with no reality, no true nature, φύσις, in it), φύσει δ' οὐθέν, ὅτι μεταθεμένων τε τῶν χρωμένων οὐθενὸς ἄξιον οὐδὲ χρήσιμον πρὸς οὐδὲν τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐστί, καὶ νομίσματος πλουτῶν πολλάκις ἀπορήσει τῆς ἀναγκαίας τροφῆς' καίτοι ἄτοπον τοιοῦτον εἶναι πλοῦτον οὖ εὐπορῶν λιμῷ ἀπολεῖται, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν Μίδαν ἐκεῖνον...διὸ ζητοῦσιν ἔτερόν τι τὸν πλοῦτον καὶ τὴν χρηματιστικήν, ὀρθῶς ζητοῦντες.—πλοῦτος is defined, Pol. I 8, sub fin. ὀργάνων πλήθος οἰκονομικῶν καὶ πολιτικῶν, 'a stock, or number, of implements or instruments for economical (domestic) and public or political uses'.

This confusion of money and wealth, the foundation of the famous 'Mercantile Theory', is exposed by Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations, Bk. 1v. See also J. S. Mill, Pol. Econ. Prelim. Remarks, Vol. 1, p. 2 seq. 'To mistake money for wealth, is the same sort of error as to mistake the highway which may be the easiest way of getting to your house or lands, for the house and lands themselves.' p. 81.

¹ It is well worth while to compare the chapters of the first book of the Politics in which the germs of the supposed invention, the science of Political Economy, already appear, with the corresponding passages of the Wealth of Nations. The

γης, χωρίων κτησις, έτι δὲ ἐπίπλων κτησις καὶ βοσκημάτων καὶ ἀνδραπόδων πλήθει καὶ μεγέθει καὶ κάλλει διαφερόντων, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ ἀσφαλη καὶ ἐλευθέρια καὶ χρήσιμα. ἔστι δὲ χρήσιμα μὲν μᾶλλον τὰ

γῆs, χωρίων κτῆσις] γῆ, 'territory', the acquisition or possession of public property, χώρια (dim. of χῶρος or χώρια, little places, regions, countries, 'spots',) 'farms', 'estates', 'domains', private properties. Or perhaps rather, γῆ merely 'land' in general, and χώρια the divisions of land,

the actual private properties.

ἔπιπλα, (a division of property) 'moveables', moveable furniture or property of all kinds: opposed to 'fixtures', such as houses and land. Xen. Oecon. IX 6 includes in it all sacrificial furniture or apparatus; and articles of dress, shoes, female ornaments; and of house furniture, as beds. In Thuc. 111 68, α ήν έν τῷ τείχει ἔπιπλα, χαλκὸς καὶ σίδηρος, it stands for household furniture of bronze and iron: everything of this kind which was in the fort, the Laced., after the capture of Plataea, converted into couches (x\lambda\invai) and dedicated to "Hpa. In Arist. Pol. II 7. 1267 b 12, καὶ κατασκευή πολλή (a large stock) τών καλουμένων ἐπίπλων, it is opposed, first, with money, slaves and cattle, to land, and then, secondly, to the three former. Similarly in the present passage, they are distinguished from cattle and slaves as inanimate moveable furniture, or 'plenishing'. Herodotus writes the word ἐπίπλοα in 1 94; elsewhere, as usual, ἔπιπλα. The derivation appears to be, τὰ ἐπιπολής σκεύη, τὰ ἐπιπόλαια, superficial'. They are said to be 'superficial', to 'lie on the surface'. because they are not fixed or rooted, like land, houses, trees; which are all 'property' nevertheless.

ταῦτα δὲ πάντα καὶ ἀσφαλῆ καὶ ἐλευθέρια καὶ χρήσιμα] All the kinds of property just mentioned are 'secure', (in the sense, 'that the use of it is always in your own power', infra), not liable to risk, as money made and employed in trade or commerce; and 'liberal', such as befit a gentleman, a man of 'liberal' education and pursuits, cultivated and accomplished and refined, ὁ πεπαιδευμένος (παιδεία, ἢ διαγιγνώσκομεν τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσχρά, Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 260); and also 'useful', πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καὶ τὸ εὖ ζῆν, and therefore a part of genuine wealth (with which money is here included,

contrary to the true theory).

έλευθέριοs, as here applied, expresses the general notion of liberality, in character and habits of mind. In the Ethics, and most frequently in the ordinary language, it is restricted as a moral virtue to a species of liberality, that namely which manifests itself περὶ δόσιν χρημάτων καὶ λῆψιν. Eth. Nic. II 7. The ἐλευθέριοs represents the gentleman

resemblance is sometimes so close—see, for example, Aristotle's account of the origin and use of money in 1 9 above referred to, and of the three earliest stages of civilisation indicated in c. 8, the hunting, the pastoral or nomad, and the agricultural stage (though it is true that Smith, and with him Mill, Pol. Econ. u. s., inverts the order of the two first and adds a fourth, the commercial stage), that it seems almost impossible that the notions at least should not have been suggested by Aristotle, though as far as I am aware Smith never mentions his name.

κάρπιμα, έλευθέρια δὲ τὰ πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν κάρπιμα

from the democratic point of view; he embodies the notion of 'freedom which is the oper, the principle, and the end and aim of the democratic commonwealth; he is the type of a free citizen, and therefore as expressive of character the term denotes 'that which a model free citizen ought to be'; and connotes or implies those qualifications, particularly education and enlightenment, which enable him efficiently to discharge the proper functions of a free citizen, and those social qualities and habits which fit him for such a society. This is opposed to the aristocratic conception of a gentleman which makes the character or notion depend rather upon birth, wealth and station; and according to which the άγαθοί, ἄριστοι, αριστήες, the boni, optimi, optimates, &c., are the nobles, the men of rank, and of good family in a state. See further on this subject, Donaldson, New Cratylus, §§ 321-328.

Another characteristic of Greek feeling, which deserves notice, is brought into view in the application of the term ελευθέρια to distinguish a particular kind of property; and this is, the contempt for trade and commerce as a profession and a means of acquiring wealth, which as B. St Hilaire observes (note on Transl. of Ar. Pol. p. 36) was common to all antiquity. A similar observation is made by Böckh, Publ. Econ. of

Athens, Bk. I c. 8 p. 43 (Transl.).

Plato's writings abound with contemptuous epithets and expressions applied to έμπορία, καπηλεία, χρηματιστική, χρηματισμός, and all arts and professions of which money-making was the only object; for instance, Legg. IV 1, 705 A, έμπορίας γάρ καὶ χρηματισμού διὰ καπηλείας έμπιπλάσα αὐτήν, ήθη παλίμβολα καὶ ἄπιστα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐντίκτουσα, αὐτήν τε πρὸς αὐτήν την πόλιν ἄπιστον καὶ ἄφιλον ποιεί καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους ἀνθρώπους ώσαύτως, where trade is represented as corrupting and demoralizing. In XI 4, 918 D, in the course of a discussion on the legitimate objects and uses of trade, he makes the remark, διὸ πάντα τὰ περὶ τὴν καπηλείαν καὶ έμπορίαν καὶ πανδοκείαν γένη (in the actual practice of them) διαβέβληταί τε καὶ έν αἰσχροῖς γέγονεν ὀνείδεσιν, which results from their general tendency to corrupt the character of those who follow these pursuits, by the immoderate desire of gain which they stimulate and foster. Accordingly no citizen of the model state is allowed to follow any retail trade; this must be confined to metics and strangers, μέτοικον είναι χρεών η ξένον ος αν μέλλη καπηλεύσειν. ΥΙΙΙ 11, 847 D, καπηλείαν δέ ενεκα χρηματισμών μήτε οὖν τούτου μήτε ἄλλου μηδενὸς ἐν τῆ χώρα ὅλη καὶ πόλει ἡμῖν γίγνεσθαι. Οπ Plato's general views on this subject, as expressed in the 'Laws', see Grote, Plato, III 431.

Aristotle similarly condemns trade and the business and practice of interchanging commodities, so far as its object is mere money-making, χρηματιστική. This is the accumulation of unnatural, artificial property: the only kind of property or wealth that is natural, φύσει, is that which can be applied directly to one's own use, πρὸς χρησω, and ultimately προς το ευ ζην, and falls under the province of οἰκονομική, from which χρηματιστική is excluded. Pol. I g. Hence of the two kinds of κτητική, the one, which may be called οἰκονομική, because it forms part of the science of economics (domestic economy) properly understood, is necesδὲ λέγω ἀφ' ὧν αἰ πρόσοδοι, ἀπολαυστικὰ δὲ ἀφ' ὧν μηδὲν παρὰ τὴν χρῆσιν γίγνεται, ὅ τι καὶ ἄξιον.

sary and laudable; the other, ή καπηλική οτ μεταβλητική, with its offspring usury, which breeds money out of money, and is thence called τόκος, 'is justly reprehended' and usury 'most reasonably the object of abhorrence'. τῆς δὲ μεταβλητικῆς ψεγομένης δικαίως, οὐ γὰρ κατὰ ψύσιν ἀλλ' ἀπ' ἀλλήλων ἐστίν, εὐλογώτατα μισείται ἡ ὀβολοστατικὴ διὰ τὸ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τοῦ νομίσματος

είναι την κτησιν και ουκ εφ' όπερ επορίσθη. κ.τ.λ. 1 10 sub fin.

On the character and tendencies of ἔμποροι, compare Xen. Œcon. XX 27, 28. In the same treatise, c. 1 12, 13, 14, a distinction is taken, similar to that of Aristotle, between χρήματα, wealth or property which you can use directly, which does you direct service, and money, which is excluded from the notion of property in this sense. Xenophon, like Aristotle, approves of nothing but the agricultural mode of life as the best both for mind and body, and as cultivating and promoting the habits which go to form the best of citizens. See Œcon. c. VI 8, 9, 10, c. XV 9.

These extracts will throw light upon the meaning of the word ελευθέρια as applied to the land and stock and buildings and moveables of the landed gentleman or country proprietor. They are said to belong to the gentleman or man of cultivation, in contrast with the degrading or

corrupting habits engendered by trade and commerce.

ἔστι δὲ χρήσιμα μᾶλλον κ.τ.λ.] Property employed in business, and therefore productive, ἀφ' ὧν μἱ πρόσοδοι 'from which one derives one's income', is more useful, but carries with it the notion of sordidness or meanness; the other, because it produces nothing but the enjoyment', which proceeds from using it, because it is not corrupted and degraded by any contact or connexion with money-making, better befits the cultivated man, who should hold himself aloof from such pursuits, and partakes more of the notion of καλόν. Comp. 1 9, 25, καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν, αἰρετά τε γὰρ ἄκαρπα ὄντα. § 26, καὶ κτήματα ἄκαρπα (καλά ἐστι). ἐλευθεριώτερα γάρ. Eth. N. IV 8 sub fin. (of the μεγαλόψυχος), καὶ οἷος κεκτῆσθαι μᾶλλον τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἄκαρπα τῶν καρπίμων καὶ ὦφελίμων—the contrast of 'honour' and 'profit'.

ἀπολαυστικὰ δέ κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Metaph. A 1, 981 δ 17, on the ascending scale of arts, in the order of superiority in knowledge and general excellence. πλείουων δ' εὐρισκομένων τεχνῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν πρὸς τἀναγκαῖα τῶν δὲ πρὸς διαγωγὴν (passe-temps, pastime, diversion) οὐσῶν, ἀεὶ σοφωτέρους τοὺς τοιούτους ἐκείνων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, διὰ τὸ μὴ πρὸς χρῆσιν εἶναι τὰς ἐπιστήμας αὐτῶν. The highest in degree are 'sciences', the invention of which is due neither to necessity nor to the mere desire of amusements, and requires 'leisure': whence it happened that mathematics were first

studied in Egypt by the priestly class.

ό τι καὶ ἄξιον] καί emphatic 'which is in fact at all worth mentioning'.

¹ ἀπόλαυσιε is properly 'sensual enjoyment'. In Eth. N. 1 3, where the three kinds of lives, the ἀπολαυσιεκός, πρακτικός or πολιτικός, and θεωρητικός are distinguished and compared, the first is that which has ήδονή for its sole object, the gratification of the animal appetites and desires, the satisfaction of τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν; the second has ἀρετή moral virtue for its τέλος; the third, θεωρία, the highest activity of the intellect.

όρος δὲ ἀσφαλείας μὲν τὸ ἐνταῦθα καὶ οὕτω κεκτησθαι ωστ' ἐφ' αὐτῷ εἶναι τὴν χρῆσιν αὐτῶν, τοῦ δὲ οἰκεῖα εἶναι ἢ μή, ὅταν ἐφ' αὐτῷ ἢ ἀπαλλοτριῶσαι λέγω δὲ ἀπαλλοτρίωσιν δόσιν καὶ πρᾶσιν. ὅλως δὲ τὸ πλουτεῖν ἐστὶν ἐν τῷ χρῆσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ κεκτῆσθαι καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἐνέργειά ἐστι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ ἡ χρῆσις πλοῦτος. εὐδοξία δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ πάντων σπουδαῖον ὑπολαμβάνεσθαι, ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι

¹ τε infra. ['scribendum τοῦ δὲ οἰκεῖα εἶναι, quod in scripto libro, quo Victorius utebatur, exstat.' Spengel, q. v.]

άξιον (λόγον). This emphatic use of καί, to enforce the meaning, usually of the single word following, and attract special attention to it, is so common in all Greek authors as scarcely to require illustration. It may be worth while to quote one or two prominent examples. Thuc. I 15, πάντες δὲ ἦσαν, ὅσοι καὶ (actually) ἐγένοντο, 97, παύτων δὲ ὅσπερ καὶ ἦψατο... Ἑλλανικός, II 51, ὁ δὲ καὶ γένοιτο εἰ τοῦτο ἐτελεύτα. Arist. Nub. 840, τί δὶ ἄν παρὶ ἐκείνων καὶ μάθοι (what could one learn?) χρηστόν τις ἄν; Eur. Hippol. 91, τοῦ δὲ καὶ μὶ ἀνιστορεῖς πέρι; 224, τί κυνηγεσίων καὶ σοὶ μελέτη; (what is thy concern with hunting?), Ιοη, 241, ὅτι καὶ θέμις, 346, ταῦτα καὶ μαντεύομαι. Aesch. Agam. 97, ὅτι καὶ δυνατόν. 279. Dem. de F. L. § 87, ὅπερ καὶ γέγονεν. § 97, ὁ καὶ θανμάζω (Schäfer's note). Porson ad Phoen. 1373; in interrogation, Wunder ad Antig. 720.

ένταῦθα καὶ οῦτω] 'in such places and in such a way, as to &c.'

τοῦ τε οἰκεῖα εἶναι ἡ μή κ.τ.λ.] The definition of their being our own or not (of ownership), lies in the power of alienation, that is, giving or selling.

όλως δὲ τὸ πλουτεῖν κ.τ.λ.] Polit. I 9 referred to above, pp. 79 and 81. ἡ ἐνέργεια] This technical term, and the opposition of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια which pervades Aristotle's entire philosophy, represents πλοῦτος as a mere δύναμις or dormant faculty or capacity, until it is 'developed' or 'realised' and 'set in action' (energized) by use (χρῆσις), by application to the 'service' of its owner. On this 'fundamental antithesis' of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια as a physical, moral, and metaphysical conception, consult Metaph. Θ 6–9, and Bonitz Comm.; Trendel. El. Log. Arist. § 6, p. 61, Kalegorienlehre, p. 157 seq., Comm. ad Ar. de Anima, Lib. II p. 295–312; Grant, Essays on Ethics, Ess. IV, p. 181 seq. (1st ed.) [p. 231 (3rd ed.)].

§ 8. σπουδαίου] As ἐπιεικής is transferred from the special sense of a particular kind of goodness, i.e. equity, or merciful consideration, to the sense of 'good' in general, (see ante, note on 1 2,4); so σπουδαίος (serious, earnest, Xen. Cyrop. II 2.9, 3.8, as opposed to παίζων¹ 'in jest', to levity and frivolity; and thence, in the sense of something solid and substantial,

¹ Eth. Nic. x 6, 1177 a. 3, βελτίω τε λέγομεν τὰ σπουδαΐα τῶν γελοίων καὶ τῶν μετὰ παιδιᾶς, καὶ τοῦ βελτίονος ἀεὶ καὶ μορίου καὶ ἀνθρώπου σπουδαιοτέραν τὴν ἐνέργειαν.

έχειν οὖ πάντες ἐφίενται ἢ οἱ πολλοὶ ἢ οἱ ἀγαθοὶ ἢ 9 οἱ φρόνιμοι. τιμὴ δ' ἐστὶ μὲν σημεῖον εὐεργετικῆς δόξης, τιμῶνται δὲ δικαίως μὲν καὶ μάλιστα οἱ εὐεργετηκότες, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τιμᾶται καὶ ὁ δυνάμενος εὐεργετεῖν εὐεργεσία δὲ ἢ εἰς σωτηρίαν καὶ ὅσα αἴτια τοῦ εἰναι, ἢ εἰς πλοῦτον, ἢ εἴς τι τῶν ἄλλων ἀγαθῶν, ὧν μὴ ραδία ἡ κτῆσις ἢ ὅλως ἡ ἐνταῦθα ἡ ποτέ πολλοὶ γὰρ διὰ μικρὰ δοκοῦντα τιμῆς τυγχάνουσιν, ἀλλ' οἱ P. 18.

sound and true, to φαῦλος, light, empty, trifling and worthless) acquires a moral sense coextensive with ἀγαθός, and is opposed to φαῦλος, Plat. Rep. VII 519 D, Legg. VI 757 A, &c. as the sound and solid to the light, empty, and unsubstantial. This familiar application of the word is recognized (as in the parallel case of ἐπιεικής, Eth. N. V 14) by Aristotle, Categ. c. 8, 10 b 7, οἷον ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ γὰρ ἀρετῆν ἔχειν σπουδαῖος λέγεται, ἀλλ' οὐ παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς (i. e. the notion is derived from ἀρετῆ, but not the word itself). Plat. ὅροι, p. 415 D (ed. Tur. p. 888) σπουδαῖος ὁ τελέως ἀγαθός.

There is however one point of difference between ἐπιεικής and σπουδαΐος, that σπουδαΐος is extended to every kind of excellence, like ἀγαθός, whereas ἐπιεικής is confined to the expression of excellence in human character. Also σπουδαΐος has another sense distinguishable from the preceding, as opposed to γελοΐος, the 'serious' to the 'jocose' or 'ridiculous'. Xen. Cyrop. II 3. I, τοιαῦτα καὶ γελοΐα καὶ σπουδαΐα ἐλέγετο, and Symp. VIII 3, σπουδαΐαι ἄφρυες, 'grave and serious'. σπουδή and παιδία 'jest' and 'earnest', 'serious work' and 'play' or 'sport', are

constantly brought into contrast by Plato.

§ 9. σημεῖον εὐεργετικῆς δόξης] 'a sign or mark' (in the recipient of the honour) 'of a reputation for beneficence, of a capacity for or tendency (-ικὸς) towards doing good'. All these 'marks of honour' here specified, being intended for the use of the public speaker, have themselves a public or national character. Eth. Nic. IX 16, 1163 b 4, τῆς μὲν γὰρ ἀρετῆς καὶ τῆς εὐεργεσίας ἡ τιμὴ γέρας...οὖτω δὲ ἔχειν τοῦτο καὶ ἐν ταῖς πολιτείαις φαίνεται. οὐ γὰρ τιμὰται ὁ μηδὲν ἀγαθὸν τῷ κοινῷν πορίζων' τὸ κοινὸν γὰρ δίδοται τῷ τὸ κοινὸν εὐεργετοῦντι, τιμὴ δὲ κοινὸν.

οὐ μὴν ἀλλά] 'not but that', 'though at the same time', marks a qualification of, or exception to, too large and unlimited an assertion: οὐ μὴν (ὅλως) ἀλλὰ (τόδε). 'Those who have already done good are fairly and more than all others entitled to such signs of reputation—not however that this need be understood absolutely, so as to exclude the capacity or

inclination to do good as a title to honour.'

πολλοὶ γὰρ διὰ μικρὰ δοκοῦντα κ.π.λ.] Trifles acquire importance, and confer honour, on special occasions, under special circumstances of time and place. Thus what is in ordinary cases a very trifling and unimportant action, as the gift of a cup of cold water, becomes under the circum-

τόποι καὶ οἱ καιροὶ αἴτιοι. μέρη δὲ τιμῆς θυσίαι, μνημαι ἐν μέτροις καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων, γέρα, τεμένη, προεδρίαι, τάφοι, εἰκόνες, τροφαὶ δημόσιαι, τὰ βαρ-

stances in which Sir Philip Sidney gave it at the battle of Zutphen a renowned act of self-denial and heroism. And under other and different circumstances the same cup of water may assume an importance which does not naturally belong to it. 'For whosoever shall give you a cup of water to drink in my name, because ye belong to Christ, verily I say unto you, he shall not lose his reward.' Mark ix. 41, Matth. x. 42.

μέρη τιμής] Some of these are enumerated in Homer, Il. M 310, Γλαῦκε, τίη δὴ νῶῖ τετιμήμεσθα μάλιστα ἔδρη τε κρέασί τ' ἦδὲ πλείοις δεπάεσσι ἐν Λυκίη; πάντες δὲ, θεοὺς ὧς, εἰσορόωσι; καὶ τέμενος νεμόμεσθα μέγα Ξάνθοιο παρ' ὅχθας,—καλὸν, φυταλιῆς καὶ ἀρούρης πυροφόροιο; comp. Z 194,

O 161.

θυσίαι] as those that were instituted by the Amphipolitans in honour of Brasidas, Eth. Nic. V 10, 1134 b 24, οἶον τὸ θύειν Βρασίδα, Thuc. V 11, καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν οἱ ᾿Αμφιπολίται περιέρξαντες αὐτοῦ τὸ μνημεῖον ὡς ῆρωῖ τε ἐντέμνουσι καὶ τιμὰς δεδώκασιν ἀγώνας καὶ ἐτησίους θυσίας κ.τ.λ. Victorius quotes from Plutarch, Vit. Flam. c. 16, p. 378 B, the honours paid by the Chalcidians to T. Quinctius Flamininus, ἔτι δὲ καὶ καθ. ἡμᾶς ἱερεὺς χειροτονητὸς ἀπεδείκνυτο Τίτου, καὶ θύσαντες αὐτῷ τῶν σπονδῶν γενομένων ἄδουσι παιᾶνα πεποιημένον.

μνῆμαι ἐν μέτροις καὶ ἄνευ μέτρων] 'Memorials in prose and verse', possibly epitaphs; but rather, as these may be included in τάφοι, to be understood (as Vict.) of poems and prose compositions in memoriam, such as the English work that bears this title, poems in honour of the illustrious dead, and panegyrics in prose, like some of Isocrates' speeches and Xenophon's Agesilaus. Philosophical dialogues too were sometimes inscribed to the memory of departed friends and named after them, as Aristotle's Gryllus and Eudemus, and Theophrastus' Callisthenes, &c.

Introd. p. 53.

γέρα] gifts of honour; as μισθοί, 'rewards of merit', not money, for mere use; such as privileges conferred on princes and persons of distinction ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς γέρασιν πατρικαὶ βασιλεῖαι, Thuc. I 13; constantly in Homer, (pars praecipua, donum praecipuum, principi prae aliis datum, Damm, Lex. Homer.) as the prime of the spoils, the fairest of the captives, κούρην, ἡν ἄρα μοι (Achilles) γέρας ἔξελον νἶες 'Αχαιῶν, Il. II 56, the largest portion of meat, or drink, at the banquet, Il. M 312 (quoted above). Eth. Nic. V. 10, 1134 b 8, μισθὸς ἄρα τις δοτέος, τοῦτο δὲ τιμὴ καὶ γέρας. Fritzsche, ad h. l., quotes Plato, Rep. VII. 516 C, τιμαὶ καὶ ἔπαινοι καὶ γέρα, and Legg. XI 922 A.

τεμένη] From τέμνειν, something 'cut off' and appropriated, as a portion of land, to the special service of a. God or hero; also to chieftains and kings during their lifetime for their own use. Frequent in Homer, as Il. M 313 (u. s.). Z 194, καὶ μὴν οἱ Λύκιοι τέμενος τάμον ἔξοχον ἄλλων,

¥ 184, 391.

προεδρίαι, τροφαί δημόσιαι] The privilege of the 'foremost or front seat' at public spectacles, public assemblies, games, the theatre, &c. 73 &c.), and 'maintenance at the public expense'; at

βαρικά, οἷον προσκυνήσεις καὶ ἐκστάσεις, δῶρα τὰ

Athens in the Prytaneum or Θόλος (Dem. de F. L. §§ 279, 361), σίτησις ἐν Πρυτανείω, Arist. Ran. 764, Pac. 1084, Acharn. 125, Dem. u. s. and §§ 35, 259; both of these privileges were conferred in acknowledgment of meritorious public services, and are often named together, Arist. Equit. 573, καὶ στρατηγὸς οὐδ' ἀν εἶς | τῶν πρὸ τοῦ σίτησιν ἤτησ' ἐρόμενος Κλεαίνετου' | νῦν δ' ἐὰν μὴ προεδρίαν Φέρωσι καὶ τὰ σίτια, | οὐ μαχεῖσθαί φασιν. Ib. 702, Κλέων ἀπολῶ σε νὴ τὴν προεδρίαν τὴν ἐκ Πύλου. 'Αλ. ἰδοὺ προεδρίαν οἶον ὄψομαί σ' ἐγὼ | ἐκ τῆς προεδρίας ἔσχατον θεώμενον. 709, 'Αλ. ἀπονυχιῶ

σου ταν Πρυτανείω σίτια.

τὰ βαρβαρικά, οἶον προσκυνήσεις] προσκύνησις, from πρὸς, and κυνείν, 'to kiss', denotes the oriental and 'barbarous' custom of saluting by 'kissing the hand to' another, in token of inferiority and subjection, and thence is applied to any act of servile obeisance or homage, or to worship and adoration in general: in the last or metaphorical sense it is found in most of the best Greek writers. This practice may very likely have been accompanied by the analogous one of prostration, as the two are often found associated together in one expression. It was distinctive of Oriental barbarism; and prevailed amongst the Medes, Herod. I 119, of Harpagus and Astyages, the Persians, Id. I 134, ἐντυγχάνοντες δ' ἀλλήλοισι έν τησι όδοισι, τώ δε αν τις διαγνοίη εί όμοιοί είσι οί συντυγχάνοντες. άντι γάρ του προσαγορεύειν άλλήλους, φιλέουσι τοις στόμασι. ήν δε ή ουτερος ύποδεέστερος ολίγω τὰς παρειάς φιλέονται ήν δὲ πολλώ ή ουτερος άγεννέστερος, προσπίτνων προσκυνέει τον έτερον, and the Egyptians 11 80, αντί του προσαγορεύειν άλλήλους έν τησι όδοισι προσκυνέουσι κατιέντες μέχρι του γούνατος την χείρα. Obeisance by prostration, the salam or kotoo, differs from this, though they probably were often used together. It is the latter that is referred to, as a barbarous practice and unworthy of a free Greek, by Aeschylus, Agam. 919 (Dind.), and Pers. 594, comp. 152. They appear to be confounded by Euripides, Orest. 1507, προσκυνώ σ', ἄναξ, νόμοισι βαρβάροισι προσπιτνών. Plato distinguishes them, Legg. X 887 E, προκυλίσεις αμα καὶ προσκυνήσεις. Stallb., in his note on this passage of Plato, cites, in illustration of the προσκύνησιε, Lucian. Encom. Demosth. § 85, καὶ τὴν χεῖρα τῷ στόματι προσάγοντας, οὐδὲν ἄλλ' ή προσκυνεῖν ύπέλαβον. [Cf. Isocr. Paneg. § 151, (οἱ βάρβαροι) έξεταζόμενοι πρὸς αὐτοις τοις βασιλείοις και προκαλινδούμενοι και πάντα τρόπον μικρον φρονείν μελετώντες, θνητόν μεν ἄνδρα προσκυνούντες και δαίμονα προσαγορεύοντες, κ. τ. λ. S.]

ἔκοτασις is the abstract conception of 'getting out of the way'. This 'making way or room' for the passage of a person of rank seems also to have been characteristic of Persian manners. Victorius quotes Plutarch, Artax. c. 11, p. 1016 C, ἐπαιρόμενος δὲ (ὁ Κῦρος) τῆ νίκη, καὶ μεστὸς ὢν ὁρμῆς καὶ θράσους, διεξήλαυνε βοῶν, 'ἐξίστασθε πενιχροί' ('out of the way, beggars',) τοῦτο δὲ Περσιστὶ πολλάκις αὐτῷ βοῶντος, οἱ μὲν 'ἐξίσταντο προσκυνοῦντες. Herodotus, 11 80, says of the Egyptians, συμφέρονται δὲ καὶ τόδε ἄλλο Αἰγύπτιοι Ἑλλήνων μούνοισι Λακεδαιμονίοισι οἱ νεώτεροι αὐτέων τοῖσι πρεσβυτέροισι συντυγχάνοντες εἴκουσι τῆς ὁδοῦ καὶ ἐκτράπονται' καὶ ἐπιοῦσι ἐξ ἔδρης ὑπανιστέαται. So Simonides to Hiero (Xenoph. Hiero VII 2, comp. § 9), in enumerating his privileges as a tyrant, ὑπανιστῶνται ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν θάκων ὁδῶν τε παραχωρῶσι: and Aristotle of the respect due

παρ' ἐκάστοις τίμια. καὶ γὰρ τὸ δῶρόν ἐστι κτήματος δόσις καὶ τιμῆς σημεῖον, διὸ καὶ οἱ φιλοχρήματοι καὶ οἱ φιλότιμοι ἐφίενται αὐτῶν ἀμφοτέροις γὰρ ἔχει Ρ. 1361 δ. ὧν δέονται καὶ γὰρ κτῆμά ἐστίν, οὖ ἐφίενται οἱ φιλοχρήματοι, καὶ τιμὴν ἔχει, οὖ οἱ φιλότιμοι.

10 σώματος δὲ ἀρετὴ ὑγίεια, αὖτη δὲ οὕτως ὥστε ἀνόσους εἶναι χρωμένους τοῖς σώμασιν πολλοὶ γὰρ ὑγιαίνουσιν ὥσπερ Ἡρόδικος λέγεται, οὖς οὐδεὶς ἃν εὐδαιμονίσειε τῆς ὑγιείας διὰ τὸ πάντων ἀπέγεσθαι

from youth to age, Eth. Nic. IX 2, 1165 a 28, καὶ παντὶ δὲ τῷ πρεσβυτέρῳ τιμὴν τὴν καθ ἡλικίαν, ἱπαναστάσει καὶ κατακλίσει καὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις. Cic. Cato Maior 18.63. On the deference paid to old age, enjoined by law at Athens, see Aesch. c. Tim. § 24. Xen. Symp. 31, ὑπανίστανται δὲ μοι ἥδη καὶ θάκων, καὶ ὁδῶν ἐξίστανται οἱ πλούσιοι and de Rep. Lac. XV 6, of the customs at Sparta, καὶ ἔδρας δὲ πάντες ὑπανίστανται βασιλεῖ, πλὴν οὐκ ἔφοροι κ.τ.λ. Another illustration of ἔκστασις is the custom, once generally prevalent, of 'giving the wall' to a superior, as a mark of respect, céder le haut du pavé. (Dict. Acad. Fr.) [Ovid, Fasti, V 67, (senex) et medius iuvenum, non indignantibus ipsis, ibat, et interior, si comes unus erat and Horace, Sat. II 5. 17, 'comes exterior'. S.]

προσκυνήσεις, ἐκστάσεις] The plural of abstract nouns denotes the various individual acts or moments or states included under the general conception.

δῶρα τὰ παρ' ἐκάστοις τίμια | 'quae apud singulas gentes in pretio sunt', Victorius: who illustrates by the olive crown as a prize in the Greek games, and quotes Horace, Ep. II 2. 32, clarus ob id factum donis ornatur honestis, of the prize of valour, bearing a special value in the Roman Military service, assigned to 'Lucullus' soldier'. Of the words by themselves this interpretation is perfectly fair and natural; but in connexion with what follows (as Aristotle seems to have intended, καὶ γὰρ τὸ δῶρον...) they may be understood somewhat differently, and the παρ' ἐκάστοις referred to 'the individuals of the two classes' mentioned immediately after, the φιλοχρήματοι and φιλότιμοι.

§ 10. σώματος δὲ ἀρετὴ ὑγίεια] Health, as a bodily excellence, necessarily implies vigour and the power of active exertion for the fulfilment of the duties of life, without these it is no ἀρετή at all, and no subject of congratulation to the possessor. Health is said to be the ἀρετή of the body, in reference to the doctrine of the proper ἔργον of anything; see note on p. 40 c. 2 § 12. Life is the special function of the body (Eth. Nic. 1 6), and health is life in its best form, as far as the body is concerned.

'Ηρόδικος] a famous physician, native of Selymbria, in Thrace on the Propontis; to be distinguished from another less known physician, Gorgias' brother. of Taontini Plat. Gorg. 448 B, 456 B. On Herodicus and

11 των ανθρωπίνων ή των πλείστων. κάλλος δὲ ἔτερον καθ ἐκάστην ήλικίαν ἐστίν. νέου μὲν οὖν κάλλος τὸ πρὸς τοὺς πόνους χρήσιμον ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα τούς τε πρὸς δρόμον καὶ πρὸς βίαν, ήδὺν ὄντα ἰδεῖν πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν, διὸ οἱ πένταθλοι κάλλιστοι, ὅτι πρὸς

his medical practice, see Plat. Phaedr. 227 E, and Heindorf's and Ast's notes; also Rep. III 406 A seq., where an account of him and his system of self-tormenting is given. Protag. 316 E¹.

τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων] See note on c. 1 § 7, δε άλλας αίτίας ἀνθρωπικάς.

§ 11. Personal beauty has no absolute standard or uniform expression, manifesting itself in the same forms at all periods and under all circumstances. It is relative, not only to the three stages of human life, youth, prime (\$\disp(a\cupi')\$) and old age, but also to the habits and functions natural and appropriate to each of those stages; manly and athletic exercises, in the way of training, to youth; military service, the imperative duty of an active and able-bodied citizen, to middle age; sedentary and intellectual pursuits, to old age, yet so that strength and vigour remain adequate to the endurance of ordinary or 'necessary' labours—extraordinary exertions, as in athletic exercises and service in the field, being no longer required. The habit of body which is fitted to the exercise of these several functions at the corresponding period of life is a constituent element of its personal beauty.

νέου μὲν οὖν κάλλος κ.τ.λ.] When it is said that the beauty of a young man consists partly in the possession of a body in a serviceable state for undergoing the labours and pains incident to the race and feats of strength, the meaning seems to be that the robust habit of body and the muscular development required for the one, and the *indications* of activity combined with strength, which appear in the outward form, necessary for the other, are pleasant to the eye, both in themselves and also as suggesting a fitness or adaptation or harmony of the exterior of the person with the habits and pursuits which are appropriate to youth.

 $\pi\rho\delta s$ ἀπόλαυσιν] means no more than the mere enjoyment afforded by the *sight* of personal beauty. Victorius, who suggests another interpretation, concludes finally in favour of this.

οί πένταθλοι κάλλιστοι] The combination of a natural aptitude or

¹ Macaulay, in his celebrated Essay on Bacon, Edin. Rev., July, 1837, selects these opinions of Plato, which he describes at length from the passage of the Republic, as to the value of Herodicus' system of medical practice, as one of the illustrations of the contempt for all that is useful and practical which pervades the Platonic philosophy; contrasting this, much to the disadvantage of the ancient philosopher, with the opposite spirit and tendency of the Baconian system, which aims, as he assumes, exclusively at practical and attainable good, and promotes the investigation of truth solely with a view to the substantial and solid benefit of the human race. Schrader cites Dial. de Orat. XXIII 4 Ne corpore quidem valetudinem medici probant, quae animi anxietate contingat. Parum est acgrum non esse; fortem et laetum et alaerem volo. Prope abest ab infirmitate in qua sola sanitas laudatur.

βίαν καὶ πρὸς τάχος άμα πεφύκασιν ἀκμάζοντος δὲ

capacity (πεφύκασι πρόs) for strength and speed, vigour and activity, as evidenced by success in the various exercises of the πένταθλον, and the outward expression of these faculties in the configuration of the body, when accompanied with beauty in the shape, symmetry, and expression of the features, is the highest form of personal beauty in the young man. Die übung im Pentathlon war wegen der verschiedenartigkeit der fünf wettkämpfe ganz vorzüglich das werk junger rustiger männer mit elastischem leibe. Die Pentathlen zeichneten sich daher durch gleichmässige stärke der glieder, allseitige gewandtheit und körperlich harmonische bildung vor allen übrigen vortheilhaft aus, und werden daher vom Aristoteles als die schönsten Agonisten genannt. Krause, Gymn. u. Agon. der Griechen, Vol. 1, p. 494, abschn. VI § 31. The exercise of the πένταθλον is therefore mentioned in the passage before us as belonging solely to the period of youth.

The πένταθλον consisted of five exercises as the name implies. These are enumerated in an epigram of Simonides, Anthol. 67 (73), Bergk, Fragm. Lyr. p. 791,

"Ισθμια καὶ Πυθοῖ Διοφῶν ὁ Φίλωνος ἐνίκα ἄλμα, ποδωκείην, δίσκον, ἄκοντα, πάλην,

and in an epigram of unknown authorship quoted by Eustath. ad II. Ψ. p. 1320, Anthol. ἐπιγράματα ἀδέσποτα CCCLIV,

άλμα ποδών, δίσκου τε βολή, καὶ ἄκοντος έρωή, καὶ δρόμος, ήδὲ παλή· μία δ' ἔπλετο πάσι τελευτή.

The same five are named in the Schol. on Pind. Isthm. I 35, and in the Schol. on Plat. Erast. c. 4. I35 D, πάλη, σίγυννος (i. e. ἄκων), ἄλμα, δίσκος, καὶ δρόμος. On the πένταθλον and its contents, see Krause, Οφ. cit. p. 476 seq. abschn. VI § 29.

Πυγμή, boxing, was therefore not included in the πένταθλον; and we are driven to suppose that the concluding words of § 14, \dot{o} δὲ πᾶσι πένταθλον, which certainly according to the ordinary laws of the interpretation of language ought to include it with the rest of the foregoing exercises, are one amongst many instances of Aristotle's carelessness in expressing himself, and affirm something which he could not really have meant. πᾶσι, if it can be said to have any meaning at all, must be understood simply to imply, that the πένταθλον combines in one the greatest number and variety of the single and separate exercises. Such is also the opinion of Krause, Op. cit. p. 258, n. 6. He observes that such a conclusion (as would naturally be drawn from the words of Arist.) is opposed to all the

1 The πένταθλος however, though by the number and variety of his accomplishments he is superior to all other athletes, yet in regard of certain special excellences, as compared for instance with the runner or wrestler, he is only second rate. Plat. Erast. 135 E. The philosopher in the popular sense, Aristotle's πεπαιδευμένος, the man of universal attainments, is compared to the all-accomplished athlete. ᾿Αρ΄ ἐννοῶ οἶον λέγεις τὸν φιλόσοφον ἄνδρα; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι λέγειν οἶον ἐν τῷ ἀγωνία εἰσὶν οἱ πένταθλοι πρὸς τοὺς δρομέας ἡ τοὺς παλαιστάς. καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τούτων μὲν λείπονται κατὰ τὰ τούτων ἄθλα καὶ δεύτεροὶ εἰσι πρὸς τούτους, τῶν δὲ ἄλλων ἀθλητῶν πρῶτοι καὶ νικῶστι πιξαπίε

προς μεν πόνους τούς πολεμικούς, ήδυν δε είναι δοκείν μετά φοβερότητος γέροντος δε προς μεν πόνους τούς άναγκαίους ίκανόν, άλυπον δε διά το μηδεν έχειν ων 12 το γηρας λωβαται. Ισχύς δ' εστί μεν δύναμις τοῦ

notices which we find in the ancient writers. Aristoteles konnte hier in behannten dingen die mehr worte bedürfende deutlichkeit einer gedrungenen präcisen, und in gemessener gradation fortschreitender redeweise, welche ihm eigenthümlich ist, aufopfern, da ja doch jedem Hellenen die

fünf bestandtheile des Pentathlon bekannt waren.

ἀκμάζοντος δέ κ.τ.λ.] The simplest way of filling up the elliptical construction seems to be to supply κάλλος after ἀκμάζοντος, and γέροντος in the next clause, and πεφυκέναι from the immediately preceding πεφύκασιν after πολεμικούς in the former clause and ἰκανόν in the latter. The required sense may be equally well supplied by repeating (as Victorius) the first words of the sentence, ἀκμάζοντος δὲ (κάλλος) (τὸ) πρὸς μὲν πόνους τοὺς πολεμικούς (χρήσιμον ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα); but the consideration of the immediate proximity of πεφύκασιν seems more in favour of the other.

iκανόν] fit for, strong enough for, capable of.

äλυπον] causing no pain, no painful impression or repulsion, in consequence of the absence of all the ordinary deformities or disfigurements

incident to old age.

ών τὸ γῆρας λωβάται] i.e. ἐκείνων ἃ τὸ γῆρας λωβάται. This unusual and irregular form of attraction of the relative to the case of its antecedent. where, had the antecedent been expressed, the relative should have been the nominative to a succeeding verb, is exemplified by Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 473, obs. 1, from Herod. I 68, οὐδέν κω εἰδότες τῶν ἦν..., Thuc. VII 67 άφ' ων ήμιν παρεσκεύασται. Add to these, Plat. Protag. 334 C έν τούτοις οίς μέλλει έδεσθαι, de Rep. V 465 D, εὐδαιμονίζονται έκεῖνοι ων τούτοις ύπαρχει. Dem. de Cor. p. 318, 19, § 277, οὐδ' ἐφ' à συμφέρει τῆ πόλει χρῆται. And from Aristotle, this passage, and Rhet. 1 2, 11, et do truxer. In Dem. c. Steph. p. 1116, περί ών μή κατηγόρηται λέγειν, which has been cited as an instance, κατηγόρηται is the irregular passive 'has been accused', and therefore περὶ ών need not be interpreted as περὶ ἐκείνων ἄ; it is for περὶ ἐκείνων περὶ ών. Another doubtful example is Eur. Med. 262, τον δόντα τ' αὐτῷ θυγατέρ', ην τ' ἐγήματο, where Seidler retains this (the v. l.), and regards ην as a case of attraction for αὐτην η. An analogous case of this kind of attraction is Sophocles' οίας γ' ἐμοῦ, Trach. 443, for οΐα έγώ είμι.

§ 12. $l \sigma \chi \dot{\nu} s$] bodily strength, is defined, in a very superficial and perfunctory manner, with a special view to strength in personal encounter—as appears in the several forms it takes, though it is afterwards more definitely expressed in $d\gamma\omega\nu\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\eta$ $d\rho\epsilon\tau\dot{\eta}$ —as the power of moving some one else ($\tilde{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma\nu$ may possibly be neuter, something else, anything whatsoever), by pulling, or pushing, or lifting (possibly referring to the encounter of Herakles with Antaeus, who showed his great strength by 'lifting' him off the ground into the air; or, if $\tilde{\epsilon}\tau\epsilon\rho\sigma\nu$ be neuter, by lifting any heavy weight), or squeezing, or crushing; which seems to be intended for

κινεῖν ἕτερον ὡς βούλεται, ἀνάγκη δὲ κινεῖν ἕτερον ἢ ἕλκοντα ἢ ώθοῦντα ἢ αἰροντα ἢ πιέζοντα ἢ συνθλίβοντα, ὥστε ὁ ἰσχυρὸς ἢ πᾶσιν ἢ τούτων τισίν 13 ἐστιν ἰσχυρός. μεγέθους δὲ ἀρετὴ τὸ ὑπερέχειν κατὰ μῆκος καὶ βάθος καὶ πλάτος τῶν πολλῶν τοσούτω μείζονι ώστε μὴ βραδυτέρας ποιεῖν τὰς κινήσεις διὰ 14 τὴν ὑπερβολήν. ἀγωνιστικὴ δὲ σώματος ἀρετὴ σύγκειται ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ ἰσχύος καὶ τάχους καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς ἰσχυρός ἐστιν ὁ γὰρ δυνάμενος τὰ σκέλη ῥιπτεῖν

a complete analysis of the different ways in which a person or thing can

be 'moved' by another.

§ 13. μείζονι] agrees with τινί understood after dperή: the accusative μείζονα, with τινά understood in τὸ ὑπερέχειν, would be more usual. Two MSS read uellova. 'Excellence in size' implies superiority over the average (people in general), in length (height), depth (thickness), and breadth, but only (superior) to such an extent as not to impede the motions (of the body) by the excess (of size), lit. to one being only so much greater as not to make the body's motions (slower than they otherwise would be, or than they ought to be, i.e.) too slow. Minos, βάθος, and πλάτος are the three dimensions of space; but it is not quite certain how they are applied here to the proportions of the human body; μηκος or βάθος might possibly represent the abstract height. I have taken μήκος in this sense here because it is found in Homer to represent the 'stature' of a man, and μάκιστος for 'tallest'. Odys. λ'. 309, Otus and Ephialtes, ους δή μακίστους θρέψε ζείδωρος άρουρα, and 312, άτὰρ μῆκός γε γενέσθην εννεόργυιοι. v. 71, of the daughters of Pandareus, μήκος δ έπορ' "Αρτεμις άγνή, and in Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. II 5, είς μήκος αὐξάνεσθαι τὰ σώματα. Μῆκος therefore is the man's height, πλάτος the breadth of the body, measuring from right to left, and Bábos the depth or thickness, measuring in the direction backwards and forwards. Bάθος, though it can be applied to vertical measure, up and down, yet as in the ordinary language it represents only what is below us, and not what is above, could hardly be applied to the more than average stature of a tall man.

§ 14. ἐκ μεγέθους καὶ ἰσχύος] for boxing and wrestling; τάχους, for the

foot-race.

καὶ γὰρ ὁ ταχὺς loχυρός ἐστω] seems to be added as a mere passing observation, or note upon τάχους: and the γάρ, which implies that this clause gives a reason for the preceding, must therefore be regarded as due to mere carelessness of writing, there being no logical connexion between the two sentences. (If there were any such connexion between the two, the meaning could only be, that the relation of strength and speed as genus and species, speed being only a variety of strength, is the reason for the introduction of τάχος into the list of agonistic virtues: the fact being that this could only be a reason for omitting it.)

in iactare, of a repeated action. Hermann ad Aiac.

πως καὶ κινεῖν ταχὺ καὶ πόρρω δρομικός, ὁ δὲ θλίβειν καὶ κατέχειν παλαιστικός, ὁ δὲ ὦσαι τῆ πληγῆ πυκτικός, ὁ δ᾽ ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις παγκρατιαστικός, 15 ὁ δὲ πᾶσι πένταθλος. εὐγηρία δ᾽ ἐστὶ βραδυτὴς γήρως μετ᾽ ἀλυπίας. οὕτε γὰρ εἰ ταχὺ γηράσκει, εὕγη- p. 19.

235, Trach. 776. See also Lobeck, Aj. 239, p. 1771. This distinction, which has been doubted by some scholars, is now I believe generally accepted. At all events it applies very well here, where the simple notion of flinging or hurling, once for all, from you, as a stone, would be quite inappropriate to the motion of the legs intended to be described. $\rho_{\ell}\pi\tau\epsilon\bar{\nu}\nu$ $\tau\dot{\alpha}$ $\sigma\kappa\dot{\epsilon}\lambda\eta$ is to 'toss about' or 'swing the legs', backwards and forwards, again and again.

κινείν πόρρω] 'to take long strides'.

ωσαι $\tau \hat{\eta}$ πληγ $\hat{\eta}$] in boxing, to push or thrust away from you by the blow, so as aliquem de statu deicere; as when you knock a man down.

- ἀμφοτέροις τούτοις] These two last, boxing and wrestling; not running. Supply therefore, in explanation of ἀμφοτέροις, θλίβειν καὶ κατέχειν, καὶ ασαι τἢ πληγῷ δυνάμενος. Victorius (and also Krause, u. s., p. 534, n. 1) quotes Plut. Symp. 4, ὅτι γὰρ μέμικται τὸ παγκράτιον ἔκ τε πυγμῆς καὶ πάλης, δῆλον, and Quint. Inst. Orat. 11 8, 13, as confirming Aristotle's statement. Other ancient authorities are given in Krause's notes.

On the pancratium, and the size, strength, and skill required by those

who engaged in it, see Krause, u. s. p. 534-538, abschn. VI § 41.

Compare with the four preceding sections the following passage of Plato on the use of athletic exercises. Legg. VIII 832 E seq. ἔστι γοῦν πάντων πολεμικώτατον ἡ σώματος ὀξύτης πάντως, ἡ μὲν ἀπὸ τῶν ποδῶν, ἡ δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν χειρῶν ψυγεῖν μὲν καὶ ἐλεῖν ἡ τῶν ποδῶν, ἡ δὲ ἐν ταῖς συμπλοκαῖς (the παγκράτιον, and especially wrestling) μάχη καὶ σύστασις ἰσχύος καὶ ῥώμης δεομένη,

§ 15. evynpia supr. § 4, 'fortunate old age, good fortune or happiness

in old age'.

βραδυτής] 'tardiness', i. e. slow approach or progress.

 $\epsilon \tilde{v} \gamma \eta \rho \omega s$] occurs under the form $\epsilon \tilde{v} \gamma \eta \rho o s$ in Hippocrates, and Ar. Hist. Anim. IX 12, 3.

1 Lobeck in his elaborate dissertation on the question seems to leave the matter in doubt; and no doubt, from the uncertainty of the MSS readings, the distinction of the two forms of the verb being shewn in most cases merely by the difference of accent, it is difficult to decide in any particular case which of the two forms is to be preferred: and Lobeck shews by examples that (so far as the reading is to be depended on) the same notion of the verb is expressed indifferently by either form. At the same time in the somewhat obscure summing up at the conclusion of his note, he seems (as I understand him) to be in favour, as a general principle, of the hypothesis, that a difference of form in the termination of a verb radically the same (he cites $t\lambda\lambda\omega$ or $t\lambda\lambda\omega$ and its numerous varieties as a remarkable instance) does express a corresponding variety in the signification; as in the instance given, the various terminations correspond to different varieties of the general notion of 'rolling'.

ρως, οὖτ' εἰ μόγις μὲν λυπηρῶς δέ. ἔστι δὲ καὶ ἐκ
τῶν τοῦ σώματος ἀρετῶν καὶ τύχης μὴ ἄνοσος γὰρ
ὢν μηδὲ ἰσχυρὸς οὐκ ἔσται ἀπαθής, οὐδ' ἄλυπος καὶ
πολυχρόνιος [οὖτ'] ἄνευ τύχης διαμείνειεν ἄν. ἔστι
δέ τις καὶ χωρὶς ἰσχύος καὶ ὑγιείας ἄλλη δύναμις
μακροβιότητος πολλοὶ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν τοῦ σώματος
ἀρετῶν μακρόβιοί εἰσιν ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἡ ἀκριβολογία
16 χρήσιμος ἡ περὶ τούτων εἰς τὰ νῦν. πολυφιλία δὲ
καὶ χρηστοφιλία οὐκ ἄδηλα τοῦ φίλου ώρισμένου, ὅτι
ἔστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος φίλος ὅς τις, ἃ οἵεται ἀγαθὰ εἶναι

ανευ τύχης] in Muretus' excellent emendation of v. l. αν εὐτυγής.

ἔστι δέ τις κ.τ.λ.] The causes of length and shortness of life in plants and animals are further investigated in the little treatise περὶ μακροβιότητος καὶ βραχυβιότητος, in the collection of tracts called the Parva Naturalia, appended to the work περὶ ψυχῆς. They all belong to the 'Physical' department of philosophy. π. μ. καὶ βρ. Ι § 4.

άλλ' οὐδὲν ἡ ἀκριβολογία κ.τ.λ.] Nice, exact, or scientific analysis and the treatment of a subject in minute detail, are out of place in a rhetorical treatise. Any further details on the subject of longevity would be useless to the rhetorician. On the various senses of ἀκρίβεια, see Grant on Eth. Nic. 1 7, 18: and on the mode of handling a subject appropriate to Rhe-

toric, Introd. on the 'materials of Rhetoric', p. 11-14

§ 16. " forer o toloutos pilos k.t.l.] 'all such are friends, as, when they think anything good for some particular person' (¿κείνω, some one in particular, that particular person, whoever it may be) 'are inclined to do it for his sake'. In this definition, friendship or love is described as a state of mind, a moral habit or disposition, not as a natural affection. The desire of doing our friend good for his own sake is a necessary accompaniment and consequence of the feeling or affection, but not identical with it. The definition is 'rhetorical', and does not give the 'essence' of the thing, as a scientific definition would. The definition of φιλία as a πάθος, 11 4, 2, is in exact conformity with this, and equally deficient. In the Ethics, VIII 2, after quoting some of the ordinary current notions of love to be found in the preceding poets and philosophers, he proceeds to the establishment of his own. And here again the same conception of it reappears in the words τῷ δὲ φίλφ φασὶ δείν βούλεσθαι τάγηθὰ ἐκείνου ἔνεκα. Accordingly φιλία is εύνοια εν άντιπεπονθόσι, reciprocal goodwill or affection; the reciprocity being essential to true φιλία or affection of two human beings to one another. For though we may be 'fond' of wine, φίλοινος, or 'fond' of animals, there is in these cases no true reciprocity of affection. Further, since 'fondness' is applicable to three classes of objects, the good, the pleasant, and the useful, three classes of corresponding 'friendships' or 'fondnesses' are hereby determined; but only the first of them, the love of the good, is the basis of true and perfect love; and consequently

ἐκείνω, πρακτικός ἐστιν αὐτων δι' ἐκεῖνον. ὧ δὴ πολλοὶ τοιοῦτοι, πολύφιλος, ὧ δὲ καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄνδρες, 17 χρηστόφιλος. εὐτυχία δ' ἐστίν, ὧν ἡ τύχη ἀγαθων P. 1362. αἰτία, ταῦτα γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν ἣ πάντα ἣ τὰ πλεῖστα ἢ τὰ μέγιστα. αἰτία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τύχη ἐνίων

the highest and perfect form of 'love' can only exist between the good, τελεία δ' ἐστὶν ἡ τῶν ἀγαθῶν φιλία καὶ κατ' ἀρετὴν ὁμοίων' οὖτοι γὰρ τἀγαθ, ὁμοίως βούλονται ἀλλήλοις, ἢ ἀγαθοί ἀγαθοὶ δ' εἰσὶ καθ' αὐτούς, c. 4, init. In the concluding definition of c. 2, the jeeling or loving disposition is introduced in the word εὐνοεῖν, δεῖ ἄρα εὐνοεῖν ἀλλήλοις καὶ βούλεσθαι τὰγαθὰ μὴ λανθάνοντας δι' ἔν τι τῶν εἰρημένων. These τὰ εἰρημένα are the three objects of affection. This is therefore the general conception of love according to Aristotle. The highest form of human love or friendship would be εὐνοεῖν...διὰ τὸ ἀγαθόν.

ἐπιεικείς] Note on c. 2 § 4, p. 30.

§ 17. εὐτυχία] 'good fortune or luck', accidental, transitory, fragmentary, is opposed to εὐδαιμονία, complete, permanent, substantial happiness, the essence of which resides in its αὐτάρκεια or independence of all accidental and external conditions. Eth. Nic. II 5 (Bekk.), 1097 δ 6 seq. X 7, 1176 α 27 (οπ θεωρητική as the highest happiness). Polit. IV (VII), I, 1323 δ 23, μάρτυρι τῷ θεῷ χρωμένοις, δε εὐδαίμων μέν ἐστι καὶ μακάριος, δι' οὐθὲν δὲ τῶν ἐξωτερικῶν ἀγαθών ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτον αὐτὸς καὶ τῷ ποιός τις εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐτυχίαν τῆς εὐδαιμονίας διὰ ταῦτ ἀναγκαίον ἐτέραν εἶναι τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν αἴτιον ταὐτόματον καὶ ἡ τύχη, δίκαιος δ' οὐδεὶς οὐδὲ σώφρων ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδὲ διὰ τὴν τύχην ἐστί. Eur. Med. 1229, ὅλβου δ' ἐπιρρυέντος εὐτυχέστερος ἄλλου γένοιτ' αν ἄλλος, εὐδαίμων δ' ᾶν οΰ, where Paley quotes, Troad. 509, τῶν δ' εὐδαιμόνων μηδένα νόμιζετ' εὐτυχεῖν πρὶν ἃν θάνη, explaining the distinction; and Androm. 420, ἦσσον μὲν ἄλγεῖ δυστυχῶν δ' εὐδαιμονεῖ.

ή τύχη alτίa] On Aristotle's conception of τύχη as 'a cause', with further details, see Introd. Appendix C to Bk. I c. 10, p. 218—224. On this

passage, p. 223.

γίγνεσθαι καὶ ὑπάρχειν] 'acquisition or possession'. καί in this and similar cases is properly rendered by 'or'. Aristotle frequently expresses as a combination two things which are not actually, but only hypothetically, combined in the conception, which we therefore more correctly

represent as an alternative.

αίτία ή τύχη ένίων ὧν καὶ αἱ τέχναι] 'Simplicius, ad Phys. II p. 73, 6, inter alia hacc habet: καὶ τῶν ποιητῶν δὲ ἔνιοι πάντα σχεδὸν εἰς τὴν τύχην ἄγουσιν, ὅστε καὶ τῆς τέχνης οἰκείαν αὐτὴν ποιεῖν, λέγοντες, τέχνη τύχην ἔστερξε καὶ τύχη τέχνην (Agathon ap. Ar. Eth. Nic. VI 4'). τὸν εὐτυχοῦντα δὲ καὶ φρονεῖν φασι (Eur. Fragm. Inc. 204). πρὸς δὲ τούτοις ὁρῶμεν ἔνια τῶν ἀπὸ τέχνης γινομένων καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης γινόμενα' καὶ γὰρ ύγίεια καὶ ἀπὸ τύχης δοκεῖ γίνεσθαι ὅσπερ ἀπὸ τέχνης διψήσας γὰρ καὶ πιών τις ψυχρὸν ὕδωρ γέγονεν

 $^{^1}$ καὶ τρόπον τινὰ περὶ τὰ αὐτά ἐστιν ἡ τύχη καὶ ἡ τέχνη, καθάπερ καὶ 'Αγάθων φησί, τέχνη τύχην, κ.τ.λ.

μὲν ὧν καὶ αἱ τέχναι, πολλῶν δὲ καὶ ἀτέχνων, οἶον ὅσων ἡ φύσις ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι ὑγιείας μὲν γὰρ τέχνη αἰτία, κάλλους δὲ καὶ μεγέθους φύσις. ὅλως δὲ τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐστὶν ἀπὸ τύχης, ἐφ' οἶς ἐστὶν ὁ φθόνος. ἔστι δε καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγον ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη, οἶον εἰ οἱ ἄλλοι αἰσχροὶ ἀδελφοί, ὁ δὲ καλός, ἢ οἱ ἄλλοι μὴ εἶδον τὸν θησαυρόν, ὁ δ' εὖρεν, ἢ εἰ τοῦ πλησίον ἔτυχε τὸ βέλος, τούτου δὲ μή, ἢ εἰ μὴ ἦλθε μόνος ἀεὶ φοιτῶν, οἱ δὲ ὑγιής. These are illustrated in the text by two examples; health, which may be due to chance as well as art; and beauty and strength, to chance as well as nature.

ἀτέχνων] 'independent of art'.

οἶον ὄσων ή φύσις] The contradiction between this and the statements

in the scientific Physics is pointed out in the Introd., u. s., p. 223.

ἐνδέχεται δὲ καὶ παρὰ φύσιν εἶναι] Most probably a mere occasional and parenthetical note, according to the usual practice of this author (comp. § 14), 'chance may give rise not only to things natural and independent of nature, but also to things unnatural, monstrous, or abnormal', τὰ παρὰ φύσιν τέρατα: on which see the reff. in Introd. p. 225. Compare the def. of φύσις in I 10, 13, δόξειε δ' ἃν καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων, i.e. τῶν παρὰ φύσιν. In this case the colon should be retained after εἶναι, the connexion being carried on from οἶον ὄσων ἡ φύσις to ὑγιείας μέν κ.τ.λ. as examples, ὧν αὶ τέχναι, καὶ ἡ φύσις αἰτία, and the note parenthetical.

Bonitz, however, Aristotel. Stud. 1 87, would alter the punctuation, placing a comma at $\epsilon l\nu a\iota$, and connecting this clause closely with the preceding, in the sense, 'of which the cause is nature, but (which) may be also contrary to nature': regarding this as an instance of the Aristotelian custom of 'not repeating the relative in the second of two co-ordinated members', illustrated by Waitz, Organ. 25 b 35, and certainly common enough in our author. This is further supported by Muretus, who translates, 'quae natura efficientur, ita tamen ut etiam praeter naturam

evenire possint.

The words quoted above from I 10, 3, seem to me to be in favour of the former interpretation: and the practice of introducing 'notes' of this kind is at least as common with Aristotle as that which is noticed by

Bonitz.

ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν παρὰ λόγον ἀγαθῶν αἰτία τύχη] Phys. 197 α 18, καὶ τὸ φάναι εἶναί τι παράλογον τὴν τύχην ἀρθῶς ὁ γὰρ λόγος ἢ τῶν ἀεὶ ἄντων ἢ τῶν ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἡ δὲ τύχη ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις παρὰ ταῦτα: ὧστ' ἐπειδὴ ἀόριστα τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ ἡ τύχη ἀόριστος. See further in Introd. p. 221.

τοῦ πλησίου] (όντος, ίσταμένου), 'one's next neighbour', as ὁ πέλας. In Plat. Theaet. 174 C, it is distinguished from γείτων, ὁ πλήσιον καὶ ὁ γείτων,

having a more extended and general sense, 'a fellow-creature'.

ή εί μη ήλθε μόνος ἀεὶ φοιτών κ.τ.λ.] 'Or if one who was in the constant

άπαξ έλθόντες διεφθάρησαν πάντα γάρ τὰ τοιαῦτα εύτυγήματα δοκεί είναι.

περί δε άρετης έπείπερ οικειότατος ό περί τους 18 έπαίνους τόπος, όταν περί έπαίνου ποιώμεθα τὸν λό-

γον, τότε διοριστέον.

ών μεν ουν δεί στοχάζεσθαι προτρέποντα ώς έσο- CHAP. V μένων ή ύπαρχόντων, καὶ ὧν αποτρέποντα, φανερόν. τὰ γὰρ ἐναντία τούτων ἐστίν. ἐπεὶ δὲ πρόκειται τῶ συμβουλεύοντι σκοπός το συμφέρον, βουλεύονται δέ οὐ περί τοῦ τέλους άλλά περί τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ συμφέροντα κατὰ τὰς πράξεις, τὸ δέ συμφέρον αγαθόν, ληπτέον αν είη στοιχεία περί 2 άγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος άπλῶς. ἔστω δὴ άγαθὸν p. 20.

habit of visiting a certain place '(φοιτάν, to go backwards and forwards, ever and anon, repeatedly, to frequent, haunt) 'was the only one that failed to go (on some particular occasion), whilst those that went only once (aπaξ, once for all) all perished'. It is possible that this sense of repetition in the verbal termination an may be the origin of the other signification of 'disease' illustrated on the word πνευστιάν, c. 2 § 18 p. 45. A too-frequently repeated action might very well be interpreted as a diseased habit.

§ 18. όταν περί ἐπαίνου κ.τ.λ.] i. e. in c. 9 of this book, the chapter on the topics of encomium and censure, proper to the encomiastic or epideictic branch of Rhetoric.

CHAP. VI.

On the purport of this chapter, its principal divisions, and connexion with the general plan of the work, see Introd. p. 177.

§ 1. ἡ ὑπαρχόντων On this addition over and above the theory, see

note on c. 3 § 4; and Introd. p. 120.

βουλεύονται δέ...των πρός τὸ τέλος Εth. Nic. III 5, 1112 δ 12, βουλευόμεθα δε οδ περί των τελών άλλά περί των πρός τὰ τέλη. (This is because the means are within our own power to attain, the ends are not. βουλευόμεθα δέ περί των έφ' ήμεν πρακτών, 1112 α 31, όσα γίνεται δι' ήμων...περί τούτων βουλευόμεθα, Ib. line 12, and this is afterwards repeated.) Οὖτε γάρ laτρός βουλεύεται εl ύγιάσει, ούτε ρήτωρ εl πείσει, ούτε πολιτικός εl εύνομίαν ποιήσει, ουδέ των λοιπών ουδείς περί του τέλους άλλα θέμενοι τέλος τι, πώς καὶ διὰ τίνων ἔσται σκοπούσι, κ.τ.λ. Ιb. b 34, οὐκ ὰν οὖν εἵη βουλευτὸν τὸ τέλος, άλλα τα πρός τα τέλη.

στοιχεία] i.e. τόπους, the 'Elements', the primary topics of the subject

'good'. See Introd. p. 127, 8.

άπλῶς] See note on p. 30, c. 2 § 4. The sense in which άπλῶς is here intended is evidently that of good in general, as a general or abstract

ο αν αὐτο ἐαυτοῦ ἐνεκα ἢ αἰρετόν, καὶ οῦ ἐνεκα ἄλλο

conception, opposed to kab kaarov special and particular goods. Schrader's rendering extra comparationem, if it means, as it seems to do, 'absolute good', 'good in itself', opposed to 'relative' or 'human good'—that which cannot be compared with, i.e. has no relation to, any other kind of good, but exists in itself independently—is certainly wrong. 'Absolute good' can have no place in a rhetorical system or in the practice of the rhetorician; such a definition would be in direct violation of the principle so often laid down by Aristotle, that the rhetorical method must be in conformity with the materials of the art, of a popular and practical character, adapted to the understanding of an unlearned and unscientific audience. This is especially the case with definitions. See Introd. p. 12, 13. The general notion of good is first considered in §§ 1—3, and then this is applied and illustrated in particulars in the remainder of the chapter.

§ 2. ἔστω δὴ ἀγαθόν κ.τ.λ.] The 'popular' character of these definitions is marked by the introductory ἔστω, 'let it be taken for granted'; no demonstration is required, any current notion of good will serve our purpose. The same phraseology occurs again in a similar case, c. 7 § 2,

έστω δή υπέρεχον κ.τ.λ.: c. 5 § 3, and 10 § 3.

First, 'Good is anything that is in itself and for its own sake desirable (an object of choice), and that for whose sake we choose something else (which is the ulterior end of our preference for anything); and that which is the universal aim, either of everything or '(as a qualification to exclude inanimate things) 'everything that has sensation or reason, or (would be their aim) if they were to acquire the reasoning faculty' (supposing they have it not yet, as infants and beasts). Comp. c. 7 § 21,

ο λαβόντα τὰ πράγματα (anything) φρόνησιν έλοιτ αν εκαστον1.

The first of these two definitions, which represents Good as desirable in and for itself, and as that to obtain which we choose something else, is in fact identical with the second which describes it as the ultimate end or aim of all action and desire, only differing from it in terms. Every thing that we choose or desire, and every act that we perform, is as the means to one universal end, the Good. This view of the nature of Good is laid down and illustrated in the first chapter of the Nic. Eth. πᾶσα τέχνη καὶ πᾶσα μέθοδος, ὁμοίως δὲ πρᾶξίς τε καὶ προαίρεσις, ἀχαθοῦ τινὸς ἐφίεσθαι δοκεῖ διὸ καλῶς ἀπεφήναντο (it is a current, popular, definition of) τὰγαθόν, οὖ πάντὶ ἐφίεται—εὶ δή τι τέλος ἐστι τῶν πρακτῶν ὁ διὶ αύτὸ βουλόμεθα, τάλλα δὲ διὰ τοῦτο (the means to the universal end) καὶ μὴ πάντα διὶ ἔτερον αἰρούμεθα, (there is something, i. e. Good, which we desire only for itself,)...δῆλον ὡς τοῦτ ἀν εἴη τὰγαθὸν καὶ τὸ ἄριστον, and so on. Comp. c. 5. Similarly at the commencement of the Politics, we find that this is the end of states as well as individuals, because τοῦ εἶναι δοκοῦντος ἀγαθοῦ

¹ Schrader quotes Cic. de Fin. 1 11, non est igitur voluplas bonum. Hoc ne statuam quidem dicturam pater aiebat, si loqui posset. v. 14, earum etiam rerum quas terra gignit educatio quaedam et perfectio est—ut ipsae vites, si loqui possent, ita se tractandas tuendasque esse faterentur. Add Acsch. Agam. 37, οἶκος δ' αὐτὸς εἰ φθογγὴν λάβοι σαφέστατ' ἄν λέξειεν. Eur. Iph. Taur. 51.

αἰρούμεθα, καὶ οὖ ἐφίεται πάντα ἢ πάντα τὰ αἴσθησιν ἔχοντα ἢ νοῦν, ἢ εἰ λάβοι νοῦν· καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς ἀν ἐκάστω ἀποδοίη, καὶ ὅσα ὁ περὶ ἕκαστον νοῦς ἀποδίδωσιν ἐκάστω, τοῦτό ἐστιν ἐκάστω ἀγαθόν, καὶ

χάριν πάντα πράττουσι πάντες. Comp. III 12, init. Metaph. B 2, 996 a

23-26, Α 3, 983 α 31, τὸ οδ ἔνεκα καὶ τάγαθόν.

The same view of the nature of Good is to be found equally in Plato, from whom Aristotle may have derived it. See, for instance, Phileb. 53 E, seq. particularly 54 C, where good is proved to be the οδ δνεκα, or universal end. Sympos. 205 A, where happiness, which consists in the possession of good, is similarly represented. Gorg. 499 E, τέλος εἶναι ἀπασῶν τῶν πράξεων τὸ ἀγαθὸν, καὶ ἐκείνου ἔνεκεν δεῖν πάντα τάλλα πράττευθαι, ἀλλ'

ούκ ἐκεῖνο τῶν ἄλλων. Euthyd. c. 8, 278 E, seq.

καὶ ὅσα ὁ νοῦς κ.τ.λ.] 'And all that reason in general, or universal reason, would assign to each of us, and all that the individual reason assigns to each of us, that is good to every human being'. That is, all that this supreme or universal reason or the particular reason of each individual, would assign as suitable to each; the former what is good for all alike, the latter what is good for each particular individual; since these sometimes differ: or, as Schrader interprets it, the universal reason that dictates general principles or rules of action, as contrasted with & vous & mepl έκαστον, mens quae de singularibus decernit, which decides in special and individual cases. The reason as an agent is here opposed to mere nature, or to a blind natural impulse; the choice of good is a reasonable choice, good is what reason universal or individual would necessarily choose. (vois stands here in a general sense for the special faculty or part of it poongoes1, the practical reason, the calculating discursive and moral part of the intellect, which directs us in our choice between good and evil. In Eth. Nic. VI, pous in its proper sense, the intuitive and speculative reason, is distinguished from the διάνοια or discursive intellect, and its special virtue φρόνησις or practical wisdom).

'Or that, by the presence of which anything (not only man in soul and body, but also things inanimate) is put in a healthy or proper condition (is made what it ought to be, what is best for it to be) and made self-sufficing (independent of all external conditions), and self-sufficiency or independence in general'. On αὐτάρκεια see note on § 3 of Chapter V, p. 74, αὐτάρκεια ζωῆς. It is thus briefly defined Pol. IV (VII) 5, init. τὸ

πάντα ὑπάρχειν καὶ δεῖσθαι μηθενός.

'Or any thing that is productive or preservative of (tends to produce or preserve) things of that sort, or that which is attended by such, or things that have a tendency to prevent and destroy the opposites of these'. These forms of good belong to a lower order, subordinate to τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθά, as means to the end. Eth. Nic. I 4, 1096 ὁ 10, λέγεσθαι δὲ καθ' ἐν εἶδος τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ διωκόμενα καὶ ἀγαπώμενα, τὰ δὲ ποιητικὰ τούτων ἡ ψυλακτικά πως ἡ τῶν ἐναντίων κωλυτικὰ διὰ ταῦτα λέγεσθαι καὶ τρόπον ἄλλον.

¹ This is actually substituted for voor in the corresponding passages c. 7 § 21.

οῦ παρόντος εὖ διάκειται καὶ αὐτάρκως ἔχει, καὶ τὸ αὕταρκες, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν ἢ φυλακτικὸν τῶν τοιούτων, καὶ ῷ ἀκολουθεῖ τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ τὰ κωλυτικὰ 3 τῶν ἐναντίων καὶ τὰ φθαρτικά. ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ διχῶς ἢ γὰρ ἄμα ἢ ὕστερον, οἷον τῷ μὲν μανθάνειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι ὕστερον, τῷ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν ἄμα. καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τριχῶς, τὰ μὲν ὡς τὸ ὑγιαίνειν ὑγιείας,

§ 3. ἀκολουθεί δὲ διχῶς] 'the term attending upon admits of two different senses, either simultaneous (attendance, accompaniment) or subsequent (consequence), as knowledge attends on learning subsequently, but life on health simultaneously 1', ἀκολουθεῖν and ἔπεσθαι are both used in logic to denote not merely something that follows, a 'consequence' in the ordinary acceptation of the words, but also an invariable or necessary attendant or concomitant in five different senses: (1) a preceding concomitant, or antecedent, Top. Γ 2, 117 a 11, καὶ γὰρ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον έπεται, as learning is always preceded by ignorance; Categ. c. 12, πρότερον έτερον έτέρου λέγεται τετραχώς...δεύτερον δε το μή αντιστρέφον κατά την τοῦ είναι ἀκολούθησιν, οίον τὸ έν των δύο πρότερον' δυοίν μέν γάρ ὅντων ἀκολουθεί εὐθὺς τὸ ἐν είναι, κ.τ.λ. (2) a simultaneous concomitant, ἄμα: as health and life, Rhet. I 6, 3; 7, 5. (3) a subsequent concomitant, or 'consequent', ὕστερον, as learning is followed by knowledge, Rhet. II. cc. (4) δυνάμει, a virtual concomitant, by implication, as sacrilege necessarily implies, includes potentially or virtually the notion of theft or fraud, by the rule omne maius continet in se minus; and (5) reciprocal contradictories regarded as consequents, Top. B 8, 113 b 25, ή κατὰ τὴν ἀντίφασιν ἀκολούθησις, or ἀντικατηγορουμένως, where two terms or propositions are 'convertible', αντιστρέφει: such are ὁ ἄνθρωπος ζώον, and τὸ μη ζώον οὐκ ἄνθρωπος: τὸ μὴ ἡδὰ οὐ καλὸν, and τὸ καλὸν ἡδύ. It seems from this as if the primary sense of ἀκολουθείν were to attend or wait upon, and that that of 'following' is a special and secondary signification under the general notion of accompaniment. Hence ἀκόλουθος becomes pedissequus, a constant attendant, footman, or 'follower'. The 'simultaneous' kind of accompaniment appears also in this word sometimes even in the ordinary language, as when Plato writes, Menex. 249 D, ἀκολούθει μετ' έμοῦ, Lach. 187 D, μετά τοῦ πατρὸς ἀκυλουθών: and similarly Demosthenes and the Orators; and Xenophon joins it with σύν. Diog. Laert. VII § 125, τὰς δ' άρετας λέγουσιν αντακολουθείν άλλήλαις, και τον μίαν έχοντα πάσας έχειν, of the Stoics. Plutarch, de Repugn. Stoic. c. 27, p. 1045 E, attributes the same doctrine in the same words to Chrysippus.

καὶ τὰ ποιητικὰ τριχῶς] This triple division of productive causes or conditions is thus explained by Majoragius. 'Ponit tres species rerum conficientium quae ita distingui possunt. Quae conficient, aut sunt a

¹ So Quintilian, Inst. Orat. v 10. 75. Sed hace consequentia dico, ἀκόλουθα; est enim consequens sapientiae bonitas: illa sequentia, παρεπόμενα, quae postea facta sunt aut futura...hoc temporis, illud naturae.

τὰ δὲ ώς σιτία ὑγιείας, τὰ δὲ ώς τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι, ὅτι
4 ώς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ποιεῖ ὑγίειαν. τούτων δὲ κειμένων
ἀνάγκη τάς τε λήψεις τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθὰς εἶναι καὶ
τὰς τῶν κακῶν ἀποβολάς ἀκολουθεῖ γὰρ τῷ μὲν τὸ
μὴ ἔχειν τὸ κακὸν ἄμα, τῷ δὲ τὸ ἔχειν τὸ ἀγαθὸν
5 ὕστερον. καὶ ἡ ἀντ' ἐλάττονος ἀγαθοῦ μείζονος λῆψις καὶ ἀντὶ μείζονος κακοῦ ἐλάττονος. ῷ γὰρ ὑπερ- Ρ. 1362 ἐ

natura, h. e. intrinsecus, aut extrinsecus adhibentur. A natura sunt, ut temperies humorum, et bona corporis constitutio, conficiens est bonae valetudinis. Quae extrinsecus adhibentur aut sunt tanquam instrumenta, aut sunt actiones; instrumenta, ut cibaria:...actiones, ut exercitatio corporis, et deambulatio, quae frequenter bonam valetudinem efficit.' This account, though correct in the main, requires a little further explanation and modification. The ground of the distinction of the first of the three classes, of which the illustration is to vyraiver, the healthy state of body, active, actual health, as produced by vyreia, health in itself, we learn from two passages of the Nic. Eth. First, VI 13, 1144 a 4, ἔπειτα καὶ ποιοῦσι μέν (αύται αί άρεταί) ούχ ώς Ιατρική ύγίειαν, άλλ' ώς ή ύγίεια, ούτως ή σοφία εύδαιμονίαν' μέρος γαρ ούσα της όλης άρετης τῷ ἔχεσθαι ποιεί καὶ τῷ ἐνεργείν εὐδαίμονα. Here ψγίεια itself represents the formal cause of health, which is internal and essential (μέρος, ἔχεσθαι), and developes, quickens, and stimulates the bodily functions into healthy activity, gives health an active reality (évepyei), and is therefore contrasted with the efficient, and external cause, the physician, who, as the Paraphrast on the parallel passage, X 4, says, συντηρεί και φυλάττει, και όπως παραμείνη ζητεί. The second passage, x 4, 1174 b 25, is again an illustration : οὐ τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τόπον η τε ήδονη τελειοί καὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν τε καὶ ή αἴσθησις, σπουδαΐα ὅντα, ώσπερ οὐδ' ή ὑγίεια καὶ ο λατρος ομοίως αιτιά έστι του θγιαίνειν: on which the Paraphrast's (Andronicus Rhodius) commentary is, ή μεν γάρ αὐτή ποιεί μή οὐσα (i. e. ἐνέργεια, not 'non-existent') την τοῦ ύγιαίνειν ενέργειαν, ὁ δε συντηρεί κ.τ.λ. as before. The second and third divisions represent two kinds of extraneous causes or conditions, distinguished from this formal, intrinsic cause. These are first, necessary conditions, as of health, represented by food; and secondly, probable conditions, as exercise, which, as Aristotle adds, only produces health έπὶ τὸ πολύ.

§ 4. We now proceed to the application or illustration of the general principles laid down in the three first sections, which continues to the end of the chapter; τούτων δὲ κειμένων κ.τ.λ. Application of the two topics of 'consequents', ἄμα and ὕστερον ἀκολονθεῖν: the receipt of all good things is an instance of the latter, because it is followed by the possession of good things; and the loss or riddance of evil things, which is accompanied simultaneously by the relief from what is bad, exemplifies the former. This latter conclusion rests upon the principle, here understood, but stated in § 18, ῷ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν. Comp. also Top. Γ 2, 117 ὁ 2, on λήψεις and ἀποβολαί.

§ 5. ω γὰρ ὑπερέχει κ.τ.λ.] 'for the amount of the excess of the greater

έχει τό μείζον τοῦ ἐλάττονος, τοῦτο γίνεται τοῦ μὲν 6 λῆψις τοῦ δ' ἀποβολή. καὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς δὲ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὸν εἶναι κατὰ γὰρ ταύτας εὖ τε διάκεινται οἱ ἔχοντες, καὶ ποιητικαὶ τῶν ἀγαθῶν εἰσὶ καὶ πρακτικαί. 7 περὶ ἐκάστης δέ, καὶ τίς καὶ ποία, χωρὶς ῥητέον. καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι πάντα γὰρ ἐΦίεται τὰ ζῷα

over the less, the same is the measure of the gain of the one (good) and the loss of the other (evil)'. γίνεται, 'becomes', i. e. 'amounts to'. The excess of the greater over the lesser good, and the excess of the greater over the lesser evil, is the measure of the gain in the one case, and the loss in the other; the loss of the evil being a gain, by the same rule as

before, ω τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν.

§ 6. ποιητικαί...καὶ πρακτικαί] virtues, besides being 'productive of good', like many other things, have also this special peculiarity, that they are effective of good by action. The distinction is, that whereas ποιείν tends to some έργον or substantial enduring result, as a picture, or statue, or other work of art, the end of mparter is action itself, and there is no further result. See the commencement of the Nic. Eth., and what is there said about these two rely. Ethics and Rhetoric are mourτικαί τέχναι, the arts of the painter and statuary ποιητικαί. Compare Introd. pp. 16-19. By the distinction here taken we find brought into view the specially 'practical' character of the virtues, which, like the art that describes them, end in action: though besides this, some of the virtues, at any rate, produce lasting effect, and leave results beyond the mere performance of the act, some positive benefit (as an epyov) to an individual or the community. But the words here distinguished are elsewhere employed indifferently to express generally the power of producing an effect or result, as appears in the comparison of 5 \$\3; 16; 6 \\$ 2. Of the two, ποιητικός is most frequently used in the expression of this conception, as may be seen in the following sections.

All moral virtues must necessarily be each a form of good: for they produce a good moral habit, or condition, or constitution in those that possess them, and are besides productive (and effective) of good in their

actions and the results of these.

'Each of them, its substance or true nature' (the first Category, τί ἐστί, οὐσία, substance what the thing is, really and essentially), 'and qualities' (the third Category), 'must be treated separately, χωρίς, apart'. This is done in c. 9. The contents of the chapter to which reference is here made shew that ἀρεταί are here confined to the ἡθικαί or moral virtues, the 'virtues' par excellence, and do not include physical, or any other, 'excellences'.

§ 7. καὶ τὴν ἡδονὴν ἀγαθὸν εἶναι] What is here taken for granted, as universally admitted, that pleasure is good (though not necessarily the good) is in both the treatises on pleasure, in the 6th and 10th books of the Nicomachean Ethics, carefully investigated and the opinions held upon the question by pre

αὐτῆς τῆ φύσει. ὤστε καὶ τὰ ἡδέα καὶ τὰ καλὰ ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ εἶναι τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἡδονῆς ποιητικὰ, τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ καθ ἐαυτὰ αἰρετά ἐστιν.

δε δε καθ' εν είπεῖν, ἀνάγκη ἀγαθὰ είναι τάδε. εὐδαιμονία καὶ γὰρ καθ' αὐτὸ αίρετὸν καὶ αὐταρκες,

and Plato, examined, Bk. VII, c. 12, seq. and X, c. 2. Aristotle's conclusion (in Bk. x) is that though pleasure may be regarded as good it is not the good, i.e. the supreme good, good in itself, because there are some pleasures which are not proper objects of choice and therefore not good. Eudemus (if the seventh book be his), seems rather to be inclined to the contrary view; it is said at any rate, c. 14, init., ἀνάγκη οὖν τὴν ἡδονὴν άναθόν τι είναι, and three lines further, άριστον τ' ουδέν κωλύει ήδονήν τινα elvas. And at the beginning of c. 13, in answer to Plato's objection in the Philebus, we find, ότι δ' οὐ συμβαίνει διὰ ταῦτα μὴ είναι ἀγαθὸν μηδὲ τὸ αριστον, έκ τῶνδε δήλον. This difference of view between the master and pupil (on the supposition that Eudemus is the author of Bk. VII) is in fact in exact conformity with the difference of their respective definitions of pleasure; Aristotle defining it as the perfecting (τελείωσις) of the ἐνέρyea, but not our evépyea itself, and therefore not 'the supreme good'; whilst Eudemus goes further and describes it as an 'unimpeded energy', ανεμπόδιστος ενέργεια: and in fact this variation may be regarded as one of the principal arguments for the difference of authorship of the two treatises on pleasure in the Nic. Eth. The principle upon which the fact is here assumed in the Rhetoric, is stated in both treatises of the Ethics; the universal recognition, namely, of the principle that pleasure is desirable. See VII 14 init. and X 2, 1172 b 35, of & ενιστάμενοι ώς οὐκ ἀγαθὸν οῦ πάντ' έφίεται, μη οθθέν λέγωσιν' δ γάρ πασι δοκεί, τοῦτ' είναι φαμέν.

τῶν δὲ καλῶν τὰ μὲν ἡδέα τὰ δέ κ.τ.λ.] This division of καλόν brings into view the physical and moral aspects of it united in the term beauty and right. καλόν as ἡδύ, an object of pleasure, is the physical beauty that pleases in nature and art; in καθ΄ αὐτὸ αἰρετόν we are referred to the moral side of it, that which is 'fair' and right, which is an end in itself, in itself desirable, and to be sought on its own account and with no ulterior object. It is defined in this latter sense, c. 9, 3, ὁ ᾶν δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ον ἐπαινετὸν ἢ, (its being the object of 'praise' confers upon it its moral character) ἡ ὁ ᾶν ἀγαθὸν ὁν ἡδὺ ἢ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν. Comp. II 13, 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρον αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς. Eth. Eudem. VII 15, 3, 1248 ὁ 18, τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων τέλη ἐστιν, ἃ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν ἔνεκά ἐστιν αίρετά. τούτων δὲ καλά, ὅσα δι' αὐτὰ ὅντα πάντα ἐπαινετά ἐστιν. On the καλόν as a moral end, the ultimate object and motive of human action, to which all action should be directed and all lower interests sacrificed, see the fine passage of Eth. Nic. IX 8, 1169 a 6, seq., particularly 20—27.

§ 8. ως δε καθ' ἐν εἰπείν] 'to describe good things singly', in detail, by an enumeration of particular kinds of good.

εὐδαιμονία] happiness, the universal τέλος, aim and end of life and

9 καὶ ένεκα αὐτοῦ πολλὰ αἰρούμεθα. δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοψυχία, μεγαλοπρέπεια καὶ 10 αὶ ἄλλαι αὶ τοιαῦται έξεις ἀρεταὶ γὰρ ψυχῆς. καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ κάλλος καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀρεταὶ γὰρ σώμα-

action. See especially Eth. Nic. 1 5, where happiness is defined by its three principal characteristics; it must be τέλειον, αυταρκες, τὸ τῶν πρακτών τέλος. These same characteristics appear in the definition here given in the Rhetoric: τέλειον corresponds to το καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν, its perfection or completeness being chiefly shewn in its desirability for its own sake. Eth. N. I 5, 1097 b 31, τελειότερον δε λέγομεν το καθ' αὐτό διωκτόν τοῦ δι' έτερου, καὶ τὸ μηδέποτε δι' άλλο αίρετὸν τῶν καὶ καθ' αὐτὰ καὶ διὰ τοῦθ' αίρετών, καὶ άπλως δή τέλειον το καθ' αύτο αίρετον αεί καὶ μηδέποτε δι' άλλο. τοιούτον δ' ή εύδαιμονία μάλιστ' είναι δοκεί ταύτην γάρ αίρούμεθα άει δι' αύτην καὶ οὐδέποτε δι' ἄλλο, τιμήν δε καὶ ήδονήν καὶ νοῦν καὶ πάσαν άρετην αἰρούμεθα μέν και δι' αὐτά...αἰρούμεθα δέ και τῆς εὐδαιμονίας χάριν, διὰ τούτων ὑπολαμβάνοντες εὐδαιμονήσειν. την δ' εὐδαιμονίαν οὐδείς αίρείται τούτων χάριν, οὐδ' ολως δι' ἄλλο: note on c. 5 § 1, p. 72. On αὐτάρκεια, the second characteristic of happiness, see c. 5 § 3, and note there, p. 74. The sentences of Eth. Nic. I 5, following those already quoted, are upon this same subject. The concluding summary of the contents of the chapter is, τέλειον δή τι φαίνεται καὶ αὐταρκες ή εὐδαιμονία, τῶν πρακτῶν οὖσα τέλος, which gives the third of the conditions in the Rhetoric. A precisely similar description of happiness is found in Eth. Nic. x, cc. 6 and 7.

§ 9. The list of virtues here given is very incomplete, and a mere extract or sample of that given in the Nic. Eth. II 7, which is itself anything but a complete or satisfactory enumeration of them. A longer list is to be found in c. 9 § 5, which includes the two intellectual virtues, σοφία and φρόνησις, but still omits several of those which are distinguished in the table of the Ethics. All the virtues here mentioned are analyzed in detail in Eth. N. III, IV, V, justice being treated separately at

great length in the fifth book.

έξις, the genus of the definition of virtue, is an acquired, developed, confirmed habit or state, physical, mental or moral—the last of the three, of course, when applied to virtue. It is properly opposed to διάθεσις, as a settled and permanent state, opposed to a temporary and changeable disposition. It is developed out of the πάθη by the operation of ἔθος, habit or association, till it has acquired a fixed tendency and direction and a confirmed character, which shews itself in the constant exercise of similar ἐνεργεῖαι, and is now no longer liable to change and the opposite tendency to vice. On the growth of virtue, and the formation of the ἔξις, see Eth. Nic. II I—5, particularly 4 and 5. Also Sir A. Grant, Ess. on Ethics, I p. 120 seq. (1st Ed.) [=p. 164, 3rd Ed.] Trendel. on de Anima p. 311, and 366. Kategorienlehre, p. 95.

§ 10. ὑγίεια...ἄριστον δοκεῖ εἶναι] This is one of many opinious. So the 'Delian inscription', quoted by Aristotle, Eth. N. 19, and Eudemus, Eth. Eud. 11, 1, with a slight variation; also in Theogn. Eleg. 255 (Bergk), κάλλιστον τὸ δικαιότατον, λῷστον δ΄ ὑγιαίνειν | ἦδιστον δὲ πέψυχ' οῦ

τος καὶ ποιητικαὶ πολλῶν, οἶον ἡ ὑγίεια καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ τοῦ ζῆν, διὸ καὶ ἄριστον δοκεῖ εἶναι, ὅτι δύο τῶν p. 21. τοῖς πολλοῖς τιμιωτάτων αἴτιόν ἐστιν, ἡδονῆς καὶ 11 τοῦ ζῆν. πλοῦτος ἀρετὴ γὰρ κτήσεως καὶ ποιητικὸν 12 πολλῶν. φίλος καὶ φιλία καὶ γὰρ καθ αὐτὸν αἰρε-13 τὸς ὁ φίλος καὶ ποιητικὸς πολλῶν. τιμή, δόξα:

τις ἐρᾶ τὸ τυχεῖν, for which Bergk gives in the second line, πρῆγμα δὲ τερπνότατον τοῦ τις, ἔραιτο τυχεῖν. Soph. Creus. Fragm. ap. Stob. CIII 15 (Dind. Fr. Soph. 326), κάλλιστόν ἐστι τοῦνδικον πεφυκέναι λῷστον δὲ τὸ ζῷν ἄνοσον ἢδιστον δ᾽ ὅτῷ πάρεστι λῆψις ὧν ἐρᾶ καθ᾽ ἡμέραν. Ariphron, Dithyr. I (ap. Bergk, Fragm. Lyric. Gr. p. 841 [p. 984 Ed. 2]), ὑγίεια, πρεσβίστα μακάρων, μετὰ σεῦ ναίοιμι τὸ λειπόμενον βιστᾶς...σέθεν δὲ χωρίς οὕτις εὐδαίμων ἔφω. See also a fragment of Licymnius, Fr. 4, in Bergk, u. s., p. 840 [p. 986 Ed. 2] (a dithyrambic poet and rhetorician, mentioned by Aristotle, Rhet. III 12, 2; 13, 5, and quoted, as Bergk supposes, in III 14, 5); Plut. de virt. mor. c. 10, quoting from some poet, ἢ τε τοῦ σώματος ὑγίεια—δοκεῖ μέγιστον ἀγαθόν οὕτε γὰρ πλούτον χάριν ἡ τεκέων, οὕτε τᾶς ἱσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιληίδος ἀρχᾶς—τοῦ ὑγιαίνειν μὴ παρόντος. de fraterno amore, c. 2, ἦς χωρὶς οὕτε πλούτον, φασίν, οὕτε τᾶς ἰσοδαίμονος ἀνθρώποις βασιληίδος ἀρχᾶς εἶναί τινα χάριν καὶ ὄνησιν. (ap. Bergk not.)

§ 11. πλοῦτος, ἀρετὴ κτήσεως] The ἄργον, special office or function, that which it was intended by its nature to do, determines the ἀρετή or special excellence of anything. If wealth is the object of acquisition, and acquisition fulfils its proper function, its destination, the law of its being, in the accumulation of wealth; then the ἀρετή or special excellence of the art of acquiring is manifested in the attainment of that object, or the wealth amassed. Wealth as a 'good' seems here to be regarded as an end; if so, this is in contradiction to the more scientific doctrine laid down in the Politics 1 8, according to which wealth is only an instrument, see note on p. 79 (c. 5, 7), and note 1 on the same page. However, as some good things are only instrumental and means to an end, we are not obliged to suppose that Aristotle regards wealth here otherwise than as one of those mediate ends, subordinate and subservient to some other and higher end. On the relation of ἔργον and ἀρετή, see notes on c. 2, 12, and 5, 4, and the reff. in the former.

§ 12. καθ' αὐτὸν αἰρετὸς ὁ φίλος] This is an application of the general principle in § 2, that good in general is in itself desirable, to the special case of friendship. That a good friend, or the friendship of the good, is desirable in itself is made to appear in the course of a long and subtle argument in Eth. N. IX. 9, of which the conclusion is (at the end of the chapter) δεήσει ἄρα τῷ εὐδαιμονήσοντι φίλων σπουδαίων. The words most in point here are, εἰ δὴ τῷ μακαρίῳ τὸ εἶναι αἰρετόν ἐστι καθ' αὐτό, ἀγαθὸν τῷ φύσει ἀν καὶ ἡδύ, παραπλήσιον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ φίλον ἐστιν, καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν αἰρε-

των αν είη.

§ 13. τιμή, δόξα] The distinction between these two is stated in note on c. 5, 4, p. 76. These are not only 'pleasant' and therefore good in them-

καὶ γὰρ ήδέα καὶ ποιητικὰ πολλῶν, καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ 14 αὐτοῖς ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ τὸ ὑπάρχειν ἐφ' οἶς τιμῶνται. δύναμις τοῦ λέγειν, τοῦ πράττειν ποιη-15 τικὰ γὰρ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀγαθῶν. ἔτι εὐφυΐα,

selves, but also productive of various advantages which accrue to them from the respect of others, and so 'good' in this secondary or subordinate sense likewise.

καὶ ἀκολουθεῖ αὐτοῖς κ.τ.λ.] 'and they are accompanied for the most part by the actual possession of the things' (natural gifts, qualities, accomplishments, acquirements, military distinction, rank and fortune, and such like) 'which the honours paid them (these supposed possessors) imply', $\dot{\epsilon}\phi$ ' oἶs $\tau\iota\mu\hat{\omega}\nu\tau a\iota$, on the basis of which, on account of, for which, they receive the honour paid, or 'on which the honours paid them rest, are grounded, or based'. $\dot{\epsilon}\phi$ ' oἶs τ . might possibly be rendered 'for which they (the honour and reputation) are valued'; on which their value depends, or, by which it is measured; but the other interpretation seems more direct and natural.

The rule here tacitly referred to, as warranting the inference that, when honour is conferred, those so honoured are generally worthy of it, is that a generally received opinion, or popularly current maxim, or the expression of these in the ordinary language, may be for the most part depended on as true. With το ὑπάρχειν, τοῖς κεκτημένοις, or something similar,

must be supplied.

§ 15. εὐφυία] is a happy natural constitution of mind or body or both; εὐφυής τὸ σῶμα καὶ την ψυχήν, Plat. Rep. III 409 E. In de Soph. El. c. 1, 165 a 5, we have εὐφυέστατος applied to 'a topic', in the sense (apparently) of 'naturally best adapted to a certain purpose'. And in the spurious addition to the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 38 (Bekk. 39), 19, euchoun τόπων occurs to denote the 'natural advantages of situation', opportunitas locorum. The word is however applied here, as it usually is, to the mental faculties, and signifies cleverness, quickness of intellect, intellectual dexterity, differing very little from ἀρχίνοια. And so, infr. § 29 and II 15 3. Similarly de Anima B 9, 2, 421 a 25, οί μεν γάρ σκληρόσαρκοι άφυείς την διάνοιαν, οί δὲ μαλακόσαρκοι εὐφυείς. Τορ. Γ 2, 118 α 22, φιλοπονείν άρνούμεθα ιν' εὐφυείς είναι δοκώμεν, 'we deny that we are industrious in order to gain the reputation of cleverness'. In Top. Θ 14, 163 b 13, ή κατ' ἀλήθειαν εὐφνία is defined, for dialectical purposes, τὸ δύνασθαι καλώς ελέσθαι τάληθες και φυγείν το ψεύδος όπερ οι πεφυκότες εὐ δύνανται ποιείν. In Eth. Nic. III 7, 1114 b 9, it is used similarly to denote sagacity in aiming rightly at the true end, καὶ τὸ εὖ καὶ τὸ καλώς τοῦτο πεφυκέναι ή τελεία καὶ άληθίνη αν είη εὐφνία. Rhet. III 2, 10 init. In Poet. 22, 17 it stands for readiness in poetical invention. advins, the opposite, is 'dull' and 'stupid', Plat. Phaed. 96 C. In the Platonic opou, p. 413 D, it is defined, τάχος μαθήσεως γέννησις φύσεως άγαθή άρετή έν φύσει.

¹ This principle is in fact constantly appealed to by Aristotle, and is one of the ordinary arguments to which he has recourse in the establishment of the doctrines of his philosophy. μνήμαι, εὖμάθεια, ἀγχίνοια, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα' ποιητικαὶ γὰρ αὖται ἀγαθῶν αἱ δυνάμεις εἰσίν. ὁμοίως δὲ 16 καὶ αἱ ἐπιστήμαι πᾶσαι καὶ αἱ τέχναι καὶ τὸ ζῆν' εἰ γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλο ἕποιτο ἀγαθόν, καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν ἐστιν' καὶ τὸ δίκαιον' συμφέρον γάρ τι κοινῆ ἐστίν.

μνημαι] Victorius, Vater and Vahlen (in Trans. of Vienna Acad. Oct. 1861, p. 105) object to the plural of this word, on the ground either that abstract nouns do not admit of the plural formation, or (as Vahlen) that as it is the faculty of memory that is here in question the plural is inadmissible. As to the former, such is no doubt the rule, but the exceptions are abundant. Parallel to this is avapriosess, 'acts of recollection', de Memor. 2, 6 and 10. We have already noticed προσκυνήσεις and έκστάσεις as examples in c. 5, 9; three more occur together in c. 11, 4, ραθυμίαι, απονίαι, αμέλειαι. Eth. N. I 13, 1102 b 4, έν τοις υπνοις, II I, 1103 b 19, τὰς ὀργάς, 2, 1104 a 27, γενέσεις, αὐξήσεις, φθοραί, b 25 τὰς ἀρετὰς ἀπαθείας τινὰς καὶ ήρεμίας. Pol. II 5, 1264 a 35, είλωτείας τε καὶ πενεστείας καὶ δουλείας. The plural expresses the several acts or moments of these abstract conceptions when carried into operation, or particular cases or instances of the manifestation of them. Munual therefore means here, any ordinary examples of retentive memory. It occurs itself, Metaph. A 1, 980 b 29, and Anal. Post. II 19, 100 a 5. [Also, in Eth. N. IX 4, 1166 a 25; X 2, 1173 b 19, Index Aristotelicus. S.]

εὖμάθεια] which is equivalent to εὖφυΐα πρὸς μάθησιν, is a particular kind of natural sagacity and readiness directed to learning. εὖφυΐα ψυχῆς

πρός τάχος μαθήσεως. "Οροι Platon, 413 D.

ἀγχίνοια] 'ready wit', 'quickness of apprehension', is mentioned as a kind of εὐστοχία and distinguished from εὐβουλία (right judgment), but not defined, Eth. Nic. VI 9. The defin. of ὅροι Platon. is εὐφυΐα ψυχῆς, καθ' ἢν ὁ ἔχων στοχαστικός ἐστιν ἐκάστῷ τοῦ δεόντος ὀξύτης νοῦ, which agrees very well with the preceding. It is therefore an intellectual (not moral) 'presence of mind', the faculty of seeing the point at once, or 'ready wit'. In Anal. Post. I 34, init. it is thus defined, εὐστοχία τις ἐν ἀσκέπτῷ χρόνῷ (intuitive, immediate) τοῦ μέσου (the middle term of the syllogism, which expresses the cause), οἶον εἴ τις ἰδὼν ὅτι ἡ σελήνη τὸ λαμπρὸν ἀεὶ ἔχει πρὸς τὸν ἦλιον, ταχὺ ἐνόησε διὰ τί τοῦτο, ὅτι διὰ τὸ λάμπειν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου ἡ διαλεγόμενον πλουσίῷ ἔγνω διότι δανείζεται ἡ διότι φίλοι, ὅτι ἐχθροὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, which expresses in a logical form precisely the same characteristic of the faculty, rapidity of apprehension, ταχὺ ἐνόησε.

εὶ γὰρ μηδὲν ἄλλο κ.τ.λ.] This seems to refer exclusively to the last mentioned of the three, το ζην, to which alone it is strictly appropriate. Sciences and arts are avowedly 'productive of good', and rest their claims

upon that alone,

§ 16. καὶ τὸ δίκαιον κ.τ.λ.] The argument is, justice is κοινῆ συμφέρον, it promotes the public interest, it is advantageous or expedient to society, whose interest it is that the laws should be duly observed and the rights of its citizens maintained, and evildoers punished, and all this is the effect of τὸ δίκαιον: but that which is useful or expedient is good, § I,

17 ταῦτα μὲν οὖν σχεδὸν τὰ ὁμολογούμενα ἀγαθά 18 ἐστιν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἀμφισβητησίμοις ἐκ τῶνδε οἰ συλ-19 λογισμοί. ῷ τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν. καὶ

because it is the means to an end, that end being happiness, the ultimate and universal aim.

§ 17. So far the good things treated of are universally acknowledged to be such, and we may therefore take it for granted that they are so. We now come to cases of doubtful good things, which are or may be disputed, and which therefore require argument for their support. συλλογισμός here stands for the rhetorical enthymeme, or rather, perhaps, for any kind of regular inference or ratiocination in general. See note on c. 2, 11, and c. 4, 5.

σχεδόν] 'pretty nearly', 'about'. Used in qualification of a too general expression, just like ώς ἔπος εἰπεῖν. The author means to say that he has given a tolerably complete list, or exact account of them; he does

not profess perfect accuracy.

§ 18. ο τὸ ἐναντίον κακόν, τοῦτ' ἀγαθόν] If, for instance, you can shew that vice and folly are bad, you may infer at once that their opposites, virtue and wisdom, are good. This is not universally true; Aristotle himself places it amongst the topics which are 'open to question'. So Bacon, Cuius contrarium malum bonum; cuius bonum malum. Non tenet (this does not hold) is the 'redargutio', in iis rebus quarum vis in temperamento et mensura sita est. Dum vitant stulti vitia in contraria current. Pref. to Colours of Good and Evil. Bacon's Works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, Vol. VII p. 67. According to Aristotle, Eth. N. 11 8, there is double opposition in the case of virtue and vice, at per yap ακραι και τη μέση και άλληλαις έναντίαι είσιν, ή δε μέση ταις ακραις. When virtue, the mean disposition, is opposed to either of the extremes or vices, the rule holds; when the extremes or vices are considered as opposed to one another, it fails. Categ. c. 11, 13 δ 36, εναντίον δε εστιν εξ ανάγκης άγαθφ μεν κακόν τούτο δε δήλον τη καθ εκαστον επαγωγή, οδον ύγιεία νόσος καὶ ἀνδρεία δειλία, ὁμοίως δὲ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων. κακῷ δὲ ότὲ μὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίου, ότε δε κακόν τη γαρ ενδεία κακώ όντι ή ύπερβολή εναντίου κακόν όν όμοίως δέ και ή μεσότης έναντία έκατέρω, ούσα άγαθόν. έπ' όλίγων δ' άν τὸ τοιούτον ίδοι τις, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν πλείστων ἀεὶ τῷ κακῷ τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐναντίον έστίν. 14 α 19, ἀνάγκη δὲ πάντα ἡ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ γένει είναι, ἡ ἐν τοῖς ἐναντίοις γένεσιν, ή αὐτὰ γένη είναι... ἀγαθὸν δὲ καὶ κακὸν οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν γένει, ἀλλ' αὐτὰ τυγχάνει γένη τινών οντα. Cic. Topic. XI 47, deinceps locus est qui a contrario dicitur. Contrariorum autem genera sunt plura: unum eorum quae in eodem genere plurimum differunt (Aristotle's еуштіа, in his ordinary usage of the term. Good and bad however are different genera, not extremes of the same genus), ut sapientia et stultitia. Eodem autem genere dicuntur quibus propositis occurrunt tamquam e regione quaedam contraria, ut celeritati tarditas, non debilitas: ex quibus argumenta talia existunt: si stultitiam fugimus sapientiam sequamur; et bonitatem si malitiam. The dialectical topics of rà évapria, in which this is not included, are analysed in Topic. B cc. 7,8. To this head may also be referred the topic of originals, privatio, criticised by Bacon, Coloma of Good οὖ τὸ ἐναντίον τοῖς ἐχθροῖς συμφέρει οἶον εἰ τὸ δειλοὺς εἶναι μάλιστα συμφέρει τοῖς ἐχθροῖς, δῆλον ὅτι 20 ἀνδρία μάλιστα ἀφέλιμον τοῖς πολίταις. καὶ ὅλως ὁ οἱ ἐχθροὶ βούλονται ἢ ἐφ' ῷ χαίρουσι, τοὐναντίον τούτῳ ἀφέλιμον φαίνεται· διὸ εὖ εἴρηται

ή κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος.

έστι δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῦτο, ἀλλ' ώς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· οὐθὲν γὰρ κωλύει ἐνίοτε ταὐτὸ συμφέρειν τοῖς ἐναντίοις· ὅθεν λέγεται ώς τὰ κακὰ συνάγει τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, P. 1363.

and Evil, No. 6, cuius privatio bona, malum: cuius privatio mala, bonum. στέρησις and έξις, one of the forms of contrariety or opposition, Met. I 4, 1055 a 33, πρώτη δὲ ἐναντίωσις έξις καὶ στέρησις ἐστιν. And Top. B 8, II4 a 7 (though in a different application), ὁμοίως δὲ τοῖς ἐναντίοις καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν στερήσεων καὶ ἔξεων σκεπτέον. Στέρησις contrasted with ἔξις is one of the four (Categ. 10, II b 17) or five (Metaph. Δ 10, 1018 a 20) kinds of opposition, ἀντικεῖσθαι. Comp. supr. § 4, in which this is implied.

§ 19. Victorius quotes in illustration, Cic. pro Muren. c. 39, Si L. Catilina cum suo consilio nefariorum hominum quos secum eduxit hac de re posset iudicare, condemnaret L. Murenam: si interficere posset, occideret....Idemne igitur delecti amplissimis ex ordinibus honestissimi atque sapientissimi viri iudicabant quod ille importunissimus gladiator

hostis reipublicae iudicaret?

οῦ ἐναντίον] The gen. immediately following the ordinary construction ῷ ἐναντίον, is remarkable. The genitive after the adjective is accounted for by the comparison implied in it, just as it follows ἔτερος, ἄλλος, διά-φορος, διαφέρειν, διαφερόντως, ἀλλοῖος, ἀλλότριος. See for examples Matth. Gr. Gr. 366, on ἐναντίος, Obs. 2.

§ 20. ἢ κεν γηθήσαι Πρίαμος] II. A 255, 'Huc confugit fallacissimus homo Sinon apud Virgilium (Aen. II 104) et ab hoc loco praesidium petivit, cum salutem suam callide procurans, quam abiecisse videri volebat, inquit, Hoc Ithacus velit, et magno mercentur Atridae.' Victorius.

ἔστι δ' οὐκ ἀεὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.] This last rule is liable to exceptions, as in the case where the same thing, the same course of action or policy, happens to be for the interest of two adversaries: a common misfortune has often this effect of 'bringing' enemies 'together', or uniting them, as when the Athenians were forced into alliance with the Thebans by their common dread and hatred of Philip. συνάγει γὰρ τοὺς ἐχθίστους ὁ κοινὸς φόβος, Polit. VIII (v), sub init. 'Misery acquaints a man with strange bedfellows', says Trinculo in the Tempest (Act II Sc. 2), which illustrates the proverb. However, the ordinary rule is, that it is common interests that produce sympathy, συνέχει τὸ κοινόν, Eth. Nic. 14, ult.; and the example of Athens and Thebes is only an apparent exception, because in the given case the common danger had altered their original relations and engendered common interests and common sympathies and antipathies.

21 όταν ἢ ταὐτὸ βλαβερὸν ἀμφοῖν. καὶ οὖ μή ἐστιν ὑπερβολή, τοῦτο ἀγαθόν, ὃ δ' ἂν ἢ μεῖζον ἢ δεῖ,

22 κακόν, καὶ οὖ ἕνεκα πολλὰ πεπόνηται ἢ δεδαπάνηται φαινόμενον γὰρ ἀγαθὸν ἤδη, καὶ ὡς τέλος τὸ τοιοῦτον ὑπολαμβάνεται, καὶ τέλος πολλῶν τὸ δὲ τέλος ἀγαθόν. ὅθεν ταῦτ εἰρηται,

καδ δέ κεν εύχωλην Πριάμφ

Kal

αἰσχρόν τοι δηρόν τε μένειν· 23 καὶ ή παροιμία δέ, τὸ ἐπὶ θύραις τὴν ὐδρίαν. καὶ οὖ

§ 21. οὖ μή ἐστιν ὑπερβολή] 'that which does not admit of excess', health, life, virtue, and all that lies in a mean state, happiness, are all ends in themselves, and desirable in and for themselves. Pleasure by this rule, which does admit of being carried to excess, is properly speaking no 'good'.

ὁ αν ή μείζον ή δεί, κακόν] by the rule, μηδέν άγαν.

§ 22. πολλά πεπόνηται ή δεδαπάνηται] 'much labour or expense has been incurred'.

 $\eta \delta \eta$] note on c. 1, 7, p. 13 'already', for that reason alone, and without looking any farther. The time, trouble, and expense which we have spent in the pursuit of an object shews already, without any further consideration, or without our knowing whether it is really good or not, that it seems at any rate good to us: it consequently becomes an end to us, and all ends are good. $d\gamma a\theta \delta v$, of effician $\pi d\nu \tau a$, 6, 2.

τὸ τέλος ἀγαθόν] because 'every art, science, action, and purpose has some good in view at which it aims, and which is therefore its end in

every case'. Eth. Nic. init.

The two quotations from Homer are taken from II. B 176, and 298. Vater observes that the half line quoted of the first does not convey the intention of the quotation; the 'boast to Priam' is not in point. The lines applicable are these: λίποιτε 'Αργείην 'Ελένην, ης εἴνεκα πολλοί 'Αχαιών ε΄ν Τροίη ἀπόλοντο φίλης ἀπὸ πατρίδος εἴης. The second line, αἰσχρόν τοι δηρόν τε μένειν κενεύν τε νέεσθαι, became proverbial; whence Cic. de Offic. III 2,6 (of the result of his son's studies at Athens), ad quos cum tamquam ad mercaturam bonarum artium sis profectus, inanem redire turpissimum est.

§ 23. καὶ ἡ παροιμία δέ] This δέ, introduced after καί—always (except in Epic poetry, II. Ψ 80, καὶ δέ σοι αὐτῷ μοῦρα, Odys. π' 418) with a word or more intervening—is inserted as something additional to the preceding, which it enforces or emphasizes, and has in these, as in all other cases, a reference to μέν expressed or implied. A first implies a second, and a second a first. Of μέν implied in δέ, see some instances in Herm., note on Soph. Phil. 86, and the reverse case, δέ in μέν, Don. New Crat. § 154, where the origin and derivation of the two particles is made out. The δέ here may

πολλοί έφίενται, καὶ τὸ περιμάχητον φαινόμενον οὖ p. 22.

be readily explained as in correlation to a suppressed μέν after ταῦτα, 'these first, and secondly the proverb'; or 'these on the one hand, on the other the proverb'. It may be rendered 'too', 'also', or from the emphasis that it conveys, 'in fact', or any thing similar. This special usage, like the other senses of $\delta\epsilon$, is derived from the primary meaning of uév and dé, 'one' and 'two'; and so, as conjunctions, in the sense of 'firstly' and 'secondly'. See Jelf, Gr. Gr. § 769, 2, where a few examples are cited. Others are given in Paley's note on Prom. Vinct. 994 (from Aeschylus): in Arnold's note on Thucyd. II 36, 6 (from Thucydides, Herodotus, and Xenophon): Plat. Rep. IX 573 B (ed. Tur.), καὶ μανίας δέ. It is found in all Greek writers, but is more common in Aristotle than elsewhere: Rhet. 1 7. 18, 19, 20; '9. 29, 30; II 3. 12; II. II, καὶ ἀρχὴ δέ: Eth. N. V 5, 1130 b 21, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον δέ: Polit. VI (IV), 13, 1297 b 10, καὶ εἰώθασι δέ: and again V 16, καὶ ή πρώτη δὲ πολιτεία, de Anim. A 4, init. καὶ αλλη δέ: c. 5, 411 a 7, καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλφ δέ, B 3, 415 a 6, καὶ τῶν αἰσθητικῶν δέ, et passim. ['Maxime in Ethicorum libro quarto octavo nono decimo,' Eucken, de Arist. dicendi ratione I p. 32. S.] The same meaning is much more frequently expressed by these particles in the inverted order,

The proverb, $\tau \delta \epsilon n \theta i \rho a s \tau \eta \nu \delta \delta \rho i a \nu$, 'to drop' or break the pitcher at the door', after you have carried it home from the distant well with much toil and trouble, expresses the general conception of 'lost labour', 'labour thrown away'. Erasmus, Adagia, p. 350, in foribus urceum, misinterprets the proverb as expressing something vile and contemptible, not worth the trouble of taking up.

Another more common corresponding proverb is πλύνειν πλίνθον, laterem lavare (Terent. Phorm. I 4, 9) 'to try to make a red brick white

¹ In the endeavour to represent these English words by precisely corresponding Greek terms, no difficulty is found in the case of break: if καταγνύναι λύραν (Pl. Phaed. 85 A) is to break a lyre, it is equally applicable to a pitcher. But when we try to render 'to drop' by a word exactly corresponding (arrior popos in its primary sense), the language seems to fail us. I examined all the analogous Greek words (that I could think of), βάλλειν, βίπτειν, έων ('to let go', but intentionally), χεῖν, and a dozen others, with their compounds, and found them all infected with the same vice, in respect of the representation of the word 'to drop', viz. that they all express a voluntary and conscious action, whereas drop is applied to an accidental and unintentional relaxation of the muscles, which cannot properly be called an action at all. The notion may no doubt be expressed by a circumlocution, of which the Homeric ξκπεσε, or ξκφυγε, χειρός (said however of the object, not the subject), comp. Lat. fugere, is a frequent example. We might also say (of the subject) περιοράν τι πίπτον οτ πίπτειν, or (of the object) λανθάνειν πεσόν. But these are not single words. And I am brought to the conclusion that the Greek language has no single word to express the notion exactly; which is the less surprising, inasmuch as the French language labours under the same deficiency; the periphrasis laisser tomber being made to supply the place of 'to drop'. ἐκχεῖν, Soph. Phil. 13, might seem to come nearest to the literal representation of it, were it not for Arist. Ran. 855, where the word undoubtedly expresses a conscious and intentional act. ὁ λόγος...ἐκπεσών οἰχήσεται, Plat. Phileb. 13 B.

γὰρ πάντες ἐφίενται, τοῦτ' ἀγαθὸν ἦν, οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ
24 ὥσπερ πάντες φαίνονται. καὶ τὸ ἐπαινετόν οὐδεὶς
γὰρ τὸ μὴ ἀγαθὸν ἐπαινεῖ. καὶ ὃ οἱ ἐχθροὶ [καὶ οἱ
φαῦλοι] ἐπαινοῦσιν ὥσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἤδη ὁμολο-

by washing it'. Theocr. Id. XVI 62, ή ὕδατι νίζειν θολερὰν λοειδέῖ πλίνθον 1, and answering to our 'washing a blackamoor white'. Compare also Eur. Iph. Taur. 116, οὕτοι μακρὸν μὲν ἥλθομεν κώπη πόρον, ἐκ τερμάτων δὲ νόστον ἀροῦμεν πάλιν.

περιμάχητον φαινόμενον] 'apparently, manifestly, conspicuously (with

φαίνεσθαι in this sense, comp. II 2, 1, bis) an object of contention'.

τοῦτ² ἀγαθὸν ἦν] 'this is, as was said', i.e. in § 2. This use of the imperfect, referring to a past transaction or statement referred to in present time, is so common both in Plato and Aristotle as to require no illustration.

ol δὲ πολλολ...φαίνονται] The acts and opinions of the great body of people, the most of those that you know or have heard of, are as convincing to the popular audience to which Rhetoric is addressed, as those of all mankind if they could be ascertained. The fact therefore that the possession of anything is much contested and coveted, implying that a great many people seek after it and care for it, is as sufficient a proof to them that it is a good, as if it could be shewn, as it ought by the rules, § 2, that it is the universal object of human aims: the sanction of 'the

many' is as good as an universal admission.

§ 24. τὸ ἐπαινετόν] The proper object of ἔπαινος is virtue, any kind of practical excellence; ἔστι δ' ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς, Rhet. I 9, 33. Οπ ἔπαινος as the test of virtue and the distinction of this from ἐγκώμιον and εὐδαιμονισμός, see Introd. Appendix B to Bk. I ch. 9, p. 212 seq. It is there said that ἔπαινος and ψέγος are the equivalents of Butler's 'moral approbation and disapprobation'. This requires some qualification. When the 'intellectual' virtues are included as the objects of ἔπαινος, as they certainly are in the Eth. Eud. II 1. 18, the approbation loses its exclusively moral character. In Eth. Nic. I 12, Aristotle together with the moral virtues, justice, courage, 'goodness' in general, includes also as objects of praise all kinds of ἀρετῆ or excellence, such as strength and swiftness, which are manifested in action.

καὶ δ οἱ ἐχθροὶ καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι ἐπαινοῦσιν] Victorius, in illustration of the former of these two topics, quotes Virg. Aen. XI 282, Stetimus tela aspera contra, Contulimusque manus; experto credite quantus In clypeum assurgat, quo turbine torqueat hastam. The prowess of Aeneas could not be more highly extolled than by the praises extorted from his enemy

Diomede.

καὶ οἱ φαῦλοι] is rejected as a subsequent insertion by Muretus, F. A. Wolf, Bekker, Brandis, and Spengel, because it is passed over unnoticed in the explanatory commentary that follows, το σπερ γὰρ—πεπουθότες.

¹ θολερὰν πλίνθον is to be interpreted here not of the colour of the brick, but of an unbaked brick dried in the sun, which melts away and turns to mud when it is washed.

γοῦσιν, εἰ καὶ οἱ κακῶς πεπονθότες διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανερὸν ὁμολογοῖεν ἄν, ὥσπερ καὶ φαῦλοι οὺς οἱ φίλοι

Vater alone defends it. The explanation of it is easy, and it is perfectly consistent with the context and with good sense. If the vilest and meanest, the 'worthless and contemptible', φαῦλοι, who are least likely to be sensible of merit in others, being almost devoid of right moral instinct, find themselves compelled to praise some signal act of valour, disinterestedness, or virtue—we are engaged here upon actions—a fortiori it must meet with the approbation of better judges, and be emphatically good. If with this reasonable explanation we take into account Aristotle's hasty and careless habit, twice already noticed, of interrupting an explanation or an argument by the insertion of something bearing indirectly on the subject, but not immediately appropriate, I think we may without scruple retain the words objected to.

ωσπερ γὰρ πάντες ἦδη ὁμολογοῦσιν] 'for this is now as good as, equivalent to, an universal admission'. ἦδη, 'by this time', now that we have got as far as this, have reached, that is, the level of enemies, the extreme case of those who are interested in denying the merit—if they approve,

all others must necessarily do so.

διὰ γὰρ τὸ φανερὸν...τὸ "Ιλιον There is a difficulty here which has much occupied the commentators, arising from the want of connexion, as the present text stands, between the two rules laid down, ωσπερ καί... ἐπαινούσιν, and the example (from Simonides) which is said, διό, to follow from them: the example, according to the present reading, is not an inference from either of them. The best way of meeting the difficulty seems to be to adopt, with Spengel, the reading of the best MS A. This omits the words ους οί φίλοι ψέγουσι καὶ ἀγαθοί, without which the sense is clear and consistent. 'For it must be owing to its being evident that they are inclined to (would) admit it, just as' (it is equally evident that, by the same rule, in the opposite case) 'those who are praised by their enemies must be worthless', (because if your enemy approves of your conduct towards him, which is assumed to be hostile, it shews that you can have done him no harm: and therefore that you have been wanting either in courage or patriotism or energy and skill). Of this the example of the Corinthians is now a real instance, and their suspicion of Simonides' intentions may be traced to the general rule, 'And this was why the Corinthians conceived the suspicion that they had been insulted by Simonides, when he wrote, 'Ilium has no fault to find with the Corinthians' (which it ought to have had if they had done their duty). The Corinthians misinterpreted Simonides' expressions; his intentions were innocent, but he failed to perceive the inference that might be derived from them. The line of Simonides is apparently misquoted by a lapse of memory. The Schol. Pind. Ol. XIII p. 78, who cites it, has pavies (i) for μέμφεται; and this reading appears also in another reference to it in Plut. Vit. Dion. c. 1 sub init. (cf. Bergk and Gaisf.), ὁ Σιμωνίδης φησί τοῖς Κορινθίοις οὐ μηνίειν τὸ "Ιλιον ἐπιστρατεύσασι μετὰ τῶν 'Αχαιῶν, ὅτι κἀκείνοις οί περί Γλαθκον έξ άρχης Κορίνθιοι γεγονότες συνεμάχουν προθύμως. Homer only says, Il. Z 152 seq., that Glaucus himself attributed his origin to

ψέγουσι καὶ ἀγαθοὶ οῢς οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἐπαινοῦσιν. διὸ λελοιδορῆσθαι ὑπέλαβον Κορίνθιοι ὑπὸ Σιμωνίδου ποιήσαντος

Κορινθίοις δ' οὐ μέμφεται τὸ Ίλιον.

25 καὶ ὁ τῶν φρονίμων τις ἢ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἢ γυναικῶν προέκρινεν, οἷον Ὀδυσσέα ᾿Αθηνᾶ καὶ Ἑλένην Θησεὺς καὶ ᾿Αλέξανδρον αἱ θεαὶ καὶ ᾿Αχιλλέα "Ομηρος. 26 καὶ ὁλως τὰ προαιρετά· προαιροῦνται δὲ πράττειν

Sisyphus of Ephyre or Corinth. If this be the true explanation of the reason why Ilium was 'not wroth', or 'found no fault', with the Corinthians, and Aristotle remembered it when he used the example, it seems that the instance is very ill chosen for the purpose of illustrating the rule. In this case nothing is imputed to the Corinthians except that the aid of Glaucus and his men of Corinthian race compensated the Trojans for their own hostility, and therefore that Troy had nothing to reproach them with, which could scarcely be construed by them as an *insult*: and the example only applies to the rule which it is supposed to exemplify in this sense; that the Trojans ought by the rule to have been represented as having directly censured the Corinthians, if Simonides had intended to pay them a compliment; by the mere omission of this they thought that he had insulted them.

ή τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν] so Eth. X 5, ult., the standard of moral judgment is said to be ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ ἀγαθός. IX 4, 1166 α 12, μέτρον ἐκάστῳ ἡ ἀρετὴ καὶ ὁ σπουδαῖος. III 6, 1113 α 32, διαφέρει πλεῖστον ὁ σπουδαῖος τῷ τἄληθὲς ἐν ἐκάστοις ὁρῷν, ὥσπερ κανὼν καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὧν.

προέκρινεν] 'decided, distinguished by preference'.

Έλένην Θησεύς] The preference of Theseus, a man of consummate authority, παντελή την ἀρετην κτησάμενον, for Helen, is actually introduced by Isocrates as one of the topics of his encomium of that much calumniated lady, Helen. §§ 18—22.

§ 26. τὰ προαιρετά] 'objects of deliberate and voluntary choice'. The προαίρεσιε seems here intended in the more general sense in which προαιρεῖσθαι and προαίρεσιε are employed in the ordinary language, and even sometimes in the Ethical treatise itself, as I 2, init. ἐπειδὴ πᾶσα γνῶσιε καὶ προαίρεσιε ἀγαθοῦ τινὸε ὀρέγεται. προαίρεσιε is defined in Eth. Nic. III 5, ult. βουλευτικὴ ὅρεξιε τῶν ἐψ' ἡμῦν, 'an impulsive faculty (implying, not directly expressing the free will) capable of deliberation, directed

τά τε εἰρημένα καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κακὰ καὶ τὰ τοῖς 27 φίλοις ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ δυνατά. ταῦτα δὲ διχῶς ἐστί,

to things within our power'-no one deliberates about things beyond his power, οὐδέν γὰρ πλέον. And again in precise conformity with this, de Mot. Anim. c. 6, ή προαίρεσις κοινόν διανοίας καὶ ὀρέξεως, ώστε κινεί πρώτον (is the ultimate mover, the origin of motion or action) to operator ral to διανοητόν, (it is the object of the two faculties, and not the faculties themselves, which is the real origin of motion, according to the Aristotelian doctrine that the primary moving agent must be itself unmoved,) οὐ πῶν δέ το διανοητον άλλα το των πρακτών τέλος. Thus the προαίρεσιε is composed of two separate elements or faculties, intellectual and impulsive, of which the latter alone is the agent of motion, or stimulates to action : the intellectual part deliberates prior to action, and decides whether the proposed object of the action is good or bad, right or wrong1. Though the moogineous in its general and wider signification of 'deliberate, voluntary purpose' is capable of prompting to action of every kind, yet in its narrower and specially ethical usage it is moral action alone that it originates and determines, οἰκειότατον γὸρ είναι δοκεί τη ἀρετή καὶ μάλλον τὰ ήθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων, Eth. N. III 4, init. Comp. III 2, 1110 b 31, οὐ γὰρ ή έν τη προαιρέσει άγνοια alτία του ακουσίου, αλλά της μοχθηρίας. From the ethical point of view therefore the definition will be 'a deliberate and voluntary moral purpose'. The principal passages on the subject of apoalpeass are Eth. Nic. III cc. 4, 5, 6, where it is analysed and distinguished from ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, which are mere animal impulses, on the one hand, and from βούλησις, βούλευσις and δόξα, on the other: ib. VI 2; and de Anima III 9, 10, where it is treated in reference to its action as a motive principle.

τὰ εἰρημένα] all the objects of voluntary choice already mentioned which consist in, or are to be obtained by, action; such as health, plea-

sure, and especially the various moral virtues.

καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κακά] This was an article of the received code of popular morality amongst the Greeks and Romans: comp. § 29, where one class of good things are â ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. This is a duty, and a part of justice. In Rhet. I 9, 24, it is said to combine two kinds of virtue, τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖοθαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι΄ τό τε γὰρ ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, καὶ ἀνδρείου τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι. II 5, 5. Rhet. ad Alex. I (2), 13. Xen. Memor. IV 2, 15, 16. Eur. Ion 1046, ὅταν δὲ πολεμίους δρᾶσαι κακῶς θέλη τις, οὐδεὶς ἐμποδών κεῖται νόμος. Med. 808, βαρεῖαν ἐχθροῖς καὶ φίλοισιν εὐμενῆ κ.τ.λ. Cic. de Off. 17, Iustitiae primum munus est ut ne cui quis noceat, nisi lacessitus iniuria.

§ 27. ταῦτα, SC. τὰ δυνατά.— τὰ γενόμενα ἃν καὶ τὰ ῥοδίως γιγνόμενα.] Two kinds of possibilities; 'things which might' (ἄν, under certain conditions, possibly difficult) 'be brought to pass, and those which are easily attained'.

Accordingly, Metaph. Θ 5, 1048 a 11, δρεξιε and προαίρεστε are distinguished; δρεξιε is the general and spontaneous impulse to action, which when controlled and determined by the intellectual principle, διάνοια, becomes the compound προαίρεστε, the deliberate moral purpose.

τά τε γενόμενα ξάν και τὰ ραδίως γιγνόμενα. ράδια δὲ ὅσα ἢ ἄνευ λύπης ἢ ἐν ὀλίγω χρόνω· τὸ γὰρ χαλεπὸν ὁρίζεται ἢ λύπη ἢ πλήθει χρόνου. και ἐὰν ως βούλονται βούλονται δὲ ἢ μηδὲν κακὸν ἢ ἔλαττον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ· τοῦτο δ' ἔσται, ἐὰν ἢ λανθάνη ἡ τιμωρία 28 ἢ μικρὰ ἦ. και τὰ ἴδια, και ἃ μηδείς, και τὰ περιττά·

The distinction is between ends or things hard and unlikely, and easy

and likely, to be attained or obtained.

The same distinction of possibilities is found in Cic. de Inv. 11 56, 169. (Victorius, who refers to it, quotes only the definition of facilis.) Atque in its omnibus quae ante dicta sunt, quid fieri et quid facile fieri possit oportet considerare. Facile id dicimus, quod sine magno aut sine ullo labore, sumptu, molestia quam brevissimo tempore confici potest; posse autem fieri quod quamquam laboris, sumptus, molestiae, longinquitatis indiget, atque aut omnes aut plurimas aut maximas causas habet difficultatis, tamen, his susceptis difficultatibus, compleri atque ad exitum perduci potest: an excellent commentary on Aristotle's topic.

τὸ γὰρ χαλεπὸν κ.τ.λ.] 'facility' is defined by the absence of pain or laborious effort, or by the shortness of the time occupied in doing anything or getting anything done, because difficulty is defined by the opposites.

όρίζεται ἢ λύπη ἢ πλήθει χρόνου] A various reading in several of the carlier Editions is λύπη ἢ πλήθος. In this case ὁρίζεται is the middle voice, as it usually is in the sense of 'defining'. ὁρίζεσθαι however, as a passive, is found, though rarely, elsewhere, as Eth. Nic. III 10, 1115 δ 23, ὀρίζεται ἔκαστον τῷ τέλει, ib. IX 8, 1168 δ 5, πάνθ' οἶς ὁ φίλος ὁρίζεται, Pol. VII (VI) 2, 1317 δ 39, ἀλιγαρχία γένει καὶ πλουτῷ καὶ παιδείᾳ ὁρίζεται, Theophrast. Hist. Plant. I 1, 6, ἢ μὲν ἀνομοιότης ὁρίζεται σχήματι χρώματι κ.τ.λ. It is not to be included in the class of irregular passives formed from

neuter verbs, the act of opigew being transitive.

καὶ ἐὰν ὡς βούλονται] sc. γένηταὶ τι (or τὰ πράγματα) ἀγαθὸν ἔσται, 'anything that turns out as they desire'; any result, either of their own acts, or of the course of events, such as they like; [Gaisford says, 'nescio an in ὡς ἀν βούλωνται' (a various reading) 'lateant vestigia melioris scripturae, ὅσ' ἀν βούλωνται.' This is not so suitable to what follows.] 'but what they do like is either no evil at all, or less than the good (ensuing): and this (the latter of the two preceding) will be the case, when (for instance) the penalty (which is attached to some illicit gain or advantage) is either unfelt (λανθάνη, escapes your notice, not the notice of others,) or trifling'. In both of these cases the profit, or good, is greater than the loss, or evil.

§ 28. καὶ τὰ ἄδια] Things or qualities, special and peculiar, not shared by the rest of the world in general, such as personal gifts, graces, or accomplishments: anything that distinguishes a man from the mass. Of the three kinds of ἄδια distinguished in Top. A 5, 102 a 18—30 (ἄδιον proper, the fourth predicable, proprium), these are ἄδια ἀπλῶs; the second, are not absolutely and at all times ἄδια, but only at particular times, under particular circumstances of time, ποτέ; the third class, to mich those

τιμή γὰρ οὕτω μᾶλλον. καὶ τὰ ἀρμόττοντα αὐτοῖς· τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύνα-here spoken of belong, are 'relative' ἴδια, ἴδια πρός τι, special and peculiar,

i. e., in this case, to a few men as compared with the rest.

ά μηδεὶς (ἄλλος ἔχει)] This is only a particular case of the preceding: in that the advantage is shared by few, in this the possessor stands alone. Anything excessively rare or unique, as a coin, a tulip, a piece of china, a book, may acquire a special value from this circumstance. Comp. Magn. Mor. B 7, 1205 δ 29, τὸ γὰρ ἐν πᾶσιν εἶναι καὶ πᾶσι κοινὸν οἰκ ἀγαθόν. This feeling is characteristic of ambition, τὸ δὴ τοιοῦτον ἐπὶ φιλοτιμοῦ μᾶλλον καὶ φιλοτιμίας οἰκεῖον ἐστιν ὁ γὰρ φιλοτιμός ἐστιν ὁ μόνος βουλό-

μενος έχειν καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχειν.

περιττά] 'things that are singular, preeminent, specially distinguished' amongst their fellows or congeners, or among things of the same sort, 'for by this they obtain greater credit'. περιττός is 'odd', singular, striking, remarkable'. From περί, 'over and above', 'exceeding', (Homer, περί δ' άλλων φασί γενέσθαι, περί μέν Δαναών,) the derivative περιττός passes into the metaphorical sense of surpassing, preeminent, standing out from the rest, out of the common way, extraordinary. This signification of the word will be found illustrated in the Lexicons. Add to these, as marked examples of some of its various significations, Eur. Hippol. 437, 445, 948. Ar. Pol. II 6, 1265 a 10, in the well-known passage on Plato's style, Ib. VIII (V) 10, 1312 a 27, πράξεως περιττής (extraordinary, signal) καὶ δι' ἡν ονομαστοὶ γίγνονται καὶ γνώριμοι τοῖς ἄλλοις, ib. II 8 init. of Hippodamus of Miletus, that he became περιπτότερος 'rather odd, eccentric, extravagant', in his dress and habits. Top. Z 4, 141 b 13, ἀκριβής καὶ περιττή διάνοια. Metaph. I 2, 1053 b 3, of Protagoras' dictum, (πάντων μέτρον ἄνθρωπος), οὐθὲν δη λέγων περιττόν φαίνεταί τι λέγειν, Rhet. II 15, 3, Probl. XXX I init. περιττοί ('distinguished' in any art or science) φαίνονται μελαγχολικοί οντες. (Waitz, on Top. Γ 2, 118 a 6, illustrates other senses of the word in Aristotle.) Of excellence of style, Dion. de Comp. Verb. c. 3, bis, sub init. et sub fin. From περί again, in the sense of 'over and above, exceeding', comes περιττός as applied to an 'odd' number; the supposition on which the name is based being, that the ἄρτιος ἀριθμός, or even number, was the primary number-2 was in fact considered as the first arithmetical number, I being the principle of unity-the odd number is an addition to or excess over the other, the next step in advance.

The three kinds of good just enumerated are all repeated in c. 9. 25, 26, under the head of καλόν. As 'goods' they are in fact all of them of

the specially 'questionable' sort', αμφισβητήσιμα; supr. § 17.

τὰ ἀρμόττοντα] 'suitable, appropriate', specially applicable or belonging to them.

τὰ προσήκοντα κατὰ γένος καὶ δύναμιν] 'things that naturally belong to them, or are due to them in respect of birth and power'.

1 'Odd' in early English is sometimes employed by a similar metaphorical application to denote superiority to others, striking excellence. 'For our tyme the odde man to performe all three perfitlie,...is in my poor opinion Joannes Sturmius'. Ascham, Scholemaster, p. 113 (Mayor's ed.). Richardson has omitted to notice this use of 'odd' in his Dictionary.

μιν, καὶ ὧν ἐλλείπειν οἴονται, κὰν μικρὰ ἡ· οὐδὲν γὰρ
29 ἦττον προαιροῦνται ταῦτα πράττειν. καὶ τὰ εὐκατέργαστα· δυνατὰ γὰρ ὡς ῥάδια· εὐκατέργαστα δὲ ὰ
πάντες ἡ οἱ πολλοὶ ἡ οἱ ὅμοιοι ἡ οἱ ἥττους κατώρθωσαν. καὶ ὰ χαριοῦνται τοῖς φίλοις, ἡ ὰ ἀπεχθήσονται
τοῖς ἐχθροῖς. καὶ ὅσα οῦς θαυμάζουσι προαιροῦνται

ών ελλείπειν οἴονται] ελλείπειν with genitive, 'to come short of, be deficient in'. 'And anything men think wanting to them, as appropriate, or suitable to their condition' (a second case of τὰ ἀρμόττοντα), 'however trifling', (they regard as a good, and eagerly pursue it): 'for none the less for that (διὰ τὸ μικρὰ εἶναι) do they choose (deliberately purpose) to do it'; i. e. to do things, to act, so as to attain their end. So Victorius, who illustrates the topic by Hor. Sat. II 6, 8, O si angulus ille proximus accedat qui nunc denormat agellum. If this is right, as I suppose it is, προαιρούνται πράττειν is carelessly written for ζητούσιν οτ ἐπιθυμούσιν, οτ ἐφίενται, or some verb that would imply the object of action, and not the mere action itself.

§ 29. The things mentioned in this and the following section all of them designate what is considered good because men like to do it.

τὰ εὐκατέργαστα] 'things easily effected, or easy achievements', are considered as good, because they are possible, by the rule §§ 26, 27; they belong to the second class of things 'possible', such as are 'easy'.

κατώρθωσαν] aor. 'ever succeeded in'; or indicating the notion of 'habit' which the verb δρθοῦν and its compounds acquire. The secondary and metaphorical signification of safety and success, from the notion of going through a career, as a race, erect and in an upright position, without stumble or fall, is well illustrated by the following passages of Sophocles, Electr. 741," καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἄλλους πάντας ἀσφαλεῖς δρόμους ἀρθοῦθ' ὁ τλήμων ὁρθὸς ἐξ ὀρθῶν δίφρων. Oed. Col. 394, Ismene, νῦν γὰρ θεοί σ' ὀρθοῦσι, πρόσθε δ' ὥλυσαν. Oed. γέροντα δ' ὀρθοῦν φλαῦρον δε νέος πέση.

å χαριοῦνται τοῖς φίλοις] 'anything by which one will oblige one's friends'. à cognate accus. for âs χάριτας. In obliging a friend you may be said to oblige yourself, a true friend being ἔτερος αὐτός: Eth. N. IX 9, sub_init. Ib. 1170 b 7. Ib. c. 4, 1166 a 31, προς δὲ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἐαυτόν, ἔστι γὰρ ὁ φίλος ἄλλος αὐτός.

å ἀπεχθήσονται τοῖς ἐχθροῖς] 'or by which one may shew one's hostility to (offend or annoy) one's enemy'. As before, ἃς ἀπεχθείας ἀπεχθείας ἀπεχθείας ἀπεχθείας ἀπεχθείας ἀπεχθείας ἀπεχθείας ἀπεχθείας ἀπεχθείας απρός τινα, οτ τινί, is 'to make oneself odious or hostile to', 'to quarrel with', or 'to disoblige, offend, annoy'. Compare διαβάλλεσθαι πρός, in Plato, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Aristotle, to have a hostile feeling towards one, to be set against him, to quarrel with him (from διαβάλλειν, to set two people at variance, to engender animosity and ill feeling between them, and hence to give one an ill opinion of the other, and so, finally, to calumniate). Both of these, men think good and right, and 'ts of pursuit.

o look up to, respect, reverence, admire'. Valck. ad

πράττειν. καὶ πρὸς ἃ εὐφυεῖς εἰσι καὶ ἔμπειροι· ράον γὰρ κατορθώσειν οἰονται, καὶ ἃ μηδεὶς φαῦλος· ἐπαινετὰ γὰρ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὧν ἐπιθυμοῦντες τυγχάνουσιν· 30 οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἡδὺ ἀλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον φαίνεται. καὶ μάλιστα ἕκαστοι πρὸς ἃ τοιοῦτοι, οἶον οἱ φιλόνικοι P. 1363 δ. εἰ νίκη ἔσται, οἱ φιλότιμοι εἰ τιμή, οἱ φιλοχρήματοι εἰ χρήματα, καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι ώσαύτως.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀγαθοῦ καὶ συμφέροντος ἐκ τούτων 1 ληπτέον τὰς πίστεις· ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλάκις ὁμολογοῦν- CHAP. VII.

Hippol. 106. Ar. Rhet. II 6. 15, 16, 24. Aristoph. Nub. 180, 428, ήμᾶς τιμῶν καὶ θαυμάζων. Ran. 1008, alibi. Isocr. Areop. ter &c.

εὐφυεῖε] 'clever', § 15, note on p. 105. Comp. c. 11 28, Probl. XVIII 6,

there quoted.

ξμπειροι] those who have *acquired* skill by practice and experience, distinguished from the naturally clever and dexterous. Success, the attainment of one's object, in any practice or occupation for which any one has either a natural talent or an acquired aptitude, is regarded as a good, because it is more *easily* attained, § 27; 'more easily', either than by others who are not so skilful, or than in other pursuits and practices.

ά μηθεὶς φαῦλος] (οὐδείς, no definite particular person; μηθείς, no indefinite person, no man whatever); sub. πραξείεν ἄν. 'Hinc ducto argumento, apud Euripidem quidam divitias non se movere dixit, quas etiam saepe improbissimi homines facillime consecuti sunt: Fragm. Aeol. 14 (5, Dind.) μὴ πλοῦτον εἴπης οὐχὶ θανμάζω θεὸν ὄν χώ κάκιστος ράδιως

έκτήσατο'. Victorius.

άλλὰ καὶ βέλτιον] All objects of desire are supposed to be good, all alperá, and ὧν ἐφίενται, § 2. The desire of a thing therefore implies not only that the satisfaction of it will give you pleasure, but also that you

suppose it (фаічетаг) to be good.

§ 30. καὶ μάλιστα ἔκαστοι (ἀγαθὰ ἡγοῦνται ταῦτα) πρὸς ἃ τοιοῦτοι] 'to which they are so and so', disposed in such and such a way. In the parallel passages of the Ethics this is expressed by φιλοτοιοῦτοι. Eth. N. 1 9, 1099 α 8, ἐκάστφ δ' ἐστὶν ἡδὺ πρὸς δ λέγεται φιλοτοιοῦτος, οἷον ἵππος μὲν τῷ φιλίππῳ, θέαμα δὲ τῷ φιλοθεώρῳ' τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον καὶ τὰ δίκαια τῷ φιλοδικαίῳ καὶ ὅλως τὰ κατ' ἀρετὴν τῷ φιλαρέτῳ. Ιb. III 13, 1118 ½ 22, τῶν φιλοτοιούτων λεγομένων. Ib. IV 10, 1125 ½ 15, πλεοναχῶς τοῦ φιλοτοιούτον λεγομένου.

CHAP. VII.

The κοινὸς τόπος of μᾶλλον καὶ ἦττον or degree applied to τὸ συμφέρον, expediency. Most of the special topics of this chapter are derived from, or at all events coincide with, those of the third book of the Dialectical Topics. Brandis, über Ar. Rhet. ap. Schneidewin's Philologus, IV I. pp. 14, 15, infers from certain slight differences of the mode of treatment, in the case of two or three of these topics in the two works, the later composition of the

τες άμφω συμφέρειν περί τοῦ μαλλον άμφισβητοῦσιν, έφεξης αν είη λεκτέον περί του μείζονος αγαθού καί 2 του μαλλον συμφέροντος. έστω δή υπερέχον μέν τοσούτον καὶ έτι, ὑπερεχόμενον δὲ τὸ ἐνυπάρχον. καὶ μεῖ(ον μὲν ἀεὶ καὶ πλεῖον πρὸς ἔλαττον, μέγα δὲ Rhetoric: but in this latter work the references, tacit or acknowledged, to the Topics, are so numerous and so precise, that we do not need this indirect evidence to establish the point. The passages to be compared are, Top. Γ 2, 117 a 11, with Rhet. I 6.3, and 7.5; Top. Γ 3, 118 b 20, with Rhet. I 7.36; Top. Γ 1, 116 a 29, and 6.8, with Rhet. I 7.8. Cicero, Topic. XVIII 68-70, in a passage too long to quote here, enumerates the topics of Comparatio, following Aristotle very closely: most of Aristotle's topics of this chapter are found in Cicero's list. The topics of comparison fall under four general heads. Comparantur igitur ea quae aut maiora aut minora aut paria dicuntur: in quibus spectantur haec, numerus, species, vis, quaedam etiam ad res aliquas affectio; which are there severally illustrated at length. First, some general principles are laid down; then we are referred back to c. 6. 2, for the various definitions of good; and then, (from § 3 to the end of the chapter), these general principles and definitions are applied to the determination of cases, special τόποι or είδη, of comparison of two good things, so as to shew which of them in each case is the greater.

§ 1. αμφω] 'both'-of two things, left to be understood.

§ 2. ἔστω] See note on c. 5. 3, 6. 2, 10. 3.

ύπερέχου—ύπερεχόμενον] 'Hae definitiones possunt declarari duabus lineis parallelis, quarum una ultra alteram protenditur: item numeris, e.g. 6 et 9. Maior enim sive linea sive numerus et aequat minorem et excurrit: minor vero inest in maiori.' Schrader. On the passive form ὑπερέχεσθαι, see Appendix (B) On the irregular passive (at the end of the notes to this Book).

τοσοῦτον καὶ ἔτι] 'so much and something over'.

τὸ ἐνυπάρχον] 'that which is contained or included in the other'.

καὶ μεῖζον μὲν ἀεὶ κ.τ.λ.] That all 'quantity', and all terms that express it, μέγα μικρόν, πολὺ ὁλίγον, are relative, πρός τι, we learn from the Categories, c. 6, 5 b 15—29, of which this passage is a summary repetition. The same thing, as a mountain or a grain of millet, when compared with two different things, is called great or little, greater or less—and so of 'many' and 'few'. None of them is absolute αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ: all of them are relative to something else, with which they are compared, πρός τι, πρὸς ἔτερον.

"And 'greater' and 'more' have always reference to a 'less', and 'much' and 'little' to the average, magnitude (τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος, the object to which the term is applied being thereby compared with

¹ If πολύ καὶ ὀλίγον are here intended to include 'many' and 'few', πολλοὶ καὶ ὀλίγοι, as they most probably are, since they occur in the Categories and are wanted to complete the list, we must extend the τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθοι to number, πληθοι, as well as magnitude.

καὶ μικρὸν καὶ πολύ καὶ ὀλίγον πρὸς τὸ τῶν πολλῶν μέγεθος, καὶ ὑπερέχον μὲν τὸ μέγα, τὸ δὲ ἐλλεῦπον 3 μικρὸν, καὶ πολύ καὶ ὀλίγον ὡσαύτως. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἀγαθὸν λέγομεν τό τε αὐτὸ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλου αἰρετόν, καὶ οὖ πάντ' ἐφίεται, καὶ ὁ νοῦν ᾶν καὶ φρόνησιν λαβόντα ἕλοιτο, καὶ τὸ ποιητικὸν καὶ τὸ φυλακτικόν, ἢ ῷ ἔπεται τὰ τοιαῦτα, τὸ δ' οὖ ἕνεκα τὸ τέλος ἐστί, τέλος δ' ἐστὶν οὖ ἕνεκα τὰ ἄλλα, αὐτῷ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ταῦτα πεπονθός, ἀνάγκη τά τε πλείω τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ τῶν ἐλαττόνων,

its congeners, as a mountain or man with the average, τοῖς πολλοῖς, of mountains and men, in order to estimate its size): and that which is called 'great' exceeds (this average ordinary size), whilst that which falls short of it is called 'small', and 'much' and 'little' in like manner1'.

§ 3. The following definitions of good are repeated from c. 6. 2, with a few trifling alterations. This section is translated, and the illogical

character of the construction explained, in Introd. pp. 177-8.

αὐτῷ δὲ ἀγαθὸν τὸ πρὸς αὐτὸ ταῦτα πεπονθός] This clause contrasts the notion of good in itself, καθ' αὐτό, here expressed by the dative αὐτῷ 'to', or, 'for and by itself', with good as the universal τέλος, the object of all men's aims and aspirations. Schrader, Vater, Buhle, and Bonitz (Aristotelische Studien, I p. 89), are in favour of αὐτῷ and αὐτόν, which would thus contrast 'good to the individual with good in general'. Eth. N. VII 13, init. ἀγαθὸν διχῶς, τὸ μὲν ἀπλῶς, τὸ δέ τινι. Τορ. Γ I, 116 b 8, τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τινὶ αἰρετώτερον. This use of the pronoun is quite in conformity with ordinary Aristotelian usage, as infra § 35, τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλῶς, and frequently elsewhere. Vater says that the Greek Scholiast gives αὐτῷ as well as αὐτὸ: and Bonitz adds that Muretus' rendering, cuique autem bonum id quod ita est affectum ad ipsum, shews that he followed this reading. Nevertheless it appears that there is no manuscript authority for the change, and Bekker and Spengel have retained αὐτῷ and αὐτὸ.

ανάγκη...μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι] Τορ. Γ 2, 117 α 16, ἔτι τὰ πλείω ἀγαθὰ τῶν ἐλαττόνων (αἰρετώτερα), ἢ ἀπλῶς, ἢ ὅταν τὰ ἔτερα τοῖς ἐτέροις ἐνυπάρχη, τὰ ἐλάττω ἐν τοῖς πλείοτω. Τwo ἐνστάσεις ('reprehensions of the fallax' Bacon calls them, Colours of Good and Evil), objections, or instances opposed to the universal validity of this rule, are next given: (1) when one thing is done for the sake of another, to attain a certain end, as getting well, healthy practices for the sake of health; in this case the two together are in no way preferable to health alone: (2) and things not good accom-

¹ Gaisford refers to Harris, *Philosophical Arrangements* ('arrangements' mean collections of notions under general heads; and the 'arrangements' that he treats of are Aristotle's *summa genera*, or Categories), ch. 9 p. 191. Harris merely repeats what Aristotle had already said in his Categories to which Gaisford does not refer.

συναριθμουμένου τοῦ ἐνὸς ἢ τῶν ἐλαττόνων, μείζον ἀγαθὸν εἶναι· ὑπερέχει γάρ, τὸ δὲ ἐνυπάρχον ὑπερές 4 χεται. καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχη, καὶ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν· καὶ ὅσα αὐτὰ αὐτῶν, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου· οἶον εἰ ὁ μέγιστος ἀνὴρ γυναικὸς τῆς μεγίστης μείζων, καὶ ὅλως οἱ ἄνδρες τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους· καὶ εἰ οἱ ἄνδρες ὅλως τῶν γυναικῶν μείζους, καὶ ἀνὴρ ὁ μέγιστος τῆς μεγίστης γυναικὸς μείζων· ἀνάλογον γὰρ ἔχουσιν αὶ ὑπεροχαὶ panied by a single good (so Waitz), may be preferable to several good things, as happiness, in conjunction with something not good, to justice

ἐστιν) καὶ ταὐτὰ μετ' ἀλυπίας ἡ μετὰ λύπης. ὑπερέχει γάρ, κ.τ.λ.] On ὑπεροχή as a test of excellence, besides other topics of this chapter, comp. c. 9, 25, 39, Eth. N. IV 8 init. there quoted. The opposition of the active and passive, superiority and inferiority, occurs

and courage together, καὶ ταῦτα μεθ' ήδονης μᾶλλον η ἄνευ ήδονης (αἰρετώτερά

Eth. N. ib. 1124 6 10, το μέν γαρ υπερέχοντος, το δ' υπερεχομένου.

§ 4. καὶ ἐὰν τὸ μέγιστον τοῦ μεγίστου ὑπερέχη κ.τ.λ.] Τορ. Γ 2, 117 b 33, ἔτι εἰ ἀπλῶς τοῦτο τούτου βέλτιον, καὶ τὸ βέλτιστον τῶν ἐν τούτω βέλτιον τοῦ ἐν τῷ ἔτέρῳ βελτίστον, οἶον εἰ βέλτιον ἄνθρωπος ἵππου, καὶ ὁ βέλτιστος ἄνθρωπος τοῦ βελτίστου ἵππου βελτίων. καὶ εἰ τὸ βέλτιστον τοῦ βελτίστου βέλτιον, καὶ ἀπλῶς τοῦτο τούτου βέλτιον, οἶον εἰ ὁ βέλτιστος ἄνθρωπος τοῦ βελτίστου ἵππου βελτίων, καὶ ἀπλῶς ἄνθρωπος ἵππου βελτίων. A practical application of this rule occurs in Pol. IV (VII) 1, 1323 b 13, ὁλως τε δῆλον ὡς ἀκολουθεῖν ψήσομεν τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου πράγματος πρὸς ἄλληλα κατὰ τὴν ὑπεροχήν, ἤνπερ εἴληχε διάστασιν ὧν φαμὲν αὐτὰς εἶναι διαθέσεις ταύτας. ὧστ εἵπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τῆς κτήσεως καὶ τοῦ σώματος τιμιώτερον καὶ ἀπλῶς καὶ ἡμῖν ἀναγκὴ καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τὴν ἀρίστην ἐκάστου ἀνάλογον τούτων ἔχειν.

ανάλογον έχουσιν] 'are proportional to one another'.

In Bacon's Colours of Good and Evil', ('a table of colours or appearances of good and evil and their degrees, as places of persuasion and dissuasion, and their several fallaxes, and the elenches of them',) this topic is given in the form, cuius excellentia vel exuperantia melior id toto genere melius. 'This appearance, though it seem of strength, and rather logical than rhetorical, yet is very oft a fallax'; and he proceeds accordingly to 'reprehend' it. Bacon's works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, vol. VII, p. 78. He certainly proves the non-universality of the rule; but by the theory of Rhetoric all these positions are alike open to question, and can always be argued on either side.

¹ Some of the topics selected for 'reprehension' are identical with those of Aristotle, and probably borrowed from him. The meaning of the word 'Colours' in this application is thus explained by Erasmus, Adagia, s.v. fucus, p. 1915, "Qui ad exornationes atque figuras se conferunt apud Gallos proverbio dicuntur 'rhetoricis coloribus' uti: hoc est, fucatis pigmentis, quibus nihil ineptius si bonis sententiis non fuerint conjuncta". And by Bacon himself in his preface.

5 τῶν γενῶν καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐν αὐτοῖς. καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν τῷδε ἔπηται, ἐκεῖνο δὲ τούτῷ μή ἔπεται δὲ ἢ τῷ ἄμα ἢ τῷ ἐφεξῆς ἢ τῆ δυνάμει ἐνυπάρχει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις ἡ τοῦ ἐπομένου ἐν τῆ θατέρου. ἔπεται δὲ ἄμα μὲν τῷ ὑγιαίνειν τὸ ζῆν, τούτῷ δὲ ἐκεῖνο οὔ, ὕστερον δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν τὸ ἐπίστασθαι, δυνάμει δὲ τῷ ἱεροσυλεῖν τὸ ἀποστερεῖν. ὁ γὰρ ἱεροσυλήσας κἂν

§ 5. καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν τῷδε ἔπηται κ.τ.λ.] 'and whensoever one thing 'follows' (i.e. attends upon, always accompanies it, in one of its five senses) 'another, but not reciprocally (or conversely, the other does not always follow it)'. Any good A, which is necessarily accompanied by another good B, where the converse does not hold, must be the greater of the two; because the one (A) always implies the presence of B, and includes the use of it, whereas this is not always true of the converse; and when there is no such reciprocal consequence A must be superior to B. Let A and B be health and life; life invariably accompanies health, but health by no means invariably accompanies life: and therefore from this point of view health may be regarded as superior to life.

ἔπεται δὲ ἢ τῷ ἄμα κ.τ.λ.] On the various senses of ἔπεσθαι and ἀκο-

λουθείν see note on c. 6, 3.

δυνάμει' ἐνυπάρχει γάρ κ.π.λ.] 'Potential concomitance or accompaniment', is explained as 'the inherence, (i.e. the virtual existence, which may be developed into actual, active, existence, or realized, ἐνεργεία,) of the use or practice of the consequent or concomitant in the other', that namely which it accompanies. The higher crime of sacrilege or temple robbing, for instance, necessarily implies, virtually contains, the lower crime of simple theft or fraud (cheating¹), the lower habit always accompanies, but not necessarily in a state of activity, the higher, and is included in it: omne maius continet in se minus. Or thus, the use of cheating, fraud, resides, is included in, sacrilege, not actually, in a fully developed realized state, ἐνεργεία, but in a dormant state, latent; it is a faculty or capacity, always ready and liable to be developed into actual sacrilege.

The use of the general topic of 'consequence' is explained, Top Γ 2, 117 a 5, ξτι ὅταν δύο τινὰ ἢ σφόδρα αὐτοῖς παραπλήσια καὶ μὴ δυνώμεθα ὑπεροχὴν μηθεμίαν συνιδεῖν τοῦ ἐτέρου πρὸς τὸ ἔτερου, ὁρᾶν ἀπὸ τῶν παρεπομένων ἢ γὰρ ἔπεται μεῖζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦθ' αἰρετώτερον. ἄν δ' ἢ τὰ ἐπόμενα κακά, ῷ τὸ ἔλαττον ἀκολουθεῖ κακόν, τοῦθ' αἰρετώτερον. ὅντων γὰρ ἀμφοτέρων αἰρετῶν οὐδὲν κωλύει δυσχερές τι παρέπεσθαι. διχῶς δ' ἀπὸ τοῦ ἔπεσθαι ἡ σκέψις

к.т. λ. See note, с. 6, 3.

¹ ἀποστερεῖν is properly 'to defraud or cheat', and especially applied to keeping back a deposit. Rhet. 11 6. 3, το ἀποστερήσαι παρακατάθηκην. Gaisf, quotes Schol. Aristoph. Plut. 373, ἀποστερῶ ἐστὶν ὅταν παρακαταθήκην παραλαβαίν εἰι διαβολήν χωρήσω καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλω διδύναι αὐτῷ ἃ ἔλαβον. [See Shilleto's note on Thuc. 1 69, 1. s.]

6 ἀποστερήσειεν. καὶ τὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ μείζονι
7 μείζω· ἀνάγκη γὰρ ὑπερέχειν καὶ τοῦ μείζονος· καὶ p. 24·
τὰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὰ μείζω· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν τὸ
μείζονος ποιητικῷ εἶναι. καὶ οῦ τὸ ποιητικὸν μεῖζον,

§ 6. καὶ τὰ ὑπερέχοντα τοῦ αὐτοῦ κ.τ.λ.] 'anything which (all that, plural) exceeds the same thing by a greater amount (than a third thing) is the greater (of the two); because it must exceed the greater also (i.e. as well as the less)'. This with the mere substitution of μείζον for αίρετώτερου is taken from Top. Γ 3, 118 b 3, αλλά καὶ εἰ δύο τινὰ τινὸς εἴη αίρετώτερα, τὸ μᾶλλον αίρετώτερον τοῦ ἦττον αίρετωτέρου αίρετώτερον. Let A be 9, B 6, and C 3. A (9) exceeds C (3) by a greater amount than that by which B (6) exceeds it, A therefore must be greater than B-must be (dvaykn), because, by the hypothesis, it is greater than the greater of the other two. This is certainly not a good argument, though the fact is true, and the application easy: and yet I think it is what Aristotle must have meant. There is no various reading, and no suspicion of corruption. The interpretation is that of Schrader, the most logical of the Commentators on the Rhetoric. And it seems, as the text stands, the only possible explanation. The fact at all events is true; and the only objection to the explanation is that the yap, which professes to give the reason, does in fact merely repeat in other words the substance of the preceding proposition. I believe that Aristotle, in framing his topic, meant by the first clause to state the fact, and by the second to give, as he thought, the reason: and that the expression actually adopted is one of the very numerous evidences of haste and carelessness in his writings. On the application of the topic, see Introd. p. 180.

§ 7. και τὰ μείζονος ἀγαθοῦ ποιητικὰ κ.τ.λ.] 'Eundem hunc locum commutatis verbis exponit in 111 Topicorum c. 1 (116 b 26), ἔτι δύο ποιητικῶν ὅντων, οδ τὸ τέλος βέλτιον και αὐτὸ βέλτιον. Ad haec verba Alex. Aphrod. p. 125, ἀσαφῶς εξηηται διὰ βραχύτητα ὁ τόπος δ' ἐστι τοιοῦτος εἰ δύο εἴη τινὰ δύο τελῶν ποιητικά, οδ τὸ τέλος βέλτιον και αἰρετώτερον και αὐτὸ βέλτιον. αὕτως παιδεία γυμνασίων δεικνύοιτ' ἃν ἀμείνων, εἴ γε γυμνάσια μὲν ὑγιείας ἐστὶ ποιητικά, παιδεία δὲ φρονήσεως, και ἔστιν ἡ φρόνησις τῆς ὑγιείας αἰρετώτερον' πάλιν τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι τοῦ χρηματίζεσθαι αἰρετώτερον' τὸ μὲν γὰρ πλούτου, τὸ δὲ ὑγιείας ποιητικόν, βέλτιον δ' ἡ ὑγίεια πλούτου.' Victorius.

τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν] 'this is what was meant by', this is what was (said to be)

good; viz. in § 3.

τδ...ποιητικῷ εἶναι] On this Aristotelian formula which denotes the abstract conception of a thing by the mind, as opposed to its actual existence as an object of sense, see Trendel. de Anima, p. 471 seq. and on I I, 2; II I, 8, also in Rheinisches Museum 1828, Vol. II 457 seq., Kategorienlehre, p. 35 with reff. in note, and Waitz, Organ. Vol. II p. 386. The distinction, which is nowhere expressly stated, is, as may be gathered from numerous passages, the following: τὸ μεγέθει εἶναι universam esse notionem, qua res constituitur, a materia avocatam, universa cogitatione conceptam—the λόγος of the thing—τὸ μέγεθος vero ad singula quaeque pertinere quae sub sensus cadant. Metaph. Z 15, 1039 b 25, οὐ γὰρ γίγνεται τὸ

ώσαύτως εἰ γὰρ τὸ ύγιεινὸν αἰρετώτερον τοῦ ἡδέος καὶ μεῖζον ἀγαθόν, καὶ ἡ ὑγίεια τῆς ἡδονῆς μείζων. 8 καὶ τὸ αἰρετώτερον καθ' αὐτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ' αὐτό, οἷον

οἰκία εἶναι ἀλλὰ τὸ τῆδε τῆ οἰκία. Anal. Post. II 4, 9I b 5, ἀληθές γὰρ πᾶν τὸ ἀνθρώπω εἶναι ζώω εἶναι, ὤσπερ καὶ πάντα ἄνθρωπον ζώον, ἀλλὶ νὸχ οὕτως ιἄστε ἐν εἶναι. Phys. I 3, 4, οὕτε γὰρ τῆ συνεχεία ἐν ἔσται τὸ λευκὸν οὕτε τῷ λόγῳ ἄλλο γὰρ ἔσται τὸ εἶναι λευκῷ κ.τ.λ. It abounds in the de Anima. Why and when Aristotle employs it, and whether the distinction is always necessary and appropriate, are questions that I will not undertake to answer. [Index Aristotelicus, p. 221 a 34—40; p. 764 a 50—p. 765 a 6. s.]

The Syntax of the phrase, which only Trendelenburg, as far as I know, has attempted to explain¹, seems to be this:—The dative is in apposition with a supposed τινἱ, τό τινι εἶναι μεγέθει, and the construction is analogous to ἄστε συλλαβόντι εἶπεῖν, I 10, 18. Other instances of a similar use of the dative, which lead up to the explanation of this, are such as Thuc. I 24, ἐν δεξία ἐσπλέυντι τὸν Ἰόνιον κόλπον: and others are to

be found in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 388.

καὶ οὖ τὸ ποιητικὸν μεῖζον ὡσαύτως] 'and that of which the productive agent or producing cause is of a higher order, (superior), follows the same rule', viz. that the product or result of the superior cause or agent is superior in a comparison between two. If wholesome food and exercise which produce health are more desirable and therefore superior to things which are merely pleasant, then the result of the former, health, is superior to

the result of the latter, pleasure.

§ 8. καὶ τὸ αἰρετώτερον καθ' αὐτὸ τοῦ μὴ καθ' αὐτὸ] Τορ. Γ Ι, 116 α 29 καὶ τὸ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν τοῦ δι' ἔτερον αἰρετοῦ αἰρετώτερον, οἶον τὸ ὑγιαίνειν τοῦ γυμνάζεσθαι τὸ μὲν γὰρ δι' αὐτὸ αἰρετών, τὸ δὲ δι' ἔτερον. And again, Ib. b 8, καὶ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τινὶ αἰρετώτερον, οἶον τὸ ὑγιάζεσθαι τοῦ τέμνεσθαι τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθόν, τὸ δὲ τινὶ τῷ δεόμενῳ τῆς τομῆς. These two though differing in expression seem to be reducible to the same head, and, from the examples given, applicable to the same cases: for the absolute good is that which is in itself desirable, and conversely; and τέμνε-

¹ Trendel. in Rhein. Mus. 1828, Vol. II p. 481-3. The author, who has discussed with great learning and ingenuity the meaning of this Aristotelian technicality, and its relation to $\tau \delta \tau l \ \vec{\eta} \nu \ \epsilon l \nu a \iota$, is, it seems to me, less successful in his grammatical explanation. I think that from the analogy of similar constructions of this dative in the ordinary language, the use of it here must needs be a case of attraction, as I have explained it in the note. Trendelenburg, who takes nothing into account but the possible meanings of the dative (or, as he rightly prefers to call it, the 'acceptive') case, locative, instrumental, acceptive, selects the last of the three as that which belongs to the dative in this phrase. το μεγέθει elvaι express, according to him, 'the abstract conception (τὸ είναι) belonging to (given to and received by) magnitude': making this dative depend solely upon elecu, and leaving out the attraction to a word in the dative, actually or hypothetically preceding, as in any way concerned in the 'government' of it. This is all that I have to object to in Trendelenburg's paper: in the rest he has shewn the same ability and intimate knowledge of his author which characterizes all his other writings upon Aristotle.

ίσχὺς ὑγιεινοῦ· τὸ μὲν γὰρ οὐχ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ P. 1364.
9 αὐτοῦ, ὅπερ ἢν τὸ ἀγαθόν. κὰν ἢ τὸ μὲν τέλος, τὸ δὲ μὴ τέλος· τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλου ἕνεκα, τὸ δὲ αὐτοῦ,
10 οἷον τὸ γυμνάζεσθαι τοῦ εὖ ἔχειν τὸ σῶμα. καὶ τὸ ἢττον προσδεόμενον θατέρου ἢ ἐτέρων· αὐταρκέστερον γάρ· ἢττον δὲ προσδεῖται τὸ ἐλαττόνων ἢ ῥαόνων
11 προσδεόμενον. καὶ ὅταν τόδε μὲν ἄνευ τοῦδε μὴ ἢ ἢ μὴ δυνατὸν ἢ γενέσθαι, θάτερον δὲ ἄνευ τοῦτου· αὐσθαι the example in the second case of particular good, is only good as the means to an end, δι ἔτερον.

lσχὺς ὑγιεινοῦ] strength is more desirable in itself; the 'wholesome' only as the means to an end, health. Strength is considered by Aristotle not as absolutely desirable alρετὸν καθ' αὐτό, but only relatively to other things—'more desirable in itself than many others.' Brandis, Philologus, IV, i, p. 44. ὅπερ ἢν τὸ ἀγαθόν] ἢν, § 7. The reference is to 6 § 2 p. 97.

§ 9. καν η το μεν τελος κ.τ.λ.] Τορ. Γ I, 116 b 22, και το τελος των προς το τελος αίρετωτερον δοκεί είναι, και δυοίν το έγγιον του τελους. The end, the ultimate object of your aims, must always be more desirable than the means which are only serviceable for the attainment of that end, as health and exercise.

§ 10. τὸ ἦττον προσδεόμενον θατέρου ἡ ἐτέρων] 'that which less stands in need of any subsidiary aid' (to make it a good), 'either of the other' (when two things are brought into comparison, as wealth and health,) 'or of other things (in general)'. A topic, which may be brought under this of the Rhetoric, but is not identical with it, occurs in Top. Γ 2, 117 a 37, where justice is preferred to courage on the ground of its comparative αὐτάρκεια, though this word is not there employed. Victorius quotes in illustration Virgil's comparison of the 'olive' and 'vine'. Georg. II 421, 2 and 428. (Victorius has here quoted from memory, and forgotten the original. It is not the 'vine' but 'poma', of which is said, vi propria nituntur opisque haud indiga nostrae; and the example is hardly in point. The note is cited by Gaisford without remark).

αὐταρκέστερον] 'it makes a nearer approach to independence, self-sufficiency': appealing to the definitions of good in c. 6, 2, of which τὸ αὖταρκες is one. On αὐτάρκεια, note on c. 5, 3, ἡ δ' αὐτάρκεια τέλος καὶ βέλτιστον. Pol. I 2,1253 α I.

ραόνων] 'easier' to do or to get, to effect or procure, πράττειν ἡ ποιεῖν ἡ κτήσασθαι.

§ 11. καὶ ὅταν κ.τ.λ.] 'and any case in which one thing cannot exist or be obtained (by acquisition or production) without some other, but the other can without it'. As agriculture, compared with the other arts, Xen. Œcon. V. 17 (Victorius). Corn. Nep. Thrasyb. 13, Peloponnesio bello multa Thrasybulus sine Alcibiade gessit, ille nullam rem sine hoc. Schrader. He also quotes from Plutarch, Apothegm. Reg. § 84, a saying of Agesilaus about the superiority of justice to virtue; it is the same example as occurs in the Topics (quoted on § 10, Γ 2, 117 a 39.

ταρκέστερον δὲ τὸ μὴ δεόμενον, ώστε φαίνεται μείζον 12 ἀγαθόν. κὰν ἢ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ὀρχή. κὰν ἢ αἴτιον,

§ 12. καν η αρχή supply το μέν, and with αίτιον in the following topic.

On the omission, see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 288, Obs. 4.

 $d\rho\chi\dot{\eta}$] in this topic, is used in its most general and popular sense, an 'origin', or 'beginning', or 'source'. In this sense it may be regarded as the fountain of all good. ἔοικε δ' οῦτως ἔχειν (ή εὐδαιμονία) καὶ διὰ τὸ είναι είρχή ταύτης γάρ χάριν τὰ λοιπὰ πάντα πάντες πράττομεν, τὴν ἀρχὴν δὲ καὶ τὸ αίτιον των αγαθών τίμιον τι καὶ θείον ετίθεμεν (Eth. N. I. 13 ult.). God himself is an ἀρχή (Metaph. A 2, 983 a 8, ὁ γὰρ θεὸς ἀρχή τις). The free will, one of the opégers or impulsive faculties, the origin of motion in the human subject, and of moral action, the ἀρχή πράξεως, is an ἀρχή: the importance of this, as the origin of human action and the ground of moral responsibility, in moral philosophy and practical life, may be estimated by the perusal of the first seven chapters of the third book of the Nicom. Ethics. It is more comprehensive than airrow; doxal are not all causes, (see in the following note), and therefore the two may be distinguished, as they are in these two topics. An origin or beginning necessarily implies that something follows, a consequence; it leads to something: in this respect it is 'greater', more important, superior to, anything that is not a beginning or origin, which leads to nothing. Plat. Rep. II 377 A, οὐκοῦν οἶσθ' ὅτι ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἔργου μέγιστον; μεγάλην γὰρ έχουσιν (al άρχαί) ροπήν πρός τὰ έπόμενα, Eth. Nic. 17, sub fin. And the same applies to altrow in the following topic. These two topics are well illustrated in Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4), 10, 11.

The importance of an ἀρχή for good or for evil is recognized by several proverbs. On the one side we have ἀρχὴ ημισυ παντός, (quoted in Demetr. περί έρμηνείας § 122, άρχη δέ τοι ημισυ παντός,) Arist. Eth. N. I 7 ult. δοκεί γὰρ πλέιον ή ημισυ παντὸς είναι ή ἀρχή, Pol. VIII (V) 4, 1303 b 29, ή δ' άρχη λέγεται ημισυ είναι παντύς, de Soph. El. c. 34, 183 b 22, μέγιστων γαρ ἴσως άρχη παυτὸς ώσπερ λέγεται. Erasm., Adag. 29, quotes Soph. Fr. Inc. (715, Dind.) ap. Plut. Mor. p. 16 A, έργον δὲ παντὸς ην τις ἄρχηται καλώς, και τὰς τελευτὰς εἰκός ἐσθ' οῦτως ἔχειν, Anglice 'Well begun is half done'. Dimidium facti qui coepit habet, Hor. Ep. 1 2, 40. The first step: Ce n'est que le premier pas qui coute, see Rhet. II 19, 5, and note. On the other side, the importance of the $d\rho\chi\eta$ in respect of the tendency to evil, we have Ovid's well-known line, become proverbial, Rem. Am. 91, Principiis obsta, sero medicina paratur. Fast. 1 178, Omina principiis, inquit (Phoebus), inesse solent. (This is indifferent as to the issue.) Herodotus, after mention of the twenty ships which the Athenians on the solicitation of Aristagoras sent in aid of the Ionians, concludes the chapter, V 97, with the emphatic words, αυται δε αί νεές, άρχη κακών έγένοντο "Ελλησί τε καὶ βαρβάροισι. This phrase became proverbial, see Rhet. III

11, 7 bis, and Isocr. Paneg. § 119, there quoted.

 τὸ δ' οὐκ αἴτιον, διὰ τὸ αὐτό ἄνευ γὰρ αἰτίου καὶ ένυπάρχουσαί είσιν αί δε εκτός, 1013 α 17. 'Αρχαί are 'origins', heads or starting-points, of a series, of three kinds; (1) of being, ovola1, (2) of generation or growth, γένεσις, and (3) of knowledge, γνώσις. ἄνευ γὰρ αἰτίου καὶ άρχης αδύνατον είναι η γενέσθαι, Rhet. I 7, 12. The six senses in which αρχή may be employed are all reducible to these three. Of these some are inherent (as the στοιχείον, the mathematical point, the origin of the line, or the starting-point of anything, that out of which it grows and is developed2; the keel of a vessel, the foundation of a house; in animals the heart or the brain, or any other part which has been assumed to be the original seat of life); some external, the origin of motion or change, (as father and mother, of child; abusive language, of a fight; or again the human will or deliberate purpose, and intellect, προαίρεσις and διάνοια, in the case of 'governments' [apxai] and arts, all of which set things in motion and produce change). The origin or starting-point of knowledge is illustrated by the *ὑποθέσεις*, the assumed first principles of a demonstration, as the major premiss of a syllogism. Another 'external origin' is the ou Eveka, or τέλος, the final cause, πολλών γάρ καὶ τοῦ γνώναι καὶ τῆς κινήσεως άρχη τάγαθον καὶ τὸ καλόν, α 21. Comp. de Anima Γ 10, 433 α 15, καὶ ἡ ορεξις ενεκά του πάσα οὖ γὰρ ἡ ὅρεξις, αὖτη ἀρχὴ τοῦ πρακτικοῦ νοῦ τὸ δ' ἔσχατον άρχη της πράξεως.

 $d\rho_{\chi\eta'}$ is not identical with alrea, though, as all alrea (all the four causes) are $d\rho_{\chi\alpha'}$, the two terms are frequently identified (Bonitz, Comm. p. 219; Waitz, Org. p. 458): but the converse is not true; as is shewn by some of the examples given above: the assertion therefore that $l\sigma_{\alpha\chi}\omega_s$ (rais $d\rho_{\chi\alpha'}$ s) sat $r\dot{\alpha}$ alrea $\lambda\dot{\epsilon}\gamma\dot{\epsilon}\tau\alpha$ yar $\gamma\dot{\alpha}\rho$ $r\dot{\alpha}$ alrea $d\rho_{\chi\alpha'}$ (a 16) must be limited to what is directly stated, the converse is not included. On the point of difference between the two, and also the identification with $\sigma\tauotototototo$

xeiov, see Waitz, Organ. p. 458.

Another definition of ἀρχή occurs in de Gen. Anim. V 7, 23, 788 α 14, τοῦτο γάρ ἐστι τὸ ἀρχήν εἶναι, τὸ αὐτήν μὲν αἰτίαν εἶναι πολλῶν, ταύτης δ' ἄλλο

ανωθεν μηδέν. See also Trendel. on de Anima p. 187.

On scientific and logical $\partial \rho \chi a l$ or first principles, ultimate axioms, rowai and $\partial l a l$, see note in Introd. p. 73. In the Eudemian Ethics, II 6, three kinds of $\partial \rho \chi a l$, general, moral, and mathematical, are distinguished, and some account given of them. [See also Index Aristotelicus, s.v. 5.]

§ 12. κἃν ἢ αἴτιον κ.τ.λ.] Τορ. Γ, 116 δ 1, καὶ τὸ αἴτιον ἀγαθοῦ καθ' αὐτὸ τοῦ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτίου, καθάπερ ἡ ἀρετὴ τῆς τύχης ἡ μὲν γὰρ καθ' αὐτὴν ἡ δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς αἰτία τῶν ἀγαθῶν, καὶ εἴ τι ἄλλο τοιοῦτον. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐναντίου (τοῦ κακοῦ) κ.τ.λ.

τὸ δ' οὐκ αἴτιον] On οὐκ after αν, understood from the preceding clause,

see Appendix (C) on el où, c. 15, 23.

The dρχή as essence, origin of being, odola, is the primal cause, τὸ τὶ ἡν εἶναι. Bonitz.

² στοιχείον "hoc loco eum (Aristotelem) non tam elementi naturam cogitasse, quam principem illam rei alicuius partem, in qua primum continetur et destinata est ipsa rei natura, ex exemplis allatis facile cognoscas." Bon. Comm. p. 218.

This is an άρχη κακών.

καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ή διάνοια κινεῖ, ὅτι ἀρχὴ αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τὸ ὁρεκτόν. de Anima 1 10, 433 a 19. αρχης αδύνατον είναι η γενέσθαι. καὶ δυοῖν αρχαῖν τὸ ἀπὸ της μείζονος μεῖζον, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίοιν τὸ ἀπὸ τοῦ μείζονος αἰτίου μεῖζον. καὶ ἀνάπαλιν δη δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν ή τοῦ μείζονος ἀρχη μείζων, καὶ δυοῖν αἰτίοιν 13 τὸ τοῦ μείζονος αἴτιον μεῖζον. δηλον οὖν ἐκ τῶν

καὶ δυοῖν ἀρχαῖν κ.τ.λ.] and again, of two origins or causes, the consequence and effect of the superior is greater. The following passage of the Topics will illustrate the preceding as well as the present topic. Γ 3, 118 α 29, ἔτι εἰ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ ἀγαθὸν ἐκεῖνο ῷ ᾶν παρŷ, τὸ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ, τὸ ποιοῦν αἰρετώτερον, καθάπερ καὶ θερμότερον τὸ θερμαῖνον τοῦ μή. εἰ δὲ ἄμφω ποιεῖ, τὸ μᾶλλον ποιοῦν ἢ εἰ τὸ βελτιον καὶ κυριώτερον ποιεῖ ἀγαθόν, οἶον εἰ τὸ μὲν τὴν ψυχήν, τὸ δὲ τὸ σῶμα: c. 5, 119 α 17, καὶ εἰ τὸ μὲν ποιεῖ τὸ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖ τὸ ἔχον τοιόνδε, μᾶλλον τοιοῦτο ὅ ποτε ποιεῖ ἡ δ μὴ ποιεῖ. εἰ δ᾽ ἄμφω ποιεῖ, τὸ μᾶλλον ποιοῦν τοιοῦτο.

καὶ ἀνάπαλιν] 'and conversely, of two origins; the origin of the greater

consequence is greater ... '.

§ 13. δήλον οὖν κ.τ.λ.] 'It is plain therefore from what has been said (§ 11, καν ή ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μη ἀρχή), that in both (the following) ways it may be said to be greater: for whether it be an origin (or beginning), and the other not a beginning, it may be shewn to be made to appear greater; or if it be not itself a beginning, but the other be a beginning (it may be equally shewn to be so), because the 'end' is greater (superior), and yet no beginning'. 'The end is greater', because τέλος ἐστίν οδ ἔνεκα τὰ αλλα: and if 'everything else' is but a mean to an end, the beginning must be included with the rest, and is therefore subordinate and inferior. μείζον is here 'greater', 'more important', superior in respect of influence or effective power; not necessarily 'better'. In the examples, first, the 'adviser' is the ἀρχή, the origin or originator of the plot; so in Metaph. Δ 2, 1013 a 31, δ βουλεύσας is an alτιον, namely the efficient cause, or origin of motion and change, ἀρχή μεταβολής. The adviser of a scheme is therefore according to this view the 'cause' of all that resulted from his advice, which is made to appear (δοκεί) by the argument more important than the result or actual crime (which is not 'the beginning'); and, secondly, the converse (ἀνάπαλιν) is proved, that the crime, the 'end' of the advice or deliberation, is the more important thing of the two, because it was for that, as a mean to attain that, that the whole scheme was undertaken. It appears from the expressions of this text that Callistratus devised the scheme and Chabrias carried it into execution.

Leodamas of Acharnae was a famous orator, an earlier contemporary of Demosthenes and Aeschines. The latter mentions him, c. Ctesiph. § 138, as having been sent as ambassador to Thebes, and as a speaker the rival of Demosthenes; indeed in his opinion even pleasanter to listen to. He is mentioned again in II 23, 25 (comp. the note there); in Dem. adv. Lept. 501 and 502, who also speaks of him as a distinguished orator, where allusion is made to a certain proposition of his to cancel the 'grant', especially the ἀτέλεια, made to Chabrias for his public services — οὖτος ἐγράψατο τὴν Χαβρίου δωρεάν¹, a proposition which he failed to

¹ This cannot be the same accusation as that which Aristotle here refers to;

εἰρημένων ὅτι ἀμφοτέρως μεῖζόν ἐστιν· καὶ γὰρ εἰ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ μὴ ἀρχή, δόξει μεῖζον εἶναι, καὶ εἰ μὴ ἀρχή, τὸ δὲ ἀρχή· τὸ γὰρ τέλος μεῖζον καὶ οὐκ ἀρχή, ώσπερ ὁ Λεωδάμας κατηγορῶν ἔφη Καλλιστράτου τὸν βουλεύσαντα τοῦ πράξαντος μᾶλλον ἀδικεῖν· οὐ γὰρ ἂν πραχθῆναι μὴ βουλευσαμένου· πάλιν δὲ καὶ

carry; and in other places of Aeschines. See Sauppe, Fragm. Or. Att. II 216; Fr. XVI, and p. 244; Fr. XXVI; Clinton, F. H. Vol. II p. 111, sub an. 372, 3.

Callistratus, son of Callicrates, of Aphidna, a distinguished Athenian orator and politician, of the earlier half of the 4th cent. B.C. His name first appears in history in the year 379 B.C. Aristotle refers to two speeches of his, Rhet. I 14. I, and III 17. 14. Leodamas' accusation of him, here mentioned, seems to have been directed against his conduct in the affairs of Oropus, in 366, Grote, Hist. Gr. X p. 392; Smith's Dict. Biogr. Art. Callistratus; Clinton, Fast. Hell. II 396, note w. He was associated with Chabrias, the celebrated Athenian general, in the transactions with respect to Oropus, and with him was brought to trial; and it is most probable that both of the speeches referred to in the text were made by Leodamas on this occasion.

On Callistratus and Chabrias Mr Elder's articles in Smith's *Biogr. Dict.* may be consulted. Callistratus' name occurs very frequently in the Attic orators. See Baiter and Sauppe, *Orat. Att.* Vol. III; Ind. Nom. p. 73.

βουλεύσωντα, βουλευσαμένου, βουλεύσωντος, ἐπιβουλεύειν] are all applied to the same transaction, viz. Callistratus' 'advice' or 'device'. They express precisely the same thing, each from a somewhat different point of view. βουλεύειν τινί τι, is to give advice, to advise. βουλεύειθαι to give oneself advice, to deliberate; or secondly, of a number of people deliberating together, and giving one another advice, 'consulting in common'. So μὴ βουλευσαμένου here is, 'if he had not deliberated upon it'

έγράψατο δωρεάν and τον πράξαντα, 'the man that carried into execution a nefarious scheme', are quite inapplicable to the same offence. Again Demosthenes, c. Mid. 535, tells us that Philostratus was the accuser of Chabrias, ὅτ' ἐκρίνετο τὴν περί 'Ωρωποῦ τὴν κρίσιν θανάτου. Were there two accusers of Chabrias on his trial? Or two separate trials? (this seems improbable): or has Aristotle made a slip of memory in assigning the accusation of Chabrias to Leodamas? None of these suppositions is necessary to reconcile the, at first sight, conflicting statements. The accusation of Leodamas is directed against both parties; he takes the case of Callistratus first, and then secondly (πάλιν δέ) applies the converse of the argument which he had issued against the other to the offence of Chabrias. Philostratus, who took part in the same proceedings, was another and independent accuser. Mr Grote, p. 393, note 3, who does not refer to the passage of Aristotle, assigns the trial or trials of Callistratus and Chabrias to this period, 366 B. C., and the alleged misconduct about Oropus. The other speech of Leodamas against Chabrias, referred to by Dem. adv. Lept. l.c. was earlier, and had nothing to do with the affair of Oropus. [Arnold Schaefer, Demosthenes und seine Zeit 1 p. 96. S.] Χαβρίου, τον πράξαντα τοῦ βουλεύσαντος οὐ γὰρ ἄν γενέσθαι, εἰ μὴ ἦν ὁ πράξων τούτου γὰρ ἕνεκα 14 ἐπιβουλεύειν, ὅπως πράξωσιν. καὶ τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου, οἷον χρυσὸς σιδήρου ἀχρηστότερος ὤν μεῖζον γὰρ ἡ κτῆσις διὰ τὸ χαλεπωτέραν εἶναι. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ ἄφθονον τοῦ σπανίου, ὅτι ἡ χρῆσις

preparatory to 'suggesting' or 'advising' it. ἐπιβουλεύειν retains its proper sense of a hostile design (ἐπί 'against'); the advice, or scheme which resulted from it, and the deliberation which suggested it, are now represented as 'a plot', a hostile, aggressive, design. It appears therefore that there is no occasion to have recourse to the explanation of Victorius and Buhle, that ἐπιβουλεύειν is (or can be) put for βουλεύειν or βουλεύειν or

eì μὴ ἦν ὁ πράξων] On this use of the definite article, indicating a member of a class or γένος, which we express by our indefinite article, see Buttmann, Gr. Gr. § 124, Obs. 2. Engl. Tr. p. 319. The two senses of the Greek definite article are, according to Schneider, on Pl. Rep. VIII 564 A, that it marks quod praesens et in conspectu positum cogitatur, and (2) the genus. 'Articulus definit indefinita, idque duobus modis: aut designando certo de multis, aut quae multa sunt cunctis in unum colligendis' (the second describes the generic use). Herm. Praef. ad Iph. Aul. p. xv. Several examples of this usage of the def. art. are collected from the N. T. by Dean Alford, in a pamphlet in reply to Bishop Ellicott, p. 45 seq. I will only quote Matth. xiii. 3, ὁ σπείρων: xxv. 32, ὁ ποιμήν. In a subsequent passage of this work, II 4, 31, Aristotle has quite unconsciously and unintentionally stated this grammatical distinction, τὸ δὲ μῖσος καὶ πρὸς τὰ γένη τὸν γὰρ κλέπτην μισεῖ κ.τ.λ.

We render ὁ πράξων 'anyone to do it', carry it out, put it in execution. § 14. τὸ σπανιώτερον τοῦ ἀφθόνου] 'The rarer, scarcer, is greater, more valuable or important, than the abundant'. This, as is implied in ἀχρηστότερος ὧν in the example, is only true in a sense; it is in fact a paradox, which may however be asserted in argument, since there is something to be said for it, and examples may be found in which it is true; as in the case of gold and iron. In the true and proper sense, in utility and real value, iron is greater and better than gold. Isocrates, ἀντίδ. § 80, 81, on this ground of comparative rarity, ὅσφ πέρ εἰσι σπανιώτεροι καὶ χαλεπώτεροι, thinks that, in his time at least, great orators and politicians 'who can speak worthily on behalf of their country's interests' are more valuable and to be more highly prized than legislators. A similar topic occurs in Top. Γ 2, 117 b 28, τὸ ἐπιφανέστερον τοῦ ἦττον τοιούτον, καὶ τὸ χαλεπώτερον μᾶλλον γὰρ ἀγαπῶμεν ἔχοντες ἃ μὴ ἔστι ῥαδίως λαβεῖν. καὶ τὸ ἰδιαίτερον τοῦ κοινοτέρον.

ἄλλον δὲ τρόπου] This gives the true side of the alternative, that the value of a thing is in proportion to its usefulness. Estimated by this standard, 'water', as Pindar says, at the opening of his first Olympian

ode, 'is the best of all things,' Böckh, who cites this passage of Aristotle

ύπερέχει· τὸ γὰρ πολλάκις τοῦ ὀλιγάκις ὑπερέχει· ὅθεν λέγεται

άριστον μέν ύδωρ.

15 καὶ ὅλως τὸ χαλεπώτερον τοῦ ράονος σπανιώτερον γάρ. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τὸ ράον τοῦ χαλεπωτέρου p. 25. 16 ἔχει γὰρ ώς βουλόμεθα. καὶ ῷ τὸ ἐναντίον μεῖζον, καὶ οὖ ἡ στέρησις μείζων. καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ ἀρετῆς καὶ

in his note, evidently agrees with him in interpreting Pindar's ἄριστον as 'best' because most useful, or necessary to the support of human life'. Dissen thinks that Pindar had in his mind the great 'wholesomeness' of water, ἄριστον dicitur τὸ ΰδωρ quia saluberrimum est. A dry and hot climate and a parched soil would also readily suggest the notion that water is the best of all things. But I agree nevertheless with Böckh in his interpretation of Pindar's thought.

These two opposite topics represent two prevailing modes of estimating 'value', by use and price: Political Economy teaches us that the former is the true, the latter the false standard. In the one view air and water are the most valuable, in the other the least valuable, of all things. Plato, Euthyd. 304, 3, gives both sides: τὸ γὰρ σπάνιον, & Εὐθύδημε,

τίμιον' τὸ δὲ ὕδωρ εὐωνότατον, ἄριστον ὄν, ώς ἔφη Πίνδαρος.

§ 15. ὅλως τὸ χαλεπώτερων] See the passage of the Topics quoted in § 14. Anything harder to do or to attain may be said to have a higher value, when the value is estimated by the price. On the other hand measured by the standard of our own nature, of our own love of ease and comfort, and also of the extent of usefulness, that which is easier to do or to make or to obtain is more valuable.

§ 16. $\[\phi \]$ $\[\tau \]$ $\[\phi \]$

οῦ ἡ στέρησις μείζων] On the various applications of στέρησις in Aristotle's philosophy, see Met. Δ c. 22, and Bonitz's Commentary: Categorie, p. 12 a 26, and Waitz, ad loc. Trendel. Kategorienlehre, p. 103 seq.

The following illustration of the topic is given by Schrader, 'Peius est caecum esse quam surdum: ergo visus auditu praestantior est.

Pindar's own view of the meaning may be readily seen by comparing the first three lines of the 10th Olympian Ode: note the word χρῆσιs. In a speech, quoted by Spedding (Letters and life of Fr. Bacon, Vol. 111. p. 18), Bacon says: I liken this bill to that sentence of the poet (Pindar), who sets this as a paradox in the fore-front of his book, recessity before pleasure; and I am of o an those things that are glorior

κακία μή κακίας μείζων τὰ μὲν γὰρ τέλη, τὰ δ' οὐ 17 τέλη. καὶ ὧν τὰ ἔργα καλλίω ἢ αἰσχίω, μείζω αὐτά.

Gravius malum est fama quam pecunia privari; ergo bona existimatio praestat divitiis.' 'Things of which the privation is greater' or more deeply felt, are those which are most necessary, essential to our existence

or comfort; as air and water again, in this point of view.

καὶ ἀρετῆς μὴ ἀρετῆς—τέλη] 'and virtue is superior to non-virtue, and vice to non-vice; because the one is an end, and the other not'. The application of this seems to be to things compared as positive and negative: positive virtue and positive vice, which can be ends or objects to aim at, are in so far superior to mere negatives which can not'. Moral considerations are altogether laid aside, and Rhetoric is here permitted (not recommended) to take the immoral side of the question: vice may be regarded as an 'end' of human desire and exertion.

Bonitz, Arist. Stud. I. p. 87, proposes an ingenious alteration, which no one who is satisfied with the preceding explanation will consider necessary. It is to substitute for the existing text, καὶ ἀρετή μὴ κακίας καὶ κακία μη άρετης μείζων, 'positive, downright, virtue is greater (better or worse) than mere absence of vice, and downright vice than mere absence of virtue': which he neither translates nor explains; but, it is to be presumed, it means that the superiority of the one to the other still rests upon its positive character. The morality remains constant; for vice is still represented as the object of men's aims: it is therefore no improvement in that respect. His reason for the change is, 'that it never could occur to any one to institute a comparison in respect of magnitude (Grösse) between αρετή and μη αρετή, and κακία and μη κακία.' Not perhaps if μείζων implied nothing but mere magnitude or quantity; but when it is extended to the general notion of superiority the comparison may very well be made between them. And besides, Bonitz's altered comparison appears to rest upon the very same distinction of the positive and negative; for in what other sense can vice be regarded as superior to nonvirtue?

§ 17. The two topics of this section are founded upon the relation of the $\partial \rho \epsilon \tau \eta$ of anything to its proper $\tilde{\epsilon} \rho \gamma \rho \nu$ or function, the work that it has to do, described by Plato, Rep. I 352 E and foll., and taken up by Aristotle as the foundation of his theory of virtue, Eth. Nic. II 5, init. The virtue or excellence of everything, horse, dog, knife, axe, the eye, the ear, the mind, is shewn in and depends upon the due performance of its proper function (supra 2. I2; 5. 4; 6. I1). $\tau \dot{\alpha} \tilde{\epsilon} \rho \gamma a$ therefore, though they extend beyond the moral virtues from which Victorius draws his illustration—the comparison of $\partial \nu \partial \rho \epsilon i a$ and $\sigma \omega \phi \rho \rho \sigma \sigma' \nu \eta$ and their opposites in respect of their results good or bad, the kinds of actions that they give rise to—and include the functions of all things that can be applied to any purpose, and everything which has a $\tau \epsilon \lambda o s$, to which the $\epsilon \rho \gamma \rho \nu$ must be subservient, and in the approach to which the $\delta \rho \epsilon \tau \dot{\eta}$ is shewn; yet the epithets

¹ Victorius, perhaps rightly, explains $\mu \eta$ doer η and $\mu \eta$ kakla as states of growth and development, which have not yet reached their 'end', the formed $\ell \xi \iota s$, but are mere $\delta \iota a \theta \ell \sigma \epsilon \iota s$, transient dispositions, and so far inferior.

καὶ ὧν αἰ κακίαι καὶ αἱ ἀρεταὶ μείζους, καὶ τὰ ἔργα μείζω, ἐπείπερ ὡς τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἱ ἀρχαί, καὶ τὰ ἀπο-βαίνοντα, καὶ ὡς τὰ ἀποβαίνοντα, καὶ τὰ αἴτια καὶ αἰ 18 ἀρχαί. καὶ ὧν ἡ ὑπεροχὴ αἰρετωτέρα ἢ καλλίων, οἶον τὸ ἀκριβῶς ὁρᾶν αἰρετώτερον τοῦ ὀσφραίνεσθαι·καὶ γὰρ ὄψις ὀσφρήσεως·καὶ τὸ φιλεταῖρον εἶναι P. 1364 ὁ. τοῦ φιλοχρήματον μᾶλλον κάλλιον, ὥστε καὶ φιλεταιρία φιλοχρηματίας. καὶ ἀντικειμένως δὲ τῶν βελτιόνων αἱ ὑπερβολαὶ βελτίους καὶ καλλιόνων καλ-10 λίους. καὶ ὧν αὶ ἐπιθυμίαι καλλίους ἢ βελτίους·αί

καλλίω and $al\sigma\chi i\omega$ shew that Aristotle had the moral virtues uppermost in his mind.

καὶ ὧν αἱ κακίαι κ.τ.λ.] the converse of the preceding, the argument from the virtue or vice, excellence or defect, of anything, back again to its function or proper work. Virtues and vices, excellences and defects stand to 'works' in the relation of cause and origin to consequence and effect or result. Now as of the greater cause and origin, the one produces a greater effect, the other leads to a greater end, (§ 12,) and the less to a less, so in the case of excellence and defect the greater produces a greater work, the less a less, both in human action or comparative virtues, and in instruments of all kinds; in men and things.

§ 18. This topic is analogous to, not identical with, that in § 4. When anything in excess is preferable to, or finer and nobler than, the excess of something else, then the former in its ordinary state is preferable to the other. See the passage of Polit. IV (VII) 1, quoted in § 4. Τορ. Γ 3, 118 δ 4, ἔτι οὖ ἡ ὑπερβολὴ τῆς ὑπερβολῆς αἰρετωτέρα, καὶ αὐτὸ αἰρετώτερον, οἶον φιλία χρημάτων αἰρετωτέρα γὰρ ἡ τῆς φιλίας ὑπερβολὴ τῆς

των χρημάτων. Omne maius continet in se minus.

το φιλεταΐρον...μᾶλλον κάλλιον] Victorius, followed by Buhle, and Waitz, Org. 116 b 24, understand μᾶλλον κάλλιον as a double comparative, a form of expression not unfamiliar to Aristotle (see Vict. on this place, and Waitz, Org. 116 b 24, II p. 465), but certainly not employed by him here. The μᾶλλον denoting the 'excess' of the two qualities, which is absolutely essential to the illustration of the topic, is added for that reason to φιλέταιρον and φιλοχρήματον, the comparison being conveyed by κάλλιον: and thus the topic is exemplified. 'Excess in love of friends being fairer, and nobler than that in love of money, friendship in its average degree is to be preferred to a similar average of love of money'. See also note on II 8, 3.

§ 19. καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιθυμίαι κ.τ.λ.] The objects of the nobler and better desires are themselves nobler and better: because all 'impulses' (ὀρέξεις, which include ἐπιθυμίαι, all natural desires and appetites, as well as θυμός and βούλησις, Eth. Eud. II 7. 2, de An. B 3, 414 b 2; see note on Rhet. II 2.1), in proportion as they are higher or stronger, have for their objects

γὰρ μείζους ὀρέξεις μειζόνων εἰσίν. καὶ τῶν καλλιόνων δὲ ἢ καὶ βελτιόνων αὶ ἐπιθυμίαι βελτίους καὶ
20 καλλίους διὰ τὸ αὐτό. καὶ ὧν αὶ ἐπιστῆμαι καλλίους
ἢ σπουδαιότεραι, καὶ τὰ πράγματα καλλίω καὶ σπουδαιότερα ὡς γὰρ ἔχει ἡ ἐπιστήμη, καὶ τὸ ἀληθές κελεύει δὲ τὸ αὐτῆς ἐκάστη. καὶ τῶν σπουδαιοτέρων
δὲ καὶ καλλιόνων αὶ ἐπιστῆμαι ἀνάλογον διὰ ταῦτα.

21 καὶ ὁ κρίνειαν αν ἡ κεκρίκασιν οἱ φρόνιμοι ἡ πάντες things 'greater', i. e. either better and higher in themselves, or more important. The stronger impulse is always towards the greater object—in some sense. And the converse: 'the nobler and better the objects, the nobler and better the desires, for the same reason'.

§ 20. καὶ ὧν αἱ ἐπιστῆμαι κ.τ.λ.] The same rule is now applied to sciences or departments of knowledge, and their objects; τὰ πράγματα, ' their subjects '', ή υποκειμένη ύλη, τὰ υποκείμενα. Τορ. Γ 1, 116 a 21, ἔστι δε άπλως μεν βελτιον και αίρετωτερον το κατά την βελτίω επιστήμην, τινί δε το sarà rhy olkeiav. The higher and nobler sciences deal with higher and nobler materials; and in proportion to the dignity and value of the objects that it treats, so is the dignity and value of the corresponding science: ἀνάλογον, 'proportionally'; greater to greater, and less to less. 'For as is the science, so is the (particular kind of) truth at which it aims: and each of them is authoritative (lays down the law, prescribes what is to be done, dictates, κελεύει) in its own special province'. On the order in invention and dignity of arts and sciences, see the instructive chapter, Metaph. A I. ἐπιστῆμαι includes here all arts as well as sciences, the two terms being constantly interchanged. The word alnows, from its strict and proper sense (when the two provinces of philosophy are distinguished, θεωρητικής τέλος αλήθεια, πρακτικής δέ έργον, Metaph. A 1), might seem to confine the application of the topic to science pure, or the 'theoretical' department of philosophy, but it is plainly here employed in a wider and more popular sense: truth, theoretical or practical, is the common object of every kind of scientific or artistic pursuit. And the word κελεύειν, to prescribe or dictate, is alike applicable to the necessary principles and necessary conclusions of mathematical demonstration, and to a practical science like Politics, which not only like the other prescribes the method in which its investigations are to be carried on and rules of action, but 'orders and arranges' διατάσσει*, determines, and limits at its pleasure the provinces and extent of the operations of the subordinate sciences and arts. Eth. Nic. I 1, 1094 a 26-b 7. On κελεύει, Victorius quotes Eth. Eud. II 3, τοῦτο γάρ έστιν ώς ή έπιστήμη κελεύει καὶ ὁ λόγος.

§ 21. καὶ ὁ κρίνειαν ἃν κ.τ.λ.] 'the judgment or decision, upon any dis
1 The terms 'subject' and 'object' from different points of view may be applied to express the same thing. The *object* of sense or of thought, material or mental, quod sensibus vel menti objicitur, is when looked at from the logical side the subject of all that is or can be predicated of it.

² So printed in Bekker's texts.

η οἱ πολλοὶ ἡ οἱ πλείους ἡ οἱ κράτιστοι ἀγαθον ἡ μεῖζον, ἀνάγκη οὕτως ἔχειν, ἡ ἀπλῶς ἡ ἡ κατὰ την φρόνησιν ἔκριναν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο κοινὸν καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων καὶ γὰρ τὶ καὶ ποσὸν καὶ ποιὸν οὕτως ἔχει ὡς ἂν ἡ ἐπιστήμη καὶ ἡ φρόνησις εἴποι. ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἀγαθῶν εἰρήκαμεν ὥρισται γὰρ ἀγαθὸν εῖναι ὁ λα-puted question, οί...' Τορ. Γ Ι, 116 α 14, καὶ ὁ μᾶλλον ἄν ἔλοιτο ὁ φρόνιμος ἡ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ, ἡ ὁ νόμος ὁ ὀρθός, ἡ οἱ σπουδαῖοι περὶ ἔκαι αὶ πλέσινε ἡ τοι-πῶτοι (ππουδαῖοι) εἰριν ἡ οἱ ἐν ἐκάστο χόνει ἐπιστήμονες ἡ ἔστικὶ πλέσινε ἡ οἱ σπουδαῖοι κερὶ ἔκαι κὶ πλέσινε ἡ δὶ και ἐπιστήμονες ἡ ἔστικὶ πλέσινε ἡ οἱ ἐν ἐκάστο χόνει ἐπιστήμονες ἡ ἔστικὶ πλέσινε ἡ οἱ ἐν ἐκάστο χόνει ἐπιστήμονες ἡ ἔστικὶ πλέσινε ἡ οἱ ἐν ἐκάστο χόνει ἐπιστήμονες ἡ ἔστικὶ πλέσινε ἡ οἱ ἐν ἐκάστο χόνει ἐπιστήμονες ἡ ἔστικὶ πλέσινε ἡ οἰ ἐν ἐκάστο χόνει ἐπιστήμονες ἡ ἔστικὶ πλέσινε ἡ οἰ ἐν ἐκάστο χόνει ἐπιστήμονες ἡ ἔστικὶ πλέσινε ἡ οἰ ἐν ἐκάστο κόνει ἐπιστήμονες ἡ ἔστικὶ πλέσινε ἡ οἰ ἐν ἐκάστο χόνει ἐπιστήμονες ἡ ἔστικὶ πλέσινε ἡ οἰ ἐν ἐκάστο κόνει ἐπιστήμονες ἡ ἔστικὶ πλέσινε ἡ οἰ ἐν ἐκάστο κόνει ἡ τοι-

ἢ ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνήρ, ἢ ὁ νόμος ὁ δρθός, ἢ οἱ σπουδαῖοι περὶ ἔκαστα αἰρούμενοι ἢ τοισῦτοί (σπουδαῖοι) εἰσιν, ἢ οἱ ἐν ἐκάστω γένει ἐπιστήμονες, ἢ ὅσα οἱ πλείους ἢ πάντες, οἰον ἐν ἰατρικὴ ἢ τεκτονικὴ ἃ οἱ πλείους τῶν ἰατρῶν ἢ πάντες, ἢ ὅσα δλως οἱ πλείους ἢ πάντες ἢ πάντα, οἰον τὰγαθὸν πάντα γὰρ τὰγαθοῦ ἐφίεται. This passage will serve as a commentary on the topic of the Rhetoric. It describes the authority of φρόνησις (practical wisdom, the intellectual virtue which selects the proper means and directs them to the end, Eth. N. VI), and the impersonation of it in the φρόνιμος. In the definition of ἀρετή, Eth. N. II 6, init. the φρόνιμος is the measure or standard, which fixes the variable mean, in which virtue resides, for each individual character. In all arts and sciences it is the professional man, the expert, who has to decide, each in his own department. The ἀγαθός decides in moral questions, which is his special province. Comp. note on 6. 25.

† πάντες—οἱ κράτιστοι] a descending scale of the φρόνιμοι, those who are competent to decide; all, or most (the many, the great mass of them, οἱ πλεῖστοι), or the (bare) majority, or the best and ablest amongst them

(in point of judgment, and professional skill).

dyaθὸν ἢ μεῖζον] So the MSS and Edd., with the exception of one MS and Buhle's Ed., which omit ἢ, as does Muretus in his Transl. The omission certainly improves the sense; but Vater with some reason objects to this order of the two words, which he says should have been inverted, μεῖζον ἀγαθόν. ἀγαθόν, which Vater proposes to omit, is certainly wanted to explain κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων in the following clause.

ἢ ἀπλῶς ἡ ἡ κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν] 'either absolutely, universally, or in respect of their practical wisdom', specially and alone. κατὰ τὴν φρόνησιν corresponds to ἡ τοιοῦτοι in the passage of the Topics, 'in so far as they

are such' (φρόνιμοι), and in no other respect.

καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἄλλων] 'of everything else as well', as good. κατά with the genit is very common in Arist in the sense of 'of', 'in the case of'; derived from its proper and primary sense 'down upon', and hence, 'applying to', 'of'. This use of it seems to come through the intermediate sense of 'predication', κατηγορεῖν, κατηγορεῖσθαί τινος, 'to predicate, be predicated, of something'.—ἐπί, 'upon', 'applying to', 'in the case of', so and so, is similarly used (ἐπ' ἀγαθῶν) in the same section.

τί, ποσόν, ποιόν] are the first three categories; (1) the substance or true nature of a thing, (2) quantity and (3) quality. These, though properly falling under the domain of science or exact knowledge, may yet be dealt with by the 'practical judgment' which may convey a popular and practical acquaintance with them, sufficient for the purposes of the Rhetorician.

εἰρήκαμεν ώρισται γάρ] supr. § 3.

βόντα τὰ πράγματα φρόνησιν έλοιτ' ἃν έκαστον: δῆλον οὖν ὅτι καὶ μεῖζον, ὃ μᾶλλον ἡ φρόνησις λέγει. 22 καὶ τὸ τοῖς βελτίοσιν ὑπάρχον, ἣ ἀπλῶς ἢ ἦ βελτίους, οἷον ἀνδρία ἰσχύος. καὶ ὃ έλοιτ' ἂν ὁ βελτίων, ἢ ἀπλῶς ἣ ἦ βελτίων, οἷον τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι μᾶλλον ἣ

ο μαλλον ή φρόνησιε λέγει] If that is good in genera' which is pronounced to be so by the man of practical sagacity, then that must be a greater good which is pronounced by the same authority to be more so, to be so in a higher degree.

§ 22. καὶ τὸ τοῖς βελτίοσιν ὑπάρχον] 'Animi bona bonis corporis praevalent quia animus est corpore praestantior'. Schrader, Courage and strength is Aristotle's illustration; for the reason assigned by Schrader.

π aπλωs] 'ut viri' (man as the nobler animal) 'virtutes praestant muli-

ebribus simpliciter'. Schrader,

† † βελτίουs] 'aut quatenus meliores sunt: viri effeminati actiones deteriores sunt actionibus virilis animi feminae'. Id. I prefer the other explanation, as more direct and natural, 'either generally, in respect of the entire character and qualities, or in respect of some special excellence'.

καὶ ὁ ἔλοιτ' ἄν ὁ βελτίων] The better man will make the better choice in general, ἀπλῶς, by virtue of his whole character; or 'in so far as he is better, in respect of that particular kind of excellence, as some special virtue, in which his superiority is shewn, $\frac{1}{2}$ βελτίων ἐστί. So Victorius; who proceeds (after Alexander) to distinguish between this and the preceding topic, § 21; in that the φρόνιμοι as a class choose between different kinds of good; here the comparison is between two different kinds of choosers, and the one who makes the better selection is the better in moral character.

οίον] (sc. ελέσθαι, or εί τις έλοιτο). The higher and nobler choice is illustrated by the preference of being wronged to doing wrong. This, though cited here as a popular sentiment, was by no means the current and prevailing opinion at Athens. Plato, Rep. 11 358 C, makes Glaucon say, speaking of the opposite view, ἀκούων Θρασυμάχου καὶ μυρίων ἄλλων: and again, at the commencement of Glaucon's exposition of the disadvantages of justice and the superiority of injustice successful and unpunished, he uses the word paol, which seems to imply that this was the general opinion. In fact one of the main objects of the Republic is to prove that the reverse of this is true; and the long and laborious process which he is obliged to go through in the establishment of his position is quite sufficient to shew how strong must have been the prejudices in favour of the adverse doctrine which must be surmounted before he could hope to make his own views acceptable. The Gorgias also is occupied with the solution of this same question, in the comparison namely of doing and receiving injury and wrong, on which side the advantage, when rightly estimated, really lies. The Sophists, as represented by Thrasymachus in the Republic, and Callias in the Gorgias, appear to have held the lower, and as we now hold it to be, immoral doctrine, Ast, in his Comm. on Pl.

23 άδικεῖν τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ δικαιότερος ἃν έλοιτο. καὶ τὸ ήδιον τοῦ ἡττον ἡδέος τὴν γὰρ ἡδονὴν πάντα διώκει, καὶ αὐτοῦ ένεκα τοῦ ἡδεσθαι ὀρέγονται, ώρισται δὲ τούτοις τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τὸ τέλος. ἡδιον δὲ τό τε p. 26.

24 άλυπότερον καὶ τὸ πολυχρονιώτερον ήδύ. καὶ τὸ κάλλιον τοῦ ἦττον καλοῦ· τὸ γὰρ καλόν ἐστιν ἤτοι 25 τὸ ήδὺ ἢ τὸ καθ' αὐτὸ αἰρετόν. καὶ ὅσων αὐτοὶ αὐτοῖς ἢ φίλοις βούλονται αἴτιοι εἶναι μᾶλλον, ταῦτα μείζω 26 ἀγαθά, ὅσων δὲ ἤκιστα, μείζω κακά. καὶ τὰ πολυ-

χρονιώτερα τῶν ὀλιγοχρονιωτέρων καὶ τὰ βεβαιότερα

Rep. p. 391, has collected a number of references to authors who sided on this point with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

§ 23. ωρισται δέ] in § 3.

ηδιον δὲ τὸ ἀλυπότερον κ.τ.λ.] Pleasure is subject to two drawbacks to its enjoyment, which vary in different kinds of pleasure. Some pleasures are accompanied, preceded, or followed by pain (Plato held that this is the case with all bodily pleasures), and most of them are of a very transient character and very brief duration. This may in many cases afford a measure for the comparison of pleasure: those which are marked by the entire absence or lower degree of these qualifying circumstances are superior.

§ 24. $\tau \delta \gamma \dot{\alpha} \rho \kappa \alpha \lambda \delta \nu \kappa \tau \lambda$.] This distinction of the two different kinds of $\kappa \alpha \lambda \delta \nu$, arises from its twofold aspect, physical and moral: in the former of the two senses it is the beautiful, in the latter the morally right and noble. The beautiful, to the sight and sense, is the 'pleasant' form or aspect of $\tau \delta \kappa \alpha \lambda \delta \nu$; the right is $\kappa \alpha \lambda \delta \nu \tau \delta \kappa \alpha \theta' \alpha \delta \tau \delta \alpha \delta \rho \epsilon \tau \delta \nu$, that which is desirable in and for itself and for no ulterior object, and therefore an end in itself. In this latter sense the $\tau \delta \kappa \alpha \lambda \delta \nu$ may be regarded as the end of all moral action, Eth. N. III 7, III3 δ 8, c. 10, III5 δ 24, IX 8, II68 α 34, II69 α 6, seq. 21 to the end. In Rhet. I 9.3, two definitions of it are given and the distinction of its moral and physical aspects again suggested: and again II I3. 9 it is contrasted with the expedient or profitable, the one being a relative the other an absolute form of good.

§ 25. καὶ ὅσων κ.τ.λ.] Things are shewn to be good by our desire of them, because all things universally desirable are good: and the more we desire anything for ourselves or our friend (the friend is the 'second self', the alter ego, and therefore his interest is our own,) and therefore to be the causes of it, to procure it for ourselves or our friends; the more we shew that we think it good: and the things we desire least to bring upon ourselves or our friends are by the same rule the worst and most mischievous things. The topics of Top. Γ 2, 118 a I, are akin to this, not identical with it.

§ 26. τὰ πολυχρονιώτερα καὶ τὰ βεβαιύτερα] Top. Γ I, 116 a 13, 'more lasting and more

τῶν μὴ βεβαιοτέρων· ὑπερέχει γὰρ ἡ χρῆσις τῶν μὲν τῷ χρόνῳ τῶν δὲ τῆ βουλήσει· ὅταν γὰρ βού27 λωνται, ὑπάρχει μᾶλλον ἡ τοῦ βεβαίου. καὶ ὡς ἂν

of a thing is the length of time during which it remains in our possession; another, the security or stability of it, immunity from decay or corruption and the *fear* of losing it. The absence of these very much diminishes the value of any possession. The superiority in the value of a thing is shewn in, or measured by, either the duration or the amount of desire or wishing for it $(\beta ou)\lambda \dot{\eta} \sigma \epsilon \iota$ because our wishing for it shews that we consider it a *secure* possession, one of which we are little likely to be deprived, or which itself is not likely to be impaired, and so lose its value. A safe investment, which every one desires who has spare cash, is an example of this kind of security, and of the superiority in value that it carries with it.

§ 27. καὶ ὡς ἀν (ἀκολουθοίη) ἐκ τῶν συστοίχων] as the consequences would follow (if, whenever the topic were applied) in general, so here 'in all the rest', in the particular case of the rhetorical application of them, the same consequences do actually follow. Perhaps the general application of this topic, which seems to be understood in the protasis, may have a tacit reference to the more general treatment of the same in the dialectical Topics. I think that only one topic is here intended; so far as σύστοιχα are distinguished from πτώσεις, the former includes the latter as

the genus the species.

With this topic compare Rhet. II 23, 2, Top. F 3, 118 a 34-39. The instances of mrwors there given are the substantive and corresponding adverb, δικαιοσύνη δικαίως, ανδρεία ανδρείως. σύστοιχα and πτώσεις are explained, distinguished, (quite unintelligibly, however, were our information derived solely from this place,) and the use of them illustrated, in Top. B 9, 114 a 26-b 5. σύστοιχα are coordinate logical notions, as δίκαια and δίκαιος with δικαιοσύνη, ανδρεία and ανδρείος with ανδρεία; and again a 38, δικαιοσύνη δίκαιος δίκαιον δικαίως are coordinates. Also, a 29, τὰ ποιητικά and τὰ φυλακτικά are coordinate with the things which they produce and preserve, as τὰ ὑγιεινά with ὑγίεια, τὰ εὐεκτικά with εὐεξία. πτώσεις are these same coordinates in their grammatical aspects-terms that can be similarly predicated, and applicable to the same things-and they are therefore sometimes identified with the others. The πτώσεις 'inflexions' of the same word are not confined to the mere 'declension' of nouns, substantive or adjective, (the nominative is the casus rectus, or $\pi r \hat{\omega} \sigma i s \hat{\sigma} \rho \theta \hat{\eta}$, improperly so called, the noun in its upright or normal state or position, the casus or πτώσεις are fallings away, declensions, from that standard typical form by a change of termination1,) but include adverbs,

¹ Περὶ ἐρμηνείας 2, 16 α 32, τὸ δὲ Φίλωνος ἢ Φίλωνι καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα, οὐκ ὀνόματα ἀλλὰ πτώσεις ὀνόματος. Poet. 20. 10, 1457 α 18, πτῶσις δὶ ἐστὶν ἀνόματος ἢ ῥήματος ἡ μὲν τὸ κατὰ τούτον ἢ τούτω σημαίνουσα καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα (cases), ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐνὶ ἢ πολλοῖς (numbers) οἰον ἄνθρωποι ἢ ἄνθρωπος, ἡ δὲ κατὰ τὰ ὑποκριτικά, οἰον κατ' ἐρώτησιν ἢ ἐπίταξιν (moods of verbs). Illustrated by ἐβάδισεν and βάδιζε, indicative and imperative. πτώσεις are referred to the general head of παρώνυμα.

έκ των συστοίχων καὶ των όμοίων πτώσεων, καὶ τάλλ' ἀκολουθεῖ· οἶον εἰ τὸ ἀνδρείως κάλλιον καὶ αἰρετώτερον τοῦ σωφρόνως, καὶ ἀνδρία σωφροσύνης αἰρετωτέρα καὶ τὸ ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι τοῦ σωφρονεῖν.
28 καὶ ὁ πάντες αἰροῦνται τοῦ μὴ ὁ πάντες. καὶ ὁ οἱ P. 1365.

the generic and numerical terminations, masc, and femin, singular, dual, and plural, and the inflexions of verbs; in fact, as it appears, any change of termination which a root undergoes in passing into different parts of speech, and the inflexions of these: in Aristotle mrwois is a 'declension' from a root. This logical signification of σύστοιχος and συστοιχία is 'transferred' by metaphor, from the ranks of an army or of a chorus in the theatre (like artiotpodos), to logic or grammar: but in either of the two. senses, they always denote things on the same level, coordinates, Trendel. El. Log. Arist. 75, Bonitz ad Metaph. A 5, 986 a 23. Xenophon, Conv. 2, 20, has ἀντιστοιχείν in the sense of 'to be one's opposite, or partner in a dance'. Anab. V 4, 12, ξστησαν ανά έκατὸν μάλιστα, ώσπερ οί χοροί, ἀντιστοιχοῦντες ἀλλήλοις, 'in opposite, corresponding ranks'. In Met. l. c., and Eth. N. I 4, 1085 b 7, it is applied to the ten parallel rows or columns of the opposite apxal of the Pythagoreans, the two opposite members of the ten being in each case a συστοιχία, or pair of coordinate conceptions. Hence σύστοιχα are notions of the same order : as the four elements, which have the same rank, belong to the same row, i. e. order in nature, de Caelo 302 a 29; and hence, notions which fall under the same genus, as black and white, sweet and bitter; and even such as are under different genera, so long as they have something in common, de Sens. c. 7, 447 b 30, 448 a 14 and 16.

In Aristotle therefore σύστοιχα and πτώσεις, though occasionally identified, are, when strictly and properly applied, distinguished thus: σύστοιχα are logical notions or conceptions corresponding to things of the same rank or order in nature, having a wider and more comprehensive sphere of application than the πτώσεις, which are granuatical like the 'declensions', from which the name is derived, and include the various deflexions or inflexions, expressed by changes of termination, from a root.

Cicero's coningata, which are defined Top. 111 12, correspond to Aristotle's πτώσεις. Coningata dicuntur quae sunt ex verbis generis eiusdem. Eiusdem autem generis verba sunt, quae orta ab uno varie commutantur, ut sapiens sapienter sapientia. Haec verborum coningatio συζυγίω dicitur, ex qua huiusmodi est argumentum: si compascuus ager est, ius est compascere.

Besides the authorities already referred to, see on this subject Waitz on περὶ έρμ. c. 2, 16 b 1; Anal. Post. II 15, 79 b 6; Trendel. Kategorien-tehre, p. 27 seq.; Donaldson, New Crat. § 227.

§ 28. τοῦ μὴ (ὅντος) ὁ πάντες (αἰροῦνται)] The negative of the preceding: 'than that which is not what all prefer'.

Top. Z 10, 148 a 10, ψφέλιμων, ψφέλημων, ψφέληκός are πτώσεις. Ib. H 1. $^{\circ}$ 30, 153 b 25—34, where several examples are given.

πλείους ἢ οἱ ἐλάττους ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ἦν οὖ πάντες ἐφίενται, ὥστε καὶ μεῖζον οὖ μᾶλλον. καὶ ὂ οἱ ἀμφισβητοῦντες ἢ οἱ ἐχθροὶ ἢ οἱ κρίνοντες ἢ οῢς οὖτοι κρίνουσιν τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἂν εἰ πάντες φαῖεν 29 ἐστί, τὸ δὲ οἱ κύριοι καὶ οἱ εἰδότες. καὶ ὁτὲ μὲν οὖ πάντες μετέχουσι μεῖζον ἀτιμία γὰρ τὸ μὴ μετέχειν 30 ὁτὲ δὲ οὖ μηδεὶς ἢ οὖ ὀλίγοι σπανιώτερον γάρ. καὶ τὰ ἐπαινετώτερα καλλίω γάρ. καὶ ὧν αὶ τιμαὶ μείζους, ώσαὐτως ἡ γὰρ τιμὴ ὥσπερ ἀξία τις ἐστίν. 31 καὶ ὧν αὶ ζημίαι μείζους. καὶ τὰ τῶν ὁμολογουμένων

ην] 'was' as we have said, c. 6. 2. οὐ μᾶλλον] (ἐφίενται).

οί ἀμφισβητοῦντες] 'rival claimants or competitors'.

 $\eta oi \dot{\epsilon}_{\chi} \theta \rho oi$ c. 6. 24. This applies especially to contested superiority in personal excellences or accomplishments. If rivals and enemies, $(\tau \dot{o} \mu \dot{\epsilon} \nu)$ who are most interested in disparaging their adversary, and most inclined to do so, if even these admit his superiority, we may take it for granted that every one else will do so, and therefore this is equivalent to the universal admission of it $(\dot{\omega}_{S} \dot{a}_{V} e^{i} \pi \dot{a}_{V} \tau \epsilon_{S} \phi \dot{a}_{E} \nu)$. If 'judges', those that have the right to decide by reason of special qualification, the artist or professor, the expert or adept in any pursuit or study, or those whom they select as qualified to pronounce a decision, if such as these decide in a man's favour, then it is the decision $(\tau \dot{o} \dot{o} \dot{e})$ of 'authorities', as it were, men empowered and entitled, or who have the right ($\kappa \dot{\nu} \rho \iota \sigma \iota$) to judge and decide, and (or rather, 'because of') the special knowledge which the occasion requires (oi $\dot{e} \dot{e} \dot{o} \dot{o} \dot{\tau} \dot{e} \dot{\sigma}$); and this decision is final. Compare notes on 6. 25, 7. 21.

Victorius and Schrader appear to confine κρίνειν to its judicial sense of deciding a legal cause, οὖs οὖτοι κρίνουσι being those who are selected or deputed to try a particular case when the ordinary judges are prevented from being present themselves. If there were any doubt between the two interpretations, the question would be decided by the following passage: ἔκαστος δὲ κρίνει καλῶς ἃ χινώσκει, καὶ τούτων ἐστὶν ἀγαθὸς κριτής.

Eth. N. 1 1, 1094 b 27.

de av el] Note on sav el, I I. 5, p. 9.

§ 29. This topic also is best exemplified in personal advantages, accomplishments, or possession. It can be applied either way. Sometimes $(\delta \tau \hat{\epsilon} \ \mu \hat{\epsilon} \nu, \, \tilde{\epsilon} \sigma \tau \iota \nu \, \delta \tau \epsilon, \, \hat{\epsilon} \nu i \sigma \tau \epsilon)$, in some cases, the superior value of a possession of this kind is in proportion to its universality, because the greater the number of those who have the advantage, the greater the disgrace of being without it (a case of $\sigma \tau \hat{\epsilon} \rho \eta \sigma \iota s$, § 16): in other cases the reverse may be maintained on the principle that the scarcity of a thing lends it a superior value, § 14.

§ 30. καλλίω γάρ] § 24. Virtue is the only true object of 'praise',

₹παινος. Introd. Appendix Bk. I, c. 9, p. 212 seq.

ών αὶ τιμαί κ.τ.λ.] 'and things (especially actions) may be regarded as

ή φαινομένων μεγάλων μείζω. καὶ διαιρούμενα δὲ

'greater', or superior in respect of their power or effect, of which the honours or rewards are greater; because honours and rewards are as it were (may be considered) a kind of valuation, estimate of the value, of a thing, $a\xi ia$, which will afford a comparison, or measure of the comparative value of two things: and the opposite acts which involve a higher penalty, are superior in a sense, more important and effective. $\zeta \eta \mu ia$, not 'losses', $d\pi o \beta o \lambda a i$, as it has been understood, but 'penalties', directly opposed to $\tau \iota \mu a i$ 'rewards'. So Victorius.

§ 31. Things which are, at first sight, or can be shewn to be, greater than others which are universally acknowledged to be great or are manifestly so, are seen to be so at once and without reflexion, present themselves at once as such, φαινόμενα. A conspicuous instance of this common sense of φαινόμενος, apparent, manifest to the eye, occurs Rhet. II 2, I (see

note) in the definition of opyn. Comp. 1 9.32, 8.6; III 2.9.

καὶ διαιρούμενα κ.τ.λ.] This and the following are purely rhetorical topics, and belong rather to the third book, On style. One mode of exaggerating the importance of anything, of making it assume a magnitude which it does not really possess, is in the way of description, to break up into parts or describe in detail what might be stated summarily as a whole. 'The same facts or events', when thus individually represented, will 'seem greater' than if they were all summed up together in one statement; because in the former case the excess or superiority, in point of importance and interest, of the facts exhibited in detail over the summary statement, will seem to be shewn 'in more points', which are all brought severally into view. πλειόνων ὑπερέχειν is 'to exceed in a greater number of points', whether we understand the genitive as one of quantity 'in more things', which is probably right, or as the comparative genitive after υπερέχειν, 'to surpass more things', by which the meaning is not so distinctly expressed: in either case it is the number of things detailed that makes the superior impression. The use of this topic is well illustrated by Quintilian, Inst. Or. VIII 3. 61 sq., who however refers the strong impression produced by this detail to the ενέργεια or vividness of the picture. § 67, sic urbium captarum crescit miseratio. Sine dubio enim qui dicit expugnatam esse civitatem complectitur omnia quaecunque talis fortuna recipit; sed in affectus minus penetrat brevis hic velut nuncius. At si aperias haec, et cet. [then follows the description]. Majoragius refers to Cicero's description of Pompey's military experience in the speech pro lege Manilia, and Gaisford to Harris, Philol. Inquiries, p. 58 [on p. 62, this passage of the Rhet. is quoted]. He assigns this to 'accumulation' and 'concatenation'. Shakespeare, in the Tempest, will supply us with a brilliant example: The cloud-capp'd towers, the gorgeous palaces, the solemn temples, &c. [IV. i. 152]. Comp. Acts of the Apostles, ii. 9 seq., where the wonder of the gift of tongues is heightened by the enumeration and of all the different nations whose language was and Elamites,' 's and Sped. Bacon's Colours ed.), No. 5, i general

application

είς τὰ μέρη τὰ αὐτὰ μείζω φαίνεται πλειόνων γὰρ ὑπερέχειν φαίνεται. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησι πεῖσαι λέγουσαν τὸν Μελέαγρον ἀναστῆναι

όσσα κάκ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλει τῶν ἄστυ ἀλώη: λαοὶ μὲν φθινύθουσι, πόλιν δέ τε πῦρ ἀμαθύνει, τέκνα δέ τ' ἄλλοι ἄγουσιν.

καὶ τὸ συντιθέναι δὲ καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν, ώσπερ Ἐπίχαρ-

λέγουσαν] is omitted in Ms A^e., and consequently put in brackets by Buhle and Spengel. The latter adds, *Praef. ad Rhet. Gr.* p. vi, 'aliud excidisse videtur, v. c. παράκοιτιν.' ['Intellige τὴν γυναῖκα, quo aegre cares'. Spengel, ed. 1867. s.] 'Deest λέγουσαν in Cod. antiquissimo Victorii, et videtur sane illud interpolatum esse. Uncinos applicavi'. Buhle.

ο ποιητής φησι] Homer to wit, Il. IX 592. The reading of the Vulg. is κήδε' ὄσ' ἀνθρώποισι πέλει τῶν ἄστυ ἀλώη' ἄνδρας μὲν κτείνουσι, and the rest as quoted by Ar. This example is the same as that given by Quintilian. Victorius thinks that he borrowed it from Aristotle. Spalding, ad Quint. VIII 3. 67, quotes the following Schol. on Il. XV 496, referring to the other passage of Homer: ἡητορικῶς τὸ ἐν πρᾶγμα, τὴν

πόρθησιν, είς πολλά κατεμέρισεν.

τὸ συντιθέναι καὶ ἐποικοδομεῖν] are added to the preceding topic of 'detail' as closely akin to it. That the first at all events is so, may be inferred from the identification of 'detail' with 'accumulation' by Harris. p. 58, above quoted. The two figures are 'accumulation' and 'climax'. έποικοδόμησιs is the building up of one phrase upon (ἐπί) another, one rising above another step by step, like the rounds of 'a ladder' (κλίμαξ), or the stages of a building. Rhet. ad Alex. 3 (4). 9, ἐποικοδομοῦντα τὸ ἔτερον ώς ἐπὶ τὸ ἔτερον αὕξειν τρόπω τοιώδε, which is then illustrated. Arist. de Gen. Απ. Ι 18, 34, 724 α 28, έτι δέ παρὰ ταῦτα ώς Ἐπίχαρμος ποιεί τὴν ἐποικοδόμησιν, ἐκ τῆς διαβολῆς ἡ λοιδορία, ἐκ δὲ ταύτης ἡ μάχη, ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἔκ τινος ή άρχη της κινήσεως. Eustath. ad Hom. Il. B, p. 181, τὸ δὲ σχημα του ρηθέντος χωρίου (verse 101) κλίμακα καὶ κλιμακωτὸν λέγουσιν οἱ παλαιοί, έτεροι δὲ ἐποικοδόμησιν. γίνεται δὲ σχήμα κλιμακωτὸν ὅταν τὸ λήγον τής φθασάσης εννοίας άρχη γένηται της έφεξης, οίον ώς εί τις είπη, ο βασιλεύς αγαθός, ὁ αγαθὸς αγαθὰ ποιεί, ὁ αγαθὰ ποιῶν εὐεργετεί, ὁ εὐεργετῶν θεὸν μιμείται, κ.τ.λ. Demetrius περί έρμηνείας § 270 (III 320, Rhet. Gr. Spengel) λαμβάνοιτ' αν καὶ ή κλίμαξ (sic) καλουμένη, ώς παρα Δημοσθένει, τὸ (de Cor. § 179, p. 288) οὐκ εἶπον μὲν ταῦτα, οὐκ ἔγραψα δέ οὐδ' ἔγραψα μέν, οὐκ έπρέσβευσα δέ οὐδ' ἐπρέσβευσα μέν, οὐκ ἔπεισα δὲ τοὺς Θηβαίους' σχεδὸν γὰρ ἐπαναβαίνοντι (mounting a staircase or a hill, from higher to higher) ο λόγος ἔσικεν ἐπὶ μείζονα. This figure by the Latin Rhetoricians is called gradatio, Cic. de Or. III 54. 207, Quint. IX 3. 54-7, where it is explained and illustrated by the same passage of Demosth. and from Latin authors. In Auct. ad Heren. IV 25, it is thus defined: Gradatio est, in qua non ante ad consequens verbum descenditur quam ad superius conscensum est, and then illustrated. See Aquila Romanus, cited by Ernesti, Lex. Tech. Gr. et Lat. sub vv. κλίμαξ, et gradatio, and at length by Schäfer, App. Crit. ad Demosth. p. 288, 8, Vol. 11 p. 250. Aquila calls it ascensus.

μος, διά τε τὸ αὐτὸ τῆ διαιρέσει (ἡ γὰρ σύνθεσις ὑπεροχὴν δείκνυσι πολλήν) καὶ ὅτι ἀρχὴ φαίνεται 32 μεγάλων καὶ αἴτιον. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ

ἄσπερ Ἐπίχαρμος] Besides the illustration of the figure climax from Epicharmus quoted above from the de Gen. Anim., there is another and a more complete one in Athen. II 36 C. D, indicated by Schrader, ἐκ μὲν θυσίας θοίνη, ἐκ δὲ θοίνης πόσις ἐγένετο, ἐκ δὲ πόσιος κῶμος, ἐκ κώμου δ' ἐγένετο θυανία, ἐκ δὲ θυανίας δίκη, ἐκ δὶ καταδίκης καδικης πέδαι τε

καὶ σφάκελος καὶ ζημία1.

διά τε τὸ αὐτὸ τῆ διαιρέσει Two reasons are now given for the impression that these two figures make upon the hearer: the first, the same as that which accounts for it in the case of diaipeous; the accumulation of particulars, and the rising by steps to a climax, have the same effect as the division or detail, in increasing the number of effective strokes, and so producing the impression of superiority, ή γάρ σύνθεσις ὑπεροχὴν δείκυυσι πολλήν: and secondly, you make that which you are endeavouring to magnify appear to be the cause and origin of a number of important effects, which you seem to multiply by detailing them. The following passage of the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 3 (4), §§ 10, 11, will serve as a commentary on this and the entire section: συλλήβδην δέ, έὰν πολλών αἴτιον ἀποφαίνης, έάν τε αγαθών έάν τε κακών, μέγαλα φανείται. σκοπείν δε καὶ το πράγμα όποιον φανείται κατά μέρη διαιρούμενον ή καθάλου λεγύμενον, και ύποτέρως αν μείζον ή, τόνδε τον τρόπον αὐτο λέγειν. τὰς μεν οὖν αὐξήσεις οὕτω μετιών πλείστας ποιήσεις καὶ μεγίστας, ταπεινώσεις δὲ τοῖς λόγοις καὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ τὸν ἐναντίον τρόπον μετιών, ώς εἰρήκαμεν έπὶ τῶν μεγάλων, καὶ μάλιστα μέν ἄν μηδενὸς αίτιον ἐπιδεικνύης, ελ δὲ μὴ ώς ἐλαχίστων καλ σμικροτάτων.

§ 32. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ χαλεπώτερον καὶ σπανιώτερον μεῖζον] supr. § 14. An exemplification of this topic is found in Eth. Nic. VIII 15, 1163 a 12, οἱ μὲν γὰρ παθόντες τοιαῦτά φασι λαβεῖν παρὰ τῶν εὐεργετῶν ἃ μικρὰ ἢν ἐκείνοις καὶ ἐξῆν παρ᾽ ἐτέρων λαβεῖν, κατασμικρίζοντες οἱ δ᾽ ἀνάπαλιν τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ᾽ αὐτοῖς, καὶ ἃ παρ᾽ ἄλλων οὐκ ἦν, καὶ ἐν κινδύνοις ἢ τοιαύταις χρείαις. The additional value or importance for good or for evil that things, especially actions, acquire at particular ages or times of life (illustrated in the Topics), in particular places, at particular times, at particular critical seasons and occasions (καιροί), or from the special nature of the powers or faculties that are called into exercise (δυνάμεις), is derived from the scarcity of such things and actions, and the difficulty of obtaining or performing them. The καιρός in two aspects is exemplified in the Topics, Γ 2, 117

¹ Müllach, Fragm. Philos. Gr. p. 143, gives these lines as corrected by Meineke, Dindorf, and Bochart.

Α. ἐκ μὲν θυσίας θοίνα,

έκ δε θοίνας πόσις εγένετο. Β. χαρίεν, ώς γ΄ εμίν δοκεί. Α. έκ δε πέσιος κώμος, εκ κώμου δ' εγενεθ' δανία,

έκ δ' υανίας δίκα, "κ δίκας δ' εγένετο καταδίκα,

έκ δέ καταδίκας πέδαι τε καί σφαλός (the stocks) καί ζαυ

The other passage, in the de Gen. An., Müllach attempt and produces this melodious verse, p. 144,

έκ διαβολάς μώμος έγένετο, πολλού δ' έι

σπανιώτερον μεῖζον, καὶ οἱ καιροὶ καὶ αἱ ἡλικίαι καὶ οἱ τόποι καὶ οἱ χρόνοι καὶ αἱ δυνάμεις ποιοῦσι μεγάλα· Ρ· 37- εἰ γὰρ παρὰ δύναμιν καὶ παρ᾽ ἡλικίαν καὶ παρὰ τοὺς ὁμοίους, καὶ εἰ οὕτως ἡ ἐνταῦθα ἡ τόθ', Έξει μέγεθος καὶ καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. ὅθεν καὶ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ ὀλυμπιονίκη·

a 26—b 2¹. Add Prov. xv. 23, a word spoken in due season, how good is it. χρόνοι is illustrated by the case, already quoted, of Sir Phil. Sidney, and the cup of cold water at the battle of Zutphen [p. 84]: δυνάμεις, as Aristotle himself tells us, applies to cases in which any one does something 'beyond his powers', above his ordinary level, and more than you would expect from him; and παρὰ τοὺς ὁμοίους is exemplified by the epigram and the saying of Iphicrates.

καὶ εἰ οὕτως κ.τ.λ.] 'and if such things be done (οὕτως), at particular places or times, they will acquire a magnitude and importance in things (i.e. actions) right, and good, and just, and their opposites'. οὕτως may

however mean under particular circumstances.

τὸ ἐπίγραμμα τῷ ὁλυμπιονίκη] The substantive taking the same case as the verb from which it is derived is illustrated in the dative by Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 390. Stallbaum on Phaedo 88 C. Soph. 252 D. and Euthyphr. 13 D, 15 A. Add, Aesch. Agam. 415, πτεροῖε ὀπαδοῖε ὕπνου κελεύθοιε. Soph. Oed. Col. τὰ γὰρ δέλῳ τῷ μὴ δικαίῳ κτήματ' οὐχὶ σώζεται. Trach. 668, Ἡρακλεῖ δωρημάτων. Αj. 696, Wunder ad loc. Eur. Ion, 508, τὰ θεόθεν τέκνα θνατοῖε. Iph. T. 1384, οὐρανοῦ πέσημα (i. e. τὸ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ πεπτωκόε). Plat. Parmen. 128 C, Theaet. 177 A, Gorg. 522 D, Symp. 182 D, Rep. vI 493 D, 498 B. Ar. Pol. vII (vI) 5, 1320 a 32, βοήθεια τοῖε ἀπόροιε. Some examples of an analogous construction, in which a substantive follows the ordinary construction of a verb, with prepos. and subst., are given by Stallbaum on Phaedo 99 B. Add to these, Plat. Protag. 354 A, Gorg. 472 E, Rep. II 378 D, Eur. Herc. Fur. 1334, στέφανος Ἑλλήνων ῦπο, Arist. Eth. N. X 9, 1179 a 25, ἐπιμέλεια τῶν ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ Θεῶν, Categ. 8 b 32, μεταβολὴ ὑπὸ νόσου, de Anima B. 8, 11, 420 b 27, ἡ πληγὴ τοῦ ἀέρος ὑπὸ τῆς ψυχῆε.

This epigram is expressly attributed to Simonides by Eustath. ad Hom. p. 1761, 24 (Buhle). It is found in the Anthol. I 80 (ed. Jacobs), No. 107 of the Epigrams attributed to Simonides. Bergk, Fragm. Lyr.

p. 793 [p. 921, 2nd ed], Simonidis Fragm. 166.

Eustathius 1. c. explains ἄσιλλα, σκεῦός τι ἰχθυηρόν. It is described by Hemsterhuis ad Hesychium s.v. ἀστυπολεῖ, as a iugum, a sort of wooden yoke, which was carried over the two shoulders to support the fish-baskets.

¹ καιρός 'due season', 'the right time', 'occasion', 'opportunity', the time suitable, appropriate, to the performance of anything, is that form of good which comes under the Category of time, χρόνος; Eth. Nic. I 4, 1096 a 26. On this the Paraphrast (Andronicus Rhodius) notes, ἔστι γὰρ ὁ καιρός ὁ ἐπιτήδειος ἐκάστω χρόνος. Pind. Pyth. IX 82, ὁ καιρός παντὸς ἔχει κορυφάν. Ib. IV 286 (508). Soph. Electr. 75, καιρὸς ἀνδράσιν μέγιστος ἔργου παντὸς ἔστ' ἐπιστάτης. Philoct. 837.

πρόσθε μεν άμφ' ώμοισιν έχων τραχεῖαν ἄσιλλαν ίχθῦς ἐξ Άργους εἰς Τεγέαν έφερον.

καὶ ὁ Ἰφικράτης αὐτὸν ἐνεκωμίαζε λέγων ἐξ ὧν 33 ὑπῆρξε ταῦτα. καὶ τὸ αὐτοφυὲς τοῦ ἐπικτήτου χαλεπώτερον γάρ. ὅθεν καὶ ὁ ποιητής φησιν αὐτοδίδακτος δ' εἰμί.

34 και το μεγάλου μέγιστον μέρος, οίον Περικλής τον

Alciphron I, I. p. 6, εὐθὺς οὖν ὀψῶναι πλήσιον, καὶ τὰς ἀσίλλας ἐπωμίους ἀνελόμενοι, καὶ τὰς ἐκατέρωθεν σπυρίδας ἐξαρτήσαντες (quoted in Anthol.). Otherwise called τύλη. Arist. Ach. 860, 954. Diog. Laert. IX 53, of Protagoras, who πρῶτος τὴν καλουμένην τύλην, ἐψ᾽ ἦς τὰ ψόρτια βαστάζουσιν, εὖρεν, ὧς ψησιν ᾿Αριστοτέλης ἐν τῷ περὶ παιδείας ἡ φορμοφόρος γὰρ ἦ, ὡς καὶ Ἐπικουρός πού ψησι. So that Protagoras may be added to the examples of ἐξ οἵων εἰς οἵα, I 9, 31, οτ ἐξ ὧν ὑπῆρχε ταῦτα.

The exclamation of Iphicrates 'from what I rose to this' (from what an origin this my fortune was made) is repeated in a more correct form (Buhle) in c. 9. 31, ἐξ οἴων εἰς οἶα, as is also part of the Epigram. Plutarch, Apophth. Reg. et Imp., under the head of Iphicrates, Nos. 1 and 5, has these notices of him. 'Ιφικράτης δοκών νὶὸς εἶναι σκυτοτόμου κατεφρονεῖτο' δόξαν δὲ τότε πρώτος ἔσχε ὅτε τρανματίαν πολέμιον ἄνδρα μετὰ τῶν

νείτο δόξαν δε τότε πρώτος εσχε ότε τραυματίαν πολέμιον ἄνδρα μετὰ τών ὅπλων ζώντα συναρπάσας εἰς τὴν ἐαυτοῦ τριήρη μετένεγκεν. Νο. 5, πρὸς δὲ 'Αρμόδιον τὸν τοῦ παλαιοῦ 'Αρμοδίου ἀπόγονον εἰς δυσγένειαν αὐτῷ λοιδορούμενον ἔφη, τὸ μὲν ἐμὸν ἀπ' ἐμοῦ γένος ἄρχεται, τὸ δὲ σὸν ἐν σοὶ παύεται.

§ 33. τὸ αὐτοφνὲς τοῦ ἐπικτήτου] 'native superior to acquired talents and advantages (of person, mind or character), because they are harder to come by'; nature being rather chary of such gifts, and the acquisition of them comparatively easy. Τορ. Γ Ι, 116 ὁ 10, καὶ τὸ φύσει τοῦ μὴ φύσει, οἷον ἡ δικαιοσύνη τοῦ δικαίου' τὸ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τὸ δ' ἐπίκτητον. This topic has a wider scope than the rhetorical, and again, c. 4, 119 α 7—10. Comp. Pind. Ol. IX 152, τὸ δὲ φυῷ κράτιστον ἄπαν. II 155, σοφὸς ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὸς φυῷ μαθόντες δὲ λαβροὶ παγγλωσσίᾳ ἄκραντα γαρύεμεν Διὸς πρὸς ὅρνιχα θεῖον. Nem. III 69, συγγενεῖ δὲ τις ἀρετῷ μέγα βρίθει' ὁς δὲ διδάκτ' ἔχει ψεφηνὸς ἀνήρ. Specie autem comparantur ut anteponantur quae propter se expetenda sunt iis quae propter aliud: ut innata atque insita assumptis et adventitiis et seq. Cic. Topic. XVIII 69.

ό ποιητής] Homer. Odys. χ' (XXII) 347.

§ 34. οἶον Περικλῆς τὰν ἐπιτάφιον κ.τ λ.] This celebrated simile does not occur, as is well known, in the funeral oration put into Pericles' mouth by Thucydides in his second book. Thucydides, who merely gives the general meaning of his speakers and never their actual words, may have omitted it intentionally, if Pericles really made use of it. But as Herodotus, VII 162, attributes nearly the same identical seems more probable that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it could not the appears, likewise, in a somewhich the same of the second probable that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it could not the same of the second probable that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it could not the same of the second probable that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it could not the second probable that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it could not the second probable that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it could not the second probable that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it could not the second probable that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it could not the second probable that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it could not the second probable that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it could not the second probable that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it was erroneous events it is quite clear that it was erroneous events events

ἐπιτάφιον λέγων, τὴν νεότητα ἐκ τῆς πόλεως ἀνηρῆσθαι ώσπερ τὸ ἔαρ ἐκ τοῦ ἐνιαυτοῦ εἰ ἐξαιρεθείη. 35 καὶ τὰ ἐν χρεία μείζονι χρήσιμα, οἷον τὰ ἐν γήραι καὶ νόσοις. καὶ δυοῖν τὸ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ τέλους. καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλῶς. καὶ τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ ἀδυνάτου.

τόλμας ἀφαιρῆ κἀπολωτίζη νέους), who no doubt might have borrowed it from Pericles; and it is ascribed to Demades by Athenaeus, 111 99 D. It

is repeated in Rhet. III 10. 7.

§ 35. τὰ ἐν χρεία...μείζονι χρήσιμα (μείζω ἐστί)] A friend in need is a friend indeed. 'Auget manifesto vim beneficiorum tempus, angustiaeque eorum qui beneficium accipiunt, quod etiam Demosthenes in Leptinem significavit (p. 471, 1), πάντες μὲν γάρ εἰσιν ἵσως ἄξιοι χάριν ἀνταπολαμβάνειν οἱ προϋπάρχοντες τῷ ποιεῖν ὑμᾶς εὖ, μάλιστα δὲ οἱ παρὰ τὰς χρείας.' Victorius. Comp. Eth. N. VIII 15, 1163 α 16, in estimating the value of services to a friend, when you wish to make the most of them you say that they are τὰ μέγιστα τῶν παρ' αὐτοῖς (the best you have to give), καὶ ἃ παρ'

άλλων ούκ ήν, και έν κινδύνοις ή τοιαύταις χρείαις.

δυοῦν τὸ ἐγγύτερον τοῦ τέλους] This topic is distinguishable from those in §§ 9 and 16. There the comparison is between end and not-end: here it is between different degrees or orders of means to an end. Top. It, 116 b 22, quoted on § 9. Alexander, in his Comm. on that passage, illustrates this by the comparison of shaving and exercise as means to the end, health; the active exercise of ἀρετή (this is the definition of εὐδαιμονία in the Eth. Nic.) to the mere ἔξις of it, as nearer to the end, happiness; in practical arts, the higher and more comprehensive are superior to the narrower and subordinate in each department, the latter being mere means to some higher end; so horsemanship is superior to the saddler's art, both being subordinate, but the former nearer, to the end, the military art; the woodman's and carpenter's arts as means to shipbuilding; medicine and gymnastics as both tending to a healthy habit of body.

τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλῶs] The comparison in the expression of this topic is left to be understood, and the two terms are merely placed in juxtaposition by καὶ, one and the other are laid before us, in order that we may choose between them. The topic is a comparison of absolute good, or good in general, and relative good. That which is absolutely good, or good in itself, καθ αὐτό, or good in general, need not be the best for us ('to a man's own self'), any particular individual, αὐτῷ, though theoretically, from the higher point of view, it is superior to the other. Top. Γ1, 116 δ 8, τὸ ἀπλῶs ἀγαθὸν τοῦ τινὶ αἰρετώτερον¹. Alexander, in his Comm. on Top. p. 125 (Top. 116 δ 26, τὸ δυνατὸν καὶ ἀδύνατον), illustrates this by the contrast of immortality and long life, which will apply as

¹ The comparison of these two topics well illustrates the difference of treatment in dialectical and rhetorical reasoning. In the former that which is generally and theoretically true is put forward: in the latter, looking at this same question from the practical side, we see that there are many exceptions, and that this other side is equally capable of being maintained.

το μέν γάρ αύτω, το δ' ού. και τὰ έν τέλει τοῦ 36 βίου τέλη γαρ μαλλον τὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει. καὶ τὰ προς αλήθειαν των προς δόξαν. όρος δὲ τοῦ προς P. 1365 b.

well to the ἀπλῶς and αὐτῶ as to that for which it is immediately intended: immortality may perhaps be absolutely the best, most desirable in itself, but it is out of our reach; for us therefore a long life, which may possibly be attained, is better: it is of no use to choose or prefer immortality. Another example is supplied by Heraclitus' dictum, quoted in Eth. Nic. x 5, 1176 a 7, that an ass would prefer any rubbish or refuse (σύρματα) to gold; because it is pleasanter to him. Comp. I 15. 12, τὸ

άπλως αγαθόν αίρειται οὐδείς, άλλα τὸ αύτω.

αὐτῷ (al. αὐτῷ) [on p. 146] is the reading of Vict., Buhle, Gaisf., Bekker, Spengel, and Bonitz, Arist. Stud. I p. 88. It is the equivalent of revi in the familiar antithesis of general and particular good, as in the passage of the Topics above quoted; comp. 1 9. 17 αὐτῷ, 1 15. 20, 11 13. 9, τὸ μὲν γὰρ συμφέρου αὐτῷ ἀγαθόν ἐστι, τὸ δὲ καλὸν ἀπλῶς: and as in the repetition of the antithesis, 1 15, 12, it assumes the form of airo, 'good to a man's own self', i.e. each particular individual, it is quite plain that the one form can in many cases be substituted for the other. On avrov for avrov and the rest, see Waitz, Org. p. 486, 54 a 14. Rhet. I 1. 12, ἀνάγκη δι' αὐτῶν ήττασθαι. Also, Buttm. Excurs. x ad Dem. c. Mid. p. 140, de formis αύτόν et αὐτόν. ή for καί, which is adopted by Vict. and Gaisf., and suggested by Bonitz, I. c., is, as I have above endeavoured to shew, unnecessary.

τὸ δυνατὸν τοῦ ἀδυνάτου] Τορ. Γ I, 116 6 26. See Alexander's example in the last note but one. Another occurs in 11 2. 2, on anger, ήδὺ μὲν γὰρ τὸ οἶεσθαι τεύξεσθαι ων έφίεται, οὐδεὶς δὲ των φαινομένων άδυνάτων έφίεται αὐτῷ, ὁ δ' ὀργίζόμενος ἐφίεται αὐτῷ. We deliberate, with a view to action, and that which is to be preferred of two courses of action, only about things which we believe to be possible, and possible to us; καν μέν άδυνάτφ έντύχωσιν, αφίστανται...έαν δε δυνατόν φαίνηται έγχειρούσι πράττειν. Eth.

Nic. III 5, 1112 6 25.

This topic is stated as a consequence from the preceding; the possible is to be preferred to the impossible, because the attainable good is the

only good for us, τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὖτῷ, τὸ δ' οὖ.
τὰ ἐν τέλει τοῦ βίου] The end in question is not the temporal end, but the final cause. The relos is in itself good, 7. 8, 9; 6. 2; the higher or nearer to the end (τὰ πρὸς τῷ τέλει) are any of the means employed for the attainment of it, the more they approximate in their character to the end itself; hence τὰ ἐν τέλει τοῦ βίου, the means included in, or those which subserve, the end of life-happiness, or whatever else the end of life may be-are in so far superior, being nearer to that great and final end, than other means to other and lower ends. Top. Γ 1, 116 b 23, τὸ πρός τὸ τοῦ βίου τέλος αἰρετώτερον μᾶλλον ή τὸ πρός ἄλλο τι, οἶον τὸ πρός εύδαιμονίαν συντείνου ή τὸ πρὸς φρόνησιν.

§ 36. τὰ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν τῶν πρὸς δόξαν] the real and the sham; τὸ είναι and τὸ δοκείν, τὸ ὄν and τὸ φαινόμενον; the sr stantial reality contrasted with the mere outside show or truth as absolute certainty, and probable opinic

δόξαν, δ λανθάνειν μέλλων οὐκ ᾶν έλοιτο. διὸ καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν τοῦ εὖ ποιεῖν δόξειεν ᾶν αἰρετώτερον εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ κᾶν λανθάνη αἰρήσεται, ποιεῖν δ΄ 37 εὖ λανθάνων οὐ δοκεῖ ᾶν ἐλέσθαι. καὶ ὅσα εἶναι μᾶλλον, λον ἢ δοκεῖν βούλονται· πρὸς ἀλήθειαν γὰρ μᾶλλον.

καὶ εὶ τὸ μὲν δι' αὐτὸ τὸ δὲ διὰ τὴν δόξαν αἰρετόν (αἰρετώτερόν ἐστιν), οἶον ὑγίεια κάλλους. (τὴν μὲν γὰρ ὑγίειαν δι' αὐτὴν αἰρούμεθα κᾶν μηδεὶς εἴσεσθαι μέλλη, τὸ δὲ κάλλος διὰ τὴν ἐπ' αὐτῷ δόξαν' μάταιον γοῦν δοκεῖ τὸ κάλλος εἶναι μὴ γνωριζύμενον. Alex. Aphrod. ad loc.) Aesch. Sept. c. Th. 592, of Amphiaraus the just, οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν δίκαιος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει. This topic is No. 3, in Bacon's Colours of Good and Evil (Works, ed. Ellis and Spedding, VII 79). It is shewn to fail in the case of virtue; the virtuous man 'will be virtuous in solitudine, and not only in theatro'.

ὄρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν κ.τ.λ.] Top. l. c. b 21, ὅρος δὲ τοῦ πρὸς δόξαν τὸ μηδενὸς συνειδότος μὴ ἃν σπουδάσαι ὑπάρχειν. 'The distinguishing mark or characteristic of that which is directed to mere opinion (is found in) anything that a man would not choose if he were sure that it would not be known or recognised by others'. And the same thing is expressed in the Topics, 'anything which a man would not be anxious to possess if no one else was to be privy to it'. It is the credit of possessing the thing, in the eyes of others, and not the mere possession for its own sake, that gives it its value and superiority. Compare with this \hat{a} μὴ λαυθάνει κ.τ.λ. § 40, which gives the other side of the question.

In the example, the superiority of receiving to conferring a benefit, the words δόξειεν ἄν suggest that we need not take this for granted; it can be 'made to appear' that it is true, but the real truth lies on the other side of the question; from a higher point of view, to confer is better

than to receive a benefit.

§ 37. οσα είναι μάλλον κ.τ.λ.] The difference between this and the preceding topic seems to lie in this. That lays down the general rule, and refers to 'every thing' that comes under it; and is therefore appealed to, προς ἀλήθειαν γάρ μάλλον, as the warrant and foundation of this. The second is a special variety of the first, 'what men wish to be'; the qualities, such as virtues, which they desire to possess, or seem to possess. Here again the reality is preferable to the mere credit and external appearance of the virtue. 'And, therefore, it is a vulgar and popular opinion (paol, Plat. Rep. II 358 A; and not merely the doctrine of the vulgar, οί πολλοί, but maintained also by would-be philosophers, as Thrasymachus and Callicles) that justice is a thing of small value (mean and contemptible), because the appearance of it is preferable to the reality, whereas in the case of health it is the reverse'. Victorius quotes, in exemplification of φασί, two iambic lines from Plutarch de Aud. Poet. p. 18 D. του μέν δικαίου την δόκησιν άρνυσο, τὰ δ' έργα του παν δρώντος ένθα κερδανείς. Eur. Ixion. Fr. 1. Dind. Quoted also in Stobaeus p. 30, 8. Another fragment to the same effect is ascribed by Valckenaer (Diatr. in Fragm. Eur. p. 166) to Euripides' Ixion.

διό και την δικαιοσύνην Φασί μικρον είναι, ότι δοκείν 38 η είναι αίρετώτερον τὸ δὲ ὑγιαίνειν οὔ. καὶ τὸ πρὸς πολλά χρησιμώτερον, οἶον τὸ πρὸς τὸ ζῆν καὶ εὖ ζῆν καὶ την ήδονην καὶ τὸ πράττειν τὰ καλά. διὸ καὶ ὁ πλούτος και ή ύγίεια μέγιστα δοκεί είναι άπαντα 30 γαρ έχει ταθτα. καὶ τὸ άλυπότερον καὶ μεθ' ήδονης. πλείω γάρ ένός, ώστε ύπάρχει καὶ ή ήδουή άγαθον καὶ ή άλυπία. καὶ δυοῖν ὁ τῶ αὐτῶ προστιθέμενον 40 μείζον τὸ όλον ποιεί. καὶ ὰ μὴ λανθάνει παρόντα ή λανθάνει προς άληθειαν γάρ τείνει ταῦτα. διὸ το

1 + 70 infra, cum Bekker 1. 'sed melius abest alterum 70 quod pr. Ac om. et auctore Vahleno Bekker3.' Spengel.

§ 38. τὰ πρὸς πολλὰ χρησιμώτερου] Τορ. Γ 3, 118 b 27, ἔτι διελέσθαι ποσαχώς το αίρετον λέγεται και τίνων χάριν οίον τοῦ συμφέροντος ή τοῦ καλοῦ ή του ήδέος το γάρ προς απαυτα ή προς τα πλείω χρήσιμου αίρετώτερου αυ ὑπάρχοι τοῦ μὴ ὁμοίως. Wealth and health are supposed to be of the highest value because they are serviceable in so many ways; for the support and preservation of mere life, and of a virtuous and happy life (for which they supply the means), also for pleasure and for good and noble actions.

§ 39. καὶ τὸ ἀλυπότερον καὶ τὸ μεθ ἡδονῆς] Τορ. Γ 2, 117 α 23, καὶ ταὐτὰ μεθ' ήδονης μάλλον η ἄνευ ήδονης. καὶ ταὐτὰ μετ' άλυπίας μάλλον η μετά λύπης. The desirability of anything even which is desirable in itself or on other grounds, as things useful, is increased by the addition of any pleasure that accompanies such things; so the ένέργειαι are completed and perfected by the accompanying hoor in each case, Eth. N. x 3, 4, 5. And likewise the absence of pain, as compared with its presence, may be regarded as a positive good. The topic in the Rhetoric combines the two, positive pleasure and negative relief from pain; these together being 'more than one' are superior to either of the two separately. kal is therefore 'together with'; and ωστε ὑπάρχει κ.τ.λ. 'and so (in the case supposed) we have (there are there, ὑπάρχει) the positive pleasure and the absence of pain, which may both be regarded as a good'.

καὶ δυοίν...τὸ ὅλον ποιεί] A + B is greater than A + C, therefore B is greater than C. Top. Γ 5, 119 a 22, έτι έκ της προσθέσεως, εί τῷ αὐτῷ προστιθέμενον τὸ ὅλον μαλλον ποιεί τοιοῦτο, ἡ εἰ τῷ ἡττον τοιούτω προστιθέμενον το όλον μάλλον ποιεί τοιούτο. In the second of these two cases, if the addition of a quantity to the less of two other quantities makes the sum total of the two greater than the sum total arising from the addition of another different quantity to the other, we may infer that the former of the two added quantities is greater than or preferable to the latter. 4 is less than 6: if the addition of 8 to 4 produces a total 12, which is greater than the total resulting from the addition of an unknown quantity x, to 6, and therefore less than 12, we may infer (by calculation) that

less than 8.

§ 40. \$\frac{1}{2} \lambda \lambda \text{av \theta} \frac{1}{2} \lambda \text{has been omitted, either by the auti

41 πλουτείν φανείη αν μείζον αγαθόν τοῦ δοκείν. καὶ p. 28. τὸ αγαπητόν, καὶ τοῖς μὲν μόνον τοῖς δὲ μετ' ἄλλων.

scriber. A similar omission occurs in Plat. Phaedr. 275 A, τοὖναντίον εἶπες ἢ δὖναται. Similar examples quoted from Plato by Stallbaum (note ad loc.) make it probable that the oversight is due to the author. 'Things that do shew themselves, and are conspicuous, have a greater air of reality about them than those that do not (that lurk out of sight), and

may therefore lay claim to the preference'.

διὸ τὸ πλουτείν φανείη αν μείζον ἀγαθὸν τοῦ δοκείν] This, the vulgar reading, which Victorius found in all his MSS, is no inference or exemplification of the preceding rule, though it is supported by Schrader, who however does not explain the connexion. If it be applied to the rule, the show or appearance, τὸ δοκείν, of wealth is said λαυθάνειν, not to be seen; which is absurd. It does follow from the topic in § 37, and may possibly have been thence transferred to this place. Some MSS and the Greek Scholiast give πλουτείν... και δοκείν, but it seems unlikely that the two verbs, if the combination of the two was intended, should be so widely separated: also καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν would be required. This was corrected by Muretus, το πλουτείν και δοκείν φανείη αν μείζον αγαθόν του πλουτείν, which seems rather too violent an alteration. Brandis would adopt the reading of his anonymous commentator, διὸ τὸ πλουτεῖν καὶ δοκείν φανείη αν μείζον αγαθών του μή δοκείν (Schneidewin's Philologus IV i p. 42), also conjectured by Vater, and confirmed by the Greek Schol., who explains it, καὶ το πλουτείν καὶ φαίνεσθαι μείζον τοῦ πλουτείν καὶ μή φαίνεσθαι. Another mode of correction had occurred to me, the interchange, viz. of τό and τοῦ, τοῦ πλουτεῖν...τὸ δοκεῖν. The meaning of this would be, that the appearance or outward show of wealth, together with the wealth itself which it manifested, might upon this principle be made to appear superior to the wealth without the show, because the possessor would lose all the credit of it-but this involves perhaps rather a non-natural interpretation of προς αλήθειαν τείνει. I am indebted to Mr Munro for a suggestion that deserves attention : the substitution of τώ, for τοῦ, δοκεῖν: the alteration is very slight, and gives an excellent sense; the value of wealth by this rule may be considered to be augmented by the addition of the prominent and conspicuous display of it. Bekker and Spengel retain the vulgate.

§ 41. τὸ ἀγαπητόν κ.τ.λ.] not here 'to be acquiesced in', 'that which one may be content with', (as in Eth. Nic. I, 1094 b 19); nor in the reputed Homeric sense of 'unique', 'only 1", but 'highly valued', 'dearly prized'

I Of the four places in which dγαπητός occurs in Homer, and is interpreted μονογενής, unicus, one, Od. β' 365, has the addition of μοῦνος, which seems to shew that there, at any rate, dγαπητός cannot mean μοῦνος οτ μονογενής; and in the others the translation 'dearly beloved' is just as suitable and probable. It is similarly explained (in the supposed Homeric sense) by many of the Interpp. of Matth. iii. 17, Mark i. 11, Luc. iii. 22, and other places where Christ is called ὁ ἀγαπητὸς νιὸς Θεοῦ. Dr Lightfoot, in Camb. Journ. of Classical and Sacred Philol. Vol. III. p. 92, No. 7, thinks that from the primary notion of dγαπᾶν 'to welcome'—which is undoubtedly its original and Homeric sense—it expresses rather the external act than the inward feeling, and should be translated

διό καὶ οὐκ ἴση ζημία, ἄν τις τὸν ἐτερόφθαλμον τυφλώση καὶ τὸν δύ ἔχοντα· ἀγαπητὸν γὰρ ἀφήρηται.

έκ τίνων μεν οὖν δεῖ τὰς πίστεις φέρειν ἐν τῷ προ- CHAP. VIII. τρέπειν καὶ ἀποτρέπειν, σχεδὸν εἴρηται· μέγιστον

('beloved', something which one is very fond of. Comp. unicus, as in Catullus, Carmen 64, 215). So it is used in Eth. Nic. IX 12 init. ὅσπερ τοῖς ἐρῶσι τὸ ὁρῷν ἀγαπητότατον. In Pol. II 4, 1262 ὁ 23, the meaning is more doubtful, and the sense of 'unique' possible. Here it cannot have this meaning, because in some cases it is μετ' ἄλλων, and it is only by the addition of μόνον that the 'great rarity' which gives it its high value becomes the 'solitary specimen'. Comp. Buttm. ad Mid. p. 567, note 398.

έτερὑφθαλμον] Gaisford refers to a very pertinent passage of Dem. c. Timocr. p. 744, in which the orator tells with admirable conciseness a story of a one-eyed man of Locri, who under a law framed on the retaliatory principle ('an eye for an eye and a tooth for a tooth') was threatened by an enemy with the loss of his solitary visual organ. 'Vexed at this, and thinking life intolerable at the price, he is said to have ventured to propose a law, that if any one deprived a one-eyed man of an eye, he should lose both his own in return, that the loss of each might be equalized'. This is a case of ἐπιείκεια, the spirit of the law rectifying the imperfection of the letter. Rhet. I 13. 13—19.

This concludes the treatment of the general principles and topics from which arguments may be derived by the political rhetorician in the deliberative kind of Rhetoric: there remains one special subject under this head, which is indispensable to the orator who takes part in public business, and is sketched very briefly in outline in the next chapter, with a reference to the Politics for complete details.

CHAP. VIII.

§ 1. On the general connexion of this chapter with its context, on the two rhetorical uses of the study of Politics, and the various classifications of Constitutions by Aristotle in other works, by Plato and Polybius, see Introduction, p. 181—3, and Append. A, p. 208.

'The subject, which is most important and effectual (is of the highest

in Homer rather by 'fondled or caressed', than 'beloved'. Fritzsche, on Eth. Eud. III. 6, 1233 b 2, renders τοῦ ἀγαπητοῦ, filii unice dilecti. See the references in his note. Heinsius, Exercit. Sacr. in Marc. i. II (quoted by Gaisford), pronounces very decidedly in favour of this interp. unicus, unigenitus, praeter quem alius non datur: referring to this passage (which is decisive against him), to Homer, and to Hesychius ἀγαπητον, μονογενῆ. Victorius more in accordance with facts says, "carum valet, ut puto, idque significare voluit Catullus cum inquit 'ni quid carius est oculis' quo uno se aliquis consolatur, in quo omnem spem suorum gaudiorum collocatam habet

2 co retento contentus vivere potest:" which exactly de

δὲ καὶ κυριώτατον ἀπάντων πρὸς τὸ δύνασθαι πείθειν καὶ καλῶς συμβουλεύειν, τὰς πολιτείας ἀπάσας λαβεῖν καὶ τὰ ἐκάστης ἔθη καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέ2 ροντα διελεῖν. πείθονται γὰρ ἄπαντες τῷ συμφέροντι, συμφέρει δὲ τὸ σῶζον τὴν πολιτείαν. ἔτι δὲ κυρία μέν ἐστιν ἡ τοῦ κυρίου ἀπόφασις, τὰ δὲ κύρια

authority, carries most weight, κυριώτατον) of all in conferring the power and cultivating the faculty of persuasion and good counsel, includes the exact (analytical διελείν) knowledge of all the existing varieties of constitutions, together with the habits (i.e. the habits and manners which they severally engender in those who live under them), institutions, and interests (συμφέροντα) which respectively belong to them'. Ad consilium autem de republica dandum caput est nosse rempublicam; ad dicendum vero probabiliter nosse mores civitatis, qui quia crebro mutantur, genus quoque orationis est saepe mutandum. Cic. de Orat, II 82. 337.

§ 2. ἔτι δὲ κυρία κ.τ.λ.] Not only must the public speaker be acquainted with the manners and customs, institutions, and all that is expedient to or for the interest of these various forms of government, but also with the nature of the governing body (τὸ κύριον) in each; it is by the declarations or proclamations (ἀποφάνσεις) of this supreme authority that the law is given to the citizens and their conduct prescribed to them, and as these are various under the several constitutions (τὰ δὲ κύρια διήρηται—κύρια ἐστιν), so he must be thoroughly acquainted with all the existing varieties.

ἀπόφασις] so the Vulg., retained by Bekker and Spengel: ἀπόφανσις is found in two MSS: ἀπόφανσις also occurs, with a varia lectio ἀπόpages in two MSS, in the sense of 'a declaration or utterance' (as here) in II 21.2. ἀπόφασις is no doubt used in the common language in two different senses, (1) 'denial, contradiction', as usually in Aristotle, from ἀποφάναι, and (2) 'a declaration', from ἀποφαίνειν1, as in Demosthenes and Polybius, VI 3. 1, την ύπερ του μελλοντος απόφασιν, 9. 11; 12. 10. But Aristotle most expressly distinguishes the two words again and again in the mep? έρμηνείας, as c. I, 16 a I, δεί θέσθαι...τί έστιν ἀπόφασις καὶ κατάφασις (negative and affirmative) καὶ ἀπόφανσις (an enunciation) καὶ λόγος. C. 5, 17 a 8, λόγος ἀποφαντικὸς κατάφασις, εἶτα ἀπόφασις ' C. 6, 17 α 25, κατάφασις δέ ἐστιν ἀπόφανσίς τινος ἀπό τινος: and in very many other places. Is it possible that the author of this treatise could use the one word for the other? On the other side it may be said that Aristotle is extremely hasty and careless in writing, and that the inconsistency is in this case justified and explained by his having for the nonce conformed to the ordinary usage of the language; and the evidence on either side seems so nicely balanced, manuscript authority included, that the question cannot be positively determined. Buhle is very emphatic on the point, 'equidem iure meo anoφανσις reposui.'

As φάσιε is derived from φαίνειν, so of course may ἀπόφασιε be formed from ἀποφαίνειν.

διήρηται κατά τὰς πολιτείας ὅσαι γὰρ αἰ πολιτεῖαι, 3 τοσαῦτα καὶ τὰ κύριά ἐστιν. εἰσὶ δὲ πολιτεῖαι τέτταρες, δημοκρατία ὀλιγαρχία ἀριστοκρατία μοναρχία ὥστε τὸ μὲν κύριον καὶ τὸ κρῖνον τούτων τί 4 ἐστιν ἀεὶ μόριον ἢ ὅλον τούτων. ἔστι δὲ δημοκρατία

§ 3. On the classifications of forms of government, see Appendix A, Introd. p. 208. On this ordinary, popular, fourfold division, see Pol. VI (IV) 7, init.

τὸ μὲν κύριον καὶ τὸ κρίνον κ.τ.λ.] 'the sovereign power, the highest authority', τὸ κύριον; or the 'power' which 'decides', τὸ κρίνον, with which rests the ultimate decision, to which lies the ultimate appeal—this sovereign power 'is always either a part of one of these four or the whole of it'; the 'part' in the three latter cases of the forms named: the 'whole' in the democratical form alone.

§ 4. The distinctions of the four forms of government are determined, like everything else, by the object or end proposed to itself by each of them; this is the 500s, the characteristic mark, or determining principle, of each, that which severally 'characterizes' them; and this is in each case a special conception of political justice, τὸ δίκαιον. Pol. III 9, init.

Democracy is a form of government that is distinguished from the rest, (is characterised), by the distribution of offices amongst the people by themselves (διανέμονται, mid.) and by lot, each member of the entire body of citizens having an equal chance of obtaining them: this is equivalent to saying that the spos of a democracy, its determining principle, that which gives its special character is 'equality', loorns, which is the foundation of the ελευθερία (usually assigned as its ορος), and therefore its proper τέλος. This is laid down in Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 b 30 seq. 'Liberty' and 'equality' are the catchwords of a democracy. δύο γάρ ἐστιν οἶς ή δημοκρατία δοκεί ώρίσθαι, τῷ τὸ πλείον είναι κύριον καὶ τῆ έλευθερία. τὸ μὲν γάρ δίκαιον ίσον δοκεί είναι, ίσον δ' ο τι αν δόξη τῷ πλήθει τοῦτ' είναι κύριον, έλεύθερον δέ καὶ ἴσον τὸ ος τι αν βούληταί τις ποιείν (Pol. VIII (V) 9, sub fin.). Liberty alone is not sufficient in the way of a distinction, (Ib. 1290 b 7 seq.), though it is commonly assigned as such, Ib. c. 8, 1294 a 10, aprotoκρατίας μέν γαρ άρος άρετή, όλιγαρχίαι δέ πλούτος, δήμου δ' έλευθερία. Απother current spos of democracy is the will of the majority : where that is sovereign the state is democratical. Ib. VII (VI) 3, 1318 a 18, paol yap of δημοτικοί τοῦτο δίκαιον ὅτι ἀν δόξη τοῖς πλείοσιν1. But this again rests upon the notion of equality, because it implies that as all the citizens are individually equal, and have equal rights, the greater number has the higher right, and therefore prevails over the minority. The theory of democracy is, that all citizens are equal; not that all men are born equal, because all barbarians are naturally inferior to Greeks. The use of the 'lot',

This however is common to ε in all of them alike, δτι ἀν δό τοῦτ' ἐστὶ κύριαν. Pol. VI (

μεν πολιτεία εν ή κλήρω διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς, όλι-

which leaves the choice of the candidate to chance, is an exemplification of this, because it assumes the equality of the claims of all citizens to office. On the different kinds of democracy, see Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291

8 14 seq.

The δρος of oligarchy is πλοῦτος: and therefore property, a census, riunua (estimated value of property), is necessary as a qualification for office, for that which confers authority or sovereignty, ev n of and rungμάτων (διανέμονται τὰς ἀρχάς, they likewise distribute amongst themselves, keep to themselves, all offices of state, all the powers of government). Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1290 b 1: the different kinds of oligarchy, Ibid. c. 5, the first is τὸ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων. The oligarchical theory of 'justice' is therefore ὅτι ἀν δόξη τη πλείονι οὐσία κατά πλήθος γάρ οὐσίας φασί κρίνεσθαι δείν, VII (VI) 8, 1318 a 19. A complete definition of δημοκρατία and ολιγαρχία is given, VI (IV) 4, 1290 δ 17. In the popular Rhetoric of ἀπὸ τιμημάτων is the general designation of the privileged class: but in the exacter Politics VI (IV) 5, two kinds of τιμήματα are distinguished which characterise two different kinds of oligarchies; one in which the property qualification is only so high as to exclude the poor, and acquired property procures admission into the privileged class: the other in which the qualification is high, and the governing class, which is therefore small, fill up themselves the vacancies as they occur. Again, ἀπὸ τιμημάτων is too wide a term, and therefore not properly characteristic; it includes more than oligarchies, one form of democracy, τὸ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀπὸ τιμημάτων είναι, βραχέων δὲ τούτων ἄντων, Pol. VI (IV) 4, 1291 b 39. Plato has the same phrase to describe an oligarchy, ή ἀπὸ τιμημάτων πολιτεία, Rep. VIII 550 C. Legg. III 698 B. πολιτεία και έκ τιμημάτων άρχαι τεττάρων, of the Solonian constitution.

The σρος of aristocracy is in the Politics αρετή and not παιδεία. The two following observations are added in the way of notes to explain the apparent discrepancy. 'Aristocracy is a kind of polity in which education is the qualification for a share in the government. By education, I mean that which is established by the law of the land : for it is those who have lived in constant obedience to the state institutions that bear rule in the aristocracy'. The virtue of a citizen is not one and the same; it varies under different forms of government. The system of education must therefore be fixed and controlled by the government and conformed to its established institutions. This is the 'education established by the law' of the text. On the absolute necessity of this kind of training in virtue under state direction for grown men as well as children, see Eth. N. x 10, 1179 b 32 seq., and the unfinished treatise on education in Bk. v (VIII) of the Politics. "Such men as these must necessarily appear 'best', and it is from them that this (form of constitution) has derived its name". Since maidela therefore is the necessary preparation for aperi, either of them may be represented as the object of the state. Definitions of apотократіа are to be found, Pol. III 7, 1279 a 34, where two explanations of the apιστο- in the name are given : either δια το τους apiστους αρχειν (which is adopted here), or διά τὸ πρὸς τὸ ἄριστον τῆ πόλει καὶ τοῖς κοινωνούσιν αὐτής: c. 15, 1286 b 4, των πλειόνων ἀρχὴν ἀγαθών δ' ἀνδρών, Ib. VI (ΙV) 8, 1294 α 9, δοκεί δε αριστοκρατία μεν είναι μάλιστα το τάς τιμάς νενε-

γαρχία δὲ ἐν ἡ οἱ ἀπὸ τιμημάτων, ἀριστοκρατία δὲ έν ή οί κατά παιδείαν. παιδείαν δὲ λέγω την ύπο του νόμου κειμένην οι γαρ έμμεμενηκότες έν τοις νομίμοις έν τη αριστοκρατία άρχουσιν. ανάγκη δέ τούτους φαίνεσθαι άρίστους όθεν καὶ τούνομα είληφε τοῦτο. μοναρχία δ' ἐστὶ κατὰ τοὕνομα ἐν ἡ εἶς Ρ. 1366 α. άπάντων κύριός έστιν τούτων δὲ ή μὲν κατά τάξιν ς τινα βασιλεία, ή δ' αόριστος τυραννίς. το δή τέλος μησθαι κατ' άρετήν άριστοκρατίας μέν γάρ όρος άρετή. But, c. 15, 1299 b 25,

έν ταις αριστοκρατίαις (αι αρχαί) έκ πεπαιδευμένων.

μοναρχία] the sole government of one, includes βασιλεία κατά τάξιν τινά, a monarchy under certain fixed regulations or conditions, a limited, constitutional monarchy, έπὶ ρητοῖς γέρασιν πατρική βασιλεία, Thuc. I 13, and the 'indefinite', unrestricted, unlimited tyranny. The distinction between the two here rests upon the limitation of the sovereign power or the absence of it. So in Pol. III 14, 1285 a 27, οἱ μὲν γὰρ (βασιλεῖς) κατά νόμον καὶ ἐκόντων, οἱ δ' ἀκόντων ἄρχουσιν. The second of these two distinctions of the voluntary and involuntary obedience is repeated 1285 b 2 (βασιλείαι) διὰ μὲν τὸ τυραννικαί είναι δεσποτικαί, διὰ δὲ τὸ αἰρεταὶ καὶ έκόντων βασιλικαί. 'Usurpation', as the distinctive difference of tyranny as opposed to monarchy (Eth. N. VIII 12), is insufficient. The government of the hereditary monarchs of Persia is 'tyrannous' in respect of the nature and mode of exercise of their power, though these and other barbarian monarchies are κατὰ νόμον καὶ πατρικαί, Pol. III 14, 1285 a 18 and 22, ὁ μοχθηρός βασιλεύς τύραννος γίνεται, Eth. N. VIII 12. Lastly, the tyrant has a mercenary 'body-guard', φυλακή (this is distinctive of 'tyranny'; see Rhet. I 2. 19). The regular constitutional sovereign is protected, if at all, by a national guard of citizens, 111 14, 1285 a 24. But the true distinction between them is determined by the end of the government of each: with the one it is his own interest, τὸ αὐτοῦ συμφέρου: with the other it is the interest of the governed, προς το κοινον συμφέρον, III 7, 1279 a 27-31, VIII (V) 10, 1311 a 2, ή δε τυραννίς...προς σύδεν αποβλέπει κοινόν, εί μή της ίδίας ώφελείας χάριν. ἔστι δὲ σκοπὸς τυραννικὸς τὸ ἡδύ, βασιλικὸς δὲ τὸ καλόν.

§ 5. The 'end' of each form of government may be identified with its opos, because 'everything being determined by its end', the end does determine (opigeras) or characterise the special form which each kind of government assumes. These Tool or tely have already been considered in the preceding note. All choice is directed to some end: the end of the state, or its governing and guiding principle, must control and give a direction to all the choice and the consequent action of its citizens; and hence the necessity that the statesman and public speaker should be acquainted with it. 'Plainly therefore it is with a view to the end of each form of government that our analysis of its habits, institutions, and interests should be conducted. h · motives and

actions of the body of me

mately

directed '.

έκάστης πολιτείας οὐ δεῖ λανθάνειν αἰροῦνται γὰρ τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος. ἔστι δὲ δημοκρατίας μὲν τέλος ἐλευθερία, ὀλιγαρχίας δὲ πλοῦτος, ἀριστοκρατίας δὲ τὰ πρὸς παιδείαν καὶ τὰ νόμιμα, τυραννίδος δὲ φυλακή. δῆλον οὖν ὅτι τὰ πρὸς τὸ τέλος ἐκάστης ἔθη καὶ νόμιμα καὶ συμφέροντα διαιρετέον, εἰπερ 6 αἰροῦνται πρὸς τοῦτο ἐπαναφέροντες. ἐπεὶ δὲ οὐ μόνον αἱ πίστεις γίνονται δι' ἀποδεικτικοῦ λόγου

τυραυνίδος δέ φυλακή] φυλακή is here 'precaution', 'self-defence'- a form of self-interest. τὸ ἴδιον συμφέρον, characteristic of 'tyranny'-and hence, as a means to this end, the φυλακή in its other sense, the mercenary body-guard, becomes a necessity, and distinctive of a tyranny. But as a φυλακή, in some sense, is equally required by any sole ruler or monarch, who is always in danger from the attempts of rivals, or rebels, or revolutionists,-the sole ruler has only one life to lose, and hence the personal danger; in governments of many, where the members are numerous, the attempt to get rid of them all would be difficult or impossible, and consequently it is not made—so here Barileia or morapyla is included under the general head of rupavvis: so Schrader. Failing to see this, some transcriber, whose reading appears in the Greek Scholiast 1, had inserted the clause βασιλείας δε τὸ εννόμως επιστατείν, which being wanting in all the MSS, and not rendered by the Latin Translators, was deservedly rejected by Victorius. Vater, who does not agree with Victorius' and Schrader's view, thinks that some words descriptive of the Télos of the Baoileia have dropt out; and Spengel, by 'indicating a lacuna' (Rhet. Gr. Praef. VI), appears to be of the same opinion.

Upon the whole I think that Brandis' view of the question is to be preferred (*Philologus* IV i p. 43). It certainly is not likely, though possible, that Aristotle would have identified monarchy and tyranny, considering the treatment of them which he adopts in the Politics, and that he has already subdivided μοναρχία into βασιλεία and τυραννίs in § 4. Consequently, it appears that this division was adhered to in § 5, and some-

thing to represent the rélos of Baoileia has been lost.

§ 6. On this kind of $\tilde{\eta}\theta\eta$, one of the three by which an ethical character is conveyed to the speech, and which is employed as an indirect argument or means of persuasion, see Introduction on this passage, p. 182,

and on the $\eta\theta\eta$ in general, p. 110 seq.

The spirit and tone of the speech, and the expressions employed, must be in conformity with the national character of the audience, as determined by the end of their special form of government; a democratical tone and language must not be adopted in addressing an oligarchical audience, and vice versa.

¹ It is Brandis' 'Anonymus.' See his paper in Schneidewin's *Philologus*, 1V i p. 43.

άλλα καὶ δι ήθικοῦ (τῷ γὰρ ποιόν τινα φαίνεσθαι τὸν λέγοντα πιστεύομεν, τοῦτο δ' ἐστὶν ἂν ἀγαθὸς φαίνηται ἡ εὕνους ἡ ἄμφω), δέοι ἂν τὰ ἤθη τῶν πολιτειῶν ἐκάστης ἔχειν ἡμᾶς τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐκάστης ἦθος πιθανώτατον ἀνάγκη πρὸς ἐκάστην εἶναι. ταῦτα δὲ Ρ. 29. ληφθήσεται διὰ τῶν αὐτῶν τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἤθη φανερὰ κατὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις ἀναφέρεται πρὸς τὸ τέλος.

ων μέν οὖν δεῖ ὀρέγεσθαι προτρέποντας ως ἐσομένων ἢ ὄντων, καὶ ἐκ τίνων δεῖ τὰς περὶ τοῦ συμφέροντος πίστεις λαμβάνειν, ἔτι δὲ περὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἢθῶν καὶ νομίμων διὰ τίνων τε καὶ πῶς εὐπορήσομεν, ἐφ᾽ ὅσον ἦν τῷ παρόντι καιρῷ σύμμετρον, εἴρηται διηκρίβωται γὰρ ἐν τοῖς πολιτικοῖς περὶ τούτων.

ταῦτα δὲ ληφθήσεται κ.τ.λ.] These 'political characters', he says, 'will be found by the same means', by the same kind of observation and study, as the other ήθη, the individual characters: 'in both, the characters are manifested in the choice or purpose', which is always directed to the end (which we desire to attain)'. As the individual character is shewn by the purpose or intention of every act, so the national character of the people, as a body, is manifested in their choice and purpose, which is directed to the general end, aim, and object, or the general pervading principle, of the state and its institutions: it is this common view and purpose which gives them their national character; and to this the speech must conform in order to be acceptable.

§ 7 gives a summary of the contents of the first division of the analysis of the three kinds of Rhetoric, the deliberative. We have treated of the general objects of the public speaker's aims and efforts, viz. of what is good or expedient in itself, and in relation to something else; and the topics from which arguments may be drawn on these subjects (in cc. 4--7); and we have further pointed out the channels and modes ($\delta i \dot{\alpha} \tau i \nu \omega \nu \kappa \alpha \dot{i} \tau \dot{\omega} s$) by which we may supply ourselves with materials for the treatment of the characters and institutions of the various forms of government; but only so far as was (commensurate with) suitable to the present occasion, because ($\gamma \dot{\alpha} p$) exact detail (is not required here, and) is to be found (if required) in the Politics'.

¹ ήθη φανερά κατά την προαίρεσιν. Rhet. 11 21. 16, ήθος δ' ἔχουσιν οἰ λόγοι, ἐν οἶς δήλη ή προαίρεσις. Poet, VI. 24, ἔστι δὲ ήθος μὲν τὸ τοιοῦτον δ δηλοῖ την προαίρεσιν ὁποία τις διόπερ αὐκ ἔχουσιν ήθος τῶν λόγων ἐν οἶς μηδ' δλως ἔστιν ὅ τι προαιρεῖται ἡ φεύγει ὁ λέγων. Schrader.

1 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα λέγωμεν περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας CHAP. IX. καὶ καλοῦ καὶ αἰσχροῦ· οὖτοι γὰρ σκοποὶ τῷ ἐπαινοῦντι καὶ ψέγοντι· συμβήσεται γὰρ ἄμα περὶ τούτων λέγοντας κἀκεῖνα δηλοῦν ἐξ ὧν ποιοί τινες ὑποληφθησόμεθα κατὰ τὸ ἦθος, ἤπερ ἦν δευτέρα πίστις· ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν γὰρ ἡμᾶς τε καὶ ἄλλον ἀξιόπιστον δυνη-2 σόμεθα ποιεῖν πρὸς ἀρετήν. ἐπεὶ δὲ συμβαίνει καὶ

CHAP. IX.

The following passage of Cicero, de Or. 11 84. 342, will serve as a commentary on the treatment of 'good' and 'virtue' in this chapter and c. 6; and also on the distinction of virtues in respect of their utility, § 6:

Perspicuum est igitur alia esse in homine optanda, alia laudanda. Genus, forma, vires, opes, divitiae, ceteraque quae fortuna dat aut extrinsecus aut corpori, non habent in se veram laudem, quae deberi virtuti uni putatur; sed tamen quod ipsa virtus in earum rerum usu ac moderatione maxime cernitur, tractanda in laudationibus etiam haec sunt naturae et fortunae bona: [this is illustrated.] Virtus autem, quae per se ipsa laudabilis et sine qua nihil laudari potest, tamen habet plures partes, quarum alia est alia ad laudationem aptior. Sunt enim aliae virtutes quae videntur in moribus hominum et quadam comitate ac beneficentia positae; aliae quae in ingenii aliqua facultate aut animi magnitudine et robore. Nam clementia, institia, benignitas, fides, fortitudo in periculis communibus iucunda est auditu in laudationibus; omnes enim hae virtutes non tam ipsis qui eas habent quam generi hominum fructuosae putantur.

§ 1. The subject of this chapter is the analysis of virtue and vice, the noble and disgraceful, moral right and wrong, as the objects of praise and blame, and therefore furnishing materials for the epideictic or encomiastic branch of Rhetoric, of which praise and blame are the characteristic functions.

We may also derive from this analysis topics of the $\eta\theta\eta$, characters or dispositions which serve to give the speech an ethical colour. This is to be effected by producing by the speech (artistically, not by any evidence of character previously acquired, 'authority') the impression upon the audience of our truthfulness and probity; of our practical wisdom which will enable us to give them useful advice, and finally of our goodwill towards themselves; this being 'the second mode of persuading' ($\eta\nu$ 'was said', cf. c. 2 §§ 3, 4): because the same materials can be employed in representing ourselves as well as others as 'trustworthy in respect of virtue', as men of such a character as can be depended upon.

§ 2 marks a division of panegyrics, the ordinary subjects of the ἐπιδεικτικὸν γένος of Rhetoric. A panegyric may be written and delivered 'with or without a serious purpose (σπουδή)'; the latter are burlesques. On these, and the subjects of encomiastic speeches in general, see Introd. p. 121—123. In the burlesque kind, anything

χωρίς σπουδής και μετά σπουδής έπαινείν πολλάκις οὐ μόνον ἄνθρωπον ή θεὸν ἀλλὰ και ἄψυχα και τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τὸ τυχόν, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον και περί τούτων ληπτέον τὰς προτάσεις, ώστε ὅσον παραδείγματος χάριν εἴπωμεν και περί τούτων.

3 καλὸν μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ ἀν δι αὐτὸ αἰρετὸν ὅν ἐπαινετὸν ἢ, ἢ ὁ ἀν ἀγαθὸν ὂν ἡδὺ ἢ, ὅτι ἀγαθόν. εἰ δὲ τοῦτό ἐστι τὸ καλόν, ἀνάγκη τὴν ἀρετὴν καλὸν 4 εἶναι· ἀγαθὸν γὰρ ὃν ἐπαινετόν ἐστιν. ἀρετὴ δ' ἐστὶ

however mean and trifling, 'inanimate things, or any insignificant animal', may be made the object of the panegyric. But as the materials, the topics which furnish the arguments, are the same in both, we may include the burlesque with the serious in our treatment of them in the way of examples or illustrations.

άψυχα καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζώων τὸ τυχύν] Thus Polycrates, the Sophist, wrote in praise of pots, and pebbles, and mice (see note on 11 24. 2); and others on humble-bees and salt (Isocr. Hel. § 12). As an extant specimen of these trifling productions we have the μυίας ἐγκώμιον of Lucian (cf.

note on Isocr. Paneg. § 189). S.]

§ 3. καλόν] See note on c. 7, 24. Eth. Eudem. VII 15. 3, τῶν γὰρ ἀγαθῶν πάντων τέλη ἐστίν, ἃ αὐτὰ αὐτῶν ἔνεκά ἐστιν αἰρετά. τούτων δὲ καλὰ ὅσα δι' αὐτὰ ὅντα πάντα ἐπαινετά ἐστιν. ταῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἐφ' ὧν αῖ τε πράξεις εἰσὶν ἐπαινεταὶ καὶ αὐτὰ ἐπαινετά, δικαιοσύνη καὶ αὐτὴ καὶ αἰ πράξεις κ.τ.λ. It has either a moral aspect (marked by the characteristic ἐπαινετόν; on praise and blame, approbation and disapprobation, as characteristic of virtue and vice, see Introd. on ἔπαινος, Append. B, p. 212, seq.), what is right and noble, an end in itself, δι' αὐτό; or is physical and sensual, what is beautiful, in which pleasure always accompanies that which is otherwise good. The ugly may be good in the sense of useful, but gives no pleasure.

Virtue therefore must of necessity be $\kappa \alpha \lambda \delta \nu$, because it comes under the first definition of it, it is good in itself, beneficial to the individual and to society, and also has the stamp and seal of general 'approbation'.

§ 4. àpern] The definition of virtue here given compared with the celebrated one of Eth. Nic. II 6, init., and the detailed treatment of the list of virtues and the meagre and incomplete account here given of them, contrasted with the elaborate and ingenious analysis of them in the third and fourth books of the same work, is a most striking illustration of the difference between the point of view and method of treatment in the popular Rhetoric and comparatively scientific Ethics. For example, the definition here given coincides in no single point with that of the Ethics. It regards virtue solely on the side of its usefulness, probably because this feature of it is likely to produce the greatest effect upon the popular m

μέν δύναμις, ώς δοκεῖ, ποριστική ἀγαθῶν καὶ φυλακτική, καὶ δύναμις εὐεργετική πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων, 5 καὶ πάντων περὶ πάντα. μέρη δὲ ἀρετῆς δικαιοσύνη, ἀνδρία, σωφροσύνη, μεγαλοπρέπεια, μεγαλοψυχία, 6 ἐλευθεριότης, πραότης, φρόνησις, σοφία. ἀνάγκη

—the $\pi poolipe \sigma us$, the special moral element is omitted, as is also the doctrine of the mean in its application to virtue, and the standard by which this relative mean is to be determined.

Regarded as a δύναμις, virtue is a practical faculty, employed in 'providing and securing or keeping good things'—for oneself, apparently, by the exercise of any ἀρετή, excellence or accomplishment bodily or mental—and secondly, 'a power of conferring benefits, or doing services, many and great, in fact all in everything (on all occasions)'. πάντων περὶ πάντα is doubtless, as Victorius intimates, a proverbial expression, more especially as it is found in a letter of Cicero to Cassius (ad Div. XV 17. 1, sed expecta πάντα περὶ πάντων¹). This is the moral side of virtue so far as it appears in its usefulness to society.

§ 5. μέρη ἀρετῆς] Comp. 5 § 9. The list of virtues here given differs from that in the Nic. Ethics II 7, and III 9-IV 15, in the following particulars. All the moral virtues from δικαιοσύνη to πραότης inclusive appear in the Ethics, δικαιοσύνη being treated separately in Bk. v, and the two intellectual virtues of the speculative and practical parts of the intellect, poorgots practical wisdom, and σοφία speculative wisdom or philosophy, in Bk. VI. σοφία is omitted in the detailed explanation of the virtues, most likely because it has very little in common with Rhetoric, and would be useless to the rhetorician. πραότης, which in the Ethics is ranked, as well as here, amongst the virtues, which are there exes, here δυνάμεις, in the second book of the Rhetoric becomes a πάθος, so that it belongs to all the three divisions of our moral nature distinguished in Eth. Nic. 11 4. The anonymous mean between φιλοτιμία and ἀφιλοτιμία is omitted in our list, as well as the three social virtues of an accomplished gentleman, viz. ἀλήθεια, εὖτραπελία, and φιλία, and also the two virtues of the πάθη, viz. alδώs and νέμεσις. No notice is taken here of έγκράτεια, the examination of which occupies the earlier part of Bk, VII, but this perhaps may be considered as an additional argument in favour of ascribing that book to Eudemus, which on all grounds is most probable.

§ 6. The most useful virtues are the highest and greatest, by the foregoing definition. Of these, justice and courage, the one most serviceable in peace, the other in war, are for this reason most held in honour amongst mankind: and in the next degree liberality, because it is lavish, and does not enter into competition with others (ἀνταγωννίζεσθαι) for money, which everybody else covets more than anything besides.

¹ Cicero has altered the form and the application of the proverb. In the text it means 'all kinds on all occasions', in Cicero it is 'all the news about everything'.

δὲ μεγίστας είναι ἀρετὰς τὰς τοῖς ἄλλοις χρησιμωτάτας, εἴπερ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀρετὴ δύναμις εὐεργετική. διὰ τοῦτο τοὺς δικαίους καὶ ἀνδρείους μάλιστα τιμῶσιν ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν πολέμω ἡ δὲ καὶ ἐν εἰρήνη χρήσιμος ἄλλοις. εἶτα ἡ ἐλευθεριότης προΐενται γὰρ καὶ οὐκ ἀνταγωνίζονται περὶ τῶν χρημάτων, ὧν ρ. 30. 7 μάλιστα ἐφίενται ἄλλοι. ἔστι δὲ δικαιοσύνη μὲν ἀρετὴ δι' ἡν τὰ αὐτῶν ἕκαστοι ἕχουσι, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος, ἀδικία δὲ δι' ἡν τὰ ἀλλότρια, οὐχ ὡς ὁ 8 νόμος. ἀνδρία δὲ δι' ἡν πρακτικοί εἰσι τῶν καλῶν

§ 7. Justice is the virtue which assigns to every one his due, and in this shews obedience to the law. This virtue and the two following, which are all specially characterised by 'obedience to the law', are thereby invested with a political and objective character, and distinguished from the remainder, which are rather subjective and individual. The end and object of the true statesman is to make the citizens good, and this must be effected by training them in obedience to the laws of that form of government under which they live; the type of the perfect citizen varying under various constitutions. δοκεί δὲ καὶ ὁ κατ' ἀλήθειαν πολιτικὸς περὶ ταύτην (τὴν ἀρετὴν) μάλιστα πεπονήσθαι βοίλεται γὰρ τοὺς πολίτας ἀγαθοὺς ποιεῖν καὶ τῶν νόμων ὑπηκόους. Eth. N. I 13, sub init.

ως ὁ νόμος] sc. λέγει, κελεύει, προστάττει; i.e. the law settles the legal rights of the citizens of a state, the observance of which is justice. Injustice is the cause of unfair distribution, to injustice it is owing that men take what does not belong to them, τὰ ἀλλότρια, and thus it acts or operates in disobedience to the law. Of the three kinds of justice distinguished in Eth. N. VI, this takes in only the first, δικαιοσύνη διανεμητική, c. 6; the other two are (1) διορθωτική οr ἐπανορθωτική 'corrective' justice, which ratifies and corrects wrong, and restores plaintiff and defendant to an equality, c. 7; and (2) reciprocal justice, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός the lex talionis, the law of retaliation or reciprocity transferred to commercial justice, which regulates exchanges and contracts of all kinds, c. 8.

§ 8. ἀνδρία] In the chapter on this virtue of 'gratitude' in the Nic. Ethics, III 11, ἀνδρεία (as it is there written) is first defined in general terms as a virtue residing in a mean state in things that inspire confidence, or encouragement, or boldness, τὰ θαρραλέα, on the one hand, and fear on the other: its sole object and aim in choosing a course of action and encountering danger being τὸ καλόν, the right and noble as an ultimate end, because it is so, and for no other reason; which implies

also the opposite, the spurning of what is base and disgrace is the general notion of fortitude, the endurance of pair in the pursuit of an unselfish, honourable, high and the opposite course would be base, mean, disgrace

Acts of fortitude must likewise be deliberate : ἀνάγκην ἀνδρεῖον εἶναι, άλλ' ὅτι καλόν (1116 ½ 2).

ἔργων ἐν τοῖς κινδύνοις, καὶ ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει, καὶ 9 ὑπηρετικοὶ τῷ νόμῳ· δειλία δὲ τοὐναντίον. σωφροσύνη δὲ ἀρετὴ δι' ἢν πρὸς τὰς ἡδονὰς τὰς τοῦ σώματος οὕτως ἔχουσιν ὡς ὁ νόμος κελεύει· ἀκολασία δὲ 10 τοὐναντίον. ἐλευθεριότης δὲ περὶ χρήματα εὐποιη-

then distinguished five popular notions of 'courage', avôpeia in a narrower sense, none of which can be properly called 'fortitude'. The first of these is political courage, the courage of a citizen, as a member of a state, and living under and directed by its laws, described in 1116 a 17-b 2. And this seems to be the view of courage which is taken here, the terms employed in each corresponding very closely, δοκούσι γάρ ὑπομένειν τοὺς κινδύνους (this restricts the virtue to facing danger and gives it a narrower sense than 'fortitude') οἱ πολίται διὰ τὰ ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἐπιτίμια καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη καὶ διὰ τὰς τιμάς, α 18. δι' αἰδώ (it is due to a sense of honour) καὶ διὰ καλοῦ ὄρεξιν, τιμής γάρ, καὶ φυγήν ὀνείδους, αἰσχροῦ ὄντος, a 28. Further, one of the characteristics of this form of ανδρεία reappears in Eth. Eudem. III 1, 13, as belonging to political courage, μία μέν πολιτική αυτη δ' έστιν ή δι' αίδω οίσα, and another § 16, διά νόμον δέ ή πολιτική ανδρεία. The prominence of the military character of this virtue is likewise marked in the description both of the Ethics and Rhetoric by ύπομένειν τούς κινδύνους in the one, and by έργων έν κινδύνοις § 8, and ή...έν πολέμω § 6, in the other; so that it seems that there is sufficient warrant for the identification of the two; the duty to the state and obedience to its laws being again made the ground of the obligation to practise this virtue.

§ 9. The third virtue, σωφροσύνη, temperantia, is likewise represented under a political aspect. It is a virtue by which men's bodily appetites are regulated according to the dictates of the laws of the state, 'are so disposed towards bodily pleasures as the law enjoins'. In Eth. Nic. III cc. 13, 14, there is no regular definition of it; but we gather from the contents of the two chapters that it is a virtue of self-control, which consists in a mean state with regard to the indulgence in bodily pleasures, (pains having less to do with the virtue); and in a due measure or estimate of the value of them. It is thus a 'mean' between ἀκολασία, 'excessive indulgence in them', and ἀναισθησία, total 'insensibility'. II 7,1107 b 4.

§ 10. ἐλευθεριότης] The principal difference between the views taken of the virtues in the Ethics and Rhetoric respectively, is that in the latter they are regarded solely on the side of their utility to society—a political view—in the Ethics they are confirmed habits or states resulting from a due regulation of the elementary $\pi \acute{a}\theta \eta$ out of which they are formed and developed. They are 'relative means', $\mu \epsilon \sigma \acute{o}\tau \eta \tau \epsilon s \pi \rho \grave{o}s \acute{\eta} \mu \acute{a}s$, mean states varying in individuals according to the special character of each, lying at a variable distance between two extremes of the $\pi \acute{a}\theta \eta$ out of which they grow, the proper mean in any given case being determined by the $\phi \rho \acute{o}\nu \eta \sigma \iota s$ or practical wisdom, the objective standard being the collective judgment of those who are specially endowed with this faculty, the $\phi \rho \acute{o}\nu \iota \mu \omega$. Consequently here 'liberality' in expense is represented as a dis-

11 τική, ανελευθερία δε τούναντίον, μεγαλοψυχία δε αρετή μεγάλων ποιητική εύεργετημάτων, μικροψυχία

12 δὲ τούναντίον. μεγαλοπρέπεια δὲ ἀρετή ἐν δαπανήμασι μεγέθους ποιητική, μικροψυχία δὲ καὶ μικρο-13 πρέπεια τάναντία. Φρόνησις δ' έστιν άρετη διανοίας,

position or habit inclined to do good, to make oneself useful in dealing

with money.

§ 11. μεγαλοψυχία] 'high-mindedness' is represented in the same way as the preceding, as a virtue which is 'productive of benefits', shews its utility, 'on a large scale'; to which 'little-mindedness', meanness of spirit, is the opposite. This is a very different and much narrower view of the virtue than that which is conveyed by the description of it in Nic. Eth. IV 7-9, which is summed up in the brief phrase at the end of c. 9, ή μέν οὖν μεγαλοψυχία περὶ τιμήν ἐστι μεγάλην, and defined c. 7, 1123 b 2. δοκεί δέ μεγαλόψυχος είναι ο μεγάλων αύτον άξιων άξιος ων. The μεγαλόψυχος of the Ethics is a man of high aims and lofty spirit, full of scorn and contempt for all that is beneath him, men and things, and with a pride which is justified by his deserts: pride without merits to support it is no longer proper pride, a virtue; but degenerates into vanity xavvorns, an undue sense of one's own merits.

μικροψυχία δὲ τοὐναντίον] is put in brackets by the recent Edd. as a gloss. It certainly seems to be superfluous, as it is repeated in the following sentence; and also if it be retained, μικροπρέπεια and μικροψυγία are both contrasted as opposites with μεγαλοπρέπεια, which in the latter case is certainly incorrect. At the same time if the words are omitted

the repetition of apern is quite equally objectionable.

§ 12. μεγαλοπρέπεια] 'magnificence' in expenditure, is distinguished from 'liberality' merely by this, that whereas the one is περί πάσας τὰς ἐν γρήμασι πράξεις (every kind of money transactions), magnificence is περί δαπανηράς μόνον, 'those alone in which a large cost is involved'. Eth. N. IV 4, sub init. It is only to men distinguished either by birth or reputation, or anything else that confers distinction, that this virtue is suitable -in others it is no virtue at all, 1122 b 30. Plato and his dramatis personae sometimes add μεγαλοπρέπεια to the four cardinal virtues, the classication which he usually adopts. Meno 74 A, 88 A. Rep. II 402 C, VI 490 E, 494 B, VII 536 A, VIII 560 E. It does not, however, exactly correspond with Aristotle's interpretation, but has a wider and more general signification. See Rep. VI 486 A, where it is applied to the διάνοια. It seems from the definition, (ὅροι, 412 Ε, ἀξίωσις κατὰ λογισμὸν ὀρθὸν τὸν σεμνότατον), to be a nearer approach to Aristotle's μεγαλοψυχία.

§ 13. φρόνησις] appears much in the same character here as in Eth. Nic. VI 5-9, where it is analysed at length. It is 'practical wisdom' which shews itself in the discrimination between good and evil, and particularly moral good and evil, in general, δοκεί δή φρονίμου είναι τὸ δύνασθαι καλώς βουλεύσασθαι περί τὰ αὐτῷ ἀγαθὰ καὶ συμφέρουτα, οὐ κατὰ μέρος, σίον ποία πρός ύγιειαν ή Ισχύν, άλλά ποία πρός τὸ εὐ ζην. 1140 a 25. διὰ τοῦτο Περικλέα και τοὺς τοιούτους φρονίμους οἰόμεδο κία το σύτοις άγαθα καθ' ην εὖ βουλεύεσθαι δύνανται περὶ ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν τῶν εἰρημένων εἰς εὐδαιμονίαν.

14 περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας καθόλου καὶ περὶ τῶν μορίων εἴρηται κατὰ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν ἰκανῶς, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων οὐ χαλεπὸν ἰδεῖν φανερὸν γὰρ

καὶ τὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δύνανται θεωρεῖν' εἶναι δὲ τοιούτους ἡγούμεθα τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ τοὺς πολιτικούς, Ιb. 1140 b 7. ἀρετή τἰς ἐστιν καὶ οὐ τέχνη, b 24. δυοῖν δ' ἄντοιν μεροῖν τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν λόγον ἐχόντων, θατέρου ἀν εἴη ἀρετή, τοῦ δοξαστικοῦ' (οι τοῦ λογιστικοῦ, i.e. the διάνοια οι reasoning faculty, the discursive reason, as opposed to the νοῦς, the speculative, intuitive reason, the organ of the other intellectual virtue σοφία): ἥ τε γὰρ δόξα περὶ τὸ ἐνδεχόμενον ἄλλως ἔχειν, καὶ ἡ φρόνησις, b 25. ἡ δὲ φρόνησις πρακτική, c. 8, 1141 b 31. τῶν καθ' ἐκαστά ἐστιν ἡ φρόνησις, â γίνεται γνώριμα ἐξ ἐμπειρίας, c. 9, 1142 a 14.

§ 14. τὸν ἐνεστῶτα καιρὸν] 'the present (instant) time'. ἐνιστάναι, 'to place in' a position: ἐνίστασθαι, ἐνστῆναι, ἐνεστηκέναι, ἐνεστάναι, 'to be placed, set in, stand in', a position. Hence (2) (I think) of things 'standing in the way', and so either (a) close by, 'present', 'instant', 'instans' (tempus, bellum, &c.), 'impending', 'threatening'; (for instans, 'present', Quint. V 10. 42, praeteritum, instans, futurum). In grammar, ἐνεστῶς χρόνος, 'the present tense', ἐνεστῶσα μετοχή, 'the present participle', instans tempus (Facc. Lex. s. v.); or (β) 'to stand in the way' as an obstacle, impediment, or 'objection'; as the logical ἐνστῆναι and ἔνστασις, of an objection, or contrary instance, to a supposed conclusion; and hence also 'instance', something which stands in your way and so possibly attracts your attention, or as a generalisation of the logical 'instance' or objec-

tion. See Introd. p. 269, and note.

περὶ δὲ τῶν ἄλλων] 'The rest are easily discerned'-'the rest' are what follows, the causes namely and consequences of virtue- anything that is productive of, because it tends to or promotes (πρός), virtue, or that is the effect or result of it (τὰ ἀπ' ἀρετῆς γινόμενα), is estimable, and an object of praise (καλόν). Such things are (the first) the 'signs', (the second) the works of virtue (and therefore praiseworthy)'. The σημείον (Introd. p. 161-163) is the probable-or, in the case of the τεκμήριου, certain-indication of the existence of the thing which it accompanies; from the 'signs' of virtue in a man we infer, with more or less probability. its actual existence. Schrader quotes the little tract περί ἀρετών καὶ κακιών, printed as an appendix to the three Ethical treatises in Bekker's 4to ed. Vol. II p. 1249. It is an abridgment or epitome of Aristotle's account of the virtues in the third and fourth books of the Ethics, with a slight admixture of Platonism and other occasional alterations. ἐπαινετά μέν έστι τὰ καλά, ψεκτά δὲ τὰ αίσχρά. καὶ τῶν μὲν καλῶν ἡγοῦνται αί άρεταί, των δ' αλσχρών αί κακίαι. έπαινετά δ' έστι και τὰ αίτια των άρετων και τὰ παρεπόμενα ταις άρεταις (these are the τὰ ποιητικά τῆς άρετῆς and 'signs'), καὶ τὰ γινόμενα ἀπ' αὐτῶν καὶ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν, ψεκτὰ δὲ τὰ ἐναντία, 1249 α 26.

 $\pi\epsilon\rho l$ $\delta \epsilon \tau \hat{\omega} \nu \tilde{a}\lambda\lambda\omega\nu...l\delta\epsilon\hat{\iota}\nu$] for the more usual $\tau \hat{a}$ $\tilde{a}\lambda\lambda a$ $l\delta\epsilon\hat{\iota}\nu$. This substitution of a preposition with its case for the direct government of the

ότι ανάγκη τά τε ποιητικά της άρετης είναι καλά (πρός άρετην γάρ) και τὰ ἀπ' άρετης γινόμενα, τοιαθτα δὲ τά τε σημεία της άρετης και τὰ ἔργα. 15 ἐπει δὲ τὰ σημεία και τὰ τοιαθτα ἃ ἐστιν ἀγαθοθ

verb, has been noticed by Heindorf in the case of ϵls , on Plat. Lys. § 16, and in that of $\pi \epsilon \rho l$ and $\partial_{\mu} \phi l$, on Phaedo § 65, p. 250 C (in which place $\pi \epsilon \rho l$ $\kappa \dot{\alpha} \lambda \lambda \sigma vs$ takes the place of the nominative); likewise of $\pi \epsilon \rho l$ and $\dot{\nu} \pi \dot{\epsilon} \rho$ by Bremi on Dem. Olynth. I p. 14, 18 (ap. Schäfer Appar. Crit. ad Demosth. I 208); and a similar use of the Latin, &c. by Heusing, ad Cic. de Off. I 15. 3. Comp. Epist. ad Div. II 17. I; III 12. 2 (Schäfer). But what has not been observed of this usage is, that it is almost exclusively characteristic of a middle or later period of the Greek language, viz. the fourth century B.C.

The earliest instances I have noted of it are Soph. Oed. Col. 422, ἐν δὲ μοι τέλος αὐτοῖν γένοιτο τῆσδε τῆς μάχης πέρι, and Aj. 684, ἀμφὶ τοὐτοισιν εὖ σχήσει. In Plato it is not uncommon, Phaedo 231 D, βούλεσθαι περί τινος, Rep. IV 427 A, εἶδος νόμων πέρι καὶ πολιτείας (a good example), Ib. 436 B, καθ ἔκαστον αὐτῶν πρώττομεν, Phaedo 249 C (this use of καθ ἔκαστον for the simple accusative is found in various writers; see Stallbaum on Rep. Il. cc.), Ib. VII 533 B, περὶ παντὸς λαμβάνειν, Theaet. 177 B, Gorg. 487 A. But in Demosthenes and Aristotle it becomes quite a usual mode of expression. In the de Fals. Leg. alone it occurs in §§ 6, 7, 64, 167, 239, and probably elsewhere in the same speech.

From Aristotle, with whom it is still more familiar, I will content myself with referring to Rhet. I 15. 1, περὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων...ἐπιδραμεῖν, Ib. § 27, περὶ ὅρκων...διελεῖν. II 4. 30; 5. 21, τοιούτους περὶ ὧν (i. e. οὖς) φοβοῦνται, a good example. 18. 4, περὶ μεγέθους (i. e. μέγεθος) κοινόν (ἐστι), Ib. 21, init., in both of which it stands for the nominative, as it does also in Pol. VI (IV) 2, 1289 α 11, and III 3, init. Pol. I 1 ult. 1 9,1257 α 5, II 1 init., Ib. c. 4, 1262 b 25, περὶ τοῦ μεταφέρειν—πολλὴν ἔχει ταραχήν. Eth. N. IV 4 init., περὶ μεγαλοπρεπείας διελθεῖν, X 1 sub init., 1172 α 26, ὑπὲρ τῶν τοιούτων —παρετέον εἶναι, where it stands for the accusative. de Insomniis c. 2, 459 α 29, ἐπὶ τῶν φερομένων—κινεῖται, would be more regularly τὰ φερόμενα.

§ 15. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὰ σημεῖα κ.τ.λ.] An exemplification of the preceding rule, and application of it to the special virtues. 'Seeing that the signs of virtue, and all such things as are works (results, effects), or affections' (properties, qualities, attributes—on πάθη and its various senses see Introd. pp. 113—118; on the special sense here, p. 114) 'of it are καλά', the same rule will apply to each special manifestation of it, as ἀνδρία. The πάθη of virtue are illustrated in the examples by ἀνδρείως, δικαίως, ἀδίκως: these are πάθη, 'affections', of courage, justice, and injustice, in the sense of 'what happens to them', some change they have undergone, consisting in a modification of them in form and signification; as δικαίως 'justly', denotes a certain mode of action, viz. just acting. An exception occurs to the general application of the rule to the special virtues in the case of δικαιοσύνη: in this alone, though it is true of the ἔργα, it is not true of the πάθη: in other words, in the rest of the virtues the πτώσεις are

ἔργα ἢ πάθη, καλά, ἀνάγκη ὅσα τε ἀνδρίας ἔργα ἢ σημεῖα ἀνδρίας ἢ ἀνδρείως πέπρακται καλὰ εἶναι, καὶ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ δικαίως ἔργα (πάθη δὲ οὕ· ἐν μόνη γὰρ ταύτη τῶν ἀρετῶν οὐκ ἀεὶ τὸ δικαίως καλόν, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τοῦ ζημιοῦσθαι αἰσχρὸν τὸ δικαίως μᾶλλον ἢ τὸ ἀδίκως), καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἄλλας δὲ ἀρετὰς ώσαύτως.

16 καὶ ἐφ' ὅσοις τὰ ἄθλα τιμή, καλά. καὶ ἐφ' ὅσοις

σύστοιχα, the changes of termination represent true co-ordinates, all being terms referable to the same notion or class, viz. that of virtue, as ἀνδρία, ἀνδρείως: all are equally καλά and praiseworthy (see note on c. 7. 27); but in the single case of justice this does not universally apply, for τὸ δικαίως ζημοῦσθαι, just (deserved) punishment, is not equally praiseworthy with a just act, τὸ δικαίως πράττειν, but the contrary; since it is more disgraceful than an unjust punishment. (This seems to be a mere fallacy of ὁμωνυμία, ambiguity, equivoque, δικαίως not standing in the same relation to ζημιοῦσθαι and πράττειν: in the one case the 'justice' of the act lies in the intention of the actor; in the other it belongs not to the actor, but to the law and the judge who inflicts the punishment. A similar equivocal meaning lies in the word πάθος: in the rule and the general application of it, it stands for properties or attributes: in the special exception it denotes an 'affection' in the sense of suffering or punishment.)

§ 16. ἐφ' ὅσοις τὰ ἄθλα τιμή, καλά] The καλόν is an end in itself; it is independent of all ulterior considerations and aims: therefore any act of which honour alone, and not profit (ἐφ' ὅσοις τιμἡ μᾶλλον ἡ χρήματα) is the prize, is καλόν: the prize aimed at, or the end of the exertions and efforts, determines the character of those efforts or actions, which are therefore fair and noble like the end at which they aim. τιμή is an end of this kind. Eth. N. I 4, 1096 ὁ 16, καθ' αὐτὰ (ἀγαθά) δὲ ποῖα θείη τις ἄν; ἡ (are they not?) ὅσα καὶ μονούμενα διώκεται, οἶον τὸ ψρονεῖν καὶ ὁρῷν καὶ ἡδοναί τινες καὶ τιμαί; ταῦτα γὰρ εἰ καὶ δι' ἄλλο τι διώκομεν, ὅμως τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀγαθῶν θείη τις ἄν. c. 3, 1095 ὁ 22, τιμή is the end of the πολιτικὸς βίος, pursued by the χαρίεντες καὶ πρακτικοί, v. 30, δῆλον οὖν κατά γε τούτους ἡ ἀρετὴ κρείττων. In 1ν 7—10, τιμή is represented as the end of the μεγαλόψυχοι and φιλότιμοι, the sphere in which these two virtues are exercised. c. 7, 1123 ὁ 18, μέγιστον δὲ τοῦτ ἂν θείημεν ὁ τοῖς θεοῖς ἀπονέμομεν, καὶ οὖ μάλιστ' ἐφίενται οἰ

έν άξιώματι, καὶ τὸ ἐπὶ τοῖς καλλίστοις ἄθλον. τοιοῦτον δ' ή τιμή.

καὶ ὅσα μὴ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα κ.τ.λ.] The general characteristic of all the following topics (to § 19) is disinterestedness; unselfish acts, of which the object is the good of some one else, and not one's own. Any act of this kind, where there is no ulterior end of profit or advantage to oneself, which is done therefore for its own sake, and 'because it is in itself desirable', conforms to the definition, § 3, and is καλόν. So the highest and purest form of friendship or love is distinguished from the two lower forms, those whose end is profit and pleasure. Both of these are selfish; true

τιμή μᾶλλον ή χρήματα. καὶ όσα μη αὐτοῦ ένεκα
17 πράττει τις τῶν αἰρετῶν. καὶ τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά, όσα
ὑπέρ τε πατρίδος τις ἐποίησε, παριδῶν τὸ αὐτοῦ.
καὶ τὰ τῆ φύσει ἀγαθά, καὶ ἃ μη αὐτῷ ἀγαθά αὐτοῦ Ρ. 1367.

friendship is disinterested, οἱ βουλόμενοι τὰγαθὰ το ῖς φίλοις ἐκείνων ἔνεκα μάλιστα φίλοι, Eth. N. VIII 4 init.; and the true friend is ἔτερος αὐτός, IX 9 init. and Ib. 1170 b 6, or ἄλλος αὐτός, c. 4, 1165 a 31, 'a second self' (not one's own self) alter ego. And on the other hand, ἐπιτιμῶσι τοῖς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστ' ἀγαπῶσι, καὶ ὡς ἐν αἰσχρῷ φιλαύτους ἀποκαλοῦσι, δοκεῖ τε ὁ μὲν φαῦλος ἑαυτοῦ χάριν πάντα πράττειν, καὶ ὅσφ μοχθηρότερος ἢ τοσούτφ μᾶλλον' ὁ δ' ἐπιεικὴς διὰ τὸ καλόν, κ.τ.λ. IX 8, init. And in the Politics, III 7, the distinction of the two classes of government, normal and abnormal, ὀρθαί and παρεκβάσεις (deviations from the true standard), is determined by the end of each, according as it is τὸ κοινόν οτ τὸ τόιον συμφέρον: the public interest of others, or the private interest of the governors themselves, one or several; in other words, it is determined by the selfishness

or disinterestedness of the governing powers of the state.

§ 17. ὅσα ὑπέρ τε—τὸ αὐτοῦ] This clause seems certainly out of place here, though Schrader defends it as an example of τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά. 'Qui enim ut patriam iuvet commoda sua negligit, is bonum simpliciter praefert illi quod huic bonum foret': that is, he prefers general to special or particular good, (his own). But this does not account for the TE, which if the words are retained in the received order is as superfluous as it is inexplicable. The sense would be improved and the particle accounted for by transferring the clause so as to follow τὰ τοιαῦτα (§ 17 ad fin.) The passage will then run thus: 'and all absolute (or general, see note on άπλωs, c. 2 § 4) goods: and all natural goods (things which are naturally good, in themselves, and so good for all) and (therefore, or kai, 'that is') things which are not (specially and particularly) good to oneself (αὐτῷ), appropriated to particular individuals, because such things (things that are thus special and particular, and not common to others) carry with them the notion of selfishness or self-interest'. Here the clause comes in as the first example—'anything, namely, which a man does either (re) for his country, to the neglect of his own interest, or (xai) anything that a dead man may have the benefit of, rather than one who is living (such as posthumous fame, funeral orations, monuments to his memory); because such honours paid (or advantages accruing) to a man while he is alive, involve or imply more self-interest', and are therefore less καλά.

τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά] 'Talia sunt quae absolute, citra respectum ad hunc hominem, locum, tempusve bona sunt. Unde τῷ ἀπλῶς, illi quod simpliciter tale dicitur, opponuntur τὰ αὐτῷ Rhet. 1 7. 35, et III 13. 4, τὰ τούτοιε

111 19. 1, τὰ τινί Τορ. 111 1 (116 a 21), τὰ ἡμῖν Magn. Mor. ἄλληλα de Gen. An. VII (sic) ; τὰ πῆ, ποῦ, ποτέ, πρός τι,

166 b 22.' Schrader. Add ή ἀπλῶς ἡ ἐκείνοις, Eth. N

ό ἀπλῶς, ἀλλ' ὁ πῶς, Ib. II 4, 1106 a 1.

καὶ τὰ τἢ φύσει ἀγαθά] Comp. 7. 33, τὸ αὐτοφυ tionibus mínime incongruentes materiae, ge

18 γὰρ ἕνεκα τὰ τοιαῦτα. καὶ ὅσα τεθνεῶτι ἐνδέχεται p. 31.

ὑπάρχειν μᾶλλον ἢ ζῶντι· τὸ γὰρ αὐτοῦ ἕνεκα

19 μᾶλλον ἔχει τὰ ζῶντι. καὶ ὅσα ἔργα τῶν ἄλλων

ἕνεκα. ἦττον γὰρ αὐτοῦ. καὶ ὅσαι εὐπραγίαι περὶ

ἄλλους, ἀλλὰ μὴ περὶ αὐτόν. καὶ περὶ τοὺς εὖ ποιήσαντας· δίκαιον γάρ. καὶ τὰ εὐεργετήματα· οὐ γὰρ

20 εἰς αὐτόν. καὶ τὰ ἐναντία ἢ ἐφ' οἶς αἰσχύνονται· τὰ

γὰρ αἰσχρὰ αἰσχύνονται καὶ λέγοντες καὶ ποιοῦντες καὶ μέλλοντες, ὥσπερ καὶ Σαπφω πεποίηκεν,

εἰπόντος τοῦ ἀλκαίου

critudo, ingenii acumen, solertia, docilitas, tenax memoria, ingenita animi

magnitudo, et quae a natura proveniunt bona alia.' Schrader.

αὐτῶ ἀναθά] 'good for him', that is, for this or that individual.

αὐτῷ ἀγαθά] 'good for him', that is, for this or that individual. See note on c. 7. 35, τὸ αὐτὸ καὶ ἀπλῶς, and Schrader (quoted above on τὰ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθά).

§ 19. τὰ εὐεργετήματα] 'any benefits conferred', because they are necessarily conferred on others, and therefore, so far, more praiseworthy than acquisitions. These are distinguished from εὐπμαγίαι περὶ ἄλλους (ante), which are 'any good and noble deeds done in the service of others, and not for oneself', for the same reason as the preceding. Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1163 α 1, καλὸν δὲ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν μὴ ἵνα ἀντιπάθη, ἀφέλιμον δὲ τὸ εὖεργετεῖσθαι.

§ 20. τὰ γὰρ αἰσχρά κ.τ.λ.] 'for shameful things we are all ashamed of, when we say, do, or are intending to do them'. Sappho's verses, for instance, in answer to Alcaeus,- something I would say, but shame prevents me'-she infers from this that it was something to be ashamed of, αίσχρόν, and replies, 'Hadst thou yearned after things good or fair, and had not thy tongue stirred up mischief to utter it, shame had not possessed thine eyes, but thou wouldst have spoken of the thing that is right'. The third line in particular of this Alcaic stanza requires correction, and there is not much help to be derived from the Aristotelian MSS. In the first, Blomfield, Mus. Crit. I p. 17, reads ἶκέ τ' ἐσλών: and Hermann (much better), El. Metr. Gr. III 16, de stroph. min. iké o' ('reached thee', the Homeric "Kew), from the reading "Kes of one Ms. Bergk, Fragm. Lyr. Gr. p. 607, follows MS Ac in reading Tye and the Aeolic eahor. The third line, which in the MSS appears as αίδώς κέν σε οὐκ εἶχεν ὅμματ', without varia lectio, is written by Blomfield, u. s., αίδώς κεν οὐχί τ' ὅππατ' εἶχεν: by Hermann, aldws κέ τευς οίκ είχεν οππατ': and by Bergk, aldws κε σ' ούκ αν ήχεν οππατ' (surely κε and αν thus repeated in different forms and almost immediate juxtaposition is indefensible): none of these seems to be satisfactory, but I have nothing better to suggest. [In Bergk's 2nd ed. p. 674 the fragment is printed as follows: al δ ήχες έσλων ίμερον ή κάλων, και μή τι Εείπην γλώσσ' εκύκα κάκον, αίδως κέ σ' οὐ κίχανεν ομματ', | άλλ' έλεγες περί τω δικαίως. S.]

The fact that the eye is the principal organ of the manifestation of

θέλω τι Fειπην, ἀλλά με κωλύει αἰδώς,

αί δ' είχες έσθλων ίμερον ή καλων καὶ μή τι Γειπην γλωσσ' ἐκύκα κακόν, αίδως κέ σ' οὐκ ἂν είχεν ὅμματ', ἀλλ' ἔλεγες περὶ τω δικαίω.

21 καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγωνιῶσι μὴ φοβούμενοι περὶ γὰρ τῶν 22 πρὸς δόξαν φερόντων ἀγαθῶν τοῦτο πάσχουσιν. καὶ αὶ τῶν φύσει σπουδαιοτέρων ἀρεταὶ καλλίους καὶ 23 τὰ ἔργα, οἷον ἀνδρὸς ἢ γυναικός. καὶ αὶ ἀπολαυστικαὶ ἄλλοις μᾶλλον ἢ αὐτοῖς διὸ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ 24 ἡ δικαιοσύνη καλόν. καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμω-

some of the feelings or emotions, as love, shame, fear, is here, as often elsewhere, expressed poetically by the phrase that 'shame has its seat in the eye'. Compare the proverb in 11 6. 18, τὸ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς εἶναι αἰδῶ, where see note.

§ 21. καὶ περὶ ὧν ἀγωνιῶσι μὴ φοβούμενοι] 'and things about which we are excessively anxious or distress ourselves, without fear': the acquisition of which causes us a violent mental struggle (ἀγών), distress, or anxiety, 'agony' in our exertions to attain, or in the fear of losing, it. The addition of μὴ φοβούμενοι is made here, because fear is the usual concomitant of the emotion, and generally included in the notion. Probl. II 31, ἡ ὅτι ἀγωνία φόβος τίς ἐστι πρὸς ἀρχὴν ἔργον (Vict.). ἀγωνιᾶν belongs to that class of verbs which imply a diseased state or condition of the mind or body; see note on πνευστιᾶν, 1 2.18.

The anxious feeling is usually excited about the kind of good things that 'tend to our reputation'; and this is why they are praiseworthy.

§ 22. 'The virtues (excellences) and functions of men and things naturally worthier, are nobler and more praiseworthy, as in man than in woman'.

§ 23. al ἀπολαυστικαί (ἀρεταί)] 'those which contribute to the gratification or enjoyment of others rather than of ourselves, of which justice is an instance'. ἀπόλαυσις is not here confined to sensual gratification, its proper meaning. In Eth. N. 1 3, Sardanapalus, the type of sensuality, is taken as the representative of the βίος ἀπολαυστικός: note on 1 5.7. Here again it is the unselfishness that is laudable.

§ 24. καὶ τὸ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς τιμωρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον] 'and the heavier vengeance on, punishment of, one's enemies' (μᾶλλον may be either to punish them in a higher degree, the more the better; or as contrasted with καταλλάττεσθαι. '* he reverse'), and 'refusing to be reconciled, come eing, that 'retaliatory' or 'reciprocal efore it is right, and of course (an unyielding resolution)

ρεῖσθαι μᾶλλον καὶ μὴ καταλλάττεσθαι τό τε γὰρ ἀνταποδιδόναι δίκαιον, τὸ δὲ δίκαιον καλόν, καὶ ἀν25 δρείου τὸ μὴ ἡττᾶσθαι. καὶ νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν αἰρετά τε γὰρ ἄκαρπα ὄντα, καὶ ὑπεροχὴν ἀρετῆς δηλοῖ. καὶ τὰ μνημονευτά, καὶ τὰ μᾶλλον μᾶλλον. καὶ ἃ μὴ ζῶντι ἕπεται. καὶ οῖς τιμὴ ἀκολουθεῖ. καὶ τὰ περιττά. καὶ τὰ μόνω ὑπάρχοντα

is a sign of a 'manly character'. Comp. I 6.26 (ἀγαθὰ) τὰ τοῖς ἐχθροῖς κακά, and § 29. This was a constant article of the popular morality, and is cited as such here: see, for instance, Xen. Mem. IV 2, 14 seq. Rhet. ad Alex. I (2), 13, 14. Again in Aristotle's Rhet. II 5. 5, Eur. Ion 1045—7,

Med. 808, Cic. de Off. 1 7. 2.

§ 25. 'Victory and honour are noble and praiseworthy things; for they are desirable though unproductive (see c. 5. 7, note infra § 26), and manifest (are signs of) an excess, superiority, higher degree, of virtue', i.e. a higher degree than the virtues which they crown would attain without them: a man may be good without them; with them he must be better. Comp. Eth. N. IV 8 init. οι γὰρ εὐγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οὶ δυναστεύοντες ἡ οὶ πλουτοῦντες ἐν ὑπεροχῆ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πῶν ἐντιμότερον. Comp. infra § 39.

μνημονευτά] 'things to be, capable of being, or that deserve to be, remembered'; as εὐμνημόνευτα (infra) is 'easy to be remembered'. μνημονεύματα, which Victorius adopts upon the superior authority of MSS, is monumenta, memorials, elogia, et quae memoriam alicuius ornant. He does not seem to have observed, what Bekker, who prefers the former, doubtless did, though he does not say so, that μάλλον can be construed with the adjective μνημονευτά, but hardly, or not so well, with the substantive

μνημονεύματα.

å μη ζώντι επεται] 'things that outlast life, that follow a man beyond

the grave', as posthumous fame.

ols τιμή ἀκολουθεί] Honour itself, especially as contrasted with profit (supra § 16), imparts a praiseworthy character as the prize of action, and is itself καλόν and a thing to be praised (§ 25, supra). It must therefore convey this in some measure to everything, particularly actions, by which it is attended upon or accompanied.

τὰ περιττά] (see note on 6. 28) are καλά as well as ἀγαθά. They are thus illustrated by Schrader. 'Quae aliis sui generis praestant. Gellius 1 XIII P. Crassus Mucianus traditur quinque habuisse rerum bonarum maxima et praecipua, quod esset ditissimus, quod nobilissimus, quod eloquentissimus, quod iuris consultissimus, quod Pontifex Maximus. Velleius (de Pompeio), 11 53, Vir in id evectus super quod ascendi non potest.'

τὰ μόνφ ὑπάρχοντα] τὰ ἴδια καὶ ἃ μηδείς, 6. 28. The difference between the two lies in this, that the topic of 6. 28 denotes positive good, as excellences, accomplishments, personal or intellectual advantages, which are peculiar to a man, and shared by no one else; here they rather refer to

26 καλλίω· εὐμνημονευτότερα γάρ. καὶ κτήματα ἄκαρπα· ἐλευθεριώτερα γάρ. καὶ τὰ παρ' ἐκάστοις δὲ ἴδια καλά, καὶ ὅσα σημεῖά ἐστι τῶν παρ' ἐκάστοις

peculiar actions, or qualities that can be manifested in action, which are more easily remembered, and therefore more the objects of praise, and in

this sense καλλίω: ἐκ πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος, § 32.

'In bibliotheca, quae prima in urbe ab Asinio Pollione publicata est, unius M. Varronis viventis posita imago est, Plin. VII 30. L. Metello tribuit populus Romanus quod nunquam ulli alii ab condito aevo ut quoties in senatum iret curru veheretur ad curiam. Plin. VII 43.' Schrader. I have quoted these instances because from Schrader's point of view they very well illustrate the topic. But I believe they are not exactly what Aristotle had in his mind when he wrote the words. These are not exactly subjects of 'praise', which the topics of this chapter deal with, exclusively or more immediately. τὰ περιττά and τὰ μόνφ ὑπάρχοντα are to be taken together, the latter being a step higher in degree than the former. τὰ περιττά are distinguished and exceptional (as Schrader puts it) excellences, qualities, achievements. τὰ μόνφ ὑπάρχοντα are a step beyond, 'unique'.

§ 26. κτήματα ἄκαρπα] note on 5. 7, ἔστι δὲ χρήσιμα μᾶλλον. A pleasuregarden on this principle is a finer thing and more deserving of approbation than a market-garden from which you make a profit. The reason here given for this preference is different to that assigned in Eth. N. IV 9 (quoted in the note referred to). There it is accounted for by the selfsufficiency or independence (αὐτάρκεια) that it implies; here by its being more in accordance with the gentleman's character, in contrast with the

vulgarity of trade and money-making.

τὰ παρ' ἐκάστοις ἴδια] These are special pursuits, modes of action, manners, and customs cultivated in particular countries, 'national' and 'peculiar to them'. In England, for instance, special skill in cricket and other athletic exercises gains a man applause; in Greece, running, boxing, wrestling, chariot-racing, are the great games. In Europe a man is applauded for his skill in dancing, which the Chinese utterly contemn, and regard as a useless waste of labour. Quint. Inst. Or. III 7.24, Minus Lacedaemone studia literarum quam Athenis honoris merebuntur; plus patientia, fortitudo.

σσα σημεία ἐστι τῶν παρ' ἐκάστοις ἐπαινουμένων] 'all signs, or distinctive marks, of habits (characters, actions), that are approved in particular countries, as the habit of wearing long hair in Lacedaemon. This is a 'sign' of a gentleman, a character very much approved in that country. It is a sign of this, because with long hair it is difficult to perform any menial task¹, and therefore the wearing it shews that menial occupations are alien from that character. Gaisford quotes, Xenoph. de Rep. Lac. XI 3, ἐψῆκε δὲ (Lycurgus sc.) καὶ κομᾶν τοῖς ὑπὲρ τὴν ἡβητικὴν ἡλικίαν, νομίζων οὕτω καὶ μείζους ἃν καὶ ἐλευθεριωτέρους καὶ γοργοτέρους φαίνεσθαι. [Aristoph. Aves, 1282, ἐλακωνομάνουν ἄπαντες ἄνθρωποι τότε, ἐκόμων κ.τ.λ. 8.]

1 οὐ γὰρ οἰόν τ' ἐπιτηδεῦσαι τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ζώντα βίον βάναυσον η θητικόν, l'ol. 11t 5, 1278 π 20. έπαινουμένων, οἷον ἐν Λακεδαίμονι κομᾶν καλόν· ἐλευθέρου γὰρ σημεῖον· οὐ γάρ ἐστι κομῶντα ῥάδιον 27 οὐδὲν ποιεῖν ἕργον θητικόν· καὶ τὸ μηδεμίαν ἐργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην· ἐλευθέρου γὰρ τὸ μὴ πρὸς

θητικόν Θήτες, θητεύειν, denote hired service in agriculture, but not slavery; the θήs is no δούλος. In this sense both words are used by Homer. The three formed the fourth and lowest class under the Solonian constitution. At Athens, in Aristotle's time, the θήτες, τὸ θητικὸν (πλήθος), still denotes the class of paid agricultural labourers, as an order of the state or population; and is expressly distinguished from the Baravore or τεχνίται, artisans and petty manufacturers, who are still hired labourers, but work at mechanical employments, and in towns, forming with the others the lowest order of the population of the state. In Pol. 111 5, Bávavoos and býs are several times thus distinguished. It is there said that in some constitutions (such as monarchies and aristocracies) neither of these classes is admitted into the governing body; in oligarchies the θής cannot, the βάναυσος can, be a citizen. In the account given, VI (IV) 4, 1291 b 14 seq., of the various kinds of population which form the bases of so many different varieties of democracy, we have in line 25 the term χερνητικόν, of precisely the same import, substituted for θητικών: the other had been already mentioned. In Pol. VII (VI) 4, 1319 a 27, three classes of these lower orders are distinguished, τὸ πλήθος τό τε τῶν βαναύσων (artisans) καὶ τὸ τῶν ἀγοραίων ἀνθρώπων (small tradesmen or retailers, buyers and sellers in the market, VI (IV) 4, 1291 a 4, heyw de ayopaiov to περί τὰς πράσεις καὶ τὰς ώνὰς καὶ τὰς ἐμπορίας καὶ καπηλείας διατρίβου), καὶ τὸ θητικόν. Of all these it is said just before, ὁ γὰρ βίος φαῦλος, καὶ οὐθέν έργον μετ' άρετης. θητικόν metaph. = δουλικόν, 'servile, menial', occurs again Eth. Nic. 1V 8, 1125 1.

§ 27. μηδεμίαν έργάζεσθαι βάναυσον τέχνην] This again applies to Lacedaemon: Gaisford quotes Aelian, V. H. VI 6, βάναυσον δὲ εἰδέναι τέχνην ἄνδρα Λακεδαιμόνιον οὐκ ἐξῆν. Xen. Occon. IV 2, καὶ γὰρ αἴ γε βαναυσικαὶ καλούμεναι καὶ ἐπίβρητοί εἰσι καὶ εἰκότως μέντοι πάνυ ἀδοξοῦνται πρὸς τῶν πύλεων

(add VI 5).

βάναυσον] Of the various kinds of population of a state, enumerated in Pol. VI (IV) 4, the first is the περὶ τὴν τροφὴν πλῆθος, τὸ γεωργικόν: the second, τὸ βάναυσον ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ περὶ τὰς τέχνας ὧν ἄνευ πόλιν ἀδύνατον οἰκεῖσθαι τοῦτων δὲ τῶν τεχνῶν τὰς μὲν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὑπάρχειν δεῖ, τὰς δὲ εἰς τρυφὴν ἢ καλῶς ζῆν, 1291 α 1. So that here the fine arts, as well as the necessary, indispensable, or mechanical arts, are all included in the class βάναυσοι. See on this subject Thirlwall, Hist. Gr. (Cab. Cycl. 2nd. ed.) c. 18, Vol. 111 p. 64, note. Pol. V (VIII) 2, 1337 δ 8 seq., βάναυσον δ' ἔργον εἶναι δεῖ τοῦτο νομίζειν καὶ τέχνην ταύτην καὶ μάθησιν, ὅσαι πρὸς τὰς χρήσεις καὶ τὰς πράξεις τὰς τῆς ἀρετῆς ἄχρηστον ἀπεργάζονται τὸ σῶμα τῶν ἐλευθέρων ἢ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν διάνοιαν. διὸ τάς τε τοιαύτας τέχνας ὅσαι τὸ σῶμα παρασκενάζουσι χεῖρον διακεῖσθαι βαναύσους καλοῦμεν, καὶ τὰς μισθαρνικὰς ἐργασίας· ἄσχολον γὰρ ποιοῦσι τὴν διάνοιαν καὶ ταπεινήν. Ι 11,1258 δ 37, (τῶν ἐργασιῶν) βαναύσοταται ἐν αἶς τὰ σώματα λωβῶνται μάλιστα. Eth. Eudem. 1 4, 1215 α 30, λέγω δὲ

28 άλλον ζην. ληπτέον δὲ καὶ τὰ σύνεγγυς τοῖς ὑπάρ-

βαναύσους (τέχνας) τὰς ἐδραίας καὶ μισθαρνικάς (arts sedentary and mercenary). The ἐδραίας in this last passage explains the bodily degradation and injury of the preceding. Comp. Plato, Rep. VII 522 B, IX 590 B, Phileb. 55 C, Theaet. 176 (Heind. note § 85), (Legg. VIII 4, 846 D No native must learn or practise any handicraft. One art is enough for any man; and the natives or citizens must occupy themselves exclusively in statecraft or public duties). Arts are inferior in dignity in proportion to their necessity or utility, Arist. Metaph. A I. Cic. de Off. I 42. 5.

έλευθέρου...τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν] 'to live with reference to, dependent upon, at the beck and call of, another'. Independence, αὐτάρκεια, is a characteristic of the ἐλεύθερος, the 'free and independent' citizen. Aristotle is writing at Athens, and for Athenians. So it is said of the μεγαλόψυχος, Eth. N. IV 8, 1124 θ 32, καὶ πρὸς ἄλλον μὴ δύνασθαι ζῆν ἀλλ' ἡ πρὸς φίλον δουλικόν γάρ. Metaph. A 2, 982 δ 25, (Vict.) of ἡ πρώτη φιλοσοφία, δῆλον ὡς δι' οὐδεμίαν αὐτὴν ζητοῦμεν χρείαν ἐτέραν, ἀλλ' ὧσπερ ἄνθρωπος, φαμέν, ἐλεύθερος ὁ αὐτοῦ ἔνεκα καὶ μὴ ἄλλον ὧν, οὔτω καὶ αὖτη μόνη ἐλευθέρα οὖσα τῶν ἐπιστημῶν μόνη γὰρ αἰτὴ αὐτῆς ἔνεκέν ἐστιν. Victorius also quotes, in illustration of πρὸς ἄλλον ζῆν, Dem. (pro Ctesiphonte, as he calls it) de F. Leg. p. 411, τοῖς δὲ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ζῶσε καὶ τῆς παρ' ὑμῶν τιμῆς γλιχομένοις. The import of the phrase is, to look to another in all that you say and do, to direct your life and conduct by the will and pleasure of another; in the relation (πρὸς) of servant or dependent to master.

It is to be observed that the reason here assigned for avoiding all mechanical occupations as disreputable, viz. that it destroys a man's independence, so that he cannot subsist without looking to others, places the objection to it upon a different ground to that assigned in the Politics (quoted in the last note), where it is that they disqualify a man for doing

his duty to the state.

§ 28. ληπτέον δὲ κ.τ.λ.] 'and we may assume (or represent, substitute one for the other, on occasion) things (qualities, and the terms expressing them) that are very nearly related to the identical, both in commendation and censure, as that the cautious is cold and designing, the simple (simpleton) worthy and amiable, and the insensible mild and calm'. This lays down the general rule, of which the next topic is a special variety, ὑποκορισμός.

Quint. Inst. Orat. III 7. 25. Idem praecipit (Aristotle in this place) illud quoque, quia sit quaedam virtutibus ac vitiis vicinitas, utendum proxima derivatione verborum ut pro temerario fortem, pro prodigo liberalem, pro avaro parcum vocemus: quae eadem etiam contra valent. Quod quidem orator, id est virbonus, nunquam faciet, nisi forte communi utilitate ducatur. To the same effect, Cic. Orat. Part XXIII 8t (Schrader). [Liv. XXII 12, (Fabium) pro cunctatore segnem, pro cauto timidum, affingens vicina virtutibus vitia, compellabat. S.]

χρηστός for ηλίθως is one of those ironical euphemisms which Plato is 50 fond of employing; a house's, ηδύς, and εὐηθης, this last belonging a hipp. Maj. 288 B; ηδύς, in seve 7 D, VII 527 D, and else 3, Theaet. 161 A, εὐηθεια, cf. note on .75. S.]

χουσιν ως ταὐτὰ ὄντα καὶ πρὸς ἔπαινον καὶ πρὸς Ψόγον, οἷον τὸν εὐλαβῆ Ψυχρὸν καὶ ἐπίβουλον καὶ p. 32.
29 τὸν ἢλίθιον χρηστὸν καὶ τὸν ἀνάλγητον πρᾶον. καὶ ἕκαστον δ' ἐκ τῶν παρακολουθούντων ἀεὶ κατὰ τὸ βέλτιστον, οἷον τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ τὸν μανικὸν ἀπλοῦν καὶ τὸν αὐθάδη μεγαλοπρεπῆ καὶ σεμνόν. καὶ τοὺς P. 1367.

§ 29. καὶ ἔκαστον κ.τ.λ.] "and in every case from the accompanying, attendant, qualities (the qualities that come next, but always on the higher and better side; on ἀκολουθεῖν and its various senses, see note on c. 6. 3) derive (ἐκ) a term or expression always in the best direction (with the most favourable tendency, interpretatio in melius, putting the most favourable construction on the actual facts of the case); call, for instance, the irascible and insane, 'simple and straightforward', and self-will (headstrong, stubborn, obstinate temper; αὐθάδης, one who pleases himself, αὐθ-άδης, 'self-pleaser', and will have his own way), 'magnificence', or proper pride, and a due sense of dignity (σεμνόν)".

On opythos Victorius compares Hor. Sat. 1 3.51, at est truculentior atque plus aequo liber: simplex fortisque habeatur, with Cic. de Legg. 1 7, solent enim, id quod virorum bonorum est, admodum irasci, and therefore an angry temper may be attributed to a virtuous disposition.

μανικός represents an excitable, violent, furious temper, which sometimes almost assumes the appearance of raving madness. In Plato it is applied to Chaerephon, Socrates' intimate (in the Charmides, init.), and to Apollodorus, Symp. 173 D, where it expresses a very impetuous, excitable temperament, inclined to extravagant and violent manifestations in feeling and utterance; which is illustrated by the conduct ascribed to him at Socrates' death, Phaedo 117 D.

On aπλουs, as expressive of character, see note 1 2, 4.

αὐθάδης. In Eth. Eud. II 3, 1221 α 8, III 7, 1233 δ 34, σεμνότης, proper pride, the due measure of personal dignity in one's bearing and behaviour to others, πρὸς ἔτερον ζῆν, is a mean between the two extremes, ἀρεσκεία the defect (over-complacency and obsequiousness), and αὐθάδεια the excess (undue contemptuousness καταφρόνησις, and disregard of their feelings and wishes). In the Magn. Mor. I 29, it is likewise the excess of σεμνότης, as ἀρεσκεία is the defect. It is exercised περὶ τὰς ἐντεύξεις, in the ordinary

1 It seems to me nearly certain that μεγαλοπρεπή is a mistake, either of the author himself or one of his transcribers, for μεγαλόψυχου. The two have already been distinguished in this very chapter, §§ 11, 12, and μεγαλοπρέπεια, when it is distinguished from the other as by Aristotle, and not made to include it as by Plato (see the note on § 12), is altogether unsuitable to express the character of the αὐθάδης, being confined as it is to liberality in bestowing money on a large scale: whereas the virtue of μεγαλοψυχία is precisely what αὐθάδεια might be represented to be by the figure ὑποκορισμός, by bestowing on it a 'flattering' designation. I refer for the proof of this to the Nic. Eth. 1V 7.8: it will be found that σεμνότης, another false interpretation which is here put upon αὐθάδεια, is also characteristic of the μεγαλόψυχος. Plato points out the true ὑποκορισμός in the case of μεγαλοπρέπεια, Rep. VI 560 E, ὑποκοριζόμενοι...ἀσωνίαν δὲ μεγαλοπρέπειαν.

έν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς ὡς ἐν ταῖς ἀρεταῖς ὄντας, οἶον τὸν θρασὺν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τὸν ἄσωτον ἐλευθέριον δόξει τε γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς, καὶ ἄμα παραλογιστικὸν ἐκ τῆς

intercourse of society, and manifests itself in the character οἶος μηθενὶ ἐντυχεῖν μηθὲ διαλεγῆναι, in a wilful and stubborn reserve which repels all social converse. The character is represented in the name itself; which is αὐτο-άδης, 'self-pleasing'. So that when we give the name of μεγαλόψυχος and σεμνός to one who is really αὐθάδης, we are substituting a virtue for a vice, a mean state for an excess. αὐθάδεια is one of Theophrastus' 'Characters' defined by him as ἀπήνεια ὁμιλίας, 'social brutality'.

The special form of this misapplication of names in praise and censure is called ὑποκορισμός, when it takes the favourable side, and interpretatur in melius. On this figure, the name of which is derived from the endearing terms used by nurses to children (προς κόρην ή κόρον λέγειν άποσμικρούντα, Tim. Lex., lisping in imitation of them), compare Aesch. c. Timarch. p. 17 § 126, ταύτην ἐξ ὑποκορίσματος τιτθῆς ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχω, Theophr. περὶ ἀηδίας: ὑποκορίζεσθαι ποππύζων (Ast ad loc.), or by lovers, Plat. Rep. V 474 Ε, η έραστοῦ ὑποκοριζομένου, Arist. Plut. 1012, νητταρίον αν καὶ φάττιον υπεκορίζετο (whence it stands for a 'diminutive', Rhet. III 2, 15); hence it is transferred to flattering or endearing expressions in general, and especially such as, in describing the moral character of anything, substitute some nearly associated virtue for a vice; to palliate, extenuate, gloss over. Examples occur in Plat. Rep. VIII 560 E (already referred to), III 400 E, ανοιαν ύποκοριζόμενοι καλούμεν ώς εξήθειαν. Alexis, Tarantini Fr. 3, Meineke, Fragm. Comm. III 484, δρ' οὐκ οἶσθ' ὅτι τὸ καλούμενον ζῆν τοῦτο διατριβής χάριν ὄνομ' έστιν ύποκόρισμα της ανθρωπίνης μοίρας: Ovid, Ar. Am. 11 657, nominibus mollire licet mala, followed by a long string of examples. Lucr. IV 1154 seq. Horat. Sat. 1 3. 44-54. Thucydides, III 82, in a well-known passage, mentions this perversion of moral terms amongst the signs of demoralization prevalent in Greece at the period of the Corcyrean sedition, και την ελωθυίαν αξιώσιν των ονομάτων ές τὰ έργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῆ δικαιώσει κ.τ.λ. See Ruhnken, ad Tim. p. 266, 6; Ernesti, Lex. Techn. Gr. s. v.; Shilleto, ad Dem. de F. L. § 293; Stallbaum, Plat. Rep. VI l. c.—Quintilian calls it derivatio verborum in the passage above quoted; and V 13. 25, describes it, si acri et vehementi fuerit usus oratione, eandem rem nostris verbis mitioribus proferre; which he then illustrates from Cicero's speeches. The opposite practice is described II 12. 4, est praeterea quaedam virtutum vitiorumque vicinia, qua maledicus pro libero, temerarius pro forti, effusus pro copioso accipitur. [Farrar's Chapters on Language, p. 281 sqq. S.]

καὶ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς κ.τ.λ.] The only difference between this and the preceding form of ὑποκορισμός is, that this is a special variety of the other, which substitutes the mean for the excess but still according to the favourable interpretation of it. θρασίστι

N. 11 7, 1107 6 3, 8, 1108 6 20, 1109 a thrift's habit, c. 7, 1107 6 10, c. 8


παραλογιστικον έκ τῆς altias]
II 24. 4, 'suberit fallacia manan.

αίτίας εἰ γὰρ οὖ μὴ ἀνάγκη κινδυνευτικός, πολλῷ μᾶλλον ἀν δόξειεν ὅπου καλόν, καὶ εἰ προετικὸς τοῖς τυχοῦσι, καὶ τοῖς φίλοις ὑπερβολὴ γὰρ ἀρετῆς τὸ 30 πάντας εὖ ποιεῖν. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ παρ' οἶς ὁ ἔπαινος.

(παραλογιστικόν), or false reasoning, proceeding from the cause', is the identification of two different causes which must necessarily produce dissimilar effects or actions; these latter are confounded by the fallacy, and ascribed to the same cause. The cause of an action is the προαίρεσις, the voluntary and deliberate purpose of it; otherwise represented as the 'motive' (the efficient cause). Now this cause or motive is different in the case of an act of wanton rashness, where there is no necessity (obligation) to incur the danger (οὖ μή ἀνάγκη κινδυνευτικός), and of an act of virtue, true courage, which has a noble end, τὸ καλόν, in view: they are prompted by different motives, one belonging to the class 'bad', the other that of the 'good'. This identification of the causes of the two actions leads to the 'false inference', that as the same cause produces the same effect, and the cause of both actions is the same, the effects are likewise the same, and both of them are acts of virtue. And then the further inference is drawn, that whatever a man will do from a less powerful motive, he will do a fortiori from one which is higher and more prevailing: the higher the motive or cause, the more powerful the impulse or effect. Similarly it is inferred that if a man is lavish to everybody, this must include his friends; by the rule, omne maius continet in se minus,

ύπερβολή αρετής] Cic. Tusc. Q. V 26. 105, exsuperantia virtutis. ύπερβολή and ὑπεροχή are frequently employed to express an excess above a given standard, average, or mean; the general conception of 'excess', of mere 'superiority'; without the additional notion of a 'vicious' excess, a depravation or deviation from a true standard, which usually accompanies the word, and more especially in Aristotle's theory of virtue, where it stands for a class of moral vices. 'Non significat hic nimium sed praestantia.' Victorius. With the notion here expressed, comp. Eth. N. II 2, sub fin. 1105 a 9, περί δε το χαλεπώτερον αεί και τέχνη γίνεται και άρετή καί γαρ το εθ βέλτιον έν τούτω. The average standard of excellence is surpassed, 'good becomes better', in proportion to the degree of difficulty surmounted in accomplishing any task. Pol. IV (VII) 1, 1323 b 3, κεκοσμημένοις εls ύπερβολήν, lines 8 and 14, κατά την ύπεροχήν, c. 4, 1326 a 21, lb. b 12, της ύπερβολής όρος, δ 24. Pol. VI (IV) 12, 1296 δ 19, ποσον δε (by 'quantity' I mean) την τοῦ πλήθους ὑπεροχήν. This sense of the word is also common in Demosthenes, as de Cor. 291. 24, έγω δέ τοσαύτην ύπερβολήν ποιούμαι, and the same phrase de F. L. p. 447. 25. c. Mid. 519. 24, ἔστι δὲ ὑπερβολή τών μετά ταύτα. ύπερβολή συκοφαντίας, κακίας, δωρεών, άναιδείας, ώμότητος, υβρεως, &c., in all which ὑπερβολή denotes not the vice, but merely the 'measure' of it.

§ 30. σκοπεῖν δὲ καὶ παρ' οἶs ὁ ἔπαινος] Compare III 14.11. The same illustration of the topic, from Plato's Menexenus, is there repeated, with the addition of ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, 'in the funeral oration', meaning the Platonic dialogue. Socrates, Plato's principal character, or hero, or



ωσπερ γάρ ὁ Σωκράτης έλεγεν, οὐ χαλεπὸν 'Αθηναίους εν 'Αθηναίοις επαινείν. δεί δε το παρ' εκάστοις τίμιον λέγειν ώς ύπάρχει, οἶον ἐν Σκύθαις ἢ Λάκωσιν ή φιλοσόφοις. καὶ όλως δὲ τὸ τίμιον ἄγειν 31 είς τὸ καλόν, ἐπείπερ δοκεῖ γειτνιᾶν. καὶ ὅσα κατὰ τὸ προσήκον, οἷον εἰ άξια τῶν προγόνων καὶ τῶν

spokesman, is here taken more Aristotelio as a substitute for Plato himself, whose opinions and sentiments he is supposed exactly to represent1. The passage of the Menex. 235 D runs thus, εἶ μὲν γὰρ δέοι 'Αθηναίους ἐν Πελοποννησίοις εὖ λέγειν ἡ Πελοποννησίους ἐν Αθηναίοις, ἀγαθοῦ ἀν ῥήτορος δέοι του πείσοντος και ευδοκιμήσοντος όταν δέ τις έν τούτοις άγωνίζηται ούσπερ καὶ ἐπαινεί οὐδὲν μέγα δοκεί εὖ λέγειν.

On this passage, Quintilian, Inst. Or. III 7. 23, Interesse tamen Aristoteles putat ubi quidque laudetur aut vituperetur. Nam plurimum refert qui sint audientium mores, quae publice recepta persuasio: ut illa maxime quae probant esse in eo qui laudabitur credant, aut in eo contra quem dicemus ea quae oderunt. Ita non dubium erit iudicium quod

orationem praecesserit.

τὸ παρ' ἐκάστοις τίμιον κ.τ.λ.] These are appeals to national and class prejudices and preferences. We should attribute to the object of our encomium the possession of any gift, quality, accomplishment which happens to be esteemed by the particular audience that we are addressing; as in a company of Scythians it would be advisable to address ourselves to their national habits and modes of thinking, and to praise our hero for his skill in hunting or strength or brayery; at Sparta for patience and fortitude (Quint. u. s.); at Athens for literary accomplishments.

'And in a word, (or, as a general rule), to refer (in praising any one before an audience of this kind) what they highly value to the καλόν, since they appear to border closely upon one another'. 'To refer time to to καλόν', is to invest them with a moral character, τὸ καλόν being the moral end, the right, the end of action. This is as much as to say that these things, which are so precious in their eyes, are not only valuable, but right in themselves, and therefore they do well to hold them in high

esteem.

§ 31. ὄσα κατὰ τὸ προσῆκον κ.τ.λ.] 'all that seems naturally to belong to a man in virtue of his birth or antecedents', qualities, actions, achievements; 'such things as were to be expected from him'.

1 Bp. Fitzgerald (ap. Grant, ad Eth. N. VI 13. 3) remarks, on Eth. N. III 8. 6, that Aristotle in referring to Socrates prefixes the article when he speaks of him as Plato's interlocutor and representative, and omits it when he has the real historical Socrates in his mind. This is no doubt the general (Grant says, invariable) rule; but I have noted one exception in Pol. v (VIII) 7, 1342 6 23, where we find Σωκράτει without the article in a reference to Plato's Republic, 111 398 E. The rule is extended to other Platonic characters borrowed from history, as τον Αριστοφάνην (the Aristophanes of the Symposium), Pol. II 4, 1262 b 11. and & Thuasos (Plato's Timeeus, not the real personage), de Anima A 3, 406 & 26.

προϋπηργμένων εύδαιμονικόν γάρ καὶ καλὸν τὸ προσεπικτάσθαι τιμήν. καὶ εἰ παρὰ τὸ προσήκον δὲ ἐπὶ τὸ βέλτιον καὶ τὸ κάλλιον, οἶον εἰ εὐτυχῶν μὲν μέτριος άτυχων δέ μεγαλόψυχος, ή μείζων γιγνόμενος βελτίων καὶ καταλλακτικώτερος. τοιούτον δὲ τὸ τοῦ Ἰφικράτους, έξ οίων εἰς οἶα, καὶ τὸ τοῦ όλυμπιονίκου

πρόσθε μέν άμφ' ώμοισιν έχων τραχείαν, καὶ τὸ τοῦ Σιμωνίδου

ή πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ' οὖσα τυράννων. έπει δ' έκ των πράξεων ὁ έπαινος, ίδιον δὲ τοῦ 32

προϋπηργμένων] 'res antea virtute alicuius studioque possessas, laudes quas sibi quispiam labore suo comparaverit.' Victorius. 'his own previous acquisitions or possessions'; such as a stock of previous good, noble, great deeds, with which his new achievement, now the object of the encomium, is in accordance; as it ought to be. It is praiseworthy because it is the addition of a new honour, which, since honour itself is καλόν, must also have a tendency to happiness (εὐδαιμονικόν) and be right itself, and all that is right is praiseworthy.

But not only conformity with a man's antecedents may be adduced in praise of an action, but also the opposite, 'if he surpass them, namely, and improve upon' his own early condition and actions, or those of his ancestors, not acting in accordance with the past and what he was born

to, but contrary to it, i.e. beyond it.

καταλλακτικώτερος This does not necessarily contradict the topic of § 24; the irreconcilable temper there is only to be fostered against enemies, here it probably refers exclusively to friends: or if not, in Rhetoric either side may be taken as a subject of commendation, each suitable to a different kind or disposition of audience.

τὸ τοῦ Ἰφικράτους—τὸ τοῦ ολυμπιονίκου Both of them already quoted,

I 7.32, q. v.

το τοῦ Σιμωνίδου The epigram is given at length by Thucydides VI 59. Bergk, Fragm. Lyr. Gr. Simon. Fr. 115, p. 781 [p. 906, 2nd ed.]. Ανδρός άριστεύσαντος εν Ελλάδι των εφ' εαυτού | Ίππίου Αρχεδίκην ήδε κέκευθε κόνις. | H πατρός τε καὶ ἀνδρὸς ἀδελφῶν τ' οὖσα τυράννων | Παίδων τ' οὐκ ἤρθη νοῦν ές άτασθαλίην.

§ 32. ἐκ τῶν πράξεων ὁ ἔπαινος] 'praise' is derived from actions', i. e. it is only (moral) actions that can furnish topics of emauvos, in its proper application. Praise and blame, moral approbation and disapprobation (Butler), are the tests of virtue and vice. ὁ μέν γὰρ ἔπαινος τῆς ἀρετῆς, Eth. N. I 12, 1101 & 32.

See on this subject, and upon what follows, the distinction of emairos. έγκωμιον, and εὐδαιμονισμός and μακαρισμός, Introd. App. B to c. 9 §§ 33, 34,

p. 212 seq.

σπουδαίου τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσιν, πειρατέον δεικνύναι πράττοντα κατὰ προαίρεσιν. χρήσιμον δὲ τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα. διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώ-

ίδιον τοῦ σπουδαίου τὸ κατὰ προαίρεσι»] On προαίρεσι», see note, c. 6. 26. The προαίρεσι», the deliberate moral purpose, is the distinctive characteristic of moral action. 'Acting in accordance' with this is consequently said to be 'peculiar to', the proprium, characteristic of 'the man of worth', or good man. In 'praising' any one, therefore, praise being, strictly speaking, confined to moral action, 'we must endeavour to shew that his actions are directed by a deliberate moral purpose'.

φαίνεσθαι] 'that he should be shewn to have' ... 'that it should be

made clear that he has' ... Note on 1 7.31, p. 141.

διὸ καὶ τὰ συμπτώματα κ.τ.λ.] To establish a character for virtue in the object of your praise it is desirable to shew that his virtuous acts have been often repeated; and therefore, for the same purpose, to make an apparent addition to this number, we should assume as acts done with a moral purpose, ωs ἐν προιμρέσει, any 'accidental coincidences' and 'pieces of luck' (which may have happened to him); 'for if a number of them can be brought forward 'resembling' the virtue or excellence that you wish to praise in him, they will be taken for 'a sign' of it and of the moral purpose or intention' (which constitutes virtue). The mere repetition of the actions, τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα, is serviceable in producing this impression, because it seems to shew an inclination or fondness for them, and thence a certain direction of the monaineous or choice, and a certain Ess or moral state, which are indications of a virtuous habit. συμπτώμα is a 'concurrence' or 'accidental coincidence' of one thing or act with another, between which there is no necessary connexion, and, like τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης, purely accidental. 'σύμπτωμα est, cum quopiam aliquid agente, et quod nihil ad rem quae intervenit faciat, extrinsecus quippiam excitatum contingit; e.g. deambulante illo solem deficere: ἀπὸ τύχης vero, cum quopiam aliquid agente alicuius rei gratia, aliquid ex eo actu praeter propositum evenerit; ut scrobem facientem, ut arborem serat, thesaurum defossum invenire.' Victorius. On τύχη as an agent or supposed cause, see Introd. p. 218-224, Append. C to Bk. I. Both of Victorius's instances came from Aristotle [de div. per somn. infra, and Met. A 30, 1025 a 16. S.]

On σύμπτωμα (rare in ordinary Greek) Phrynichus, χρη οὖν συντυχίαν λέγειν, η λύσαντας οὕτω, συνέπεσεν αὐτῷ τόδε γενέσθαι. Δημοσθένης μέντοι ἐν τῷ κατὰ Διονυσοδώρου (p. 1295, 21) ἄπαξ εἴρηκε τοὕνομα. The only other example of it, referred to by Lobeck, note ad loc. p. 248, in any writer earlier than Aristotle, is Thuc. 1V 36, where it stands, like συμφορά, for an 'unfortunate accident'. In Dem. it is equivalent to τὸ συμβάν, which occurs in the same sentence. It occurs also in the Platonic Axiochus, 364 C, in the sense of 'a disease' (morbus, Ast), apparently as a special kind of 'calamity'. In Aristotle I have noted the following instances: Pol. VIII (V) 4, 1304 a I (where it means 'an accident', as in Dem. and Phryn.) [ib. 6, 1306 b 6; II 12, 1274 a 12]; Top. Δ 5, 126 b 36, 39, de div. per somn. c. 1, 462 b 27, 31, σύμπτωμα δὲ τὸ βαδίζοντος ἐκλείπειν τὸν

ματα καὶ τὰ ἀπὸ τύχης ὡς ἐν προαιρέσει ληπτέον ἀν γὰρ πολλὰ καὶ ὅμοια προφέρηται, σημεῖον ἀρετῆς 33 εἶναι δόξει καὶ προαιρέσεως. ἔστι δ' ἔπαινος λόγος ἐμφανίζων μέγεθος ἀρετῆς. δεῖ οὖν τὰς πράξεις ἐπιδεικνύναι ὡς τοιαῦται. τὸ δ' ἐγκώμιον τῶν ἔργων ἐστίν, τὰ δὲ κύκλω εἰς πίστιν, οἶον εὐγένεια καὶ ῆλων (an accidental coincidence), 463 α 2, τῶν συμπτωμάτων οὐδὲν οὕτ' ἀεὶ γίνεται οῦθ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πόλυ (it is a mere occasional, unaccountable accident), de respir. 5, 472 b 26; de Gen. Anim. IV 4 § 10, 770 b 6[and 777 b 8]; Hist. An. VII 6. 4, 585 b 25, σύμπτωσιν (accident), IX 37. 6, 620 b 35, 40. 41, 626 α 29. Categ. 8, 9 b 15; p. 199 α 1; p. 1093 b 17. The medical sense of the word 'symptom' seems to be derived immediately from the Aristotelian 'accidental coincidence'. It is an attendant sign of the disease, though a mere external indication, and not of the essence of it; like a συμβεβηκός or 'accident'.

§§ 33, 34. See the Introd. p. 212 seq. Eth. Eud. II 1. 12, έτι δ' οἱ ἔπαινοι τῆς ἀρετῆς διὰ τὰ ἔργα, καὶ τὰ ἐγκώμια τῶν ἔργων...ἔτι διὰ τί ἡ εὐδαιμονία οὐκ ἐπαινεῖται; ὅτι διὰ ταύτην τἄλλα, ἡ τῷ εἰς ταύτην ἀναφέρεσθαι (Eth. N. I 12) ἡ τῷ μόρια εἶναι αὐτῆς. διὸ ἔτερον εὐδαιμονισμὸς καὶ ἔπαινος καὶ ἐγκώμιον τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐγκώμιον λόγος τοῦ καθ ἔκαστον ἔργου, ὁ δ' ἔπαινος

τοιούτον είναι καθόλου, ὁ δ' εὐδαιμονισμός τέλος.

τὰ δὲ κύκλω εls πίστιν] 'The encomium or panegyric is directed to deeds done' (έγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας, after they are done, the results of actions; ξπαινος being of the actions themselves) and the surrounding circumstances (such as noble birth1 and cultivation) serve for confirmation'. These 'surrounding circumstances' are a sort of setting of the gem, a frame for the picture, of which the real subject is the 'deeds' of the hero of the panegyric; what he has done himself; -nam genus et proavos et quae non fecimus ipsi, vix ea nostra voco. The 'confirmation' consists in this,for it is natural and probable that the offspring of the good should be good, and that one reared in such and such a way should turn out of such and such a character (fortes creantur fortibus et bonis: ws annois no ἄρα ἐσθλῶν ἀπ' ἀνδρῶν ἐσθλὰ γίγνεσθαι τέκνα, κακῶν δ' ὅμοια τῆ φύσει τῆ τοῦ πατρός, Eur. Alcm. Fragm. VII Dind.). But still the real object of our praise is the fees, the confirmed habit of virtue, the character and not the mere act; 'because we should praise a man even if he had not done the (praiseworthy) act, if we supposed that his character was such as to incline him to do it'.

τὰ κύκλφ occurs in the same sense, of 'surrounding' (or accompanying) 'circumstances', Eth. Nic. III 12, 1117 δ 2, οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δόξειεν ἃν εἶναι τὸ κατὰ τὴν ἀνδρείαν τέλος ἡδύ, ὑπὸ τῶν κύκλφ δ' ἀφανίζεσθαι, where τὰ κύκλφ are τὸ λυπηρὸν καὶ πόνοι, 'the pains and dangers by which courage is sur-

¹ The topic of genealogy is put first of all and treated at length by the author of the Rhet. ad Alex., c. 35 (36). 4, seq. in his chapter on the encomiastic and vituperative kind of Rhetoric. This stands in marked contrast to the secondary and subordinate place here assigned to it by Aristotle, who seems rather to have agreed with Ovid l. c. as to its comparative value.

παιδεία· είκὸς γὰρ έξ ἀγαθῶν ἀγαθοὺς καὶ τὸν οὕτω p. 33τραφέντα τοιοῦτον εἶναι. διὸ καὶ ἐγκωμιάζομεν πράξαντας. τὰ δ' ἔργα σημεῖα τῆς ἔξεως ἐστίν, ἐπεὶ
ἐπαινοῖμεν ἄν καὶ μὴ πεπραχότα, εἰ πιστεύοιμεν εἶναι
34 τοιοῦτον. μακαρισμὸς δὲ καὶ εὐδαιμονισμὸς αὐτοῖς
μὲν ταὐτά, τούτοις δ' οὐ ταὐτά, ἀλλ' ὤσπερ ἡ εὐδαιμονία τὴν ἀρετήν, καὶ ὁ εὐδαιμονισμὸς περιέχει ταῦτα.

35 ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος ὁ ἔπαινος καὶ αἱ συμβουλαί· ἀ γὰρ ἐν τῷ συμβουλεύειν ὑπόθοιο ἄν, ταῦτα μετατε- Ρ. 1368. 36 θέντα τῆ λέξει ἐγκώμια γίγνεται. ἐπεὶ οὖν ἔχομεν

rounded, while it looks through them to the pleasant end'; again, Rhet.

ΙΙΙ 14. 10, οἱ δοῦλοι οὐ τὰ ἐρωτώμενα λέγουσιν άλλὰ τὰ κύκλφ.

§ 34. μακαρισμὸς καὶ εὐδαιμονισμὸς αὐτοῖς μὲν ταὐτά] It is quite true that the two terms are sometimes identified, (as in Eth. N. I 12, I101 b 24, τούς τε γὰρ θεοὺς μακαρίζομεν καὶ εὐδαιμονίζομεν καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν τοὺς θειστάτους μακαρίζομεν); but they are also distinguished, and then μάκαρ and μακαρία represent 'blessedness, bliss', a higher degree of happiness than εὐδαίμων and εὐδαιμονία, which is the human form of happiness, while μακαρία is the divine. μάκαρες is specially applied to θεοί by Homer and Hesiod; as well as to the denizens of the μακάρων νῆσοι, the abode of the blessed after death.—αὐτοῖς is for ἀλλήλοις.

τούτοις δ' οὐ ταὐτά] 'but not the same with the other two', viz. ἔπαινος and ἐγκώμιον: these are included in εὐδαιμονισμός as virtue is in hap-

piness.

§ 35. ἔχει δὲ κοινὸν εἶδος κ.τ.λ.] 'There is a community of kind' (the two may be referred to one species, one of the three kinds (εἴδη) of Rhetoric, c. 3. I, either the συμβουλευτικόν or the ἐπιδεικτικόν, as the occasion requires) 'between praise and counsel or advice; for anything that you would suggest in advising may, by a mere change in the language, be converted into panegyric'. Quintilian has borrowed this, Inst. Or. III 7.28, totum autem habet (laudativum genus) aliquid simile suasoriis; quia

plerumque eadem illic suaderi hic laudari solent.

§ 36. 'And so, when we know what we ought to do in any given case, or to be in respect of character, we must then use the acquired knowledge (of the right course of action, and the right character) as suggestions, by changing and converting the language' (twisting so as to adapt it to our purpose; lit. turning them by the language). The example, and probably the topic itself, is taken from Isocrates, who in Panath. § 32 employs it as a suggestion or piece of advice, and in Evag. § 45 converts it into a topic of laudation—'Now when thus expressed, it amounts to (has the value of, may serve for,) a suggestion, but when thus, it becomes laudation, "Proud, not of the accidents of fortune, but of the distinctions due to himself alone".—The example in the laudatory form from the Evagoras runs thus in the original, our emit for the trains of the content of the distinctions of the content of the distinctions are the suggestion.

α δεί πράττειν καὶ ποίον τινα είναι, δεί ταῦτα ώς ύποθήκας λέγοντας τη λέξει μετατιθέναι καὶ στρέφειν, οἷον ὅτι οὐ δεῖ μέγα φρονεῖν ἐπὶ τοῖς διὰ τύχην άλλα τοῖς δι αὐτόν. ούτω μέν οὖν λεχθέν ὑποθήκην δύναται, ώδὶ δ' έπαινον "μέγα Φρονών οὐ τοῖς διά πύχην ὑπάρχουσιν ἀλλὰ τοῖς δί αὐτὸν." ὤστε ὅταν έπαινείν βούλη, όρα τί αν ύπόθοιο, καὶ όταν ύποθέσθαι, 37 δρα τί αν έπαινέσειας. ή δε λέξις έσται αντικειμένη έξ ανάγκης, όταν τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὸ δὲ μή κωλῦον μετατεθή.

χρηστέον δέ καὶ τῶν αὐξητικῶν πολλοῖς, οἷον εἰ 38 αὐτὸν γιγνομένοις. Aristotle was probably quoting from memory, as seems to have been his common practice.

With the passages of Isocrates comp. Ovid. Met. XIII 140, Nam genus

et proavos et quae non fecimus ipsi, vix ea nostra voco.

δύναται Rhet. It 5. I. δύνασθαι is often used in the sense of 'having the value of, amounting to, equivalent to', and is construed with the accusative. Herod. III 89, τὸ δὲ Βαβυλώνιον τάλαντον δύναται Εὐβοίδας έβδομήκοντα μνέας. Xen. Anab. I 5.6, ὁ σίγλος δύναται έπτα ὀβόλους, Thuc. VI 40, λόγοι έργα δυνάμενοι, Eur. Med. 128, τὰ δ' ὑπερβάλλουτ' οὐδένα καιρόν δύναται θνατοῖς (where Elmsley and Pflugk understand καιρόν as used adverbially); also of the power, force, import, 'meaning', of a word, Ar. Met. r 6, 1011 a 7, δύνανται δ' αἱ ἀπορίαι αἱ τοιαῦται πᾶσαι τὸ αὐτό. Thuc. I 141, τὴν αὐτὴν δύναται (is equivalent to) δούλωσιν. Id. VI 36, τοῦτο δύνανται (mean) αὶ ἀγγελίαι, VII 58, δύναται δὲ τὸ Νεοδαμώδες έλεύθερον ήδη είναι. Ast's Lex. Plat. s. vv. δύναμαι, δύναμις. The power or force which is contained in the primary sense of δύνασθαι is expressed in the secondary sense in which it appears in the above passages as a particular kind of force, the value of anything, and hence the amount, (of which equality or equivalence is a species), or the import, or meaning (which again is a kind of equivalence) of it. And the accusative is nothing but a cognate accusative. That power or force is the original notion from which the secondary meanings are derived, is proved, if proof were needed, by the parallel use of λοχύειν to express precisely the same notion; Eth. Nic. 11 3, 1105 b 2, το μεν είδεναι μικρον ή ουδέν Ισχύει, τὰ δ' ἄλλα ου μικρον άλλα το παν δύναται. As we say δύνασθαί τι for τινὰ δύναμιν, this construction is merely extended to the new kind of power which constitutes the secondary sense of the verb.

§ 37. η δε λέξις κ.τ.λ.] 'The expression must be contradictory' (the opposition of αντίφασις, κατάφασις and απόφασις, positive and negative, Categ. c. 10, p. 11 b 19, the fourth kind of 'opposites' Tà artikeineva), i.e. it must be positive in one, and negative in the other, 'when the prohibitive and the non-prohibitive are interchanged'. This is the case in the two examples; the one forbids pride, the other recommends or praises it-in a sense, provided it be directed to proper objects: by 'not forbidding' it

contradicts the other.

§ 38. των αθέητικων quae valent ad amplificandum. These are the

μόνος η πρώτος η μετ' όλίγων η και μάλιστα πεποίηκεν άπαντα γαρ ταθτα καλά. και τὰ ἐκ τῶν
χρόνων και τῶν καιρῶν ταθτα δὲ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον.
και εἰ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατώρθωκεν μέγα γάρ, και
οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης ἀλλὰ δι' αὐτὸν ἄν δόξειεν. και εἰ τὰ

-1 +8 infra, cum libris. 'Recte Wolfius apud Vaterum p. 209 8 delet.' Spengel. various modes of αυξησις, which with the opposite, μείωσις, constitutes the fourth of the κοινοὶ τόποι. See Introd. p. 129, and (on II 26) p. 276.

Some of the special topics which follow as instances of αὐξητικά have been already mentioned in § 25, and appear again as giving a special importance or prominence to crimes in c. 14. 4, with the omission of the last. They, and others of the like kind, are included in the Rhet. ad Alex. 35 (36), t2, 13, under the general head of 'Comparison' with others for the purpose of laudation, to which they are all reducible. Comp. Cic. de Orat. 11 85. 347—8, and Quint. Inst. Or. 111 7. 16. With καὶ ὁ μάλιστα πεποίηκεν, εἰ πεποίηκεν must be supplied for the sense after καί.

τὰ ἐκ τῶν χρόνων καὶ τῶν καιρῶν] 'circumstances of time and opportunity' give a praiseworthy character to particular actions at special times and seasons. This topic, equally applicable to comparative goods, has already occurred, c. 7. 32: and with παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον, comp. c. 9. 31. If, for instance, a man performs an act of liberality, at a time of great pecuniary pressure, or in a case of emergency, or at a crisis of especial difficulty, he is then doing something παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον, beyond what could naturally be expected from him, or any one else, and is entitled to especial credit for it. Similarly Victorius.

καὶ εἰ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ κατώρθωκεν] This topic is not to be confounded with τὸ πολλάκις φαίνεσθαι πεπραχότα of § 32. That is a 'repetition of the act', this denotes the 'repeated success' in any attempt, the constant success is an indication—not infallible, or certain as a proof—of special skill: as if a man were to throw sixes several times running, even if it were by mere accident, the inference would be that he had a special knack or skill in throwing dice. 'The constancy of the success gives it importance, and it will seem not accidental but due to the agent himself.

καὶ εἰ τὰ προτρέποντα κ.τ.λ.] 'And any one' (on whose account, in consequence of his actions and distinctions) 'to commemorate whom incentives, stimulants, to virtue ('encouragements' to do the like), or marks of respect for it, have been invented or were ever 'instituted', must be a praiseworthy character'. This is the general case of the invention or establishment of any public mark of honour in commemoration of the great deeds or distinctions of any signal public benefactor, and as an incentive or encouragement to others to follow his example.

The next clause, ϵ is $\delta \nu \pi \rho \hat{\omega} \tau \sigma \nu$, is a particular example of the former of the two preceding cases, the 'invention', the first appropriation, of something in a person's honour. Victorius thinks that $\kappa a \tau \epsilon \sigma \kappa \epsilon \nu \dot{\alpha} \sigma \theta \eta$ is especially applied to the *permanent* establishment of an enduring monument, as a temple.

προτρέποντα καὶ τιμώντα διὰ τοῦτον εὕρηται καὶ κατεσκευάσθη. καὶ εἰς ον πρώτον εγκώμιον εποιήθη,

ευρηται...κατεσκευάσθη] We may note here the juxtaposition of the perf. and aor., apparently with no distinction of time intended. I have elsewhere noticed (Pref. to Transl, of Gorgias, pp. xv. xvi.) the difference of idiom between the Greek and English languages which obliges us sometimes to translate the Greek agrist by the English perfect. Other examples of the same inadvertence, confusion of tenses, or whatever else it is to be called, occur, 1 3.8, where πραχθήναι in the same sense and in the same opposition is repeated in the form πεπράχθαι, Top. IX sub fin. p. 184 a 8, βεβοήθηκε μέν...τέχνην δ' οὐ παρέδωκεν. Many instances are found in Sophocles, which in a writer so subtle in the distinctions of language might lead one to think that he at any rate distinguishes them with a meaning. I leave the reader to judge. Philoct. 664, 666, (Herm. 676), λόγω μεν εξήκουσ' όπωπα δ' οὐ μάλα, 927-8, οἰά μ' εἰργάσω, οί ἡπάτηκας. 1172, τί μ' ώλεσας; τί μ' είργασαι; Antig. 406 (Dind.), present and aorist, καὶ πῶς ὁρᾶται κἀπίληπτος ἡρέθη; 1228—9, Aj. 31, Trach. 364, 5, Arist. Ran. 1010-11 (Dind.), πεποίηκας... ἀπέδειξας, Plat. Phaedr. 231 A, α τε καὶ διέθεντο, καὶ α πεποιήκασιν εὐ. Dem. de F. L. § 228, οὐτ' ἡνώχλησα οὕτε... βεβίασμαι. els ον πρώτον...] The novelty of the distinction, invented expressly for the occasion, marks a still higher sense entertained of the value of the

service or the virtue of the act which it is intended to commemorate.

ἐγκώμιον ἐποιήθη ποιεῖν is here loosely used, by the so-called figure zeugma (on c. 4. 6, note 1), in connexion with ἐγκώμιον and the statue of Harmodius and Aristogeiton in two different senses—as to Hippolochus, until we know who he was, and in what way commemorated, the application

must remain uncertain—of writing the panegyric, and 'setting up the statue in the market-place'.

Of Hippolochus nothing is known. It seems that Aristotle intended the ἐγκώμιον to refer to him. We should therefore insert a semicolon, or at least a comma after Ἰππόλοχον, in order to connect the panegyric and the statue with those that they severally concern: εἰς is to be repeated after καί. ʿAnd one (is especially praiseworthy) in whose honour a panegyric was first composed, as it was for Hippolochus; (and as the setting up of their statue in the market was 'done' first, ἐποιήθη, i.e.), and as the privilege of having their statue erected in the market was granted for the first time to Harmodius and Asistogeiton'. Thucydides in his episodical account of the assassination and the circumstances that led to it, VI 54—59, makes no mention of the statue; nor Aristotle Pol. VIII (V) 10, where the attack on Hipparchus is spoken of. Pausanias, I 8. 5, says, οὐ πόρρω δὲ ἐστᾶσιν 'Αρμόδιος καὶ 'Αριστογείτων οἱ κτείναντες "Ιππαρχον' αἰτία δὲ ἢτις ἐγένετο κ.τ.λ. He is describing the ἀγορά, though he does not expressly name it. (See Smith's Dict. of Geogr. Art. Athena, p. 293 δ.)

in the opposite cases', of men to whom any reproach or stigma, mark of disapprobation (the test of vice) was first attached. 'cum nempe quempiam aut solum aut primum aut cum paucis flagitium admisisse ostendemus, turpitudinem ipsius valde augebinus.' Victorius.

On the topics of vituperation, Quintilian, Inst. Or. 111 7. 19-22.

οἷον εἰς Ἱππόλοχον, καὶ δι Ἡρμόδιον καὶ Ἡριστογείτονα τὸ ἐν ἀγορῷ σταθῆναι. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἐναντίων. κᾶν μὴ καθ αὐτὸν εὐπορῆς, πρὸς ἄλλους ἀντιπαραβάλλειν ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης ἐποίει διὰ την

καν μη καθ' αὐτὸν εὐπορῆς κ.τ λ.] 'and if you have not enough to say about your hero himself, and in his own person, then institute a comparison between him and others... only the comparison must be with men of distinction, (reputation); because the amplifying power of the comparison and the impression of nobility which it creates, arise from the superiority which is attributed to him over those who are themselves worthy and good'. The same topic is recommended in the Rhet. ad Alex. c, 3 (4). 6.

ὅπερ Ἰσοκράτης-δικολογείν] 'which was Isocrates' custom, owing to his want of practice in forensic pleading'. Read ἀσυνήθειαν [with A^o] for two reasons. First, what is meant is that Isocrates cultivated the habit of comparing his hero with others in consequence of his want of actual practice in the law-courts. There the pleading is always direct, and the arguments pointed at an adversary; comparisons with others are altogether out of place, or only occasionally serviceable. If Isocrates had had this practice, he would not have fallen into the habit of comparing, into which he had been led by confining himself to the epideictic branch of Rhetoric where they tell and are in point. Secondly, this is what Isocrates himself tells us of his own habits and pursuits, Antid. §§ 2, 3, έγω γάρ είδως ενίους των σοφιστων βλασφημούντας περί της έμης διατριβής καὶ λέγοντας ώς ἔστι περὶ δικογραφίαν... αὐτὸς δὲ πᾶσι τοῦτο πεποιηκέναι φανερον ότι προήρημαι και λέγειν και γράφειν ού περί των ίδιων συμβολαίων. άλλ' θπέρ τηλικούτων κ.τ.λ. Panath. § 11, άλλ' έπειδή του πολιτεύεσθαι διήμαρτον έπὶ τὸ φιλοσοφείν (i.e. literary labour, speech writing) καὶ πονείν καὶ γράφειν, οὐ περὶ μικρών τὴν προαίρεσιν ποιούμενος οὐδὲ περὶ τών ἰδίων συμβολαίων ούδε περί ων άλλοι τίνες ληρούσιν, άλλά περί των Έλληνικών κ.τ.λ. Ib. § 39 seq. ήγουμαι δέ χρηναι τους βουλομένους έγκωμιάσαι τινά των πόλεων άκριβώς και δικαίως μή μόνον περί αὐτής ποιείσθαι τούς λόγους ής προηρημένοι τυγγάνουσιν, άλλ' ώσπερ (here follows a simile) ούτω καὶ ταίς πόλεσι παριστάναι μή τὰς μικράς ταις μεγάλαις, κ.τ.λ. [Cf. note on Paneg. § 11, S.]

Here we find, first, that he failed in public life; secondly, that he withdrew from the law-courts and their ἴδια συμβόλαια, the cases arising out of the 'private dealings' of the citizens with one another in their ordinary business, in order to devote himself to philosophy and the study of public affairs; and thirdly, that his ordinary practice in his Panegyrics was, just as Aristotle describes it, to compare, παριστάναι, the object of his laudation with others, whether men or cities, as great and distinguished as themselves, πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν. The two first of these statements seem to put the reading ἀσυνήθειαν beyond question, συνήθειαν being contrary alike to the known facts and the probabilities of the case. It is nevertheless supported by Max Schmidt, in his tract on the date of the Rhetoric, pp. 17, 18. With the reading, δικολογία must be confined to

speech writing for the use of parties in a legal process.

of the passages of the Rhetoric on which Victorius founds

άσυνήθειαν τοῦ δικολογεῖν. δεῖ δὲ πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν αὐξητικὸν γὰρ καὶ καλόν, εἰ σπουδαίων 39 βελτίων. πίπτει δ' εὐλόγως ἡ αὕξησις εἰς τοὺς ἐπαίνους. ἐν ὑπεροχῆ γάρ ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν. διὸ κᾶν μὴ πρὸς τοὺς ἐνδόξους, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ρ. 34 τοὺς ἄλλους δεῖ παραβάλλειν, ἐπείπερ ἡ ὑπεροχὴ 40 δοκεῖ μηνύειν ἀρετήν. ὅλως δὲ τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν

his charge against Aristotle of jealousy and illwill towards Isocrates, whom he supposes the other to have lost no opportunity of assailing with open or covert censure and ridicule in his Rhetoric. See his commentary, pp. 154, 507, 586, 605, and elsewhere. Here at least, (with the reading arounibeau), there is neither one nor the other. I have already entered into this question in the Introd. p. 40—1, where I have given the opinions of later writers on the subject.

συγκρίνειν] Pol. VI (IV) II, sub init. 12, 1296 b 24, Metaph. A 4, 985 a 24, 26, Top. A 5, 102 b 15, H 3, 154 a 5, 9, θ 5, 159 b 25. σύγκριστε , αδόκιμος φωνή. όμοιως δὲ καὶ τὸ συγκρίνειν τόνδε τῷδε καὶ συνέκρινεν ἡμάρτηται χρὴ οὖν ἀντεξετάζειν καὶ παραβάλλειν λέγειν. Phrynichus. See Lobeck's note ad loc. p. 278. In all'the passages quoted, except the two of the Metaph., συγκρίνειν and σύγκρισις denote comparison: in the other two it is a term of the early Physical Philosophy, meaning a composition of elements. opposed to διάκρισις.

Victorius quotes in illustration of πρὸς ἐνδόξους συγκρίνειν, Catullus, Carmen 64, 344, non illi quisquam bello se conferet heros, seq. Cic. de Or. II 85, 348, est etiam cum ceteris praestantibus viris comparatio in laude praeclara.

§ 39. The κοινὸς τόπος of αυξησις or amplification naturally falls under the general head or class of laudatory speeches, is especially applicable to all forms of 'praise': because its object is to establish a certain 'superiority' of the person panegyrized over others, and this 'superiority' is an honourable end to aim at. And therefore if we do not compare our hero with the distinguished, it is at all events better to do it with the rest of the world (the average of mankind) because superiority in general, in itself, is thought to be an indication of 'virtue'. Eth. Nic. IV 8, sub init. of γὰρ εὖγενεῖς ἀξιοῦνται τιμῆς καὶ οἱ δυναστεύοντες ἡ οἱ πλουτοῦντες ἐν ὑπεροχŷ γάρ, τὸ δ' ἀγαθῷ ὑπερέχον πᾶν ἐντιμότερον.

§ 40. It follows from this that of the three universal kinds of persuasion $ab\xi\eta\sigma\iota s$, or amplificatio, is most appropriate to the epideictic branch of Rhetoric (and the opposite $\mu\epsilon\iota l\omega\sigma\iota s$, vituperatio, to the censorious critical extenuatory kind of it^1): for in this the actions are taken for granted (as admitted), and therefore all that remains to be done is to invest them with magnitude (importance) and honour (dignity, glory). To the deliberative orator examples are most serviceable; because people

¹ έχομένων γάρ τούτων (when these are held fast by us, when we have mastered these) τὰ έναντία τούτοις φανερά: ὁ γὰρ ψόγος ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων ἐστίν, § 41 ἐνήτα.

άπασι τοις λόγοις ή μέν αύξησις έπιτηδειστάτη τοις έπιδεικτικοίς τὰς γὰρ πράξεις ὁμολογουμένας λαμβάνουσιν, ώστε λοιπον μέγεθος περιθείναι καὶ κάλλος. τά δὲ παραδείγματα τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς ἐκ γάρ τών προγεγονότων τὰ μέλλοντα καταμαντευόμενοι κρίνομεν τὰ δ' ἐνθυμήματα τοῖς δικανικοῖς αἰτίαν γάρ και απόδειξιν μάλιστα δέχεται τὸ γεγονὸς διά τὸ ἀσαφές.

έκ τίνων μεν οὖν οἱ ἔπαινοι καὶ οἱ ψόγοι λέγονται 41 σχεδον πάντες, καὶ προς ποῖα δεῖ βλέποντας ἐπαινεῖν καὶ ψέγειν, καὶ ἐκ τίνων τὰ ἐγκώμια γίγνεται καὶ τὰ ὀνείδη, ταῦτ' ἐστίν ἐχομένων γὰρ τούτων τὰ έναντία τούτοις φανερά ο γάρ ψόγος έκ των ένανι τίων ἐστίν. περὶ δὲ κατηγορίας καὶ ἀπολογίας, ἐκ CHAP. Χ.

are apt to draw inferences, to form a judgment or decision upon the future from the past by a sort of presentiment or anticipation. The enthymeme, direct logical argument, is most to the purpose in judicial oratory: in that there is most room for the application of direct proof, the tracing of cause and effect, and demonstration by deductive process, in clearing up the obscurity of 'past facts', which are the objects of forensic oratory, c. 3. 2. The substance of this is repeated in III 17. 3-5.

τῶν κοινῶν εἰδῶν] This seems to be a division, for the nonce, of rhetorical mioreus as a yévos, into three eion or species, each specially adapted to one of the three branches of Rhetoric. The division has no pretension to a regular scientific character: alknows is not a logical kind of argument at all, and the three members of the division are not coordinate.

καταμαντευόμενοι] μαντεύεσθαι and ἀπομαντεύεσθαι, both of them not unusual in Plato and Aristotle, are the usual terms by which this kind of 'divination', the foreboding presentiment, dark undefined anticipation of the future is expressed. It occurs again (in the simple form) I 13. 2, III 17. 10, Eth. N. I 3, 1095 b 26, of a suspicion, or hypothesis, Ib. VI 13, 1144 b 25. Examples are to be found in Stallbaum's note on Rep. 1 349 A, and many more in Ast's Lex. sub vv.—καταμαντεύεσθαι, besides this place [the only passage where it is used by Aristotle], is found in pseudo-Dem. ἐπιτάφ. p. 1400. 2, Polyb. II 22. 7, in Longinus and Athenaeus.

CHAP, X.

We now pass on to the treatment of the dicastic or forensic branch of Rhetoric, which occupies the remainder of the book; the arexvox mioreis, being peculiar to this bran κῶν), 15. I, are added as an appendix in the fif connexion of the contents of thes cial subjects the anawhich seem

πόσων καὶ ποίων ποιεῖσθαι δεῖ τοὺς συλλογισμούς, 2 ἐχόμενον ἂν εἴη λέγειν. δεῖ δὴ λαβεῖν τρία, εν μεν τίνων καὶ πόσων ἕνεκα ἀδικοῦσι, δεύτερον δὲ πῶς αὐτοὶ διακείμενοι, τρίτον δὲ τοὺς ποίους καὶ πῶς 3 ἔχοντας. διορισάμενοι οὖν τὸ ἀδικεῖν λέγωμεν ἑξῆς.

ἔστω δη τὸ ἀδικεῖν τὸ βλάπτειν ἐκόντα παρὰ τὸν νόμον. νόμος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν ἴδιος ὁ δὲ κοινός· λέγω δὲ ἴδιον μὲν καθ' ὁν γεγραμμένον πολιτεύονται,

lysis of the Introduction, pp. 185-207, and the Appendixes to Bk. I, C. D. E.

§ 1. The first subject of inquiry in this branch is the number and nature (quantity and quality) of the materials or propositions (the premisses) of which our 'syllogisms' are to be constructed, in accusation and defence, the two functions of the dicastic branch of Rhetoric.

Schrader draws attention to the term 'syllogisms' as marking the especially logical character of the arguments which are employed in this branch as compared with the other two. On syllogism for enthymeme,

see note on I I. II, p. 19.

§ 2. There are three subjects to be considered and analysed in order to furnish topics for the pleader's use; first, the number and nature of the motives and causes of injustice; secondly, the dispositions of the wrong-doers themselves; and thirdly, what characters and dispositions render men most liable to wrong and injustice.

§ 3. The first thing is to define justice, then to proceed with the rest in order.—ξοτω, of a popular or merely provisional definition; comp.

5. 3 ; 6. 2 ; 7. 2.

'Wrong' or 'injustice' is defined 'a voluntary injury contrary to law'. The two leading characteristics of a crime or punishable offence which are here brought into view are, that it is an act in violation of the law of the land—this is the political view of injustice—and that to be a crime the act must be intentional, done with malice prepense, and with full knowledge of the circumstances of the case and the probable effect of the action. It is thus distinguished from a merely accidental injury or harm done, which can hardly be considered voluntary at all, and again from a mere mistake or error of judgment arising from ignorance, not of universals, or general moral principles, but of the particular circumstances of the case (as of the absence of the button of the foil) where there is no evil or malicious purpose, no bad προαίρεσις, which constitutes the immorality of the act. See Eth. N. III 2, V 10. Rhet. I 13. 16.

νόμος δ' ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν ἴδιος ὁ δὲ κοινός] Comp. 13. 2, 11, 12, and Introd. p. 230, Append. E. to Bk. I.

λέγω δέ ίδιον κ.τ.λ.] 'by special' law I mean the written law under

This application of the term tous to νόμος is to be distinguished from the ordinary meaning of it in this combination, as, for instance, Dem. de Cor. § 211,

κοινον δε όσα άγραφα παρά πᾶσιν όμολογεῖσθαι δοκεῖ. ἐκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα εἰδότες καὶ μὴ ἀναγκαζόμενοι. ὅσα μὲν οὖν ἔκόντες, οὐ πάντα προαιρούμενοι, εἰδότες ἄπαντα οὐδεὶς γὰρ ὁ προαιρεῖται ἀγνοεῖ. δι ὰ δὲ προαιροῦνται

which the government is conducted and the citizens live', the laws and institutions—which direct the policy of the government and the conduct of the citizens—the positive, written, law of the particular state: this is human, as opposed to divine and natural, law: 'by common (universal) law (I mean) all the unwritten principles that are supposed to be universally admitted'. This is the usual distinction taken between the two: these κοινά, ἄγραφα, are described, Introd. p. 239 seq.; for the further subdivision adopted in c. 13. 2, see Ib. p. 242,

έκόντες δὲ ποιοῦσιν ὅσα κ.τ.λ.] ^τα voluntary act is characterised by knowledge, and the absence of all external force and compulsion'. Eth. N. III 3, init. ὅντος δ΄ ἀκουσίου τοῦ βία καὶ δι΄ ἄγνοιαν, τὸ ἐκαύσιον δόξειεν ἄν εἶναι οὖ ἡ ἀρχὴ ἐν αὐτῷ εἶδότι τὰ καθ΄ ἔκαστα (i. e. with special knowledge of the particular circumstances) ἐν οἶς ἡ πρᾶξις. ἵσως γὰρ οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἡ δι΄ ἐπιθυμίαν. 1 I3. 6, τὰ ἐκούσια, ὅτι ἐστὶν ὅσα εἶναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ἡ δι΄ ἐπιθυμίαν.

όσα μὲν οὖν ἐκόντες κ.τ.λ.] 'now all voluntary actions are not done with (do not imply) deliberate moral purpose, but all acts done with such a purpose imply knowledge, because no one can be ignorant of what he purposes'. Eth. N. III 4, IIII 67, ἡ προαίρεσις δὴ ἐκούσιον μὲν φαίνεται, οὐ ταὐτὸν δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ πλέον τὸ ἐκούσιον τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐκουσίον καὶ παίδες καὶ τἄλλα ζῷα κοινωνεῖ, προαιρέσεως δ' οὖ, καὶ τὰ ἐξαίφνης ἐκούσια μὲν λέγομεν, κατὰ προαίρεσιν δ' οὖ. Actions, for example, done under the impulse of violent excitement or passion, διὰ θυμόν, or of appetite, δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, are voluntary, but not κατὰ προαίρεσιν.

§ 4. δι' å δὲ προσιροῦνται κ.τ.λ.] 'The impelling motive, cause, of this purpose to do mischievous and vicious acts in violation of the law, is vice and want of self-control. This general vicious habit takes various forms in particular cases, and shews itself in different special vices according to the circumstances which call it forth at the time, and give it its special direction. Thus vice and wrong (μοχθηρία καὶ ἀδικία) may take the form of illiberality in money matters, licentiousness in pleasure, effeminacy in respect of ease and comfort (ῥαθυμία), cowardice in danger (when, for instance, the coward leaves his comrades in the lurch, and runs away out of mere terror); similarly the vice of ambition is shewn in the undue pursuit of honour, the passionate irascible temper in the over indulgence of angry feeling; victory is the motive to wrong in one that is over eager for victory, revenge with the vindictive; folly (the want of φρόνησις, practical wisdom, the special moral faculty) shews itself in the inability to distinguish (the liability to be deceived in distinctions of) right and wrong,

where it stands simply for ius privatum, relating to private (as opposed to public) affairs.

βλάπτειν καὶ Φαῦλα ποιεῖν παρὰ τὸν νόμον, κακία έστὶ καὶ ἀκρασία· ἐὰν γάρ τινες ἔχωσι μοχθηρίαν ή μίαν ή πλείους, περί τοῦτο ὁ μοχθηροί τυγχάνουσιν όντες, καὶ άδικοί είσιν, οίον ο μέν ανελεύθερος περί χρήματα, ὁ δ' ἀκόλαστος περί τὰς τοῦ σάματος ήδονάς, ο δὲ μαλακὸς περί τὰ ράθυμα, ο δὲ δειλὸς περί τους κινδύνους (τους γάρ συγκινδυνεύοντας έγκαταλιμπάνουσι διά τον φόβον), ο δέ φιλότιμος διά τιμήν, ο δ' οξύθυμος δι' όργήν, ο δέ φιλόνικος διά p. 35. νίκην, ο δὲ πικρὸς διὰ τιμωρίαν, ὁ δ' ἄφρων διὰ τὸ

1 βάθυμα infra.

the vice of the shameless man appears in his reckless disregard of the opinion of others'.—ὀξύθυμος 'quick-tempered', 'hasty'.

περί δὲ τοῦτο] Wolf, and with him Brandis, in Schneidewin's Philologus, IV i, p. 42, object to &, which is omitted by Brandis' 'anonymus'

and one Ms. See the note on They de, I I, II, p. 20.

τὰ ῥάθυμα] are things and circumstances which tend to promote and encourage an easy, careless state of mind, 'things comfortable', which incline us to self-indulgence and inactivity. So ράστώνη in Plat. Gorg. 569 C, οὖκουν πολλή ράστώνη γίγνεται; 'isn't it a great comfort...?' Crit. 45 C, τὰ ραθυμότατα αίρεῖσθαι, of 'careless, easy-going, indifference'.

έγκαταλιμπάνειν, 'to leave behind in the lurch', desert a comrade in danger [Cf. 11 4. 26, 5. 7; 111 16. 5.]. ἐν sc. τῷ κινδύνω. Eupolis Δήμοι Fragm. VI (Meineke, Fragm. Comic. Gr. 11 458), of Pericles' eloquence, μόνος τῶν ρητόρων τὸ κέντρον ἐγκατέλειπε τοῖς ἀκροωμένοις, 'to leave the sting behind in the wound', (ἐν τῷ ἔλκει). Plat. Phaedo, 91 C, ὥσπερ

μέλιττα τὸ κέντρον έγκαταλιπών οἰχήσομαι.

πικρός] 'Translato a tristi sapore nomine, πικρούς Graeci appellant qui accepta iniuria non facile placantur sed diu simultatem gerunt, de quibus accuratius egit noster, Eth. Nic. IV (11, 1126 a 20), οἱ δὲ πικροὶ δυσδιάλυτοι, καὶ πολύν χρόνον ὀργίζονται' κατέχουσι γὰρ τὸν θυμόν. παῦλα δὲ γίνεται ὅταν άνταποδιδώ ή γάρ τιμωρία παύει της όργης, ήδονην άντι της λύπης έμποιούσα. [Vict.] τούτου δε μή γινομένου το βάρος έχουσιν' δια γαρ το μή επιφανές είναι ουδέ συμπείθει αὐτοὺς οὐδείς, ἐν αὐτῷ δὲ πέψαι τὴν ὀργὴν χρόνου δεῖν εἰσὶ δ' οἰ τοιούτοι έαυτοις όχληρότατοι καὶ τοις μάλιστα φίλοις. The Latin amarus, as Victorius points out, is used in much the same sense. The distinguishing characteristic of the Aristotelian πικρότης, in which the particular 'bitterness' of this form of ôργή is shewn, is its lasting and enduring quality—the wrath is nursed 'to keep it warm' (πέψαι την οργήν)—and this gives it a malignant, spiteful, implacable character, exactly opposite to that of Horace, the irascible temper, δργιλότης, irasci celerem, tamen ut placabilis essem.

ἀπατᾶσθαι] Ignorance of moral distinctions, and consequent wrong action, may be regarded as a kind of 'deception' or 'delusion'; when a man is too foolish (unwise) to be able to distinguish right from wrong,

ἀπατᾶσθαι περὶ τὸ δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, ὁ δ' ἀναίσχυντος δι' ὀλιγωρίαν δόξης. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔκαστος περὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων.

5 ἀλλὰ περὶ μὲν τούτων δῆλον, τὰ μὲν ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰρημένων, τὰ δ' ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη ρηθησομένων λοιπὸν δ' εἰπεῖν τίνος ἕνεκα καὶ πῶς 6 ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι, καὶ τίνας. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν διελώ-when le does not know and cannot perceive the difference between them (has no φρόνησις). Victorius quotes Top. Z (9, 148 a 6), τὸ γὰρ μὴ ἔχον ἐπιστήμην οὐ δοκεῖ ἀγνοεῖν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον τὸ διηπατημένον. Ignorance is not a mere στέρησις, the privation or absence of knowledge; which is shewn by our not applying the term 'ignorant' to inanimate objects and young children; it is something positive, and consists in a deception, mistaking one thing for another.

περὶ ἔκαστον τῶν ὑποκειμένων] τὰ ὑποκείμενα, res subiectae, subiectae materies; things that fall under the same head or general notion, and so are members or species of the same genus: Eth. N. II 2, 1105 a 1, πᾶσι τοῖς ὑπὸ τὴν αἴρεσιν, 'all that fall under the choice', as its objects, or matter to operate upon. These are the six things previously mentioned, καλόν,

συμφέρον, ήδύ, and their opposites.

And so for the rest, the same rule holds in the case of every vice, 'each in the things which are specially subjected to it', which come under that particular head, as money is the 'subject-matter' of illiberality, dangers of cowardice, anger of quick, irascible temper, and so on. Victorius understands it as the 'object' of the aim or desire of each.

§ 5. ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἀρετὰς εἰρημένων] sc. in c. 9; ἐκ τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη ρηθησομένων sc. in II cc. 2—11. 'It remains now to describe the motives and dispositions or characters of wrong doers, and the dispositions and characters of their objects or victims'. In Polit. VI (IV) II, 1295 b 9, there is a division of crimes based upon their respective magnitude or degree, into great and little, crimes on a great scale, acts of oppression, outrage, insolence, and crimes on a small scale, mean and paltry, which appear in fraud, cheating, and any paltry knavery or trickery. γίγνονται γὰρ οἱ μὲν ὑβρισταὶ καὶ μεγαλοπόνηροι μᾶλλον, οἱ δὲ κακοῦργοι καὶ μικροπόνηροι λίαν' τῶν δ᾽ ἀδικημάτων τὰ μὲν γίγνεται δι᾽ ὕβριν, τὰ δὲ διὰ κακουργίαν.

§ 6. First we have to distinguish or analyse the various motives and incentives, whether in the way of pursuit or avoidance which lead men to attempt (to undertake, take in hand, ἐγχειρεῖν) wrong doing: for it is plainly the accuser's business to inquire (how many and which kinds,) the number and the kinds of these universal incentives to wrong doing to which the adversary, whom he charges with a crime, is liable: and of the defendant, how many and what sorts of them are not applicable to his case. 'Hunc locum copiose persecutus est Cicero pro Milone et in criminando Clodio et in Milone purgando: cuncta enim in Clodio fuisse ostendit quae persuadere ipsi potuerint ut insidias faceret Miloni; eademque a persona Milonis afuisse,' Victorius,

μεθα τίνων ὀρεγόμενοι καὶ ποῖα φεύγοντες ἐρχειροῦσιν ἀδικεῖν δῆλον γὰρ ὡς τῷ μὲν κατηγοροῦντι πόσα καὶ ποῖα τούτων ὑπάρχει τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ σκεπτέον, [ὧν ἐφιέμενοι πάντες τοὺς πλησίον ἀδικοῦσι,] τῷ δ' ἀπολογουμένῳ ποῖα καὶ πόσα τούτων οὐχ ὑπάρχει. 7 πάντες δὴ πράττουσι πάντα τὰ μὲν οὐ δι' αὐτοὺς τὰ δὲ δι' αὐτοὺς. τῶν μὲν οὖν μὴ δι' αὐτοὺς τὰ μὲν διὰ τύχην πράττουσι τὰ δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τῶν δ' ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὰ μὲν βία τὰ δὲ φύσει ' ώστε πάντα ὅσα μὴ δι' αὐτοὺς πράττουσι, τὰ μὲν ἀπό τύχης τὰ δὲ φύσει τὰ δὲ βία. ὅσα δὲ δι' αὐτούς, καὶ ὧν αὐτοὶ αἴτιοι, τὰ Ρ. 1369, μὲν δι' ἔθος τὰ δὲ δι' ὄρεξιν, τῶν δὲ δι' ὄρεξιν τὰ μὲν 8 διὰ λογιστικὴν ὄρεξιν, τὰ δὲ δι' ἄλογον 'ἔστι δ' ἡ

§ 7. This inquiry naturally leads to a classification of the sources or causes of human action, which are sound to fall under seven heads; some of these have their origin in ourselves and are under our own control, others are external to us and independent of us, and exercise upon us and our actions the force of necessity and compulsion. To the causes whose origin is without us belong (1) chance or accident, (2) nature, and (3) external force or compulsion; over these we have no control: the causes which spring from within us, and are therefore more or less in our power to master and overrule, are (4) habit, (5) reasoning or calculation, (6) passion, (7) appetite or desire. These seven incentives to action have been carefully examined, and compared with other doctrines and opinions elsewhere expressed by Aristotle on the same subjects, in Append. C to Bk. I, Introd. p. 218 seq., to which I refer for further illustration of them.

This same classification of the causes or sources of actions is indicated or alluded to elsewhere, but nowhere else so completely made out. See, for instance, Eth. Nic. III 5, III2 a 32, αἴτια γὰρ δοκοῦσιν εἶναι φύσις καὶ ἀνάγκη καὶ τύχη, ἔτι δὲ μοῦς καὶ πῶν τὸ δι' ἀνθρώπου, and VI 4, in the definition of art, II40 a 14, οὕτε γὰρ τῶν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ὅντων ἡ γιγνόμενων ἡ τέχνη ἐστίν, οὕτε τῶν κατὰ φύσιν ἐν αὐτοῖς γὰρ ἔχουσι ταῦτα τὴν ἀρχήν. And in I 10, 1099 b 20 seq. the same division is hinted at.

§ 8. ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Eth. N. III 4, IIII b 26, ἔτι δ' ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὰ μᾶλλον, ἡ δὲ προαίρεσις τῶν πρὸς τὸ τέλος, οἶον ὑγιαίνειν βουλόμεθα, προαιρούμεθα δὲ δι' ὧν ὑγιανοῦμεν, καὶ εὐδαιμονεῖν μὲν βουλόμεθα καὶ φαμέν, προαιρούμεθα δὲ λέγειν οὐχ ἀρμόζει ὅλως γὰρ ἔοικεν προαίρεσις περὶ τὰ ἐφ' ἡμῖν εἶναι. This is a qualification of the too unlimited statement of the unscientific Rhetoric. 'In English, unfortunately, we have no term capable of adequately expressing what is common both to will and desire; that is, the nisus or conatus—the tendency towards the realisation of their end. By will is meant a free and deliberate, by desire

μεν βούλησις, (βούλησις δ') άγαθοῦ ὅρεξις (οὐδεὶς γάρ βούλεται άλλ' ή όταν οίηθη είναι άγαθόν), άλογοι δ' όρέξεις όργη καὶ ἐπιθυμία, ώστε πάντα ὅσα πράττουσιν ανάγκη πράττειν δι' αιτίας έπτα, δια τύχην, διά φύσιν, διά βίαν, δι έθος, διά λογισμόν, διά θυμόν, ο δι' ἐπιθυμίαν. τὸ δὲ προσδιαιρεῖσθαι καθ' ἡλικίας ἡ έξεις ή άλλ' άττα τὰ πραττόμενα περίεργον εί γὰρ συμβέβηκε τοις νέοις όργίλοις είναι ή έπιθυμητικοίς, οὐ διὰ τὴν νεότητα πράττουσι τὰ τοιαῦτα ἀλλὰ δί οργήν και επιθυμίαν. ουδέ διά πλούτον και πενίαν. άλλα συμβέβηκε τοῖς μεν πένησι δια την ένδειαν έπιθυμείν χρημάτων, τοίς δε πλουσίοις διά την έξουσίαν έπιθυμεῖν τῶν μὴ ἀναγκαίων ἡδονῶν ἀλλὰ πράξουσι a blind and fatal, tendency to action'. Sir W. Hamilton, Lect. on Metaph. XI Vol. 1. p. 184-5. On this, the Editor refers in a note to this passage. But βούλησις here means not 'will', but 'wish', as appears from the definition ἀγαθοῦ ὄρεξις-the 'will' is not always directed to good-and from the analysis of it in Eth. N. 111 4. The term by which Sir W. H. proposes to designate the common quality of this family of faculties, and so separate them from the rest, is Conative. Impulsive means much the same thing, and has the advantage of being an English word.

οὐδεὶς γὰρ βούλεται κ.τ.λ.] This question of the end and object of 'the wish' is discussed in Eth. Nic. 111 6 (Bekk.), and the conclusion, 1113 α 23, is as follows: εἰ δὲ δὴ ταῦτα μὴ ἀρέσκει (the two opposite views that it is τὰγαθόν από τὸ φαινόμενον ἀγαθόν), ἆρα φατέον ἀπλῶς μὲν καὶ κατ' ἀλήθειαν βουλητὸν εἶναι τὰγαθόν, ἐκάστω δὲ τὸ φαινόμενον; τῷ μὲν οὖν σπουδαίω τὸ

κατ' ἀλήθειαν είναι, τῷ δὲ φαύλφ τὸ τυχόν.

§ 9. $\tau \delta$ δè προσδιαιρεῖσθαι κ.τ.λ.] What he says is superfluous (περίεργον) here, is actually done in the six ethical chapters, 12—17, of Bk. II, and this apparent contradiction has raised a suspicion that some error has crept into the text. There is however in reality no inconsistency between the theory here laid down and the actual practice in Book II. There the treatment of these $\dagger\theta\eta$ is appropriate, as supplementary to that of the $\pi d\theta\eta$: here it would be out of place, because the present subject of inquiry is about the causes of human action; and though these states and conditions, youth, age, wealth, poverty and the rest, are as a general rule attended and characterised by certain tendencies or $\pi d\theta\eta$, yet these latter can be by no means regarded as effects of causes, but are mere συμβεβηκότα, separable accidents, which do not invariably accompany the states that they characterise. Youth and age, wealth and poverty, are not the causes of any particular classes of actions; in so far as they do accompany them they are accidental, not essential.

άναγκαίων ήδονών] These are thus defined by Plato, Rep. VIII 12, 558D,

καὶ ούτοι οὐ διὰ πλούτον καὶ πενίαν άλλά διὰ την έπιθυμίαν. όμοίως δέ καὶ οἱ δίκαιοι καὶ οἱ άδικοι, καὶ οί άλλοι οἱ λεγόμενοι κατά τὰς έξεις πράττειν, διὰ μ. ταύτα πράξουσιν· ή γάρ διὰ λογισμόν ή διὰ πάθος· άλλ' οἱ μὲν δι ήθη καὶ πάθη χρηστά, οἱ δὲ διὰ τάναν-10 τία. συμβαίνει μέντοι ταις μέν τοιαύταις έξεσι τὰ τοιαθτα ἀκολουθείν, ταις δὲ τοιαισδε τὰ τοιάδε. εύθύς γαρ ίσως τω μέν σώφρονι διά τὸ σώφρονα είναι δόξαι τε καὶ ἐπιθυμίαι χρησταὶ ἐπακολουθοῦσι περὶ οὐκοῦν ας τε οὐκ αν οἰοί τ' είμεν ἀποτρέψαι δικαίως αν ἀναγκαίαι καλοίντο, καὶ όσαι ἀποτελούμεναι ἀφελούσιν ήμας; τούτων γὸρ ἀμφοτέρων έφίεσθαι ήμῶν τῆ φύσει ἀνάγκη, comp. Phileb. 72 E. They are therefore pleasures that are forced upon us by nature, and therefore 'necessary' or 'indispensable' to us. Of these the 'bodily pleasures', the gratification of the appetites, are the most necessary, and sometimes the latter are confined to them; for in Eth. N. VII 14, 1154 a the pleasures which are first called σωματικαί, in lines 7 and 9, afterwards, in line 11, receive the name of avayraia, which is repeated in line 17. The Scholiast and Paraphrast both explain avaykaiat by σωματικαί. Plato more frequently speaks of the avayraiai emibuulai in the same sense.

§ 10. Not however that I mean to deny—it does happen, συμβαίνει—that there is a connexion of certain particular results or qualities with particular moral states (but these classes and conditions of life are not 'states' in this sense): any virtue, I dare say, (ἴσως), as self-control, does generate a particular kind of opinions and desires about things pleasant, good ones namely; and the opposite vice of licentiousness the contrary in

the same sphere.

This is a parenthetical note to avoid misunderstanding.

εὐθὺς...ἐπακολουθοῦσι] ' there is at once, from the very first, an immediate and close connexion (or consequence) between the σώφρων in virtue of his self-control, and certain good opinions and desires in respect of pleasure'. «νθύς in the sense of 'at once', 'straight off', and corresponding sometimes to the Latin statim and ultro, passes into a variety of significations which take their colour from the context. Eth. N. V 14, 1137 b 19, suapte natura, εὐθύς τοιαύτη ή τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν; see Bonitz on Metaph. Γ 3, 1004 a 5, who cites Categ. 12, 14 a 32, Anal. Pr. 1 16, 36 a 6, Eth. N. VI 5, 1140 b 18, εὐθὺς οὐ φαίνεται, omnino non apparet. Polit. III 4, 1277 a 15. την παιδείαν εὐθὺς (from the very first) ἐτέραν. Ib. VI (IV) 11, 1295 ὁ 16, καὶ τοῦτ' εὐθὺς οἴκοθεν ὑπάρχει παισὶν οὖσιν (from their very earliest home associations). Ib. VIII (V) 10, 1310 b 8, εὐθὺς ἐξ ἐναντίων (at once, from direct opposites). Ib. c. 10, ult. μή βουλομένων γάρ εύθύς οὐκ ἔσται βασιλεύς (he won't be king at all, omnino). Eth. Eudem. 11 5, 1222 a 37, διότι ή φύσις εὐθύς οὐ πρὸς ἄπαντα ὁμοίως ἀφέστηκε τοῦ μέσου. See Fritzsche, note ad loc. Phys. VII 4. 2, bis, 248 a 21, άλλ' εὐθὺς ἀνάγκη, and 23. Hist. Anim. II 13. 2, 17.7, κείται ὑπὸ τὸ διάζωμα εὐθύς, statim, at once, immediately under. V 17.5,

των ήδέων, τῷ δ' ἀκολάστω αἱ ἐναντίαι περὶ των 11 αὐτων τούτων. διὸ τὰς μὲν τοιαύτας διαιρέσεις ἐατέον, σκεπτέον δὲ ποῖα ποίοις εἴωθεν ἔπεσθαι εἰ μὲν γὰρ λευκὸς ἢ μέλας ἢ μέγας ἢ μικρός, οὐδὲν τέτακται τῶν τοιούτων ἀκολουθεῖν, εἰ δὲ νέος ἢ πρεσβύτης ἢ δίκαιος ἢ ἄδικος, ἤδη διαφέρει. καὶ ὅλως ὅσα τῶν συμβαινόντων ποιεῖ διαφέρειν τὰ ἤθη τῶν ἀνθρώπων, οἶον πλουτεῖν δοκῶν ἐαυτῷ ἢ πένεσθαι διοίσει τι, καὶ εὐτυχεῖν ἢ ἀτυχεῖν. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ὕστερον ἐροῦμεν, νῦν δὲ περὶ τῶν λοιπῶν εἴπωμεν πρῶτον.

12 ἔστι δ' ἀπὸ τύχης μὲν τὰ τοιαῦτα γιγνόμενα, de Gen. et Corr. II 11. 2, de part. Anim. IV 5. 1. Like ἤδη its connotation is transferred from time, its natural and proper signification, to place.

§ 11. 'And therefore', (because they are inappropriate as not assigning causes of human action,) 'such distinctions as these may be dismissed for the present; but still we are bound to inquire into the connexion which subsists between particular qualities and particular persons or classes'; (the general subject deserves investigation;) 'for though in respect of the qualities black and white or tall and short there is no fixed succession or accompaniment' (between them and any particular persons or classes), 'yet when we come to the connexion of young or old men with justice or injustice, then (by this time) there is a difference'. That is to say, that although in certain connexions of particular qualities with particular classes the establishment of such would be worthless or impossible, yet there are other cases, as in that of moral qualities, where it would be worth while to establish such a connexion, if it were possible. 'And in general, any accidental circumstance that makes a real difference in the characters of men; as the opinion a man has of his own wealth or poverty, or good or bad fortune, will make such a difference'. So after all it seems that it is possible to trace some such connexions between qualities and classes; but as this is not the proper place for such an inquiry-the reason being already given-'we will postpone it for the present', and wait till we come to the $\pi \acute{a}\theta \eta$, where it will be in its proper place: 'And now let us proceed to what remains' of the subject on which we are at present engaged.

πλουτείν δοκῶν ἐαυτῷ is a reading of some MSS, followed by the old Latin Translation, and adopted by the recent Edd. The vulgate has πλουτείν δοκεί, which Buhle retains. δοκεί τφ, a conjecture of Victorius,

is also found in some MSS.

§ 12. On τύχη see Appendix C to Bk. I. Introd.; on alτία ἀόριστος see ib. p. 221 seq. 'Illos eventus qui a causa quam nemo facile definiat oriuntur ad fortunam referimus. Arist. Phys. II 4, 196 δ 6, εἰσὶ δέ τινες οἷς δοκεῖ εἶναι αἰτία μὲν ἡ τύχη, ἄδηλος δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη διανοία ὡς θεῖών τι αἶσα καὶ δαιμονιώτερον.' Schrader. (Schrader quotes this as

όσων ή τε αίτια αόριστος και μη ένεκά του γίγνεται και μήτε άει μήτε ώς έπι το πολύ μήτε τεταγμένως. δηλον δ' έκ τοῦ όρισμοῦ τῆς τύχης περί τούτων.

13 φύσει δέ, όσων ή τ' αἰτία έν αὐτοῖς καὶ τεταγμένη· P.
ἢ γὰρ ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ ὡσαύτως ἀποβαίνει. τὰ
γὰρ παρὰ φύσιν οὐδὲν δεῖ ἀκριβολογεῖσθαι, πότερα
κατὰ φύσιν τινὰ ἢ ἄλλην αἰτίαν γίγνεται· δόξειε δ'

14 αν καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία εἶναι τῶν τοιούτων. βία δέ, ὅσα παρ' ἐπιθυμίαν ἣ τοὺς λογισμοὺς γίγνεται δί

15 αὐτῶν τῶν πραττόντων. ἔθει δέ, ὅσα διὰ τὸ πολ-

16 λάκις πεποιηκέναι ποιοῦσιν. διὰ λογισμὸν δὲ τὰ δοκοῦντα συμφέρειν ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀγαθῶν ἢ ὡς τέλος ἢ ὡς πρὸς τὸ τέλος, ὅταν διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν πράττηται ἕνια γὰρ καὶ οἱ ἀκόλαστοι συμφέροντα πράττουσιν, ἀλλ' οὐ διὰ τὸ συμφέρειν ἀλλὰ δι' ήδονήν.

καὶ (ὅσα) μὴ ἔνεκά του...μήτε τεταγμένως] 'in any fixed, regular, prescribed order'.

§ 13. φύσει] Introd. p. 224.—ἡ ἀεὶ ἡ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, 'either constantly, or as a general rule': the latter alternative allows for the possible objection of τὰ παρὰ φύσιν to the perfect regularity of the operations of Nature.

καὶ ἡ τύχη αἰτία] The καί admits that chance as well as Nature may be the cause of these unaccountable monstra, these deviations from the ordinary laws of nature; but leaves the question unsettled.

§ 14. βi_a] Introd. p. 225, anything that is done by our own instrumentality, but in opposition to our desires and calculations, may be said to be done βi_a , by compulsion.

§ 15. 70ec] Ib. p. 226-228.

§ 16. λογισμόν] Ib. p. 229. Reasoning or calculation is a cause of action, when any of the goods already mentioned (c. 6) are presented to us as objects of our interest, as expedient and useful to us, (this is good under the aspect of utility; the other two forms of good are τὸ καλόν the moral end, 'the right', and τὸ ἡδύ: see Eth. Nic. II 2, 1104 ὁ 30, τριῶν γὰρ ὅντων τῶν εἰς τὰς αἰρέσεις...καλοῦ συμφέροντος ἡδέος,) in the form of an end, or of means to that end; when, that is, good is the object of the action, (I add this qualification) because even the licentious (those who have lost all self-control, and therefore cannot act with a deliberate purpose to an end) do things that are expedient or for their interest, only not for that reason, but for mere pleasure.

§ 17. θυμός and δργή. Ib. p. 231,—τὰ τιμωρητικά, 'acts and feelings of

τιμωρία καὶ κόλασις· ἡ μὲν γὰρ κόλασις τοῦ πάσχοντος ἔνεκά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ τιμωρία τοῦ ποιοῦντος, ἴνα 18 ἀποπληρωθῆ. τί μὲν οὖν ἐστὶν ἡ ὀργή, δῆλον ἔσται p. 37. ἐν τοῖς περὶ παθῶν, δι' ἐπιθυμίαν δὲ πράττεται ὅσα

revenge, are prompted by passion and anger'. I have translated θυμός 'passion' and ἀργή 'anger' to express the distinction that the one is a more general, the other a more precise and definite, term. Besides this, θυμός being the older and Homeric term to represent anger might by that very fact have conveyed to the ears of the more modern Greek a difference of meaning which had no real existence. dpyh, if Damm's Lexicon is to be trusted, never occurs in Homer; [the word is not to be found in Mr G. L. Prendergast's (unpublished) Concordance to the Iliad. S.] Both of the terms as applied to emotions are in fact modifications and limitations of more general notions—θυμός the life or soul (Hom.) is limited to the most prominent and impressive outward manifestation of it, the expression of passion: ὀργή 'anger' is one, the most striking, of a class of animal impulses, δργαί. In Aristotle's psychology, the θυμός is one of the impulsive faculties (¿ρέξεις), together with the appetites and the (deliberate) wish, de Anima B 3, 414 b 2, and in the Platonic scheme the θυμός or θυμοειδές represents a whole class of impulses of which no doubt δργή is one—it is in fact the impulsive element of the human soul.

On the difference of τιμωρία and κόλασις, see Introd. p. 232. Compare 1 14. 2. Of this theory of punishment as a preventive, a very good account is given by Protagoras, Plat. Protag. 324 B. Comp. also Eth. N. II 2, 1104 b 16, al κολάσεις...lατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, ai δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.

§ 18. For further particulars about $\partial \rho \gamma \dot{\gamma}$ we are referred to the treat-

ment of the $\pi \dot{a} \theta \eta$ in Bk. II: the chapter on anger is the second.

ἐπιθυμία. The last of the seven causes or stimulants of action is desire (Introd. p. 233), which excites all actions of which the object is pleasure. This pleasure may be either real or apparent, and therefore to include the latter we have ὅσα φαίνεται and not ἐστίν.

In the next two sentences the four incentives to action which originate in ourselves are shewn to be all referable in some sense to pleasure, real or apparent good, real or apparent as a motive cause. Of ἐπιθυμία it has been already stated that pleasure is the direct motive. Habit, again, is a kind of pleasure, for experience teaches that habituation and familiarity make actions not naturally agreeable pleasant to us—habit becomes a second nature. Of anger, revenge is the object, and revenge is proverbially sweet. And reasoning or calculation has always of course some good, real or supposed, for its object.

I have no doubt that Victorius is right in the distinction that he draws between σύνηθες and εθιστόν. The former represents a natural familiarity derived from familiar associations, with which, as I have pointed out on 1 1.2, the derivation, σὺν ἦθος, 'the haunting, herditogether', the gregarious habit of some animals, is in exact accors so συνήθεις, of a man's 'familiar associates, habitual companions' 1

φαίνεται ήδέα. ἔστι δὲ καὶ τὸ σύνηθες καὶ τὸ ἐθιστον ἐν τοῖς ήδέσιν πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ τῶν φύσει μὴ ήδέων, ὅταν ἐθισθῶσιν, ήδέως ποιοῦσιν. ὥστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν, ὅσα δι' αὐτοὺς πράττουσιν, ἄπαντ' ἐστὶν ἢ ἀγαθὰ ἢ φαινόμενα ἀγαθὰ ἢ ήδέα ἢ φαινόμενα ήδέα. ἐπεὶ δ' ὅσα δι' αὐτούς, ἐκόντες πράττουσιν, οὐχ ἐκόντες δὲ ὅσα μὴ δι' αὐτούς, πάντ' ἄν είη, ὅσα

the other is an acquired habit, a practice to which you habituate yourself by study and attention; of which virtue the settled exist formed by ethor is the best example. 'In priore vero,' says Victorius, 'nulla industria aut cura, sed potius una cum aetate crevisse, eo verbo intelligitur; ut cum a puero quispiam in illis vixerit, inde factum sit ut ea ipsi iucunda videantur.'

čθισθώσιν] Spengel has adopted συνεθισθώσιν from συνεθίσωσιν, the reading of Ms A. ['έθισθώσιν ceteri ut p. 1370, 13' (c. II. 4). 'Restitui

passivum.' Spengel.]

πολλὰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.] 'Perelegans est locus Agatharcidae p. 61 fragm. ed. Η. Steph. οὖτως ἔχει τι φίλτρον μέγα πᾶσα συνήθεια΄ καὶ νικῷ τὴν ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος δυσχέρειαν ὁ χρόνος (it isn't the time, it is the association) ὁ τὴν

πρώτην δεξάμενος els του βίου ήλικίαν.' Gaisford.

ώστε συλλαβόντι εἰπεῖν] The dative is explained by supplying an imaginary τινί, 'as for one summing up to say'. An analogous phrase is ώς συνελόντι εἰπεῖν, Χεη. Μεμ. III 8. 10, IV 3. 7. See note on 1 7. 7, τὸ ποιητικῷ εἶναι, and Matth. Gr. Gr. § 388. Add Eth. N. 1 5, 1097 ὁ 13, ἐπεκτείνοντι ἐπὶ τοὺς γονεῖς...εἰς ἄπειρον πρόεισιν. In this and similar examples

the dative may almost be regarded as an absolute case.

οὐχ ἐκόντες] Victorius here draws attention to Aristotle's well-known distinction, Eth. N. III 2, init., between οὐχ ἐκών and ἄκων. Acts due to ignorance, acts which would not have been done, had the doer been aware of all the circumstances of the case, cannot be called aκούσιοι, involuntary or unintentional, unless they bring after them regret or repentance; neither are they strictly speaking ἐκούσιαι, intentional, because no harm was intended; they lie between the two and must take the name of οὐχ ἐκούσιαι, 'not-intentional'; neither intentional nor 'unintentional'. I doubt if this distinction is applicable here; the only cases that it can be applied to are chance or accident, nature, and external compulsion, under which all actions are said to be involuntary, i.e. in which the will has no concern; and this is true. But in the Ethics, the actions there in question are not said to be involuntary—the doer meant to do what he did-but acting in ignorance, he acted unintentionally, in so far as he did not intend to do the mischief that followed. But this ignorance from which the unintentional character of the act is derived, essential in the Ethics, has no place here; ignorance is not included in an act done by chance, nature, or external compulsion.

Now as we act voluntarily in all these four cases in which the impulse is from within and action in our own power, it follows (from the preceding) that the object of all voluntary action is some form either of real or έκόντες πράττουσιν, η άγαθὰ η φαινόμενα άγαθὰ η ηδέα η φαινόμενα ηδέα τίθημι γὰρ καὶ την τῶν κακῶν η ἀπαλλαγην η ἀντὶ μείζονος ἐλάττονος μετάληψιν ἐν τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς (αἰρετὰ γάρ πως), καὶ την τῶν λυπηρῶν η φαινομένων η ἀπαλλαγην η μετάληψιν ἀντὶ μειζόνων ἐλαττόνων ἐν τοῖς ηδέσιν ώσαύτως. ληπτέον ἄρα τὰ συμφέροντα καὶ τὰ ηδέα, 19 πόσα καὶ ποῖα. περὶ μὲν οὖν τοῦ συμφέροντος ἐν τοῖς συμβουλευτικοῖς εἴρηται πρότερον, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ηδέος εἴπωμεν νῦν. δεῖ δὲ νομίζειν ἰκανοὺς εἶναι τοὺς ὄρους, ἐὰν ὧσι περὶ ἐκάστου μήτε ἀσαφεῖς μήτε ἀκριβεῖς.

apparent good, or of real or apparent pleasure; including, in the good, real and apparent, the removal of evil and the substitution of a greater good for a less, because all these are αἰρετά (desirable), objects of choice; and in the case of pleasure, the entire removal of pain and the substitution of a less for a greater; both of which are like the others (ὧσαὐτως) desirable in the sense of pleasurable.

§ 19. It is therefore (from the preceding considerations) the rhetorician's business to discover the number and kinds (so Aristotle, but the number of kinds will be sufficient,) of good in the form of utility or expediency, and of pleasure. And as the first has been already examined and analysed under the head of deliberative Rhetoric (cc. 6, 7, good, absolute, and comparative), it remains for us to bestow a similar treatment on pleasure. Meanwhile we are not to forget that definitions for rhetorical purposes are sufficient, provided they are neither obscure nor over-exact: in the one case they are not understood, in the other they are also apt to be unintelligible by the popular apprehension, but besides this they trespass upon an alien province and method of reasoning, the scientific, namely, or philosophical, 1 4.4—6, &c. Accordingly,

CHAP, XI

gives the analysis of pleasure, so far as it is of service to the rhetorician.

The general plan of this chapter, and the connexion of its contents, are as follows. First we have a definition of pleasure and a general description of its nature in §§ 1, 2. From this we learn that all that is in accordance with our nature is pleasurable, all that runs counter to it painful, §§ 3, 4. Consequently all natural desires and appetites produce pleasure by their gratification: and these fall into two classes, bodily appetites and mental desires, the former irrational and connected with the pleasures of sense, the latter rational, in so far as they are of an intellectual character, suggested and acquired by some kind of intellectual process of the nature of persuasion, § 5, and conveyed by a faculty, $\phi a prao a$, intermediate between sense and intellect. The analysis

υποκείσθω δ' ήμιν είναι την ήδονην κίνησίν τινα CHAP. 3
της ψυχης καὶ κατάστασιν ἀθρόαν καὶ αἰσθητην εἰς
την ὑπάρχουσαν φύσιν, λύπην δὲ τοὐναντίον. εἰ δ'
ἐστὶν ήδονη τὸ τοιοῦτον, δηλον ὅτι καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ P. 1370
ποιητικὸν της εἰρημένης διαθέσεως, τὸ δὲ φθαρτικὸν
η της ἐναντίας καταστάσεως ποιητικὸν λυπηρόν.
3 ἀνάγκη οὖν ἡδὺ εἶναι τό τε εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἰέναι
of these intellectual pleasures (which include the pleasures of imagination,

of these intellectual pleasures (which include the pleasures of imagination, memory and anticipation, of love and friendship, and its counterfeit, flattery) occupies §§ 6—20. In the remainder of the chapter other kinds of intellectual pleasures are distinguished, and referred to the principles implied in the definition.

§ 1. The first word of the chapter is a commentary upon the concluding observations of the last: $i\pi o\kappa \epsilon i\sigma\theta\omega$, 'let us assume', as a definition, 'take it for granted': there is no occasion to enter into details, or attempt to prove that it is what 1 am about to describe. Similarly $\tilde{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\omega$, 5. 3, 6. 2,

7. 2, 10. 3.

On the terms of this definition, and the comparison of it with other doctrines held by Aristotle himself and other critics on the same subject,

see Introduction, Appendix D to Bk. I, p. 234 seq.

κατάστασω...εἰς τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν φύσω] This characteristic of pleasure, 'the resettlement of the soul', i.e. the vital and sensitive system, 'into its normal state' after a disturbance of the balance or harmony, which is pain, reappears in one of the special forms of pleasure, § 21, ἐν τῷ μανθάνεω εἰς τὸ κατὰ φύσω καθίστασθα. So that learning, as a pleasure, like pleasure in general, is, according to this view, the filling up of a vacuum, the supply of a want, the satisfaction of a craving, the restoration of a balance of the system, the re-establishment of a broken harmony. This is the Platonic conception of pleasure; not, so far as I remember, of learning in particular. See Appendix, p. 234. Lucretius takes the same view of pleasure, de Rer. Nat. II 963 (there quoted).

§ 2. καὶ ἡδύ ἐστι τὸ ποιητικόν] by the ordinary rule, I 6.2, and note: as all is good that is conducive to good; if the end, then the means; so all is pleasant that is productive of, or conducive to, pleasure. Comp. Eth. N.

I 4, 1096 b 10, quoted on the above passage.

τῆς εἰρημένης διαθέσεως] pleasure is here properly called a διάθεσις, 'a temporary and passing disposition', as opposed to the 'confirmed, complete, and permanent state' which constitutes the εξις. On the distinction of the two, see Categ. c. 8, p. 8 b 27, διαφέρει δὲ εξις διαθέσεως τῷ πολυχρονιώτερον εἶναι καὶ μονιμώτερον. τοιαῦται δὲ αἴ τε ἐπιστῆμαι καὶ αἰ ἀρεταί...διαθέσεις δὲ λέγονται ᾶ ἐστιν εὐκίνητα καὶ ταχὺ μεταβάλλοντα, οἶον θερμότης καὶ ψυχρότης καὶ νόσος καὶ ὑγίεια καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα΄ διάκειται γάρ πως κατὰ ταύτας ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ταχὸ δὲ μεταβάλλει ἐκ θερμοῦ ψυχρὸς γενόμενος κ.τ.λ.

§ 3. If pleasure is what it has been described to be, a return from a temporary disturbance or unnatural state into a state of nature (φύσις

ώς έπὶ τὸ πολύ, καὶ μάλιστα ὅταν ἀπειληφότα η την ἐαυτῶν φύσιν τὰ κατ' αὐτην γιγνόμενα, καὶ τὰ ἔθη· καὶ γὰρ τὸ εἰθισμένον ὥσπερ πεφυκὸς ήδη γίγνεται· ὅμοιον γὰρ τι τὸ ἔθος τῆ φύσει· ἐγγὺς γὰρ καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τῷ ἀεί, ἔστι δ' ἡ μὲν φύσις τοῦ ἀεί, 4 τὸ δὲ ἔθος τοῦ πολλάκις. καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον· παρὰ

being here understood in one of the ordinary Aristotelian significations, the normal nature, nature in its best and completest condition), then all 'passing into a natural state' must be pleasant, 'and especially whenever what takes place in accordance with it has reached its own proper nature', i.e. its acme or maximum, the highest attainable point of its development, for instance, drinking, quenching the thirst is a pleasure, learning is a pleasure, but the acme or highest point they reach is still more pleasant in both. Schrader, who suggests these examples, expresses the later of the two stages in each, by sitim restinxisse, didicisse, which not only does not give Aristotle's meaning correctly, but also, as I think, is not true as a matter of fact.

ἀπειληφότα $\tilde{\eta}$] has attained to, acquired as its *due*, the opp. of ἀποδι-δόναι, see note on I 1.7. Gaisford cites in exemplification of this application of ἀπολαμβάνειν, Plutarch, de tuenda sanitate, II 130 Ε, τὸ γὰρ οἰκείον

ή φύσις ἀπείληφεν (Nature has recovered, regained her own).

καὶ τὰ ἔθη κ.τ.λ.] 'and all habits, for in fact that which has become habitual now (by this time, now that it has reached this point) takes the form (γίγνεται) of something just like what is natural: for habit is a thing (τί) closely resembling nature; because frequent repetition makes a near approach to the constant and uniform, and nature belongs to the constant and uniform, and habit is a case of frequent repetition'. With this statement about habit, comp. de Memoria 2. 16, p. 452 a 27, ὅσπερ γὰρ φύσις ἤδη τὸ ἔθος, and line 30, τὸ δὲ πολλάκις φύσιν ποιεῖ. Gaisford refers to Plutarch, de tuenda sanit. 132 A, τὸ ἔθος τρόπον τινὰ φύσις τοῦ παρὰ φύσιν γέγονεν.

Consuetudo altera natura, Prov.ap. Erasm. (Adagía) p. 994. Eth. N. VII
11, 1152 a 30, μαον γὰρ ἔθος μετακινῆσαι φύσεως διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τὸ ἔθος
χαλεπὸν, ὅτι τῆ φύσει ἔοικεν, ὧσπερ καὶ Εὖηνος λέγει, φημὶ πολυχρόνιον μελέτην

έμεναι φίλε, καὶ δὴ | ταύτην ἀνθρώποισι τελευτώσαν φύσιν είναι.

§ 4. καὶ τὸ μὴ βίαιον] 'and freedom from constraint, freedom of action' by the same rule; because all external force, compulsion or violence, is unnatural. 'And therefore all necessity (of every kind) is painful'. This marks the distinction of ἀναγκαῖον and βίαιον. Fate, for example, is

ἀναγκαΐον, and Necessity ('Ανάγκη herself).

There is a chapter on $\tau \delta$ draykalor which includes β lator as a species, in Metaph. Δ 5. There are four kinds of 'necessary' things'. The first is physical necessity, as breath and food are necessary to life: the second class consists of things necessary as means to an end, as taking medicine to get well, to take a voyage to the new: under this head comes β la (and

φύσιν γὰρ ή βία. διὸ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον λυπηρόν, καὶ ὀρθῶς είρηται

πῶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρῶγμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔφυ.
τὰς δ' ἐπιμελείας καὶ τὰς σπουδὰς καὶ τὰς συντονίας p. 38.
λυπηράς· ἀναγκαῖα γὰρ καὶ βίαια ταῦτα, ἐὰν μὴ
ἐθισθῶσιν· οὕτω δὲ τὸ ἔθος ποιεῖ ἡδύ. τὰ δ' ἐναντία
ἡδέα· διὸ αἱ ῥαθυμίαι καὶ αἱ ἀπονίαι καὶ αἱ ἀμέλειαι
καὶ αἱ παιδιαὶ καὶ αἱ ἀναπαύσεις καὶ ὁ ὕπνος τῶν

something independent of ourselves and our own will, (here the external compulsion or violence is the necessary means to the attainment of its end, control). βίαιον is thus described, 1015 α 26, τοῦτο δ' ἐστι τὸ παρὰ τὴν ὁρμὴν καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἐμποδίζον καὶ κωλυτικόν. τὸ γὰρ βίαιον ἀναγκαῖον λέγεται, διὸ καὶ λυπηρόν, ὅσπερ καὶ Εὖηνός φησι, 'πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον πρᾶγμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔφν.' καὶ ἡ βία ἀνάγκη τις, ὅσπερ καὶ Σοφοκλῆς λέγει 'ἀλλ' ἡ βία με ταῦτ' ἀναγκάζει ποιεῖν' (this is incorrectly quoted; memoriter, as Bonitz thinks; the line runs, ἀλλ' ἡ βία γὰρ ταῦτ' ἀναγκάζει με δρᾶν, Electr. 256). The third species of ἀναγκαῖον includes τὰ μὴ ἐνδεχόμενα ἄλλως ἔχειν; and the fourth, which is somewhat unnecessarily distinguished from this, is the necessity of demonstration, ἀπόδειξις, of which the conclusion 'can only be in one way'—which shews that it ought to be included in the preceding. See also Waitz, ad Organ. 83 δ 38, Comm. II p. 358.

καὶ ὀρθῶς εἰρηταί] 'Pentameter statim subsequens laudatur quoque ab Arist. in Met. IV 5, et in Ethic. ad Eud. II 7; necnon a Plutarcho in l. quod non suaviter vivi possit secundum Epicurum, 1102 C. Tribuitur utrobique Eveno Pario, poetae Elegiaco, Philisti historici praeceptori. Legitur tamen idem versus unica voce immutata ap. Theogn. 470 (472 Bergk, Fragm. Lyr. Gr. p. 382) πᾶν γὰρ ἀναγκαῖον χρῆμ' ἀνιαρὸν ἔψυ.' Buhle,

'And all acts of attention or study, serious effort, vigorous exertion are painful' (supply $d\nu d\gamma \kappa \eta \epsilon l \nu a \iota \lambda \nu \pi \eta \rho ds$), 'for all these imply necessity and constraint, unless they become habitual; but then the habit makes them pleasant. The opposites are of course pleasant; all states of ease and comfort, and idleness and inattention, carelessness and indifference, and sports, and recreations, and sleep, belong to the family (or class) of things pleasant; for none of these is related to (or has a tendency to,

πρός) necessity'.

τῶν ἡδέων (τι)] Comp. I 9. 25, νίκη καὶ τιμὴ τῶν καλῶν, I II. 16 and 17. These are examples of a mode of expression, not unknown to earlier and contemporary writers, but more familiar to Aristotle. It is the substitution of a genitive case with τί omitted, for the direct predicate in apposition or agreement with the subject. In Aristotle τί or ἔν τι is sometimes expressed. I have not noted it in any writer earlier than Plato, but have no reason to suppose that he was the first to use it. Protag. 319 C, τῶν γενναίων. Theaet. 164 B, τῶν ἀδυνάτων τι ξυμβαίνειν φαίνεται. Phaed. 68 D, Rep. II 376 E (Stallbaum's note), Ib. IV 424 C, θès τῶν πεπεισμένων, 437 B, IX 577 B, ἡμεῖς εἶναι τῶν δυνατῶν ᾶν κρίναι. Æsch. c. Tim. § 143, ἔν τι τοῦτο

5 ήδέων οὐδὲν γὰρ πρὸς ἀνάγκην τούτων. καὶ οὖ ἂν ή ἐπιθυμία ἐνῆ, ἄπαν ἡδύ. ή γὰρ ἐπιθυμία τοῦ ἡδέος

τῶν λυπηροτάτων. Demosth. c. Lept. sub init, ἀφαιρεῖσθαι τὴν δωρεὰν τῶν άδίκων έστίν, Olynth. I 16, των ατοπωτάτων αν είη, Olynth. II p. 18. 13, ώς ἔστι τῶν αἰσχρῶν, μάλλον δὲ τῶν αἰσχίστων, de Fals. Leg. § 345, τῶν ἀπιστούντων. Isocr. κατά των Σοφιστων § 2, έν τουτο των άδυνάτων έστι. § 16, οὐκ είναι τῶν πάνυ χαλεπῶν. Ar. Eth. Nic. VI 7, 1141 b 3, τῶν τιμιωτάτων, VI 12, sub init. 1152 64, VIII 1 ult. των καλων έν τι. Polit. 1 2, 1253 α 2, των φύσει ή πόλις ἐστί, Ib. 5, 1254 a 22, c. 9, 1257 a 36, VI (IV) 4, 1291 a 9, ἔν τι τῶν άδυνάτων, Ib. c. 8, 1294 a 1, VIII (V) 3, 1303 a 19, των άρχόντων γενομένου Ήρακλεοδώρου, Ib. 7, 1306 b 28, IV (VII) 6, 1327 a 27, Ib. c. 9, 1329 a 9, Ib. c. 14, 1332 b 32, εν τι τῶν ἀδυνάτων. de Anima A 1. 2, 402 a 10, c. 5, 411 a 15, τῶν παραλογωτέρων (comparative, very unusual). de Caelo, 1 5. 1, sub init. II 12. 4, 292 a 12, των αναριθμήτων είναι. Hist. An. III 11. 4, 518 a 2, των συνεχών δέ τὸ δέρμα έν ἄπασι τοις ζώοις. Τορίc. B 9, 114 b 18, 19, 21, Γ 6, 119 b 11, Z 3, 141 a 5, τών ἀτόπων, θ 2, 157 a 25. Waitz ad Org. 121 b 36, Vol. II p. 473.

§ 5. καὶ οὖ ἀν ή ἐπιθυμία ἐνῆ] Anything is pleasant of which the desire is innate in us, 'the object of any of our natural desires or appetites', the definition of desire being 'an impulse towards pleasure'. de Anima B 3. 2, 414 δ 2, ὅρεξις μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμία καὶ θυμὸς καὶ βούλησις, δ 5, τοῦ γὰρ ἡδέος ορεξις αυτη (ή ἐπιθυμία). Ib. Γ 10. 4, 433 a 25, ή γάρ ἐπιθυμία υρεξίς τις έστιν; and compare the following sections on ἐπιθυμία and its congeners. Eth. N. III 15, 1119 δ 6, κατ' ἐπιθυμίαν γὰρ ζῶσι καὶ τὰ παιδία, καὶ μάλιστα ἔν τούτοις ή τοῦ ἡδέος ὄρεξις. Similarly Plato speaks of desire as naturally associated with pleasure, Phaedrus 237 D, ή ξμφυτος οὖσα ἐπιθυμία ήδονῶν.

This leads to a distinction of desires into rational and irrational, corresponding severally to the two parts of our moral and intellectual nature, the λόγον ἔχον and the ἄλογον—the latter division is attributed to Plato by the author of Magna Moralia, I I. 7, 1182 a 23.

The irrational appetites, the Platonic ἐπιθυμητικόν (Republic), are those which are not accompanied or guided by reason, which act naturally or by a physical necessity, δσαι λέγονται φύσει, (these are Plato's ἀναγκαΐαι ἐπιθυμίαι; Rep. VIII 554 A, 558 D, 559 A, B, see the whole passage, IX 572 C, τάς δὲ μὴ ἀναγκαίους, ἀλλὰ παιδιάς τε καὶ καλλωπισμοῦ ἔνεκα γιγνομένας; and have corresponding ήδοναί, Rep. VIII 558 D, Phileb. 72 E), and are not prompted by any 'supposition', έκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν τι, any suggestion of ulterior advantage of any kind thereby accruing, but are forced upon us by the imperious demands of nature; such as bodily appetites (those which we have, which come to us, through the channel or medium of (διά) the body, sensual, αί σωματικαί, Eth. N. VI 6, sub init. ἀναγκαΐα τὰ σωματικά, compare the whole passage), for instance, that of food, thirst, and hunger, and the (special) desires of particular kinds of food (special tastes leading to particular kinds of placeural, and those connected with taste in general, and with ich includes

taste, 'gustus', with fe init.), and with sr those which are

ἐστὶν ὅρεξις. τῶν δὲ ἐπιθυμιῶν αὶ μὲν ἄλογοί εἰσιν αὶ δὲ μετὰ λόγου. λέγω δὲ ἀλόγους μὲν ὅσας μὴ ἐκ τοῦ ὑπολαμβάνειν τι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν εἰσὶ δὲ τοιαῦται ὅσαι εἶναι λέγονται φύσει, ὥσπερ αὶ διὰ τοῦ σώματος ὑπάρχουσαι, οἶον ἡ τροφῆς, δίψα καὶ πεῖνα, καὶ καθ ἕκαστον [τροφῆς] εἶδος ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αὶ περὶ τὰ γευστὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια καὶ ὅλως τὰ ἀπτά, καὶ περὶ ὀσμὴν [εὐωδίας] καὶ ἀκοὴν καὶ ὅψιν μετὰ λόγου δὲ ὅσα ἐκ τοῦ πεισθῆναι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν πολλὰ γὰρ καὶ θεάσασθαι καὶ κτήσασθαι ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἀκού-6 σαντες καὶ πεισθέντες. ἐπεὶ δ' ἐστὶ τὸ ἡδεσθαι ἐν

'persuasion' of some kind—these are artificial and acquired tastes, as opposed to the natural and inborn τὰ ἔνοντα, φυσικά—because the hearing (things praised and admired by others) and persuasion in general (the influence of fashion and association and instruction as well as direct persuasion) suggest to us a taste for, or desire of, seeing and possessing things.

The division accordingly resolves itself into (1) natural and necessary,

(2) artificial and acquired, desires and tastes.

όσας ἐπιθυμοῦσιν] sc. ἐπιθυμίας, is a cognate accusative; ἐπιθυμεῖν is

construed only with the genitive case and infinitive mood.

§ 6. The received text followed by Bekker and Spengel puts a full stop at ελπίζει [p. 206, line 3]. (The latter editor has also adopted the reading of MS A' del ev for καν). With this punctuation, καν τω μεμνημένω - ελπίζει must be the apodosis, and the argument runs thus: 'If pleasure consists in sensation, and paragla is a kind of sensation, then (assuming that there is pleasure in memory and anticipation) memory and anticipation must be always accompanied by a mental impression of what is remembered or anticipated'-pleasure being the middle term, without which the supposed apodosis will not follow from the premisses. But this is not what Aristotle undertakes to shew; and also it assumes first what is proved in the next sentence, viz. that pleasure does accompany memory and anticipation. Surely Victorius and Vater are right in supposing the apodosis of the entire sentence, έπεὶ κ.τ.λ. to be δήλον ὅτι—καὶ αἴσθησις, which is in fact what Aristotle here wishes to establish. Substitute a colon for the full stop : retain καν (for και έν) instead of del έν; and understand the first three clauses $\epsilon \pi \epsilon l - \epsilon \lambda \pi i \xi \epsilon \iota$, as three distinct and independent propositions, the basis of the conclusion which follows; el de rouro is a repetition in sum of the foregoing, 'if all this, I say, be so', (de is appropriate in a resumption of what has been just said, note on 1 1.11); if pleasure is a mode of sensation, if paragia is a feeble kind of sensation, and if memory and hope are attended by a parragia or mental impression of that which is remembered or hoped (some phenomenon past or future, the former a fact, the latter an imagination), it follows that pleasure, which is sensation, accompanies the memory of the past and the anticipation of the future because paragia

τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαί τινος πάθους, ή δὲ φαντασία ἐστὶν

φαντασία] which is here called a 'sort of feeble sensation', is described otherwise in the psychology of the de Anima. It is defined I 3, 429 a 1, ή φαντασία αν είη κίνησις ύπο της αλοθήσεως της κατ' ενέργειαν γιγνομένη (for γιγνομένης, Trendelenburg and Torstrik), not, therefore, a mode of sensation as here, but a motion generated by sensation in active exercise: and again 428 a 1, φαντασία καθ' ην λέγομεν φάντασμά τι ήμιν γίγνεσθαι: 'the presentative faculty' (Sir W. Hamilton). It is a faculty intermediate between sensation and memory, and thus becomes connected with the intellect; the seat of memory is τὸ πρώτον αλαθητικόν, viz. the heart, where the results of sensation are all collected in a focus, and thence transmitted to the mind. The memory is defined, de memoria, c. 1, ult. 451 a 15, φαντάσματος, ώς εἰκόνος οῦ φάντασμα, εξις; which represents it as a state (in the heart, or the appropriate organ) of the impression φάντασμα, transferred by the faculty of paraola from the sensation itself, which (the impression) is the representation (the εἰκών) of the real object of sense, that of which it is the φάντασμα. The office of the φαντασία is therefore to convey the impressions of the actual objects of sense delivered to it by sensation, and to impress or print them on the organ fitted for their reception; when thus impressed or 'represented' they become memory, and so are passed on to the intellect. To compare with what is said in the Rhetoric, of this carravia being a sort of feeble sensation, we have in the de Anima, Γ 3, 428 b 11, what almost (not quite) justifies it, ἐπειδή... ή δε φαντασία κίνησίς τις δοκεί είναι και ούκ άνευ αισθήσεως γίγνεσθαι άλλ' αλσθανομένοις καλ ών αξοθησίς έστιν, έστι δε γίνεσθαι κίνησιν ύπο της ένεργείας της αλοθήσεως, καλ ταύτην όμοιαν άνάγκη είναι τη αλοθήσει, είη άν αθτη ή κίνησις ούτε ἄνευ αἰσθήσεως ενδεχομένη ούτε μή αἰσθανομένοις ὑπάρχειν...καὶ είναι καὶ ἀληθη καὶ ψευδη. Though thus closely allied with sensation, and dependent upon it, the partagla is not a faculty of mere sensation, but belongs equally to the intellect, φαντασία απασα ή λογιστική ή αἰσθητική. de Anima F to ult. 433 b 29, (being apparently intermediate between them and partaking of the nature of both); of which (intellect), when we take the whole of it, the diaroua as well as the rows, into account, the darragia

¹ That pleasure is attendant upon every act of sensation is stated in Eth. Nic. x 4, 1174 b 21, κατά πασῶν γὰρ αἴσθησιν ἐστιν ἡδονή, and again, line 27, καθ' ἐκάστην δ' αἴσθησιν ὅτι γίνεται ἡδονὴ δηλον. But this is not the same thing as the statement of the Rhetoric which identifies the two, just as Eudemus in the book of the Nic. Eth. identifies pleasure with the ἐνἐργειαι, of w 10th book it is only the concomitant. And there is a present ment here of the nature of the φαντασία, as compare in the de Anima, where it is said to be a kind of connected with it. See the following note, on φαντ

αίσθησίς τις άσθενής, κάν τῷ μεμνημένω καὶ τῷ ἐλπίζοντι ακολουθοί αν φαντασία τις οδ μέμνηται ή έλπίζει'. εί δὲ τοῦτο, δηλον ότι καὶ ήδοναὶ άμα μεμνηη μένοις και έλπίζουσιν, έπείπερ και αίσθησις. ώστ' ανάγκη πάντα τὰ ήδέα ή έν τῷ αἰσθάνεσθαι εἶναι παρόντα ή έν τῷ μεμνησθαι γεγενημένα ή έν τῷ έλπίζειν μέλλοντα· αἰσθάνονται μὲν γὰρ τὰ παρόντα, μέμνηνται δέ τὰ γεγενημένα, έλπίζουσι δέ τὰ μέλ-8 λοντα. τὰ μὲν οὖν μνημονευτὰ ήδέα ἐστὶν οὐ μόνον Ρ. 1370

i έλπίζει (see note on p. 204).

actually forms a part; c. 3, 427 b 28, τούτου δέ (τοῦ νοείν) τὸ μέν φαντασία δοκεί είναι το δε ὑπόληψις. 'Imaginatio inter sensuum perceptiones et mentis cogitationes media intericitur, ut imaginatio sensibus, mens imaginatione egeat.' Trendelenburg ad de Anima 111 3, 4, p. 453. On the various relations of the davragia, see the notes of the same Comm. ad de Anima, pp. 166, 462, 538, also Bonitz on Metaph. A 1, 980 b 26, p. 38, Waitz ad Org. 100 b 27, Vol. 11, p. 440. [Ueber den Begriff des Wortes pavragia bei Aristoteles, 7. Freudenthal (Göttingen) 1863, pp. 59. S.]

§ 7. Consequently all pleasures may be reduced to three classes, according as they are referred to things present, past, or future. The pleasures of the present are the immediate pleasures of direct sensation; those of the past are the 'pleasures of memory', the pleasures that accompany, or are revived by, association, in the way of recollection, of past facts; and those of the future are derived by a similar association from the anticipation of future pleasure. ήδεία δ' έστὶ τοῦ μέν πάροντος ή ένέργεια, του δε μελλουτος ή ελπίς, του δε γεγενημένου ή μνήμη ήδιστον δε το κατά την ενέργειαν [Eth. N. IX 7, 1168 a 13]. Of memory, Ov. Heroid. XVIII 55, (Hero to Leander) Nox erat incipiens; namque est meminisse voluptas; cum foribus patriis egrediebar amans.

§ 8. Therefore everything that can be remembered is capable of giving pleasure; not only things that were pleasant at the time they happened, but some that were not, provided the after consequence of them was something right or good (right, morally; good, as tending to profit or advantage)1; whence the saying, 'nay truly, pleasant it is to remember past troubles after deliverance (escape) from them'. Fragm. Eur. Andromed. XV (Dind. XXXVI), Wagner, Fragm. Poet. Trag. Gr. Vol. II p. 75,

When there has been no compensation of this kind, the remembrance of past suffering is painful. Ovid, Metam. IX 290, quin nunc quoque frigidus artus, dum loquor, horror habet; pars est meminisse doloris. XIII 283, (Ulysses) me miserum, quanto cogor meminisse dolore temporis illius, quo Graium murus Achilles trocubuit. Virg. Aen. II 10, sed si tantus amor casus cognoscere nostros...quamquam animus meminisse horret luctuque refugit, incipiam. Dante, Inferno, c. V 121, Nessun maggior dolore, che ricordarsi del tempo felice nella miseria. Shaksp Richard 11. Act. 1 Sc. 3. 300, Oh no! the apprehension of the good gives but t. greater feeling to the worse.

όσα ἐν τῷ παρόντι, ὅτε παρῆν, ἡδέα ἦν, ἀλλ' ἔνια καὶ οὐχ ἡδέα, ἂν ἦ ὕστερον καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθὸν τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο· ὅθεν καὶ τοῦτ' εἴρηται,

άλλ' ήδύ τοι σωθέντα μεμνησθαι πόνων,

καὶ

μετὰ γάρ τε καὶ ἄλγεσι τέρπεται ἀνήρ μνήμενος, ὅς τις πολλὰ πάθη καὶ πολλὰ ἐόργη. 9 τούτου δ' αἴτιον ὅτι ήδὺ καὶ τὸ μὴ ἔχειν κακόν. τὰ

cited by Plut. Symp. II 1, p. 630 E, and translated by Cicero, de Fin. II 32. 105, suavis laborum est praeteritorum memoria. Cic. Ep. ad Fam. v 12. 2 habet enim praeteriti doloris secura recordatio delectationem. Wagner adds, 'ex hoc loco et altero Archippi Comici apud Stobaeum LIX 7, profecisse Epictetum ap. Schweig. T. III, p. 104, scribentem, ως ήδυ την θάλατταν ἀπὸ γῆς ὁρᾶν, οῦτως ἡδὺ τῷ σωθέντι μεμνῆσθαι πόνων, monuit Meinek. ad Menandrum p. 86.' Stobaeus quotes a second verse of Archippus, ώς - όρᾶν, ω μῆτέρ έστι, μη πλέοντα μηδαμού, which supplies the link of association from which the pleasure is derived. It is from a contrast of past trouble with present immunity, and the feeling of security which it engenders; and it has for its foundation the same feeling as is suggested by the celebrated lines of the opening of the second book of Lucretius' poem, the famous snave mari magno. The same association, the sense of comfort and security derived from an uncomfortable contrast, is the foundation of the pleasure expressed in the exquisite lines of Sophocles, Fragm. Tymp. 563 (Dind.) apud Stobaeum LIX 12, φεῦ φεῦ, τί τούτου χάρμα μείζον αν λάβοις του γης επιψαύσαντα κάθ' ύπο στέγη πυκυής ακούσαι ψεκάδος εύδούση opevi; -to make the land, and then, the fatigues and perils past, to sit safe and snug under shelter, listening in dreamy and drowsy mood to the fastfalling drops of rain overhead-sign of the storm still raging, reminiscence of the past, and contrast with the comfort within. Comp. Cic. ad Atticum II 7, cupio istorum naufragia ex terra intueri; cupio, ut ait tuus amicus Sophocles, κῶν ὑπὸ στέγη et cet.

Another illustration of this source of pleasure is taken from Homer Odys. o' (xv) 399, which Aristotle, as usual, has misquoted. With this compare Virg. Aen. I 202, revocate animos maestumque timorem mittite. Forsan et haec olim meminisse iuvabit. Comp. again Cic. ad Fam. l. c. Nihil est aptius ad delectationem lectoris quam temporum varietates fortunaeque vicissitudines: quae etsi nobis optabiles in experiendo non fue-

runt, in legendo tamen erunt iucundae.

τούτου δ' αΐτιον κ.τ.λ.] 'and the reason of this is that there is pleasure even in the absence of evil'; that is, in the way of contrast with our former condition, from which we are now relieved; all relief, the removal of one

'everything is pleasant in antiight or profit when present; ',' and in general, all that δ' ἐν ἐλπίδι, ὅσα παρόντα ἣ εὐφραίνειν ἣ ώφελεῖν p. 39. φαίνεται μεγάλα, καὶ ἄνευ λύπης ώφελεῖν. ὅλως δ' ὅσα παρόντα εὐφραίνει, καὶ ἐλπίζοντας καὶ μεμνημένους ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. διὸ καὶ τὸ ὀργίζεσθαι ἡδύ, ώσπερ καὶ "Ομηρος ἐποίησε περὶ τοῦ θυμοῦ

ός τε πολύ γλυκίων μέλιτος καταλειβομένοιο·
οὐθεὶς γὰρ ὀργίζεται τῷ ἀδυνάτῳ φαινομένῳ τιμωρίας
τυχεῖν, οὐδὲ τοῖς πολὺ ὑπὲρ αὐτοὺς τῆ δυνάμει, ⟨ἀλλ'⟩
10 ἢ οὐκ ὀργίζονται ἢ ἦττον. καὶ ἐν ταῖς πλείσταις

delights when present, delights for the most part in anticipation and recollection. Therefore even anger is pleasant'—the prospect of vengeance lends a solace and a charm even to anger; comp. II 2.2, πάση ὀργῆ ἔπεσθαί τινα ἡδονὴν τὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλπίδος τοῦ τιμωρήσασθαι κ.τ.λ. and the same line of Homer, II. Σ 100, is quoted in illustration, 'for no one is angry with one who is plainly beyond the reach of his vengeance', (see the above passage of Book II,) 'or with those who are far above him in power; either not at all, or less'. ἀδικούμενοί τε, ὡς ἔοικεν, οἱ ἄνθρωποι μᾶλλον ὀργίζονται ἡ βιαζόμενοι' τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἴσου δοκεῖ πλεονεκτεῖσθαι, τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τοῦ κρείσσονος καταναγκάζεσθαι, Thuc. I 77. 5. On φαινόμενος =φανερός, see note on II 2. I.

§ 10. Most appetites and desires are accompanied by a certain pleasure: which is felt either in the recollection of the past, or in the anticipation of the future, enjoyment; for instance, those who are suffering under (lit. held, possessed by) fevers feel a pleasure in the thirst (that attends them), either from the remembrance of former draughts, or the expectation of future; and lovers in talking of their beloved (in his absence), or painting his portrait, or drawing his likeness, from memory, and composing verses in his honour' (so Victorius and Vater; else, γράφοντες 'writing of him', and ποιοῦντές τι ἀεί 'in anything that they ever do which has any connexion with him', περὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου 'so as to recall him to their recollection'); for in all such cases the recollection appears to their fancy (σἴονται) to be like the (present) perception (by any of the senses) of

the beloved.

All these last are pleasures of memory, agreeable reminiscences. The pleasures of memory are further exemplified in this, that when the love which has already arisen from the delight found in the actual presence of the beloved is retained by the memory in his absence, this is a sure sign of the commencement of a genuine and lasting passion. Bekker, ed. 3, followed by Spengel, has put ἐρῶσιν in brackets: F. A. Wolf had previously objected to it. It may be retained and explained as I have translated it, but the text and the general meaning would not suffer by its omission. ἐρῶσιν if retained implies that the passion is already conceived. Gaisford, after Victorius, quotes Eth. Nic. IX 5, II67 a 4, ἔοικε δὴ (ἡ εὕνοια) ἀρχὴ φιλίας εἶναι, ὥσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν ἡ διὰ τῆς ὅψεως ἡδονή' μὴ γὰρ προησθεὶς τῆ ἰδέα οὐθεὶς ἐρᾶ, ὁ δὲ χαίρων τῷ εἴδει οὐθὲν μᾶλλον ἐρᾶ, ἀλλ' ὅταν καὶ ἀπόντα ποθῆ καὶ τῆς παρουσίας ἐπιθυμῆ.

έπιθυμίαις ακολουθεί τις ήδονή· ή γάρ μεμνημένοι ώς έτυχον ή έλπίζοντες ώς τεύξονται χαίρουσί τινα ήδονήν, οίον οί τ' έν τοίς πυρετοίς έχόμενοι ταίς δίψαις καὶ μεμνημένοι ώς έπιον καὶ έλπίζοντες πιείσθαι

11 χαίρουσιν, καὶ οἱ ἐρῶντες καὶ διαλεγόμενοι καὶ γράφοντες καὶ ποιοῦντές τι ἀεὶ περὶ τοῦ ἐρωμένου χαίρουσιν· ἐν ἄπασι γὰρ τοῖς τοιούτοις μεμνημένοι οἷον αἰσθάνεσθαι οἴονται τοῦ ἐρωμένου. καὶ ἀρχὴ δὲ τοῦ ἔρωτος αὕτη γίγνεται πᾶσιν, ὅταν μὴ μόνον παρόντος

12 χαίρωσιν άλλὰ καὶ ἀπόντος μεμνημένοι. διὸ καὶ ὅταν λυπηρὸς γένηται τῷ μὴ παρεῖναι, καὶ ἐν τοῖς πένθεσι καὶ θρήνοις ἐγγίνεταί τις ἡδονή ἡ μὲν γὰρ λύπη ἐπὶ τῷ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἡδονὴ δ' ἐν τῷ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ ὁρᾶν πως ἐκεῖνον, καὶ ἃ ἔπραττε, καὶ οἷος ἦν. διὸ καὶ τοῦτ' εἰκότως εἴρηται,

ως φάτο, τοῖσι δὲ πᾶσιν ὑφ' ἵμερον ώρσε γόοιο. 13 καὶ τὸ τιμωρεῖσθαι ἡδύ· οὖ γὰρ τὸ μὴ τυγχάνειν

ἐχόμενοι] Victorius inquires here whether ἐχόμενοι should be construed with ἐν τοῖς πυρετοῖς, as Plat. Phileb. 45 Β, ἐν τοιούτοις νοσήμασιν ἐχόμενοι, or with ταῖς δίψαις: the case is doubtful, either will do.

ταις δίψαις] their thirst, that which naturally belongs to them: the

possessive use of the definite article.

§ 12. 'And this again is the reason why, even when (the beloved) (becomes painful) causes pain (to his admirer) by his absence, there is still some pleasure that finds its way into (grows up, is engendered, in) his lamentations and wailings; for the pain that he feels is at the want of him, but with that, there is a pleasure in the recollection and, in a sense, sight of himself, and what he used to do, and how to look and behave, (olos what sort of person he was, in external appearance, and character, i. e. conduct)'. The very absence, and the pain that it causes, and the expression of grief, have a charm in them which affords some compensation by the recollection of all that he is and does. 'Hence the appropriateness of the saying',-meaning especially the use of the word inspos, which implies eager desire, in relation to yoos-thus spake he, and in them all aroused longing desire for wailing'. This is a familiar phrase in Homer, and occurs several times both in the Iliad and Odyssey. See in Damm's Lexicon, s. v. iµepos. Andromache looking back at Hector as she was taking leave of him, δακρυύεν γελάσασα, is a picture of the mixture of pleasure and pain (Il. Z 484).

§ 13. 'And revenge is sweet', by the logical theory of convertible

λυπηρόν, τὸ τυγχάνειν ήδύ· οἱ δ' ὀργιζόμενοι λυποῦνται ἀνυπερβλήτως μη τιμωρούμενοι, ἐλπίζοντες

- 14 δὲ χαίρουσιν. καὶ τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλονίκοις ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν· φαντασία γὰρ ὑπεροχῆς γίγνεται, οὖ πάντες ἔχουσιν ἐπιθυμίαν ἡ ἡρέμα ἡ μᾶλλον.
- 15 ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ νικᾶν ἡδύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰς παιδιὰς ἡδείας opposites, 'for where failure is painful, success must be pleasant; and angry men, whilst they are vexed beyond all measure if they miss their

angry men, whilst they are vexed beyond all measure if they miss their revenge, are equally delighted in the anticipation of it'. ἀνυπερβλήτως, 'unsurpassably', a rare word, found as adj. in Isocr. Paneg. § 71, Xen. Cyrop. VIII 7. 15, Plat. Defin. 412 B, Dem. Olynth. II 23. 11, Epitaph. 1389. 7, Lycurg. c. Leocr. § 101, and more frequently in Polybius. Of the adverb I find only this one example. [Cf., however, Rhet, ad Alexandrum,

12, 1430 b 25, ἀνυπερβλήτως τιμωρούνται, Index Aristotelicus. S.]

§ 14. And victory is a source of pleasure—not only to those who have a special and peculiar 'fondness' for it (τοις φιλονίκοις), but universally, to everybody; because it gives rise to (γίγνεται, there arises) an impression (fancy or notion) of superiority, of which all feel the desire either in a slight degree or more strongly. Comp. I 9.39, ή δ' ὑπεροχὴ τῶν καλῶν... έπείπερ ή ύπεροχή δοκεί μηνύειν άρετήν. Superiority is a noble or right aim, or end of action; and indicative of 'virtue'. This is one of the modes in which the 'love of power' manifests itself, to which, as a purely selfish instinct, Hobbes sought to trace all our feelings and springs of action. The Emotion of Power is, in Mr Bain's Classification of the Emotions as sources of action, one of the most important of a family of eleven which together compose our moral constitution. Bain, Emotions and Will, p. 59, and the admirable analysis, 145-162. See also Dugald Stewart on this subject, there quoted p. 145. 'The objects of the sense of power may be described as the effects or consequences of our own agency surveyed under such a comparison as to set forth some kind of superiority.' This is the ὑπεροχή in question.

§ 15. This love of victory, as an evidence of *superiority*, is the foundation of the amusement derived from all sports and games into which competition enters; all, namely, that involve a contest either of bodily strength and skill (as cricket, athletic exercises, and all encounters of a *combative* character, μαχητικάς, cock-fights, bear-baiting, pugilistic encounters, tournaments and sham-fights of all kinds), or 'wit-combats', intellectual and dialectical encounters (ἐριστικάς); games of knuckle-

bones, of ball, of dice, and draughts.

Three MSS Q, Y^b, Z^b here add αὐλητικάς, (τὰς μαχητικὰς καὶ τὰς αὐλητικὰς καὶ ἐριστικάς), to represent 'musical' contests, which spoils the

antithesis, and introduces a vicious classification,

On the zeal and eagerness and love of victory manifested by children in their sports, comp. Cic. de Fin. V 22. 61. On παιδιοί εριστικοί, Probl. XVIII 2 (referred to by Gaisford). Διὰ τί οἱ εριστικοὶ λόγοι γυμναστικοί εἰσιν; ἢ ὅτι ἔχουσι τὸ νικὰν ἡ ἡττῶσθαι πυκνόν; ψιλονείκους οὖν εὐθὺς ποισῦτιν καὶ γὰρ νικώντες διὰ τὸ χαίρειν προάγονται μάλλον ερίζειν καὶ ἡττώ-

είναι τὰς μαχητικὰς καὶ τὰς ἐριστικάς (πολλάκις γὰρ P. 1371. ἐν ταύταις γίγνεται τὸ νικᾶν) καὶ ἀστραγαλίσεις καὶ σφαιρίσεις καὶ κυβείας καὶ πεττείας. καὶ περὶ τὰς

μενοι ώς αναμαχούμενοι. και οί έν τοις άλλοις αγώσι ταὐτό διὸ και μαχόμενοι

καὶ ήττους όντες πολλάκις οὐ βούλονται διαλύεσθαι.

έριστική here in the Rhetoric means nothing more than the practice of dialectics, arguing against an opponent, and for victory. It has, however, almost always in Plato, and not unfrequently in Aristotle, the additional connotation of captious reasoning, quibbling and sophistry. In Top. IV (de Soph. El.) 11, 171 b 24, the έριστικοί are defined as οἱ πάντως νικῶν προαιρούμενοι, and again 25, οί μεν οθν της νίκης αθτης χάριν τοιοθτοι εριστικοί ἄνθρωποι καὶ φιλέριδες δοκούσιν είναι. Here there is already the imputation of an over-disputatious habit implied by the word, but by and by, in lines 30, 32, it is associated with sophistry and sophists; but with this distinction -they both argue unscrupulously, 'but the eristics do this to gain an apparent victory, the sophists to make a show of wisdom'; the definition of the sophist being, c. 1, 165 a 22, χρηματιστής ἀπὸ φαινομένης σοφίας องื่อกุร ซ้ องี. Again, c. 2, 165 b 7, they are distinguished from the genuine dialecticians, who deal with τὰ ἔνδοξα real probabilities, by this sophistical habit and mode of arguing, εριστικοί δε οί έκ των φαινομένων ενδόξων μή οντων δε συλλογιστικοί ή φαινόμενοι συλλογιστικοί. ψευδής λόγος καλείται τετραχώς ενα μεν τρόπον όταν φαίνηται συμπεραίνεσθαι μή συμπεραινόμενος, δ καλείται έριστικός συλλογισμός. Τορ. Θ 12, 162 b 3. In Rhet. II 24. 10, τὰ ἐριστικά stands for the sophistical practice of unfair reasoning, γίγνεται φαινόμενος συλλογισμός 'lead to an apparent, or fallacious, conclusion'.

doτραγαλίσεις] The game of doτράγαλοι, 'knucklebones', cut into rough dice with only four flat sides (talus), and so distinguished from the κύβοι (tesserae), which (as the name imports) had all six sides flat, is described in Rich, Dict. of Gk. and Rom. Antiq. p. 64, Smith, Dict. Antiq. s. v. talus, p. 1095 (ed. 2), Becker, Gallus, Exc. II, p. 499 (Engl. Tr.), Charicles, Exc. III, p. 354. And for an account of the other games mentioned see the same authorities (reff. in Index); [also K. F. Hermann's Lehrbuch der

Griechischen Privatalterthümer, ed. 2, § 55. S.]

σφαιρίσεις] Theaet. 146 A, Athen. A 25, 26, p. 14 D-15 C, πολύ δέ τὸ

σύντονον καὶ καματηρόν της περί την σφαιριστικήν άμίλλης κ.τ.λ.

κυβείας καὶ πεττείας] often go together, Plat. Phaedr. 274 D, Rep. II 374 C, (on the difficulty of these two games); Soph. Naupl. Fragm. 4, πεσσούς κύβους τε. Fragm. 380, 381 (Dindorf). Plut. (Cap. Descr.) Qu. Rom. p. 272 F, Ζάκορός τις...ἀπολαύων σχολῆς ἔθος εἶχεν ἐν πεττοῖς καὶ κύβοις τὰ πολλὰ διημερεύειν. The πεττοῖ in particular was an old and favourite game, which appears from the constant allusions to it in Greek literature. The earliest mention of it occurs in Homer, Od. α΄ 107. The corresponding Latin game, latrunculi, is described by Ovid, Ars Am. II 208, III 357.

The same is the case with 'serious' gar and attention, such as chess, and merre l. c.)—the only difference between s amusement, in respect of the pleasure

έσπουδασμένας δὲ παιδιὰς όμοίως αὶ μὲν γὰρ ήδεῖαι γίγνονται, ἄν τις ἤ συνήθης, αὶ δ' εὐθὺς ἡδεῖαι, οἷον p. 40. κυνηγία καὶ πᾶσα θηρευτική ὅπου γὰρ ἄμιλλα, ἐνταῦθα καὶ νίκη ἐστίν. διὸ καὶ ἡ δικανικὴ καὶ ἡ 16 ἐριστικὴ ἡδεῖα τοῖς εἰθισμένοις καὶ δυναμένοις. καὶ τιμὴ καὶ εὐδοξία τῶν ἡδίστων διὰ τὸ γίγνεσθαι φανthe one case must be acquired, and arise from habit and cultivation, whereas others are naturally agreeable, lit. at once (εὐθὸς, from the very first); to this latter class belong hunting with dogs, and every kind of chace.

Various 'kinds of chace' are enumerated in the Politics, I 8, in the description of the 'hunting stage', the second, according to Aristotle, in the development of human civilization. He takes occasion from this to distinguish the several kinds of hunting. οἱ δ' ἀπὸ θήρας ζῶσι, καὶ θήρας ἔτεροι ἐτέρας, οἶον οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ ληστείας, οἱ δ' ἀφ' ἀλιείας, ὅσοι λίμνας καὶ ἔλη καὶ ποταμοὺς ἡ θάλατταν τοιαύτην (i. e. of the same kind as the lakes, marshes and rivers, namely, fish-producing) προσοικοῦσιν, οἱ δ' ἀπ' ὀρνίθων ἡ θηρίων ἀγρίων, piracy, man-hunting, fishing, fowling, and hunting wild animals, hunting proper.

Wherever there is rivalry or competition, there is also victory, the opportunity of shewing one's superiority. And this is what makes practice at the bar and in the law courts (where there is a perpetual struggle and contest for the victory going on between the two rival pleaders), and that of dialectics (what is avowedly and technically a

contest between two opposites), pleasant occupations.

§ 16. This quasi-sensation, the carravia, is again employed to explain the pleasure we derive from honour and fair fame, the favourable opinion of others. These are pleasant because every one who possesses them always acquires an impression or fancy that he must be such an one as is the good (such as ὁ σπουδαίος, to whom alone such things are really due), and a davragia, being a form of sensation, always carries pleasure with it, § 6; and this pleasure is still greater (the φαντασία becomes still more vivid, and its effect greater) when he believes that those who say so (ore τοιούτός έστιν οίος ο σπουδαίος) are likely to be right in what they say. Such (οί δοκοθυτες άληθεύειν) are near neighbours who know a man better, and are therefore better judges, than those (friends) that live at a distance; intimates (familiar, habitual associates, συνήθεις, note on 1 1.2, 10. 18), and fellow-citizens rather than strangers afar off, (who only know him by report); contemporaries rather than posterity (to whom the same reason applies); wise men rather than fools; many rather than few. This is because (γάρ; i.e. the preference, expressed by the μάλλον in each case, is due to the fact that) those (first) mentioned are more likely to arrive at the truth than the opposite; for when a man has a great contempt for any one, as children and beasts, he cares not at all for their respect good opinion, at least on account of the opinion itself, but, if at a something else.

των ήδίστων] Note on § 4, supra.

τασίαν ἐκάστω ὅτι τοιοῦτος οἶος ὁ σπουδαῖος, καὶ μάλλον όταν Φωσιν οθς οίεται άληθεύειν. τοιούτοι δ' οί έγγυς μάλλον των πόρρω, και οί συνήθεις και οί πολίται των άπωθεν, καὶ οἱ ὄντες των μελλόντων,

τῶν ἄπωθεν] The fact that words (substantives, adjectives, adverbs, and pronouns, Διόθεν οὐρανόθεν οἰκόθεν, ἀλλύθεν παντόθεν, ἔντοσθεν ἔξωθεν πρόσωθεν ἔσωθεν, οθεν σέθεν έμέθεν) with the old genitive termination -θεν, are often substituted for the primitive forms, particularly with the definite article as οἱ αὐτόθεν (see many instances of this idiom in Index to Arnold's Thucyd. s. v.), οἱ ἔξωθεν, οἱ ἄνωθεν, κάτωθεν, οἰκόθεν, ἐκεῖθεν, and such like, in phrases where the termination seems to have entirely lost its force, has been long known and noticed: see examples in Wunder's note, Antig. 519, and Lobeck, Phryn. p. 128: but the explanation of this usage, so far as I know, is still wanting. It is to be found in an observation of Hermann, on Soph. Electr. 888, ἐσχάτης δ' ὁρῷ πυρᾶς νεωρῆ βόστρυχον, and 882, ὁμῶ κολώνης ἐξ ἄκρας νεοβρύτους πηγὰς γάλακτος, 'solent Graeci spatia non a vidente et audiente ad id quod ille videt et audit, sed ab isto ad hunc metiri': they reverse our order of proceeding; we measure from ourselves to the object, the Greeks from the object to themselves. The application of this simple fact to all the cases resembling those above given solves the whole mystery of the idiom, which, as Lobeck says, olim vel barbatos magistros obstupefecit. (Lobeck is speaking merely of the knowledge of the fact; he himself assigns no reason.) Rhet, 1 15, 16, of δ' ἄπωθεν, II 6. 23, τους ἄπωθεν. In Eurip. Ion 585-6 (Dind.) both points of view are taken, οὐ ταὐτὸν είδος φαίνεται τῶν πραγμάτων πρόσωθεν ὅντων έγγύθεν θ' ὁρωμένων, unless, as is at least equally probable, the interpretation of εγγύθεν δρωμένων be, 'seen' not 'from a near point' where we are, but 'seen', the sight of them proceeding, from a near point, where they are. Arist. Pol. VII (VI) 4, 1319 a 8, gives an excellent illustration of this difference between the Greek and our point of view: Aristotle is speaking of some restrictions on the occupation of land: ή τὸ ὅλως μη έξείναι κεκτήσθαι πλείω γην μέτρου τινός ή άπο τινός τόπου πρός το άστυ και τήν πόλιν-or, as we say, 'within a certain distance from the city'. Plat. Theaet. 165 D, εγγύθεν επίστασθαι πόρρωθεν δε μή (not, as in English, at a distance, but from a distance, as seen from a distance), Rep. VII 523 B, τὰ πόρρωθεν φαινόμενα, Ib. C, είτ' εγγύθεν προσπίπτουσα είτε πόρρωθεν. Ib. 514 B. είς το πρόσθεν, φως πυρός ανωθεν και πόρρωθεν καόμενον όπισθεν αὐτων. Soph. Oed. Col. 505, τοὐκείθεν ἄλσους, Philoct. 27, δοκώ γάρ οἶου εἶπας ἄντρον εἰσορᾶν. 'Οδ. ἄνωθεν, ή κατωθεν; οὐ γὰρ ἐννοῶ. Eur. Iph. T. 41, σφάγια δ' άλλοισιν ἄρρητ' ἔσωθεν τωνδ' ἀνακτόρων θεας. Tyrtaeus, Fragm. 8.38, 9.12 (Bergk, Fr. Lyr. Gr.), ἐγγύθεν Ιστάμενοι. Examples might be multiplied indefinitely.

As regards ἄπωθεν and ἀπ the former is condemned as formed Göttling on Ar. Pol. II 1, on a ews that both forms p.

lev is found in verse

καὶ οἱ φρόνιμοι ἀφρόνων, καὶ πολλοὶ ὀλίγων μᾶλλον γὰρ εἰκὸς ἀληθεύειν τοὺς εἰρημένους τῶν ἐναντίων ἐπεὶ ὧν τις πολὺ καταφρονεῖ, ὥσπερ παιδίων ἡ θηρίων, οὐδὲν μέλει τῆς τούτων τιμῆς ἡ τῆς δόξης αὐτῆς της τῆς δόξης χάριν, ἀλλ' εἴπερ, δι' ἄλλο τι. καὶ ὁ φίλος τῶν ἡδέων τό τε γὰρ φιλεῖν ἡδύ (οὐδεὶς γὰρ φίλοινος μὴ χαίρων οἴνω) καὶ τὸ φιλεῖσθαι ἡδύ φαντασία γὰρ καὶ ἐνταῦθα τοῦ ὑπάρχειν αὐτῷ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι, οὖ παντες ἐπιθυμοῦσιν οἱ αἰσθανόμενοι τὸ δὲ θανμάζεσθαι ἀγαπᾶσθαί ἐστιν αὐτὸν δι' αὐτόν. καὶ τὸ θαυμάζεσθαι ἡδὺ δι' αὐτὸ τὸ τιμᾶσθαι. καὶ τὸ κολα-

§ 17. o φίλος των ήδέων] § 16, των ήδίστων, note on § 4 supra.

τό τε γάρ φιλεῖν ήδύ...οἴνω] Friendship or a friend belongs to the class of pleasant things-the term pixos or pixeir, 'to be fond of' anything, implies pleasure; no one is said for instance to be fond of wine who does not take pleasure in it; and the converse, 'to be liked' is also pleasantfor here again comes in the 'impression' or fancy that the thing liked or loved (φιλείν has just the same double sense as the French aimer, the stronger 'love', and the feebler 'liking') must have some good in (belonging to) it, good in some form or other being the universal object of desire of all sentient beings; i.e. of all creatures that are capable of appetites and affections, which capacity depends on sensation, the power of feeling pleasure and pain, de Anima B 3, 414 b 1-5, line 4, φ δ' αἴσθησις ὑπάρχει, τούτφ ήδονή τε και λύπη και το ήδύ τε και λυπηρόν, οίς δε ταῦτα και ή επιθυμία τοῦ γαρ ήδέος ορεξις αύτη. This φαντασία &c. belongs to, and is meant to illustrate, the active liking, τὸ φιλεῖν ήδύ. Every one who likes anything always has the impression that the object of his liking has something good about it, which is the reason for his liking it, since good is the universal desire. 'And being liked or loved is to be valued, esteemed, for one's own sake and for nothing else'. This is what may be called the 'passive' liking, said of the recipient of the action or liking; and is opposed to the active form of liking or love in this respect; that it is an end or ultimate object in itself, whereas the other looks to some further end beyond itself, namely, some good which it seems to see in the object of its affection. It is probable that little or no distinction is here intended to be made between φιλείν and αγαπάν, since it is the end and not the process that is here in question, and they seem to be used pretty nearly as synonyms. They represent two different aspects of love, as a natural affection or emotion, and as an acquired value, which we express by 'esteem'. See further, in Appendix A at the end of this Book.

§18. καὶ τὸ θανμάζεσθαι] 'And admiration is a source of pleasure, due the very honour or respect (that it carries with it or implies)'. αὐτό honour itself, alone, and nothing else: notwithstanding that there more substantial benefit derived from it (Victorius). τιμή is pleasan

κείεσθαι καὶ ὁ κόλαξ ήδύ· φαινόμενος γὰρ θαυμαστής 19 καὶ φαινόμενος φίλος ὁ κόλαξ ἐστίν. καὶ τὸ ταὐτὰ 20 πράττειν πολλάκις ήδύ· τὸ γὰρ σύνηθες ήδὺ ἦν. καὶ τὸ μεταβάλλειν ήδύ· εἰς φύσιν γὰρ γίγνεται μετα-

Flattery is pleasant, because it is accompanied by the ϕ arraola (which is always capable of conveying pleasure, § 6) the pleasant impression (not reality) of admiration and friendship in the flatterer.

§ 19. The frequent repetition of the same acts is pleasant, because they become habitual and familiar; as we were told $\langle \tilde{\eta} \nu \rangle$ in c. 10. 18.

Probl. XIX 5, ult. έτι καὶ τὸ σύνηθες ήδὺ μάλλον τοῦ ἀσυνήθους.

§ 20. And change is pleasant; by the definition, because change is a relapse into the normal condition of our nature: 'the constant repetition of the same thing causing a (vicious) excess of the settled state'. It is this vicious excess which is represented in the proverbial under ayar, ne quid nimis, 'toujours perdrix.' When we have reached a 'settled state', as a state of health finally established by a gradual course of medical treatment, the medical applications which were repeatedly employed during the cure should be at once discontinued or the state of body will be vitiated; and so in all cases when a state has reached its acme or normal condition anything that causes it to exceed this is injurious. Eating and drinking too much are other cases in point; when the system is settled or satisfied, the repetition of the acts of eating and drinking disturbs the harmonious balance and produces discomfort or disease. The same expression occurs in Eth. N. VII 13, 1153 a 4, άναπληρουμένης τε της φύσεως και καθεστηκυίας, where from the contrast of the two participles the first plainly signifies the state of progress towards satisfaction, and the second the complete or satisfied state; and so the Paraphrast explains it, πληρωθέντες ήδομεθα κ.τ.λ.: and similarly έν τη καθεστηκνία ήλικία, Thuc. 11 36, means, a confirmed and settled, mature and vigorous time of life, when the age of growing is over.

And in general, all excess is vicious; as the Pythagoreans and Plato (Philebus) held, and Aristotle himself proves by induction in the establishment of the doctrine of the mean, in the Nicom. Ethics, II. The concluding words of the seventh book of the Nic. Eth. may serve as a commentary on this topic; μεταβολή δὲ πάντων γλυκύτατον, κατὰ τὸν ποιητήν, διὰ πονηρίαν τινά (i. e. imperfection: we are always wanting a change, because we never are in a 'complete state'). ὧσπερ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος εὐμετάβολος ὁ πονηρός, καὶ ἡ ψύσις ἡ δεομένη μεταβολῆς' οὐ γὰρ ἀπλῆ οὐδ' ἐπιεικής. The 'poet', referred to here and in the Rhetoric, is Euripides, Orest. 234, ἡ κὰπὶ γαίας ἀρμόσαι πόδας θέλεις χρόνιον ἴχνος θείς; μεταβολή πάντων γλυκύ. The 'changeableness' of the bad man in the illustration, is deduced, I presume, from the axiom that right is one, error and wrong infinite, ἐσθλοί μὲν γὰρ ἀπλῶς παντοδαπῶς δὲ κακοί: see the whole passage from which this apothegm is to 15, ult. 1106 b 29, ἔτι τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν πολλαχῶς τὸ δὲ

felt in change that makes men and things as to us or happen 'after an interval'; βάλλειν· τὸ γὰρ αὐτὸ ἀεὶ ὑπερβολὴν ποιεῖ τῆς καθεστώσης έξεως· ὅθεν είρηται

μεταβολή πάντων γλυκύ.

διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τὰ διὰ χρόνου ἡδέα ἐστί, καὶ ἄνθρωποι καὶ πράγματα· μεταβολή γὰρ ἐκ τοῦ παρόντος ἐστίν, 21 ἄμα δὲ καὶ σπάνιον τὸ διὰ χρόνου. καὶ τὸ μανθάνειν καὶ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἡδὺ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ· ἐν μὲν

'because they bring a change from our present condition or circumstances, (this is a di-version or a-musement,) and at the same time that which can be used (or enjoyed) only at intervals is rare': but rarity makes things 'better', c. 7, 14, 29, 32, or gives them a preference over others in value and importance—not necessarily however in the amount of pleasure which may be derived from them; though in many cases, such as the possession of any rare object, print, coin, gem, in a collection, it certainly does.

§ 21. And learning and wondering are pleasant for the most part; wonder, because in it is contained, manifested, the desire of learning; and therefore the wonderful is an object of desire (every desire is directed to some pleasure, § 5) and consequently pleasant; and learning includes, implies, a settlement into our normal condition'. φύσω here stands for the true and highest nature, the normal perfect state, of anything, see Grant, on Eth. N. II I. 3, Polit. I 2, 1252 δ 32, οἶον γὰρ ἔκαστοῦν ἐστι τῆς γενέσεως τελεσθείσης φαμὲν τὴν φύσιν εἶναι ἐκαστοῦ, ὧσπερ ἀνθρώπου, ἵππου, οἶκίας. This highest condition of our nature is θεωρία, philosophy, the contemplation of truth, which is also the highest form or ideal of happiness, Eth. Nic. x 8 and 9. A state of knowledge, to which learning leads, may therefore be regarded as a settled or complete state, and to be the 'normal condition of the intellect', the noblest part of the entire ψυχή. A settlement into this condition must therefore by the definition, § I, be a form of pleasure.

On wonder, or curiosity, as the origin of learning, of all speculative inquiry or philosophy, compare Plato, Theaet. 155 D, to whom the observation is due, μάλα γὰρ φιλοσόφου τοῦτο τὸ πάθος, τὸ θαυμάζειν οὐ γάρ ἄλλη ἀρχή φιλοσοφίας ή αῦτη, κ.π.λ. From Plato it is borrowed by Aristotle, Metaph. A 2, 982 δ 12, διά γάρ το θαυμάζειν οἱ ἄνθρωποι καὶ νῦν καὶ τὸ πρώτον ἤρξαντο φιλοσοφεῖν...ὁ δὲ ἀπορών καὶ θαυμάζων οἵεται ἀγνοεῖν, Poet. IV 4, αἴτιον δὲ και τούτου, ὅτι μανθάνειν οὐ μόνον τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἤδιστον άλλα και τοις άλλοις όμοιως άλλ' έπι βραχύ κοινωνούσιν αὐτών, and Coleridge again, Aids to Reflection, on spiritual religion, Aph. IX., has thus improved upon Plato and Aristotle, 'In wonder all philosophy began: in wonder it ends: and admiration fills up the interspace.' See also Sir W. Hamilton's Lect. on Metaph. Lect. IV. Vol. I. p. 77 seq. Ar. Met. init. πάντες ἄνθρωποι τοῦ εἰδέναι ὀρέγονται φύσει, κ.τ.λ. Here (in the Met.) as elsewhere, the pleasure of learning or knowledge is assumed. The reverse of this is the cynical Horatian Nil admirari, &c., followed by Pope, "'Not to admire is all the art I know, To make men happy and to

γάρ τω θαυμάζειν τὸ ἐπιθυμεῖν μαθεῖν ἐστίν, ώστε τὸ θαυμαστὸν ἐπιθυμητόν, ἐν δὲ τῷ μανθάνειν εἰς τὸ 22 κατά Φύσιν καθίστασθαι. καὶ τὸ εὖ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ εὖ πάσχειν των ήδέων το μέν γάρ εὖ πάσχειν τυγχά- Ρ. 1371 δ. νειν έστιν ων έπιθυμούσι, τὸ δὲ εὖ ποιεῖν ἔχειν καὶ ύπερέχειν, ων αμφοτέρων έφίενται. δια δέ το ήδύ p. 41. είναι τὸ εὐποιητικόν, καὶ τὸ ἐπανορθοῦν ἡδὸ τοῖς ανθρώποις έστι τούς πλησίον, και το τα έλλιπη έπι-23 τελείν. έπει δέ το μανθάνειν τε ήδυ και το θαυμάζειν. καὶ τὰ τοιάδε ἀνάγκη ήδέα είναι οίον τό τε μιμού-

keep them so.' Plain truth, dear Murray, needs no flowers of speech,

So take it in the very words of Creech." [Epist. I, 6. 1.]

§ 22. The pleasure of conferring and receiving benefits and favours is made to arise, in the case of the reception of good, or good treatment, from the gratification of our desires which this implies, any gratification of a desire being pleasant, § 5; and the other, the pleasure of conferring favours, is due to the gratification of our love of power (Hobbes again, cf. p. 210); the power, namely, evinced in our having (xxiv) the means of bestowing them, and of shewing our superiority (ὑπερέχειν) by doing so. Aristotle, neither here nor elsewhere, takes any account of the benevolent affections as elements of human nature.

Similarly τὸ ἄρχειν is said to be ἤδιστον, § 27.

From the pleasure of doing service in general is derived the particular pleasure of 'setting our neighbours right' (rectifying, restoring their fallen fortunes or character to its normal or upright state) either in their property, when their affairs have gone wrong; or in their judgment, when they have made a mistake; or in their conduct, when they have deviated (παρεκβαίνειν) from the right path: and also of supplying their deficiencies (as before, pecuniary, intellectual, and moral) and bringing them up to a complete or satisfactory condition. emeredein is 'to put the end upon', (as ἐπιστέφειν, ἐπισφραγίζειν, ἐπιγράφειν, ἐπιχρωματίζειν Plat. Rep. x 601 A, ἐπιτιθέναι, et sim.), hence, to finish, complete, or 'fill up'.

§ 23. The pleasure derived from the 'imitative arts' is next traced to the same sources, the pleasures, namely, of learning and wonder. These being assumed, it follows that every work of imitation, as of painting, sculpture, poetry-especially dramatic poetry-(we must either read here with Vater γραφική &c. in the dative, as had occurred to myself, or suppose that the 'art' in the three cases is carelessly substituted for the 'product' or result of the art); and especially any exact imitation, even when the object imitated is not pleasant in itself; the pleasure lies in the mere imitation, and arises in drawing an

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μενον, ώσπερ γραφική και ανδριαντοποιία και ποιη-

seen before, if any pleasure is to be derived from the imitation; and the learning arises from the observation of the two and the comparison of them whereby we acquire some knowledge of what the things really are. This explanation is found in Poet. c. 4. 5. I will quote the entire passage from the beginning of the chapter, as a complete commentary on the passage of the Rhetoric, which indeed seems to be directly taken from the other. In the Poetics, as here in the Rhetoric, the love of imitation is ultimately based upon the love of learning; § 4, αίτιον δέ καὶ τούτου κ.τ.λ. infra. The faculty or power of imitation which attends us from our very birth, σύμφυτον, and the love of imitation which accompanies it, both natural, are the two causes of poetry, §§ 1 2, and also of the other mimetic arts. Eoikaor de yevingous μέν όλως την ποιητικήν αλτίαι δύο τινές, και αύται φυσικαί. τό τε γαρ μιμείσθαι σύμφυτον τοις ανθρώποις έκ παίδων έστι, και τούτω διαφέρουσι των άλλων ζώων ότι μιμητικώτατόν έστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιείται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς πρώτας, καὶ τὸ χαίρειν τοῖς μιμήμασι πάντας. σημείον δὲ τοῦτο τὸ συμβαίνον ἐπὶ τῶν έργων ά γάρ αὐτά λυπηρώς όρωμεν τούτων τὰς εἰκόνας τὰς μάλιστα ήκριβωμένας χαίρομεν θεωρούντες, οίον θηρίων τε μορφάς των ατιμοτάτων (the lowest and most degraded) καὶ νεκρών. (§ 4) αΐτιον δέ καὶ τούτου ὅτι μανθάνειν ού μόνον τοις φιλοσόφοις ήδιστον άλλα και τοις άλλοις όμοιως άλλ' έπι βραχύ κοινωνούσιν αύτου. διά γάρ τουτο χαίρουσι τάς είκόνας δρώντες, ότι συμβαίνει θεωρούντας μανθάνειν καὶ συλλογίζεσθαι τί έκαστον, οἶον ὅτι οὖτος ἐκεῖνος, ἐπεὶ έὰν μή τυγχάνη προεωρακώς οὐ διὰ μίμημα ποιήσει την ήδονην άλλά διὰ την άπεργασίαν (the execution, elaboration, finish, Plat. Rep. VI 504 D) ή την χροιάν ή διά τοιαύτην τινά ἄλλην αιτίαν. In the first three chapters of this treatise it is assumed that all the fine arts, painting, sculpture, music, and poetry in all its branches-architecture, except so far as the sculpture employed in decoration is concerned, does not appear in the list-are imitative, and derived from the love of imitation and the power of imitation characteristic of humanity; and it is upon the various modes of imitation that the division of the fine arts is founded.

In the same way the pleasure which we derive from metaphors consists in tracing the resemblance—a process of learning, μάθησίς τις—between the word 'transferred' and the thing it, sometimes remotely, resembles; so that here again the natural pleasure which attends all acquisition of knowledge, το γάρ μανθάνειν ράδιως ήδὺ φύσει πᾶσίν ἐστι, is assumed as the foundation of the love of imitation. Rhet. III 10. 2. Comp. 111 8. 2, ἀηδές γὰρ καὶ ἄγνωστον τὸ ἄπειρον. 111 9. 2, 11. 9. And in Probl. XIX 5, the same principle is applied to music: διὰ τί ήδιον ἀκούουσιν ἀδώντων ὅσιι ἄν προεπιστάμενοι τυγχάνωσι τῶν μελῶν ἡ ὧν μὴ ἐπίστανται ;...... ἡ ὅτι ἡδὺ τὸ μανθάνειν; τούτου δὲ αἴτιον ὅτι τὸ μὲν λαμβάνειν τὴν ἐπιστήμην, τὸ δὲ χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀναγνωρίζειν ἐστίν.

Twining in his note on Poet. IV 4 (note 22, p. 186 seq.) in describing and illustrating this doctrine of Aristotle, remarks that 'he does not see how any information can be said to be acquired by the spectator' (or listener) from the mere identification of two objects, the inference that 'this is that'. And this remark is true if this were all that Aristot means by his doctrine. The mere identification of an object compar with one already known conveys no new knowledge, which is essential

τική, καὶ πᾶν ὁ ἂν εὖ μεμιμημένον ἢ, κἄν ἢ μὴ ἡδὺ αὐτὸ τὸ μεμιμημένον οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ τούτω χαίρει, ἀλλὰ συλλογισμός ἐστιν ὅτι τοῦτο ἐκεῖνο, ὥστε μανθάνειν 24 τι συμβαίνει. καὶ αὶ περιπέτειαι καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν σώζεσθαι ἐκ τῶν κινδύνων πάντα γὰρ θαυμαστὰ

the notion of learning. But what seems to be Aristotle's real meaning is (as I have expressed it above) that by the comparison of the representation with the original, whether it be a picture, or a trait of character in a tragedy, or a metaphor, you learn something new in this respect: that the representation, in proportion to its accuracy and finish (the number of details introduced), enables you to discover or observe by the comparison something new in the object which you had never observed before: and this is the 'inference' from the resemblance, which the συλλογισμός, here and in the Poetics, is intended to express. On the love of imitation, and the pleasure derived from the imitation of objects in themselves disagreeable, Schrader quotes de Part. Anim. 1 5, b 45, a 5. [καὶ γάρ αν είη ατοπον εὶ τὰς μέν εἰκόνας αὐτών θεωρούντες χαίρομεν ὅτι τὴν δημιουργήσασαν τέχνην συνθεωρούμεν, οίον την γραφικήν ή την πλαστικήν, αὐτῶν δὲ τῶν φύσει συνεστώτων μὴ μᾶλλον ἀγαπῷμεν τὴν θεωρίαν, δυνάμενοί γε τὰς αἰτίας καθορᾶν. διὸ δεῖ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν παιδικώς τὴν περὶ τῶν ἀτιμοτέρων ζώων επίσκεψιν.]

§ 24. From the love of wonder arises the pleasure that we derive from (tragic) 'catastrophes' and 'narrow escapes from danger', which are all objects of wonder. Poet XI init. ἔστι δὲ περιπέτεια μὲν ἡ εἰς τὸ ἐναντίον τῶν πραττομένων μεταβολή,...καὶ τοῦτο δὲ...κατὰ τὸ εἰκὸς ἡ ἀναγκαῖον. The term περιπέτεια therefore expresses merely the 'sudden change or revolution of fortune' of the actors in the drama; the later appellation καταστροφή (Polybius) conveys the same notion of 'revolution' (στροφή), with the additional annotation of a 'downward' tendency (κατά) or downfall, to

degradation or ruin.

παρὰ μικρόν] The preposition, which in this and similar phrases, παρὰ βραχύ, παρ᾽ οὐδίγον, παρ᾽ οὐδέν (ἄγειν, τίθεσθαι, ἡγεῖσθαι), is usually translated in English by 'within', 'within a little of', 'within an ace or an inch of', in reality implies comparison; two things when set 'side by side' being more easily compared together. (Rhet. II 23. 30, παρ᾽ ἄλληλα φανερὰ... μᾶλλον, III 2. 9, διὰ τὸ παράλληλα τὰ ἐναντία μάλιστα φαίνεσθαι, Ib. 9. 8, It. 9, 17. 3.) The comparison in these phrases is expressed in terms of quantity, 'about as much as, amounting to'; and so παρὰ μικρόν becomes 'nearly about, closely approaching to, or within a little of'. A few instances of a very common idiom are given in Jelf's Gr. Gr. § 637 on παρά, Vol. II, p. 301, [Kuhner's Ausführliche Grammatik, § 440, Vol. II, p. 445] and Matth. Gr. Gr. 588 a, who does not properly explain it. 'Phys. B 5, 8, 197 a 27, a sentence which con-

νικρόν: διὸ καὶ τὸ παρὰ μικρὸν κακὸν ἡ το ἐστίν, ὅτι τὸς ὑπάρχον λέγει ἡ διά-

25 ταῦτα. καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ἡδύ, τὰ συγγενῆ δὲ κατὰ φύσιν ἀλλήλοις ἐστίν, πάντα τὰ συγγενῆ καὶ ὅμοια ἡδέα ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, οἶον ἄνθρωπος ἀνθρώπω καὶ ἵππος ἵππω καὶ νέος νέω. ὅθεν καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι εἴρηνται, ὡς ἦλιξ ἥλικα τέρπει, καὶ ὡς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖον, καὶ ἔγνω δὲ θὴρ θῆρα, καὶ ἀεὶ κολοιὸς 26 παρὰ κολοιόν, καὶ ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ

§ 25. καὶ...τὰ συγγενῆ δέ] Note on 1 1.11, p. 20. συγγενῆ are things that belong to the same γένος or family, congeners of all kinds, 'all things akin to and resembling one another': the συγγενῆ, besides the examples given directly, man, horse, youth, are also indirectly illustrated by the things mentioned in the proverbs: they are 'class fellows', any thing of the same kind with another. All that is natural is pleasurable—by the definition—things belonging to the same class have a natural connexion, ('κατὰ φύσιν inter se esse dicit quod eiusdem naturae participes sint,' Vict.)—therefore all συγγενῆ are ἡδέα; but only 'for the most part', not always: for sometimes 'a man's greatest foes are those of his own household', and 'two of a trade can never agree'; κεραμεῦς κεραμεῖ κοτέει καὶ τέκτονι τέκτων, Hes. Op. et D. 25. The two sides are given, Eth. Nic. VIII 2 init.

ηλιξ ήλικα τέρπει] Crabbed age and youth cannot live together. Hence ήλικιώτης is 'a companion and friend', as Arist. Nub. 1006. The Schol. on Plat. Phaedrus 240 C, ήλικα γὰρ καὶ ὁ παλαιὸς λύγος τέρπειν τὸν ήλικα, gives the remainder of the line, ἡλιξ ήλικα τέρπε, γέρων δέ τε τέρπε γέρουτα. The proverb occurs again in Plato, Gorg. 510 B, Symp. 195 B, Lys. 214 A, and is alluded to Rep. I 329 A, πολλάκις γὰρ συνερχόμεθά τινες εἰς ταὐτὸ παραπλησίαν ἡλικίαν ἔχοντες, διασώζοντες τὴν παλαιὰν παροιμίαν. Eth. Nic. VIII 14, 1161 ὁ 35, μέγα δὲ πρὸς φιλίαν...τὸ καθ' ἡλικίαν' ἡλιξ γὰρ ἡλικα, καὶ οἱ συνήθεις ἐταίροι. Eth. Eudem. VII 2, 1238 a 34, where another of these proverbs of association is quoted from Eur. Belleroph. Fr. VIII (Dind.) κακῷ κακός τε συντέτηκεν ἡδοναῖς. Cic. de Senect. c. 3. Ast and Stallbaum's notes, ad ll. cc.

ώς αἰεὶ τὸν ὁμοῖων] ἄγει θεὸς ώς τὸν ὁμοῖον, Hom. Od. ρ' (XVII) 218. Eth. N. VIII 2, init. IX 3, 1165 b 17, Eth. Eud. VII 1, 1235 a 7, Magn. Mor. II 11, 1208 b 10, Theophrastus $\pi \epsilon \rho \iota$ φιλοπονηρίας, ult. καὶ ἀληθές ἐστι τὸ τῆς παροι-

μίας, τὸ ὁμοῖον πρὸς τὸ ὁμοῖον πορεύεσθαι.

ἔγνω δὲ θῆρ θῆρα] Eth. Eud. u. s., ἔγνω δὲ φώρ τε φῶρα καὶ λύκος λύκον. κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιὸν] Birds of a feather flock together. Eth. Eud., u. s., καὶ γὰρ κολοιὸς παρὰ κολοιὸν. Magn. Mor. II 11, 1208 ὁ 9, καὶ γὰρ κολοιὸς τάρει ('perch together'), Eth. N. VIII 2, u. s. Theocr. Id. IX 31, τέττιξ μὲν τέττιγι φίλος, μύρμακι δὲ μύρμαξ, ἵρηκες δ' ἵρηξιν. Epicharmus, apud Diog. Laert. III 1. 16 (quoted by Gaisford), καὶ γὰρ ἀ κύων κυνὶ κάλλιστον εἶμεν φαίνεται, καὶ βοῦς βοῖ, ὅνος δ' ὅνφ κάλλιστόν (ἐστιν Gaisford; Mullach, Fragm. Phil. Gr. p. 142; ὖς δὲ θὴν ὑῖ, Cobet, Diog. L.), ὖς δ' ὑῖ. Three of these proverbs are illustrated by Erasmus, Adagia, pp. 1642—44.

§ 26. Next from the principle of the 'fondness of like for like' is

όμοιον καὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ήδὺ ἐαυτῷ ἄπαν, μάλιστα δ'

deduced the universality of 'self-love'. τὸ όμοιον καὶ τὸ συγγενες ἡδύ εαυτώ stands for τὰ ὅμοια καὶ τὰ συγγενή ἡδέα ἀλλήλοις ἄπαντα; 'since all things that are like and akin (closely related) are agreeable to one another, and a man stands in the highest degree in this relation to himself, (routo mé- $\pi o \nu \theta \epsilon \nu$, 'suffers this', has this affection, i. e. relation to...) all men must be more or less fond of self (self-lovers); because all such relations (ὁμοιότης and συγγένεια) belong to him (ὑπάρχει αὐτῷ), most of all to himself'; i. e. he stands in these relations more nearly to himself than to any thing or any body else. In the discussion of τὸ φίλαυτον, the subject of Eth. Nic. IX 8, two kinds of self-love are distinguished; the one low and vulgar, characteristic of the πολλοί, which consists in τὸ έαυτοῖς ἀπονέμειν τὸ πλείον έν χρήμασι καὶ τιμαῖς καὶ ήδοναῖς ταῖς σωματικαῖς...τούτων γὰρ οἱ πολλοὶ ὀρέγονται...οί δή περί ταῦτα πλεονέκται χαρίζονται ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ὅλως τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ τῷ ἀλόγω τῆς ψυχῆς-διὸ καὶ ή προσηγορία γεγένηται ἀπὸ τοῦ πολλοῦ φαύλου όντος, 1168 b 16, seq.; and it has therefore got a 'bad name': but τὸ φίλαντον in its true sense, when this desire of superiority over others, and consequent preference of self-this grasping spirit, πλεονεξία, in a good sense-manifests itself in a desire to excel them in honour and virtue, then becomes praiseworthy and right. ἐν πάσι δή τοῖς ἐπαινετοῖς ό σπουδαίος φαίνεται έαυτῷ τοῦ καλοῦ πλέον νέμων. οὕτω μὲν οὖν φίλαυτον είναι δεί καθάπερ είρηται ώς δ' οἱ πολλοί, οὐ χρή, 1169 a 35. Comp. Pol. 11 5, 1263 6 2, τὸ δὲ φίλαυτον είναι ψέγεται δικαίως οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ φιλείν έαυτόν, άλλά το μάλλον ή δεί φιλείν, καθάπερ καὶ τὸν φιλοχρήματον, ἐπεὶ φιλουσί γε πάντες ώς είπειν έκαστον των τοιούτων. So we say 'fond of money' or anything else, meaning 'over-fond' of it. The natural fondness is in all cases to be distinguished from the vicious over-fondness.

This love of self will naturally be extended to all that immediately belongs to, or is closely connected with, oneself, τὰ αὐτῶν, as our 'words' and 'works'. Noyou all that we 'say'-and, as we should now add in this our 'reading age', 'read and write'-all our talk, studies, habits of thought, theories, arguments and such like, everything in which intellect is expressed; and topya, all that we do, or produce, all our actions and works; in which latter is included the propagation of children, avrov yap έργα τὰ τέκνα. Comp. Plat. Rep.1 330 C, ώσπερ γάρ οἱ ποιηταὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ποιήματα και οι πατέρες τους παίδας άγαπωσι ταύτη τε δέ και οι χρηματισάμενοι περί τὰ χρήματα σπουδάζουσιν ώς έργον έαυτών, καὶ οὐ κατὰ τὴν χρείαν ώσπερ of ἄλλοι. This natural fondness for our own 'works' is assigned in Eth. Nic. IX 7 as the reason why benefactors usually feel more affection for those on whom they have conferred their favours than these are inclined to return. The compensation principle, the debtor and creditor account between the two parties, belongs to justice, and has nothing to do with this natural affection, φιλία. δόξειε δ' αν Φυσικώτεοον είναι το αίτιον, καὶ follows the true ούχ όμοιον τῷ περί τούς δανείσαντο explanation, οπερ καὶ επὶ τῶν: שר בפיעסט

explanation, οπερ και επι άγαπα μαλλον η άγαπηθείη ΐσως τούτο περί τούς ποι ποιήματα, στέργοντες ωσ It is this love whicl αὐτὸς πρὸς ἐαυτὸν ἔκαστος τοῦτο πέπονθεν, ἀνάγκη πάντας φιλαύτους εἶναι ἢ μᾶλλον ἢ ἦττον πάντα γὰρ τὰ τοιαῦτα ὑπάρχει πρὸς αὐτὸν μάλιστα. ἐπεὶ δὲ φίλαυτοι πάντες, καὶ τὰ αὐτῶν ἀνάγκη ήδέα εἶναι πᾶσιν, οἶον ἔργα καὶ λόγους. διὸ καὶ φιλοκόλακες ώς ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ καὶ φιλερασταὶ καὶ φιλότιμοι καὶ φιλότεκνοι αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργα τὰ τέκνα. καὶ τὰ ἐλλιπῆ ἐπιτελεῖν ἡδύ αὐτῶν γὰρ ἔργον ἤδη γίγνεται. 27 καὶ ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ήδιστον, καὶ τὸ σοφὸν δοκεῖν εἶναι

or work that is the foundation of their liking for flattery, for the love of others, and for honour, the external tokens of respect—all of which are recognitions of their merit in word or deed in some shape or other, and evidence of respect, admiration, and regard; from the flatterer a mere pretence, with the others a reality. It is also the explanation of the parental affection, children being in a special and peculiar sense a man's own work.

And this accounts also for the pleasure which we find in supplying a defect, or bringing anything to a state of perfection (see on § 22), 'because now (by this time, not before, $\tilde{\eta}\delta\eta$) the work becomes our own': the perfection of it is due to ourselves, and we get the credit of the whole. Victorius remarks upon this, that the difference between this form of pleasure and that which is expressed in the same words in § 22, lies in the difference of the source of the pleasure and the motive of the action in either case. In the former the motive is benevolent, and the pleasure is that of doing good to others; here the motive is selfish, and the

pleasure that of gratifying oneself.

§ 27. ἐπεὶ τὸ ἄρχειν ἥδιστον] 'ut res plana certaque ponitur'. Victorius. However, it may most readily be deduced from the innate love of power, already indicated in §§ 14, 22, q. v. To this natural impulse or emotion is traced the pleasure that is derived from 'wisdom', or the reputation of it-this is not the same as the pleasure of learning or acquiring knowledge, but that of possessing and exercising it, or the influence which the reputation of it carries with it-Now 'wisdom' may be understood in two senses; 'practical wisdom', φρόνησις, τὸ φρονείν, which is pleasant to possess and exercise because it implies power, in the shape of influence over the actions of others; and 'speculative wisdom', oodia, which gratifies our love of wonder, § 21, because it brings with it the knowledge of all sorts of things that are interesting and curious (and therefore objects of wonder). One would have supposed that the love of taxing, censuring, or finding fault with our neighbours and friends, ἐπιτιμᾶν, is directly traceable to the pleasure of exercising power so frequently noticed before. Here however an intermediate step is introduced between the feeling and it real origin. This is the love of honour. Censuring and finding fault ir plies an advantageous contrast between ourselves and those whom v thus 'tax', a superiority in judgment or virtue, which gives us the right

ήδύ· ἀρχικὸν γὰρ τὸ φρονεῖν, ἔστι δ' ή σοφία πολλῶν καὶ θαυμαστῶν ἐπιστήμη. ἔτι ἐπεὶ φιλότιμοι ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὸ ἐπιτιμᾶν τοῖς πέλας ἡδὺ 28 εἶναι. καὶ τὸ ἐν ῷ βέλτιστος δοκεῖ εἶναι αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ, ἐνταῦθα διατρίβειν, ὥσπερ καὶ Εὐριπίδης φησὶ

κάπὶ τοῦτ' ἐπείγεται, νέμων ἐκάστης ἡμέρας πλεῖστον μέρος, ἵν' αὐτὸς αὐτοῦ τυγχάνει βέλτιστος ὤν.

find fault; and the honour we all love is reflected upon ourselves by the contrast. But the pleasure lies ultimately not in the honour itself, but in the superiority that respect and the outward signs of it indicate.

MS A° here adds καὶ τὸ ἄρχειν after ἡδὸ εἶναι, adopted by Spengel. It would mean of course the general exercise of authority, an extension of the special ἐπιτιμᾶν, and analogous to it, as manifested in various modes of punishment or correction by word and deed. And herein would lie the distinction. The private citizen can only find fault (viz. with his tongue); the ruler can inflict actual penalties, personal or pecuniary.

§ 28. There is pleasure again in 'dwelling upon', lingering in (passing one's time in, diarpisew) any pursuit or occupation in which one is 'at one's very best'. διατρίβειν is by a similar metaphor applied to dwelling on, brooding over, nursing, the prospect of vengeance, II 2. 2. This same topic is also applied to 'good', I 6.29; the difference being in the 'ends' or motives severally proposed, which stimulate the action in each; in the one it is success, a form of good; in the other, pleasure; the skill or degree of excellence shewn in the exercise of any faculty, bodily or mental, is the same in both. To dwell on that in which our superiority is shewn is of course pleasant, by the preceding rule. Problem XVIII 6, quoted by Gaisford, raises the question suggested by this topic. The solution which corresponds to the explanation here given, is the second: ή ότι εν οίς οίεται εκαστος κρατιστεύειν ταθτα προαιρείται, ὁ δε αίρείται καὶ επί τοῦτ' ἐπείξεται (here follows the quotation from Euripides; and it is added,) ότι δ' αν τινες έξ άρχης ελωνται, κών οις αν συνεθισθώσιν, οὐδε κρίνειν δύνανται τὰ βελτίω' διέφθαρται γὰρ ή διάνοια διὰ φαύλας προαιρέσεις: that is, men in these cases choose a lower kind of pursuit instead of a higher, in consequence of a depravation of judgment arising from the familiarity created by constant exercise of those practices in which their special skill lies.

aὐτὸς αὐτοῦ βέλτιστος] Matth. Gr. Gr. § 460. The superlative in these phrases seems to be substituted for the comparative, and to belong to the rather large family of misuses of the former, which are found in our own language no less than in the Greek.

This fragment of Euripides' Antiope (Fr. XX Dind., XXVII Wagner) is quoted also in Plata's Corries 484 E, &c., with one or two trifling ve hus, νέμων τὸ πλεῖστον ἡμέρας is also the reading of the

is also the reading of the 146 A, with κράτιστος.
. In the two following

29 όμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπεὶ ἡ παιδιὰ τῶν ἡδέων καὶ πᾶσα P. 42. ἄνεσις, καὶ ὁ γέλως τῶν ἡδέων, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὰ γελοῖα ἡδέα εἶναι, καὶ ἀνθρώπους καὶ λόγους καὶ ἔργα· διώ- P. 1371 ρισται δὲ περὶ γελοίων χωρὶς ἐν τοῖς περὶ ποιητικῆς.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ήδέων εἰρήσθω ταῦτα, τὰ δὲ λυπηρὰ ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων τούτοις Φανερά.

pages of the Gorgias a good deal more of the same passage has been incorporated in Callicles' speech as prose. Of the attempted restorations of this I have given an account in Note A, Appendix to *Translation of Gorgias*, p. 134. [On p. 64 the lines here quoted are translated as follows: 'Each shines in that, to that end presses forward, Devotes to that the better

part o' the day, Wherein he chances to surpass himself.']

§ 29. τῶν ἡδέων] Note on I 11.4.—ἄνεσις, 'relaxation', metaphor from unscrewing and thereby relaxing the strings of the lyre, and so lowering the tone; and ἐπίτασις the opposite: ἐπιτείνειν and ἀνιέναι are hence extended to denote 'intensification' and 'relaxation' in general. See note on I 4.12. The undue propensity of people in general to the enjoyment of 'the ridiculous' is noticed in Eth. Nic. IV 14, 1128 a 13 (on εὐτραπελία the mean in the use of the γελοίον), ἐπιπολάζοντας δὲ τοῦ γελοίου, καὶ τῶν πλείστων χαιρόντων τη παιδιά καὶ τῷ σκώπτειν μάλλον ή δεί κτ.λ. The discussion of το γελοΐον here referred to as existing in the Poetics, and again in Rhet. III 18. 7, where we are told that the 'kinds' of it are enumerated, cannot possibly mean the passage which we actually find there in c. 5. 2, which is a mere definition. The subject was probably treated in the second book of the two of which the Poetics originally consisted1; and most likely formed part of the treatise on Comedy, which the author promises at the commencement of the sixth chapter of the extant work. Such are the opinions of Heitz, the latest writer on the question; Verlorene Schriften Arist. pp. 87-103.

On the 'ludicrous', see Cicero de Orat. II 58 seq. de ridiculo; Quint. Inst. Orat. VI 3. Demetr. περὶ έρμηνείας in the chapter—περὶ τῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι χαρίτων, ap. Spengel, Rhet. Gr. III 298 seq. Bain, On the Emotions and Will, pp. 282—285; and Herbert Spencer, Essays &c., 2nd

Series, Essay III, The Physiology of Laughter.

elpή $\sigma\theta\omega$] This is the first instance in the Rhetoric of the use of this most familiar Aristotelian form of expression (a verb in the third person of the imperative passive), which in some of his works occurs sometimes at the end of nearly every chapter. It expresses the completeness and sufficiency of any action or process, that a thing has been completely gone through and finished, and that that is sufficient, and no more need be said or done about it. Thus $\epsilon l \rho \dot{\eta} \sigma \theta \omega$, 'let so much have been said upon the subject', means, let it suffice to have said so much, let this be considered sufficient, and the subject closed; and let us now 'have done with it', and go on to something else. It is not peculiar to Aristotle. though very much more common in him than in other writers. It

¹ The two lists of the Aristotelian writings differ. Diogenes V. 2' τικά. α'; the Anonymus, ap. Buhle, Vol. 1 p. 63, τέχνης ποιητικής, β'.

ών μὲν οὖν ἕνεκα ἀδικοῦσι, ταῦτ' ἐστίν. πῶς δ' CHAP. XII. ἔχοντες καὶ τίνας, λέγωμεν νῦν. αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν ὅταν

for instance in Xenophon, Mem. IV 2.19, ὅμως δὲ εἰρήσθω μοι, 'be satisfied with my saying so much', let it suffice to have said so much: Plato, Phileb. 57 C, εἰρήσθω, 'let it be said once for all', and no more about it. Ib. 62 E, μεθείσθων, and Stallbaum's note on Phaedr. 278 Β, πεπαίσθω, 'enough of this joking', Ib. 250 C, κεχαρίσθω, Theaet. 197 D, πεποίήσθω, Euthyd. 278 D, πεπαίσθω ὑμῖν, Rep. VIII 553 A, 562 A, IX 588 D, πεπλάσθω. Thucyd. I 71, ὑρίσθω, 'let this definition suffice'. Ar. Eth. Nic. I I ult. πεφροιμιάσθω, 'let so much suffice by way of preface'; Top. A 8, 103 b I, and 13, 105 a 21,

διωρίσθω: et passim.

This notion of a completed, perfected, concluded, fixed and permanent, and sufficient action, belongs to the perfect tense in general, and appears, not only in the imperative of the passive, but also in the indicative, perfect and future (the paulo post futurum, on which see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 498). Of the indicative, instances are, Soph. Trach. 586, μεμηχάνηται τοὔργον, Philoct. 1280, πέπανμαι, Eur. Hippol. 1457, κεκαρτέρηται τἀμά, my powers of endurance are exhausted, the play is played out, all my endurance and sufferings are over, and this is the end: compare πεπόνθασι γάρ, Rhet. II 8.2; Aesch. Eum. 680, and Aesch. S. c. T. 1050, διατετίμηται (Paley's notes on both passages). Fragm. Phryx (Fr. Aesch. 263), διαπεφρούρηται βίος. Eur. Orest. 1203, and Phoen. 1019, εἴρηται λόγος. Plat. Phileb. 62 D, μεθεῖνται. Ar. Rhet. I 14 ult. II 5 ult. καὶ περὶ μὲν φοβερῶν καὶ θαρραλέων εἴρηται, 'so much for', where the perf. ind. pass. in summing up at the end of the chapter, plainly differs only in form from the ordinary imperative. Troia fuit. Fuit Ilium.

Of the paulo post futurum a good instance occurs Theaet. 180 A, in the humorous description of the Heraclitean philosophers, 'and if you look for an explanation of the meaning of the meaning of this, ἐτέρω πεπλήξει καινῶς μετωνομασμένω, you will be instantly shot with (lit. another phraselet, ἡηματίω) another brand new word coined for the occasion', i.e. you will have been shot already, as it were; almost before you know

where you are.

The observation on this use of the tense in Jelf's Gr. Gr. § 399, obs. 1, is quite inadequate, and not quite correct: Matthiae, Gr. Gr. § 500, p. 841, is somewhat more satisfactory.

CHAP, XII.

§ 1. Such are the motives and incentives that stimulate men to injustice and wrong, which have been found to be so many varieties of pleasure: we next proceed to examine and classify, for the use of the forensic practitioner, the dispositions and characters of wrong-doers and of their intended victims, those who are most likely to be exposed to wrong.

"lity' of effecting it must always be taken into uplates the perpetration of a wrong: and , as whether so and so is possible to a e possibility), but a special possibility to

οἴωνται δυνατὸν εἶναι τὸ πρᾶγμα πραχθῆναι καὶ έαυτοῖς δυνατόν, εἴτε ἀν λαθεῖν πράξαντες, ἣ μὴ λαθόντες μὴ δοῦναι δίκην ἢ δοῦναι μὲν ἀλλ' ἐλάττω τὴν
2 ζημίαν εἶναι τοῦ κέρδους ἐαυτοῖς ἢ ὧν κήδονται. ποῖα
μὲν οὖν δυνατὰ φαίνεται καὶ ποῖα ἀδύνατα, ἐν τοῖς
ὕστερον ρηθήσεται (κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντων τῶν
λόγων), αὐτοὶ δ' οἴονται δυνατοὶ εἶναι μάλιστα
ἀζήμιοι ἀδικεῖν οἱ εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι καὶ οἱ πρακτικοὶ
καὶ οἱ ἔμπειροι πολλῶν ἀγώνων, κᾶν πολύφιλοι ὧσιν,
3 κᾶν πλούσιοι. καὶ μάλιστα μέν, ᾶν αὐτοὶ ὧσιν ἐν

themselves, καὶ ἐαυτοῖς δυνατόν; in other words, the moral possibility, when the act is done in such a way or under such circumstances as shall render it worth their while; such that the prejudice or injury sustained by the action or its consequences shall not outweigh the prospective benefit; an act done in spite of these considerations may be regarded as morally 'impossible'.

eἴτε ἀν (οἴωνται) λαθεῖν πράξαντες] 'whether, that is, the intended wrongdoers think the crime will never be detected at all; or be detected, but remain unpunished; or if it be punished, that the loss or injury so sustained will be less than the gain resulting from it to themselves'.

§ 2. ἐν τοῖς ὕστερον] The subject of 'general probability and improbability' shall be considered hereafter, that is, in II 19, where the δυνατόν and ἀδύνατον (one of the four κοινοὶ τόποι) are analysed. This is expressed by the κοινὰ γὰρ ταῦτα πάντων τῶν λόγων of the parenthesis: 'because they are common to all kinds of speeches', (viz. the three kinds of Rhetoric, which is here taken as the basis of their κοινότης, elsewhere it is their opposition to the εἴδη, see Introd. on τόποι, p. 128), 'therefore they shall be considered hereafter', viz. with the rest in II 19. We now proceed to the subject of the special or moral probability, which affects would-be wrongdoers themselves (αὐτοὶ δ' οἴονται δυνατοὶ εἶναι...), and under the circumstances of any particular case.

The first class of persons that rely on this kind of possibility, in the sense of a possible exemption from punishment if they do wrong, are able speakers and men of action—the one capable of defending themselves against attack with their tongues by plausible argument, the other of carrying through the business or transaction in the best and completest way, so as to secure all possible advantage; and men already practised in many forensic contests—and so with acquired experience of the resources available for defence against an accuser in a court of justice; and men with many friends, having an extensive or influential connexion, or befriended,—these will be well helped; and the wealthy—who can I an accuser or antagonist, and corrupt the judges.

§ 3. The possibility of doing wrong with impunity is grea the parties themselves answer to any of the foregoing descrip τοῖς εἰρημένοις, οἴονται δύνασθαι, εἰ δὲ μή, κᾶν ὑπάρχωσιν αὐτοῖς τοιοῦτοι φίλοι ἢ ὑπηρέται ἢ κοινωνοί· διὰ γὰρ ταῦτα δύνανται καὶ πράττειν καὶ λανθάνειν 4 καὶ μὴ δοῦναι δίκην. καὶ ἐὰν φίλοι ὧσι τοῖς ἀδικουμένοις ἢ τοῖς κριταῖς· οἱ μὲν γὰρ φίλοι ἀφύλακτοί τε πρὸς τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι καὶ προσκαταλλάττονται πρὶν

if not, (in the next degree), when they have friends, or servants and followers, or associates of these kinds; for these circumstances and capacities make it possible for them ($\delta\iota\dot{a}$, the cause, the power is due to these) to do the things (this applies specially to the $\pi paktikol$), and to escape either

detection or punishment.

§ 4. Again, the possibility is increased, the attempt becomes easier, if they are friends either of the objects of the wrong, those whom they propose to injure, or of the judges who would have to try the case if brought before them: for friends are off their guard (lit. unguarded), and thereby particularly exposed to injury and wrong, and moreover are inclined to come to terms or to be reconciled without 'prosecuting' the case, or bringing it before a court of justice; and judges are ready to oblige their friends, and either let them off altogether, or inflict a very

slight penalty (so fair and upright were the Athenian dicasts).

oi...φίλοι ἀφύλακτοι κ.τ.λ.] This sounds very atrocious, and certainly has a highly immoral appearance on the face of it. But we are to recollect that the author told us in his apology for Rhetoric in the preface that such suggestions are to be regarded only as exemplifications of the theory of the art, which argues each side of every question indifferently without regard to moral considerations: but in practice, though the rhetorician as such can employ immoral arguments, no honest rhetorician would have recourse to them. Rhetoric does not profess to teach virtue; that must be learned aliunde. This is Aristotle's view of the matter: the Sophists, who, as we are expressly told, identified the study of Rhetoric with a general, political education, had no such excuse or justification for the immoralities of their Rhetoric, which they inculcated without alloy.

προσκαταλλάττονται] 'καὶ πρὸς, et praeterea. pessime vulgo προσκαταλλάττονται'. Gaisford. Bekker and Spengel retain the vulgate, to which there is no possible objection. καταλλάττεσθαι alone, it is true, conveys all that is necessary to the sense, the reconciliation namely; but πρός is very often added to a verb, simple or compound, to express 'direction' to an object, as προσεντείνειν πληγάς, Dem. c. Mid. 528. 25; προσενθύνειν, Ar. Pol. VII (VI) 8, 1322 b 9; and particularly with verbs that imply conciliation or reconciliation, as προσχωρείν Thuc. I 103, IV 71, 'to come over to a side', προσάγεσθαι, 'to bring over to one, to conciliate'. Isocr. Nicol ⁶ 22 θεραπείας προσαγάγεσθαι. Thuc. III 43, ἀπάτη προσά-

*στω μήτ' ἐπιεικεία, οἷς οὐδὲ ἐγω ἐω προσάγεσθαι
milia. So here the compound verb
tlement of the disputed points, and
ing won over, which attends it.

έπεξελθεῖν, οἱ δὲ κριταὶ χαρίζονται οἶς ἃν φίλοι 5 ὧσι, καὶ ἢ ὅλως ἀφιᾶσιν ἢ μικροῖς ζημιοῦσιν. λαθητικοὶ δ' εἰσὶν οἵ τ' ἐναντίοι τοῖς ἐγκλήμασιν, οἷον ἀσθενὴς περὶ αἰκίας καὶ ὁ πένης καὶ ¹αἰσχρὸς περὶ μοιχείας. καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ καὶ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς·

1 & infra cum libris. [b] Spengel.

§ 5. Persons likely to escape detection are those whose personal and moral or mental character is opposite (this is the 'opposition' of 'contrariety', the extremes under the same genus, as black and white in colour, bitter and sweet in taste, hot and cold in touch or feeling, and such like) to that which the charge necessarily implies; as when a man of feeble bodily frame is charged with 'assault and battery', or a poor and

ugly man with adultery.

The ἀσθενής charged with aixia was a stock example of the τόπος of τὸ εἰκός in the early rhetorical treatises. This τόπος was the staple of Corax's τέχνη, Rhet. II 24. II; and the case of the 'weak man' is quoted by Aristotle as one of the examples there used. The application of the argument of 'probability' to the treatment of it, shewing how Rhetoric τάναντία συλλογίζεται, is there illustrated. It appears again in Rhet. ad Alex. 36 (37). 6, and Pl. Phaedrus 273 B, as an extract from Tisias' réyen. where the τόπος of τὸ εἰκός is represented as somewhat differently treated. Victorius cites Quint. v 10. 26, speaking of the same mode of inference; the probability namely of the conformity of a man's actions to his bodily condition and ordinary character. These are 'personal' topics of argument, argumenta a persona, § 23, inferences from personal conditions, qualities, habits, employed to determine the probability of a certain action, as proceeding from him: one of these is, habitus corporis: ducitur enim frequenter in argumentum species libidinis, robur petulantiae; his contraria in diversum-the two cases given by Aristotle.

ό πένης καὶ ὁ αἰσχρός, the definite article marking the genus, the member of a certain class. See note on I 7.13 εὶ μὴ ἦν ὁ πράξων, p. 130. In this and the next topic there is a change from persons to things, which

are resumed as the objects of analysis in § 32.

καὶ τὰ λίαν ἐν φανερῷ] 'And things, i. e. acts, that are excessively conspicuous, open to observation and under people's eyes'. τὰ ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς, 'things in sight', qui santent aux yeux. Polit. VII (VI) 4, 1319 ὁ 18, ὀλίγον μὲν γὰρ πονηρὸν παρορᾶται, πολὺ δὲ γινόμενον ἐν ὀφθαλμοῖς μᾶλλόν ἐστιν. Such glaring acts are not guarded against (ἀφύλακτα here occurs in a different sense to ἀφύλακτοι φίλοι in § 4: that is 'unguarded', from φυλάττεσθαι, the direct passive; this is 'not guarded against', the passive of (the middle) φυλάττεσθαί τι 'to guard oneself against anything', comp. §§ 6 and 21), no precautions are taken to prevent them, 'because no one would suppose that any one was likely to attempt them'. Supply to complete the sense τιν ἀν ποιῆσαι αὐτά, or ἐπιχειρῆσαι αὐτοῖς. This is a reti to the original topic of ἃ δύνανται πράττειν 'possible actions'. τὰ λία φανερῷ are therefore acts which are likely 'to be carried into effect' 'to escape detection', λαθητικά from the preceding clause, which some sort parenthetical.

6 ἀφύλακτα γὰρ διὰ τὸ μηδένα ἄν οἴεσθαι. καὶ τὰ τηλικαῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα οἶα μηδ' ἄν εἶς ἀφύλακτα γὰρ καὶ ταῦτα πάντες γὰρ τὰ εἰωθότα ώσπερ ἀρρωστήματα φυλάττονται καὶ τάδικήματα, ὁ δὲ μηδείς πω ήρρώστηκεν, οὐδεὶς εὐλαβεῖται. καὶ οἷς μηδεὶς ἐχθρὸς ἢ πολλοί οἱ μὲν γὰρ οἴονται λήσειν διὰ τὸ μὴ φυλάττεσθαι, οἱ δὲ λανθάνουσι διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ἄν ἐπιχειρῆσαι φυλαττομένοις, καὶ διὰ τὸ ἀπολογίαν

δ 6. And acts again which are of such a magnitude (τηλικαῦτα) and of such a kind as no one (else) would ever think of doing (supply ποιήσειε); for these too (like the preceding) are not guarded against, (viz. novel and audacious attempts and enterprises which people are unprepared for, and which therefore take them by surprise); for it is only against customary offences, just like sicknesses, that people are on their guard; against diseases hitherto unknown, (which no one has ever yet had,) no one ever takes precautions. ἀρρώστημα, ἀρρωστία, ἀρρωστεῖν properly denote 'want of strength', bodily weakness, and hence any infirmity, such as sickness. Hence Thucydides applies it, III 15, to want of strength of will, or of inclination, ἀρρωστία τοῦ στρατεύειν; and VII 47, to weakness of mind; the mental prostration or despondency which prevailed amongst the Athenian troops before Syracuse: and again in VIII 83, to Tissaphernes' weakness of will or inclination, as shewn in his 'remissness' or 'disinclination' to supply pay to the crews of the Peloponnesian vessels; which Arnold well expresses by 'he was sick of it'. In Plat. Rep. II 359 B it represents nothing more than the defect or weakness of a faculty. In Xenophon the three words usually denote some form of disease or sickness: Demosth. Ol. II p. 24. 5, ωσπερ γαρ έν τοις σώμασιν ήμων, εως μεν αν έρρωμένος ή τις, ούδεν επαισθάνεται των καθ εκαστα σαθρών, επαν δε άρρωστημά τι συμβή, πάντα κινείται, κῶν ῥῆγμα κῶυ στρέμμα κῶν ἄλλο τι τῶν ὑπάρχοντων σαθρὸν ή, any disease or other imperfection and unsoundness of body, including fractures, sprains, &c.

§ 7. καὶ οἶς μηδεὶς ἐχθρὸς ἡ πολλοί] is a return to the original construction of § 3. Supply οἴονται δύνασθαι πράττειν κ.τ.λ, or simply οἴονται δύνασθαι ἀδικεῖν. And also those (are disposed to do wrong, or think they can do it undetected or with impunity) who have no enemy at all or a great many: the former think they will escape undetected because there is no one (no enemy) to take precautions against them (and their attempts); the latter pass undiscovered, because they are not likely (ἄν) to be suspected of assailing people when they are on their guard against them (as enemies), διὰ τὸ μὴ δοκεῖν ᾶν ἐπιχειρῆσαι 'because they would not be thought (/it. seem) likely to assail', 'because no one would think them likely to:

of justice), they have a defence ready not at all *likely* to make, such an *improbable*; Corax's topic of τὸ 8 ἔχειν ὅτι οὐκ ἀν ἐνεχείρησαν. καὶ οἶς ὑπάρχει κρύψις p. 43. ἢ τρόπος ἢ τόπος ἢ διάθεσις εὕπορος. καὶ ὅσοις μὴ λαθοῦσιν ἔστι δίωσις δίκης ἢ ἀναβολὴ χρόνου ἢ διαφθοραὶ κριτῶν. καὶ οῖς, ἐὰν γένηται ζημία, ἔστι δίωσις τῆς ἐκτίσεως ἢ ἀναβολὴ χρόνιος. ἢ ⟨εἰ⟩ δι΄ 9 ἀπορίαν μηδὲν ἕξει ὅ τι ἀπολέση. καὶ οῖς τὰ μὲν

§ 8. And those again who have any means of concealment (either of themselves, or of the goods they have stolen,) or any 'mode' (of changing it, so that it shall not be recognised, Victorius, or more generally, 'any contrivance or device') or any place (of refuge for themselves, or for stowing away the stolen property) or are of an inventive disposition, or habit

of mind', (suggestive of τρόποι in the second sense, and μηχαναί).

Victorius confines the whole of this topic to the one crime of robbery. de furibus ac latronibus; and interprets κρύψις qui possunt quae sustulerint nullo negotio occulere; τρόπος quibus modus viaque facilis est illa immutandi. Quod aut figuram aut colorem variare possint; aut artificio denique suo aliquo modo facere ne ipsa agnoscantur. I should prefer giving it the wider sense of contrivances, devices of all kinds, tricks, artifices, any 'ways' or 'modes' of getting out of a scrape, and escaping the consequences of a criminal act. In Plat. Phileb. 16 A, it has a nearly similar sense, εί τις τρόπος έστιν καὶ μηχανή. Lastly, confining διάθεσις to the same subject, he translates it vendere, as we say to dispose of a thing; adding, διάθεσιν enim hic alienationem valere arbitror, and quoting, in support of the interpretation, Plut. Solon, p. 91 E, των δε γενομένων διάθεσιν προς ξένους έλαίου μόνον έδωκεν άλλα δε έξάγειν εκώλυσεν. Demosth. Olynth. II, p. 22, οὖθ' όσ' ἀν πορίσωσιν οῦτως ὅπως ἀν δύνωνται ταῦτ' ἔχοντες διάθεσθαι. Isocr. Paneg. § 42, τὰ μὲν ὅπου χρὴ διάθεσθαι τὰ δ' ὁπόθεν εἰσαγάγεσθαι, (the word in this sense implies 'distribution', and so, 'disposing or setting out for sale.' Similarly ib. § 9, τοις ονόμασιν εὐ διάθεσθαι 'to set out, or forth, in words'; and several of the best authors use it of 'disposing of' a variety of different things, property, one's own person, a daughter, goods for sale).

It seems to me preferable to extend the meaning, as in the other cases, beyond the mere 'disposal' of stolen goods, to any disposition or habit of mind, which is at all events the usual meaning of $\delta\iota\dot{a}\theta\epsilon\sigma\iota s$. And there is this further reason for rejecting Victorius' limitation of the topic, that if it is adopted no difference whatsoever is left between $\kappa\rho\dot{\nu}\psi\iota s$ and $\tau\dot{o}\pi\sigma s$

here and afterwards in §§ 33, 34.

καὶ οἶs, ἐὰν γένηται ζημία κ.τ.λ.] And those who, if they don't escape detection, have the means of getting rid of (lit. pushing off) the trial altogether, or postponing it, or of bribing the judges. And those who, if a penalty be actually imposed have the means of getting rid of the payment of it, or postponing it for a long time, or who from poverty have nothing to lose: (in the last clause the relative οἶs, which is convertible with εἶ τις, must be supposed to take that form when joined with ε̃ξει).

§ 9. Another class of cases in which men are disposed to do wrong,

κέρδη φανερά ἢ μεγάλα ἢ ἐγγύς, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι μικραὶ ἢ ἀφανεῖς ἢ πόρρω. καὶ ὧν μή ἐστι τιμωρία ἴση τῆ P. 1371 b. 10 ὡφελεία, οἶον δοκεῖ ἡ τυραννίς. καὶ ὅσοις τὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα λήμματα, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι ἀνείδη μόνον. καὶ οἶς τοὐναντίον τὰ μὲν ἀδικήματα εἰς ἔπαινόν τινα, οἶον εἰ συνέβη ἄμα τιμωρήσασθαι ὑπὲρ πατρὸς ἢ μητρός, ὥσπερ Ζήνωνι, αἱ δὲ ζημίαι εἰς χρήματα ἢ φυγὴν ἢ τοιοῦτόν τι δι ἀμφότερα γὰρ ἀδικοῦσι καὶ

and think wrong deeds possible, is where the profit likely to accrue is evident, or certain (patent to all, free from all doubt or obscurity), or great, or immediate; and the penalties to which they are liable small, or obscure and uncertain (not such as to attract attention, and so deter from the intended wrong; quae obscurae admodum et caecae sunt ut perspici nequeant: Victorius), or remote.

Or again, where no possible punishment is equal to the prospective benefit; as is supposed (δοκεί) to be the case with absolute sovereignty or tyranny. On τυραννίε, and the distinction between it and μοναρχία, see

note on 1 8.4 and 5, p. 155.

§ 10. 'And cases in which the offence, and the profit or result of it, is a substantial, solid gain, and the penalty mere disgrace'.—λήμματα refers

perhaps to pecuniary gain (lucrum).

'And the reverse; where the (legal) crime tends to any kind of praise (is directed to, as its meed or reward; i.e. where what is a crime in one point of view, is likely to meet with praise in another), as, for instance, if the crime was accompanied by vengeance for father or mother, as it was in Zeno's case; whilst the penalties are all directed against a man's purse or person, as fine, imprisonment, banishment, or anything else of the same kind (not affecting his character or reputation); for both circumstances and both dispositions may be motives to wrong acts, only not in the same persons and the same characters'.

Men of different characters are influenced by different motives in the commission of crime. Some care more for honour and glory and reputation than for their money and personal ease and comfort, and these, like Zeno, will be ready to commit what may be construed as a crime and render them liable to punishment, provided it be attended with something which leads to praise: the others, who value their personal well-being more than their good name, will be induced rather to do wrong acts which lead to substantial gain, and affect only their reputation. The one are virtuous, though they err; the others, sordid, mean, and vicious.

Of Zeno's case, here referred to, nothing is known, and we are reduced to conjecture. Of the two best known of this name, Zeno of Citium, the founder of the Stoic sect, whose death is placed in B.C. 263 (Clint. Fast. Hell.), would, if alive, have be an Aristotle wrote the Rhetoric to have attracted the sible that the other, Zeno the logicia the traces the person

άμφοτέρως έχοντες, πλην οίχ οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀλλ' οἱ ἐναν11 τίοι τοῖς ήθεσιν. καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἢ λεληθότες ἢ μη
ἐζημιωμένοι. καὶ οἱ πολλάκις ἀποτετυχηκότες εἰσὶ
γάρ τινες καὶ ἐν τοῖς τοιούτοις, ώσπερ ἐν τοῖς πο12 λεμικοῖς, οἶοι ἀναμάχεσθαι. καὶ οἶς ἄν παραχρῆμα
ἢ τὸ ἡδύ, τὸ δὲ λυπηρὸν ὕστερον, ἢ τὸ κέρδος, ἡ δὲ

here meant. Of this Zeno we learn from Plutarch, Diogenes Laertius, and Diodorus (see the reff. in Brandis' Art. in Smith's Dict. Biogr.) that he joined in an attempt to rid his native country of her tyrant: and if the attempt was successful (of which we are not informed) and the tyrant slain, Zeno may possibly have mixed personal considerations with his public and patriotic motives, just as Harmodius and Aristogeiton did, as Aristotle tells us in the Politics (VIII (V) 10), in their attack upon the Athenian tyrant. Only it seems unlikely that if this were the true explanation of the allusion that Aristotle would have spoken of tyrannicide as an aðiknµa, a 'wrong', either legal or moral: and besides this, the act itself, as well as the attendant circumstance, would have been regarded as praiseworthy.

πλήν] 'only', an exception or reservation; see note on I 1.14, p. 26.

§ 11. 'And those who have often in previous attempts escaped either detection or punishment. And, on the other hand, those who have often failed in their attempts' (the opposite to the last); 'because there is a class of people who in such matters as these, as well as in actual fighting, are inclined (have a disposition) to renew the fight'. οἶοι for οἶον is due to Victorius in addendis. Victorius quotes in illustration of this pugnacious character, Problem XVIII 2, de Sophistis, καὶ γὰρ νικῶντες διὰ τὸ χαίρειν προάγονται μᾶλλον ἐρίζειν' καὶ ἡττώμενοι ὡς ἀναμαχούμενοι.

§ 12. καὶ οἶς] is no doubt masc., as it is through the whole series of these topics, and in accordance with οἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς τοιοῦτοι that follows. Otherwise it would be more naturally and conveniently translated in this

and the following section as neuter, 'in all cases where'

'And all those who have the pleasure (consequent on their action) immediately, and the pain comes afterwards; or the profit at once and the penalty later: because this suits the character of the ἀκρατεῖς who are devoid of self-control, and this vice extends (beyond mere pleasure) to every object of man's aims and aspirations', to profit as well as pleasure. And therefore wherever there is immediate pleasure or profit, and only subsequent pain or loss, the ἀκρατεῖς whose character is to be tempted by present pleasure and profit, though at the expense of future pain and loss, are naturally in all such cases prone to wrong-doing. What is here said of ἀκρατής and ἀκρατία is confirmed by Eth. Nic. VII 2, ult. ἔτι ἀκρατεῖς λέγονται καὶ θυμοῦ καὶ τιμῆς καὶ κέμδους, though, as the λέγονται shews, this is only a popular way of speaking (and therefore suited to Rhetoric): and in VII 6, 1147 b 31, seq. we are told that these are not ἀπλῶς ἀκρατεῖς, ἀκρασία proper being περὶ τὰς σωματικὰς ἀπολαύσεις, limited to the same class of objects as ἀκολασία; and ὁ τῶν τε ἡδέων διώκων τὰς ὑπερβολὰς καὶ

ζημία ὕστερον· οἱ γὰρ ἀκρατεῖς τοιοῦτοι, ἔστι δ΄
13 ἀκρασία περὶ πάντα ὅσων ὀρέγονται. καὶ οἶς ἂν
τοὐναντίον τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν ἤδη ἦ ἢ ἡ ζημία, τὸ δὲ
ἡδὺ καὶ ὡφέλιμον ὕστερα καὶ χρονιώτερα· οἱ γὰρ
ἐγκρατεῖς καὶ φρονιμώτεροι τὰ τοιαῦτα διώκουσιν.

14 καὶ οἶς ἃν ἐνδέχηται διὰ τύχην δόξαι πρᾶξαι ἢ δι ἀνάγκην ἢ διὰ φύσιν ἢ δι ἐθος, καὶ ὅλως ἀμαρτεῖν

15 άλλά μη άδικεῖν. καὶ οἶς ἂν ἢ τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς τυχεῖν. καὶ ὅσοι ἂν ἐνδεεῖς ὧσιν. διχῶς δ' εἰσὶν ἐνδεεῖς ἢ τῶν λυπηρῶν φεύγων, πείνης καὶ δίψης καὶ ἀλέας καὶ ψύχους καὶ πάντων τῶν

περὶ ἀφὴν καὶ γεῦσιν, παρὰ τὴν προαίρεσιν καὶ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἀκρατὴς λέγεται. § 13. 'And also the opposite characters to these are equally prone to wrong-doing in cases where the pain or loss is for the moment ($\eta \delta \eta$), and the pleasure and profit later and more lasting: for this is the character of

the έγκρατεῖs, those that have acquired the habit of self-control, and of the wiser sort (men of more practical wisdom, φρόνησιs), who pursue them in

this order'.

§ 14. 'And those whose actions may possibly be thought to be due to chance, or to necessity, or to nature, or to habit, and who in general may be thought to have been guilty of error rather than of crime'. There is a variation here in the classification of these impelling causes of action from that laid down in c. 10.7, 8, which is singular even in a rhetorical treatise, considering that they stand so near together. In the former there are three (of the seven) which are independent of ourselves and our own will, (1) $\tau \dot{\nu} \chi \eta$, and $\dot{d} \dot{\nu} \dot{a} \gamma \kappa \eta$ subdivided into (2) $\beta \dot{i} a$ and (3) $\dot{\phi} \dot{\nu} \dot{\sigma} \iota s$. $\ddot{\epsilon} \theta \sigma s$ in the other list is classed with the voluntary sources of action, where we are ourselves the causes of them. Here $\ddot{\epsilon} \theta \sigma s$ is referred to the other class, doubtless because habit when confirmed becomes a 'second nature', and action from habit is so far involuntary. Rhet. I II.3, and de Memoria, c. 2, $\dot{\phi} \dot{\nu} \sigma \iota s$, $\ddot{\eta} \partial \eta \tau \dot{\sigma} \dot{\epsilon} \theta \sigma s$.

άμαρτεῖν and ἀδικεῖν] refers to the well-known threefold gradation of wrong or criminality, (1) ἀτύχημα, accidental injury, (2) ἀμάρτημα, a mistake or error arising from ignorance of the circumstances of the case (Eth. N. III 2), and (3) ἀδικία, in which the προαίρεσιε, the deliberate purpose, enters and constitutes an intentional wrong or crime, malice prepense. In Eth. Nic. V 10, a fourth degree is added, ἀδίκημα, distinguished from ἀδικία in this, that though the act is voluntary and intentional at the moment, the intention is not preconceived and deliberate, the malice is not prepense; it is without προαίρεσιε, deliberate purpose; as an injury or death

inflicted in a sudden fit of passion.

§ 15. 'And those that have the pros: of of anticipate, a merciful construction being put on their ac'

and Introd. on that passage,

V 14, 1137 b 12, δίκαιον μέ

δικαίον, a rectification, 'suj

etter of the

γὰρ ως ἀναγκαίου, ώσπερ οι πένητες, ή ως ὑπερ-16 βολής, ώσπερ οι πλούσιοι. καὶ οι σφόδρα εὐδοκιμοῦντες καὶ οι σφόδρα ἀδοξοῦντες, οὶ μὲν ως οὐ δόξοντες, οὶ δ' ως οὐδὲν μᾶλλον δόξοντες.

17 αὐτοὶ μὲν οὖν οὖτως ἔχοντες ἐπιχειροῦσιν, άδικοῦσι δὲ τοὺς τοιούτους καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα, τοὺς ἔχοντας ὧν αὐτοὶ ἐνδεεῖς ἣ εἰς τἀναγκαῖα ἣ εἰς ὑπεροχὴν ἣ εἰς

18 ἀπόλαυσιν, καὶ τοὺς πόρρω καὶ τοὺς ἐγγύς· τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἡ λῆψις ταχεῖα, τῶν δ' ἡ τιμωρία βραδεῖα, οἶον p. 44.

law, legal justice, ή ελλείπει διὰ τὸ καθόλου, lb. V 27, ὁ μὴ ἀκριβοδίκαιος ἐπὶ τὸ χεῖρον, ἀλλ' ελαττωτικός, 1138. I. Soph. Oed. Col. 1127 (Oedipus), ἐπεὶ τό γὶ εὖσεβεῖ μόνοις παρ' ὑμῖν εὖρον ἀνθρώπων ἐγὰ καὶ τοὖπιεικές, milde gesinnung, humanität, gegenüber starrem recht, Schneidewin ad loc. Soph. Fragm. Inc. 699 (709, Dind.) δαίμονα, ὃς οὕτε τἀπιεικὲς οὕτε.τὴν χάριν

οίδεν, μόνην δ' έστερξε την άπλως δίκην.

'Any deficiency which a man feels may incline him to commit wrong—for the purpose of supplying it. Such deficiency is of two kinds; either deficiency in what is necessary, as poverty, or in some excess, as wealth'. Rich men often feel a craving for something over and above their wealth, something superfluous, as power, honour, license. Thuc. III 45. 4 reads like a commentary on this topic, ἀλλ' ἡ μὲν πενία ἀνάγκη τὴν τόλμαν παρέχουσα, ἡ δ' ἐξουσία ὕβρει τὴν πλεονεξίαν καὶ φρονήματι 'great resources and the consequent license breed the grasping spirit (their natural progeny, τὴν) by insolence and pride'. Comp. also Pol. II 7, quoted in § 17.

§ 16. 'And those in excessively high and in excessively low repute, the one as altogether unlikely, the other as no more likely than before, to incur the imputation of crime'. The first rely upon their character, either for the success of their attempt, which will put their victims off their guard, or for impunity by escaping suspicion; the second, having no character to lose, are emboldened by this to make new attempts, by which they may gain and cannot lose, because they cannot be in a worse

position in the eyes of the world than they are already.

§ 17. 'Such are the dispositions which lead men to attempt wrong'. We now turn to the characters and dispositions, qualities and circum-

stances which most expose men to wrong; these are as follows:

§ 18. 'First, people that have what we want, either in respect of necessity or excess (superfluity), or of sensual enjoyment, whether remote or near; for the acquisition of the one is speedy, the vengeance of the other tardy: as when we Greeks spoil the Carthaginians'. 'We Greeks' are pirates. Comp. Pol. II 7, 1267 a 2, οὐ μόνον δ' οἱ ἄνθρωποι διὰ τἀναγκαῖα ἀδικοῦσιν,...ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅπως χαίρωσι καὶ μὴ ἐπιθυμῶσι (this is the craving after superfluities out of mere wantonness of appetite)...οὐ τοίνυν διὰ ταύτην μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄν ἐπιθυμοῖεν ἵνα χαίρωσι ταῖς ἄνευ λυπῶν ἡδοναῖς. τί οὖι ἄκος τῶν τριῶν τούτων; κ.τ.λ. The difference of the two last of these lie in this, that the one is the desire caused by the painful gap to supply th

19 οἱ συλῶντες τοὺς Καρχηδονίους. καὶ τοὺς μὴ εὐλαβεῖς μηδὲ φυλακτικοὺς ἀλλὰ πιστευτικούς ράδιον γὰρ πάντας λαθεῖν. καὶ τοὺς ραθύμους ἐπιμελοῦς γὰρ τὸ ἐπεξελθεῖν. καὶ τοὺς αἰσχυντηλούς οὐ γὰρ 20 μαχητικοὶ περὶ κέρδους. καὶ τοὺς ὑπὸ πολλῶν ἀδικηθέντας καὶ μὴ ἐπεξελθόντας ὡς ὄντας κατὰ τὴν

deficiency; the other is a desire of pleasures which have no such painful craving attendant upon them, such are the pleasures of taste, learning, knowledge, and, in general, intellectual pleasures. The cure recommended for this vicious desire is philosophy, which may be obtained from within and & avrov, without any extraneous aid. It seems therefore that this division does not exactly coincide with that of the Rhetoric, though there is a strong resemblance between them.

§ 19. 'And those who are not inclined to caution or precaution, but are of a confiding temper; for they are all easy to take by surprise' ($\lambda a - \theta \epsilon \tilde{\imath} \nu$, lit. it is easy for the wrong-doer to escape their notice in attacking them).

And the careless (indolent, easy-tempered); because the prosecution of an offence belongs to (the opposite character) the careful, anxious attentive.

So Leech, in *Punch*, Aug. 2, 1862. *Infuriate Captain*. 'You scoundrel, I'll have you up as sure as you are born'. *Cabman*. 'What, summons me! Oh no, you won't, my Lord. You'll never take the trouble'. (*Exit* Cabman with 3s. 6d. over his fare.)

And the sensitive, timid, retiring, shamefaced; because they are not combative', inclined to contest the point, to stand out, in the matter of gain. alσχυντηλός, II 6. 27, 12. 10, it is characteristic of young men: whereas Eth. Nic. IV 15, 1128 δ 20, πρεσβύτερον οὐδεὶς ὧν ἐπαινέσειεν ὅτι alσχυντηλός. Plat. Charm. 158 C, Legg. II 665 E, alσχυντηλώς ἄδοντες. Vict. cites Aristoph. Equit. 264, καὶ σκοπεῖς γε τῶν πολιτῶν ὅστις ἐστὶν ἀμνοκῶν, πλούσιος καὶ μὴ πονηρὸς καὶ τρέμων τὰ πράγματα.

§ 20. 'And those who have been wronged by many and yet never prosecuted, or taken vengeance on, the aggressors, these being what the proverb calls Mysians' spoil', that is, an easy prey. Μυσῶν λεία dicitur de possessione quae defensore caret et obnoxia est direptori cuivis, Dissen ad Dem. de Corona, § 72; of anything that may be plundered with impunity, Liddell and Scott, Lex.; von allem durchaus preisgegebenen, Rost u. Palm, L. Harpocration and Suidas, s. vv., both explain the origin of the proverb to be the defenceless state of Mysia during the absence of their king Telephus, the famous beggar-hero of Euripides, and Horace's type of a pauper. See also Stallbaum's note on Gorgias 521 B, who quotes Olympiodorus (on the passage of Plato), ἡ παροιμία αὖτη ἐκ τοῦ Τηλέφου ἐστὶν Εὖριπίδου, ἐκεῖ γάρ κ.τ.λ. Whatever may be the origin of this proverb, it certainly was not derived from Euripides' play: for Harpocration expressly says that it is to be found in Strattis (the Comic poet) and Simonides ἐν ἐἰμβοις. This last is probably Simonides of Amorgos, a

21 παροιμίαν τούτους Μυσών λείαν, καὶ οὺς μηδεπώποτε καὶ οὺς πολλάκις· ἀμφότεροι γὰρ ἀφύλακτοι, 22 οἱ μὲν ὡς οὐδέποτε, οἱ δ' ὡς οὐκ ᾶν ἔτι. καὶ τοὺς

very early writer; but if it be the other Simonides, of Ceos, it is equally impossible that he could have derived it from Euripides, since he died

when Euripides was a child.

The above explanations seem to be founded upon the helpless condition of the Mysian people under some special circumstances which deprived them of their ordinary means of self-defence. I should rather suppose that the proverb implies an imputation upon their national character, because another proverbial expression, at least as common as this, represents the Mysians, as sharing with the Carians, the reputation of being the vilest and most contemptible of mankind; the property of such mean and cowardly wretches would naturally be an easy prey to any one who chose to take it. This imputation of cowardice or weakness is directly conveyed by Aristotle in the passage before us. This brings the two proverbs together as the expression of the same features of national character. This will furnish a sufficient explanation of Gorg. 521 B, el σοι Μυσόν γε ήδιον καλείν, and we need not have recourse with Stallbaum and Heindorf (ad loc. § 162) to the Μυσών λείαν to interpret it. This proverbial contempt for the Mysian character appears in Rhes, 251, Pl. Theaet. 209 (Schol. in Heindorf and Stallbaum), Magnes, (Com.) Fr. Poastriae (in Meineke's Fragm. Comic. Gr. 11 11), Philemon, Sicel. fr. 3 (Meineke u. s. IV 25), Menand, Androg. VII (Schol. Gorg. u. s., and Mein, IV 86), and Menand. Fr. Inc. 481 (Mein. 1V 327), all in the words Μυσών ὁ ἔσχατος, 'the last and lowest-even of the Mysians', worthlessness can go no further. Cic. pro Flacco, 27. 65, quid in Graeco sermone tam tritum et celebratum est, quam si quis despicatui ducitur, ut 'Mysorum ultimus' esse dicatur. Ib. 2, 3; 40, 100; Orat. VIII 27, quonam igitur modo audiretur Mysus aut Phryx Athenis, guum etiam Demosthenes, &c. ad Quint. Fratr. 1 1. 6 hominis ne Graeci quidem, at Mysii aut Phrygii potius. (Erasm. Adag. Mysorum postremus, p. 354.) The other form of the proverb occurs in Dem. de Cor. p. 248, § 72, την Μυσών λείαν καλουμένην, in Strattis, Medea, (fr. Harpocr.) Mein. II 776. (Erasm. Adag. Mysorum praeda, p. 1774.)

§ 21. καὶ οὖς μηδεπώποτε καὶ οὖς πολλάκις] sc. ἦδικήκασι. Both those who have never yet been injured and those who have been often injured (by the proposed wrong-doer) are proper objects of wrong: both of them are likely to be unprepared or taken off their guard (see on ἀφύλακτα, § 5, supra), the one because they feel secure and are careless from ignorance of all injurious treatment, and the others because they have already had so much of it that they think they must now be exempt from it for the future: that fortune or the Gods must be tired of persecuting them.

οί μὲν ὡς οὐδέποτε, οἱ δ' ὡς οὐκ ἄν ἔτι] sc. ἀδικούμενοι. The participle will suit both constructions. Soph, Oed. Col. 965, τάχ' ἄν τι μηνίουσιν εἰς γένος πάλαι expressing 'likelihood', and convertible with οἱ τάχ' ἄν τι μηνίοιεν. (Hermann ad loc. 969.) Matth., Gr. Gr. § 599 c, quotes this passage as an illustration of ἄν with a participle signifying 'mere possibility

διαβεβλημένους ἢ εὐδιαβόλους οἱ τοιοῦτοι γὰρ οὕτε προαιροῦνται, φοβούμενοι τοὺς κριτάς, οὕτε δύνανται 23 πείθειν ὧν οἱ μισούμενοι καὶ φθονούμενοι εἰσίν. καὶ πρὸς οὓς ἔχουσι πρόφασιν ἢ προγόνων ἢ αὐτῶν ἢ P. 1373. Φίλων ἢ ποιησάντων κακῶς ἢ μελλησάντων ἢ αὐτοὺς

or probability, a conjecture or a modest indefiniteness', distinguishing this from the general case which is exemplified in § 598 b. There is no ground for this distinction; the particle in both alike has its usual conditional signification; and the likelihood or probability and the rest is only one of the conditions under which the act is conceived. Here it expresses the opinion or expectation (ω_s) that they would be no longer likely to be exposed, or under such conditions or circumstances as would expose them, to wrong.

§ 22. And those that have already been the subjects of hostile charges, suspicion, calumny (all included in $\delta_{la}\beta\dot{a}\lambda\lambda\epsilon_{l}\nu$, 'to set one man at variance with, or against, another'), and such as are especially exposed or liable to it (easily calumniated, &c.); for such as these have neither the will (to prosecute) from fear of the judges (who are prejudiced against them), nor are they able to persuade (the judges, for the same reason, if they brought this case before a court of law): and to this class belong all

that are hated and envied.

φθονούμενοι] On the irregular passive, see Appendix B (at the end of this Book).

§ 23. καὶ (ἀδικοῦσι τούτους) πρὸς οὖς ἔχουσι πρόφασιν] 'and those again are liable to injury against whom there is (/i/. others have) any available pretext' (real or supposed for attacking, or doing them wrong) 'of injury received or threatened by their ancestors or themselves or their friends against themselves or their forefathers, or those whom they care for, (are interested in); because, as the proverb has it, villany only wants a pretext'.

For μελλησάντων Brandis' Anonymus (ap. Schneidewin's Philologus,

IV, 1, p. 44) read μελετησάντων; no great improvement.

μέλλειν, to be about to do, hence of something impending or threatening. Plat. Theaet. 148 E, of the intention; see Stallbaum's note; of a threatening attitude or posture, μέλλησις. Thuc. 1 69, οὖ τῷ δυνάμει τινὰ ἀλλὰ τῷ μελλήσει ἀμυνόμενοι, and 1V 126, Brasidas (of the threatening demonstrations of the barbarians before the battle), οὖτοι δὲ τὴν μέλλησιν μὲν ἔχουσι τοῖς ἀπείροις φοβεράν.

The proverb 'any pretext will serve a knave' is thus expressed by Menander, Thettale, Fr. 1. (Meineke IV 133), μικρά γε πρόφασίς ἐστι τοῦ πρᾶξαι κακῶς, ap. Stob. Flor. IV 40. Το the same effect, Eurip. Iph. Aul. 1180, ἐπεὶ βραχείας προφάσεως ἐνδεῖ μόνον, ἐφ' ἢ σ' ἐγὰ καὶ παίδες αἱ λελειμ-

μέναι δεξόμεθα δέξιν ήν σε δέξασθαι χρεών.

Victorius refers to a story of Agathocles tyrant of Sicily. as an illustration of this topic. It is told (in the de odicta 557 B) of the Corcyreans, ᾿Αγαθοκλῆς δὲ ὁ Συ σὺν γέλωτι χλενάζων Κερκυραίους ἐρωτῶντας, διὰ τί πι

η προγόνους η ων κήδονται ωσπερ γαρ ή παροιμία, 24 προφάσεως δείται μόνον ή πονηρία. καὶ τοὺς έχθροὺς καὶ τοὺς Φίλους τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ράδιον, τοὺς δ' ἡδύ. καί τους άφίλους. και τους μη δεινούς είπειν ή πράξαι ή γαρ οὐκ έγχειροῦσιν ἐπεξιέναι, ή καταλλάτ-25 τονται, ή οὐδεν περαίνουσιν. και οίς μη λυσιτελεί

ότι, νη Δία, είπεν, οί πατέρες ύμων ύπεδέξαντο τον 'Οδυσσέα' and then of the people of Ithaca, καὶ τῶν Ἰθακησίων ὁμοίως ἐγκαλούντων ὅτι πρόβατα λαμβάνουσιν αὐτών οἱ στρατιώται, ὁ δὲ ὑμέτερος, ἔφη, βασιλεὺς ἐλθών πρὸς ἡμᾶς καὶ τὸν ποιμένα προσεξετύφλωσεν. And the last is repeated, Apophth. 176 F.

§ 24. 'And friends as well as enemies; the former from the ease, the latter from the pleasure, of the undertaking and its success'. Theognis 1219, έχθρον μέν χαλεπον και δυσμενεί έξαπατήσαι, Κύρνε φίλον δέ φίλω ράδιον έξαπατάν. Lysias, κατ' 'Ανδοκίδου § 7, p. 103 ult. (of Andocides), δε τέχνην ταύτην έχει, τοὺς μὲν ἐχθροὺς μηθὲν ποιεῖν κακόν, τοὺς δὲ φίλους ὅτι ἄν δύνηται κακόν. Victorius.

'And the friendless. And those who have no skill and practice in speaking or action (business)'; (the opposite of them, οί εἰπεῖν δυνάμενοι καὶ οί πρακτικοί, are opposite also in disposition; they are of those that are inclined to do wrong, § 2); 'for these either make no attempt at all to prosecute, or if they do make the attempt, soon come to an agreement, or if they do carry on the prosecution, produce no effect (bring it to no conclusion, make nothing of it)'. These are the ampaymoves, the ordinary victims of the Cleons, and public informers, the συκοφάνται, and all other troublesome and mischievous people, who, like fever-fits or nightmares, τούς πατέρας τ' ήγχον νύκτωρ καὶ τούς πάππους ἀπέπνιγον, κατακλινόμενοί τ' έπὶ ταις κοίταις έπὶ τοισιν ἀπράγμοσιν ύμων ἀντωμοσίας καὶ προσκλήσεις καὶ μαρτυρίας συνεκόλλων (Arist. Vesp. 1039), and, καν τιν' αὐτών γνώς (Cleon) άπράγμον όντα καὶ κεχηνότα καταγαγών έκ χερρονήσου διαλαβών ήγκύρισας... καὶ σκοπείς γε τῶν πολιτῶν ὅστις ἐστὶν ἀμνοκῶν, πλούσιος καὶ μή πονηρὸς καὶ τρέμων τὰ πράγματα, Equit. 261. On the impossibility of leading a quiet life at Athens, see Criton's case in Xen. Mem. 11 9. 1, οίδα δέ ποτε αὐτὸν καὶ Κρίτωνος ἀκούσαντα ώς χαλεπον ὁ βίος 'Αθήνησαν είη ἀνδρὶ βουλομένω τὰ έαυτοῦ πράττειν. νῦν γὰρ, ἔφη, ἐμέ τινες εἰς δίκας ἄγουσιν, οὐχ ὅτι ἀδικοῦνται ύπ' έμου, άλλ' ότι νομίζουσιν ήδιον αν με αργύριον τελέσαι ή πράγματα έχειν. It ends by Criton's taking one of these 'sycophants' into his own service, like a dog, as he describes him, to keep off these wolves from his

§ 25. And those to whom it is unprofitable to waste their time in waiting for the trial or payment of the fine or penalty, such as strangers and farmers (who live in the country, and are so completely occupied in the cultivation of their land, that they cannot afford to waste time in attending the law-courts in the city); such as these are inclined to settle their differences on easy terms (διαλύεσθαι, to dissolve, break off, put an end to, and so make up, a quarrel), and readily leave off (drop) the proseδιατρίβειν έπιτηροῦσιν ἢ δίκην ἢ ἔκτισιν, οἶον οἱ ξένοι καὶ αὐτουργοί· ἐπὶ μικρῷ τε γὰρ διαλύονται καὶ 26 ραδίως καταπαύονται. καὶ τοὺς πολλὰ ἡδικηκότας, ἢ τοιαῦτα οἶα ἀδικοῦνται· ἐγγὺς γάρ τι δοκεῖ τοῦ μὴ ἀδικεῖν εἶναι, ὅταν τι τοιοῦτον ἀδικηθῆ τις οἷον εἰώθει καὶ αὐτὸς ἀδικεῖν· λέγω δ' οἷον εἴ τις τὸν

cution. 'Strangers', who are merely passing through Athens, and incessantly occupied either with business or sight-seeing, have of course no time to spare in dancing attendance at the law-courts; and 'farmers', 'cultivators of their own land', just as little, for the reason already mentioned. These αὐτουργοί, 'independent cultivators', constitute the δήμος γεωργικός, and are the best sort of democratical population, Pol. VII (VI) 4, init. βέλτιστος δήμος ὁ γεωργικός έστιν, a statement often repeated. One of the reasons for this is, 1318 a 12, διά μέν γάρ το πολλήν οὐσίαν ἔχειν ἄσχολος, ώστε μή πολλάκις εκκλησιάζειν, and the same would prevent them from waiting at the courts of law. This is confirmed by Eurip. Orest. 919, όλιγάκις άστυ κάγορας χραίνων κύκλον, αὐτουργός, οἵπερ καὶ μόνοι σώζουσι γῆν. To the same effect, Pol. VI (IV) 6, sub init., the γεωργοί, έχουσιν έργαζόμενοι ζην, ου δύνανται δε σχολάζειν. Comp. Eur. Suppl. 420, γαπόνος δ' άνηρ πένης ... ἔργων ὖπο οὐκ αν δύναιτο προς τὰ κοίν ἀποβλέπειν. The praises of agriculture and agriculturists are sung by Xenophon, Oecon. VI §§ 8, 9, 10, XV 9, and elsewhere. In Rhet. 11 4.9, the autoupyol are distinguished from the yewpytkoi, the latter being confined to farmers and agricultural labourers, auroupyoi being extended to all that work with their own hands. See Thuc. I 141.3, and Arnold's note. Thucydides does not observe Aristotle's distinction, the αὐτουργοί here are γεωργοί in the next chapter.

§ 26. And those who have committed either many wrongs themselves, or wrongs of the same kind as they are now suffering: for it seems almost no injustice at all, when a man has the same wrong inflicted on him as he himself was in the habit of inflicting (upon others); an assault, for instance, committed on a man who is habitually guilty of wanton insolence

or outrage.

alkía and ὅβρις are thus legally distinguished. alkía is personal violence, a blow, or an assault, εἰς τὸ σῶμα alκίζεσθαι πληγαῖς, Pol. VIII (V) 10, 1311 ὁ 24, and is the subject of a δίκη or private action between citizen and citizen. ΰβρις is threefold, (1) δι' αἰσχρουργίας, (2) διὰ πληγῶν (this is further defined μετὰ προπηλακισμοῦ, which distinguishes it from alκία), διὰ λόγων; that is, a violation of the feeling of personal dignity and sense of honour, humiliating, degrading, scornful, wanton, language or acts; the mental injury constituting a great part of the offence. This appears in Aristotle's definition of it, Rhet. II 2. 5, τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐφὶ οἶς αἰσχύνη ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι, μὴ ἵνα τι γένηται αὐτῷ (not for any profit to himself) ἀλλὶ ὅπως ἡσθῆ (out of mere wantonness and pleasure in the insult itself). So that ΰβρις is a mixture of intentional insult and wantonness α 'wanton insult'. To the same effect is the observation in I 13. 10, the προσσημαίνει τὴν προυίρεσιν, 'implies deliberate intention'. This then

27 εἰωθότα ὑβρίζειν αἰκίσαιτο. καὶ τοὺς ἢ πεποιηκότας κακῶς ἢ βουληθέντας ἢ βουλομένους ἢ ποιήσοντας ἔχει γὰρ καὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ καλόν, καὶ ἐγγὺς τοῦ μὴ 28 ἀδικεῖν φαίνεται. καὶ οἶς χαριοῦνται ἢ φίλοις ἢ θαυμαζομένοις ἢ ἐρωμένοις ἣ κυρίοις ἢ ὅλως πρὸς οῦς ζῶσιν αὐτοί. καὶ πρὸς οῦς ἔστιν ἐπιεικείας τυχεῖν.

ground of the distinction between alkia and $\mathring{v}\beta\rho\iota s$, and the reason for the latter being made the object of a $\gamma\rho a\phi\dot{\eta}$, or public prosecution, the honour of the state being considered as compromised in the insult to one of its members. See further on this subject, Meier und Schömann Der Attische

Process, p. 319 seq.

Hippodamus, the legislator of Miletus, who drew the plans and laid out the Piraeus, and was the architect of Thurii on its foundation, and of Rhodes, divided crimes into three kinds, as we learn from Pol. II 8, 1267 δ 38. περὶ ὧν γὰρ αl δίκαι γίνονται, τρία ταῦτ' εἶναι τὸν ἀριθμόν, ὕβριν, βλάβην, θάνατον, i.e. (1) crimes by which the feelings are wounded and the sense of personal dignity wantonly outraged, (2) those which involve loss or

damage to person or property, and (3) murder and homicide.

§ 27. And (in the way of retaliation) those who have either already done, or have intended, or are intending, or will certainly do, us mischief: because this retaliation or compensation carries with it (ἔχει) not only pleasure (sensual or intellectual, chiefly the latter in this case) but also (a sense of) right (the moral object of conduct), and so it seems bordering upon almost no wrong at all. 'Retaliation' or 'compensation' is right upon principles of justice, τὸ δίκαιον; of which the 'reciprocal' or 'retaliatory' is one of the three kinds, Eth. Nic. V c. 5, arising from the subdivision of the original two, διανεμητική, 'distributive', and διορθωτική, 'corrective'; the latter having two divisions, (1) rectification of, or compensation for, frauds and crimes, διορθωτική proper, and (2) τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός (c. 8) the justice that regulates exchanges and commercial transactions.

The difference between this topic and that of § 23, καὶ πρὸς οὖς ἔχουσι —κήδονται is, according to Victorius, that the motive or occasion of the wrong in either case is not the same. In the one the wrong-doer seeks a pretence or pretext for injuring his neighbour, in the other the occasion comes unsought; the wrong would not have been done had it not been

provoked by previous injury.

§ 28. καὶ οἶς χαριοῦνται] and those by whom, i.e. by whose injury, they will oblige either their friends, or those whom they admire and respect, or love, or their masters (any one who has power over them) or those by whose opinions or authority they direct their life and conduct.

πρὸς οὖς ζῶσιν] in reference to whom they live, who are their guides and authorities in life and action: or, on whom they depend, to whom they look for support or subsistence; as a 'dependant' does. To which is opposed in 1 9. 27, ἐλευθέρου τὸ μὴ πρὸς ἄλλον ζῷν, 'independence', αὐτάρκεια, where you don't look to any one else but yourself. See the note there, p. 173.

29 καὶ οἶς ἄν ἐγκεκληκότες ὧσι καὶ προδιακεχωρηκότες, οἶον Κάλλιππος ἐποίει τὰ περὶ Δίωνα καὶ γὰρ τὰ

καὶ πρὸς οὖς] 'those, in reference to whom', that is in our relations (or dealings) with whom, it is possible (we may expect) to meet with indulgence or merciful consideration. On ἐπιείκεια, see Introd. p. 190—93.

Victorius, followed by Vater, would connect this clause immediately with the preceding, πρὸς οὖς ζῶσιν αὖτοί, καὶ πρὸς οὖς κ.τ.λ. in order to avoid a supposed repetition of a former topic, § 14, καὶ οἶς ἆν τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς τυχεῖν. Vater, who supplies this explanation, forgets that the two topics are differently applied; in § 14 the expectation of indulgent consideration is assigned as a motive of action in the agent; in this section it is a disposition in the patient which subjects him to wrong: though it is true that the feeling or tendency itself resides in both cases in the same person. Besides this, the union of these two seems to be an improper conjunction of two heterogeneous dispositions, a sort of moral ζεῦγμα; taking a man for the guide of your life or depending upon him, and relying upon his merciful consideration, are not closely enough connected to warrant their being classed together. I have therefore retained Bekker's punctuation, which makes them separate topics.

§ 29. And if we have had cause of complaint against any one, or a previous difference with him, (we do to him) as Callippus did in the affair of Dion; for things of that kind (a wrong deed done under such circumstances) appear to us (personally and at that time, not always or in general,) to border upon, bear a close resemblance to, acts altogether innocent.

προδιακεχωρηκότες] διαχωρείν is used here as the neuter of διαχωρίζειν, to separate. In this sense it is almost a ἄπαξ λεγόμενον. No authority for this use of the word is given by Stephens or any other Lexicon earlier than Arrian. It represents morally and metaphorically a 'split', or 'separation', 'parting asunder' of intercourse and interests between two friends.

èποίει] The imperfect here seems unmeaning, as the act is only one. Spengel, in his Edition, 1867, has adopted without remark ἐποίησε from MSS Q, Yb, Zb.

Kάλλιππος...τὰ περὶ Δίωνα] Plutarch. Vit. Dion. I 982, de Sera Numinis Vindicta c. 16. The story is thus told by Victorius. Callippus was an Athenian, friend and companion of Dion during his stay at Athens, and the partner of his expedition to Sicily for the liberation of his native country. By his conduct and services he had ingratiated himself with Dion's mercenaries, whom he incited to murder their general, and thereby made himself master of Syracuse. Before this, he had spread calumnious reports about Dion and excited the citizens agai Dion being informed of this took no precautions for hi partly in scorn of the attempt, and partly because he preserve his own power and life at the expense of the friends: the scheme accordingly took effect, and L put to death. Aristotle says upon this that Callipp arguing that as Dion had now knowledge of his de

30 τοιαθτα έγγθε τοθ μη άδικεῖν φαίνεται. καὶ τοὺς ὑπ' ἄλλων μέλλοντας, ἂν μη αὐτοί, ὡς οὐκέτι ἐνδεχόμενον βουλεύσασθαι, ὥσπερ λέγεται Αἰνεσίδημος

was in danger, this anticipation of the other, was a mere measure of precaution or retaliation, and no crime at all. This suspicion of Callippus is the ground of his *complaint* and the occasion of the *previous difference*, or sundering of their apparent friendship. [Arnold Schaefer, Demo-

sthenes und seine Zeit, 111 2. p. 159, 160.]

§ 30. καὶ τοὺς ὑπ' ἄλλων μέλλοντας (ἀδικεῖσθαι), ἃν μὴ αὐτοὶ (ἀδικῶσιν avroys)] Another motive in the aggressor to commit a wrong, another circumstance which renders its intended object especially liable to it, arises, when the victim is in such a position that the wrong will be done by somebody else (ὑπ' ἄλλων) if we don't do it ourselves, or take the initiative-this seems to us a justification of the act of aggression which in other circumstances would be a gross wrong-and the necessity of immediate action allows no time for deliberation. That this is a sort of justification of such an act appears in the conduct attributed to Ænesidemus towards Gelo: the latter (tyrant of Syracuse) had anticipated him (the tyrant of Leontini) in reducing and enslaving some state that was neighbour of both: Aenesidemus sends a present to Gelo of eggs, cakes, and sweetmeats, the ordinary prize of the game of κότταβος, as a prize, in acknowledgment of his superior foresight, quickness and dexterity, shewn in his 'anticipation' of himself, ὅτε ἔφθασεν, admitting at the same time that he had had an eye to it himself. This shows that Aenesidemus thought it 'hardly a crime', eyybs rou un adureur, a justifiable act; and also illustrates the extreme liability to aggression and wrong involved in the position of this 'neighbouring state', which would have been wronged in any case by some one else, ὑπ' ἄλλων μέλλοντας, at any rate, even if Gelo (who here represents the auroi, the man who takes the initiative) had not done it

As Casaubon has observed, there is some object understood after ἀνἔραποδισαμένω. The simple τινάς οτ τινὰ πόλιν, will answer the purpose.

Nothing more is known about the circumstances of the case.

The person here called Alveσίδημοs, in Herod. Alvησίδημοs, and in Pindar Alνησίδαμοs, is mentioned twice in Herodotus, VII 154 as the son of one Patäicus, and a member of the body-guard of Hippocrates, tyrant of Gela, and in c. 165, as the father of Thero, sovereign (μούναρχος) of Agrigentum, to whom Pindar's second Olympian Ode is dedicated. In Pindar his name occurs three times, but only as the father of Thero, Ol. II 46, III 9, and of him and Xenocrates, Isthm. II 41. To reconcile Herodotus' statement about him with that of Aristotle here, we may perhaps suppose that Aenesidemus had made himself master of Agrigentum, on the throne of which he was succeeded by his son Thero, before the period to which this story belongs. Aristotle's narrative certainly represents him as a sovereign prince, and not as a mere mercenary in ance ther's service. Victorius, followed by Schrader, calls him 'tyrant tecontini', but gives no authority.

Γέλωνι πέμψαι κοττάβια ἀνδραποδισαμένω, ὅτι P- 4531 ἔφθασεν, ὡς καὶ αὐτὸς μέλλων. καὶ οὺς ἀδικήσαντες
δυνήσονται πολλὰ δίκαια πράττειν, ὡς ῥαδίως ἰασόμενοι, ὥσπερ ἔφη Ἰάσων ὁ Θετταλὸς δεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἔνια,
32 ὅπως δύνηται καὶ δίκαια πολλὰ ποιεῖν. καὶ ὰ πάντες
ἡ πολλοὶ ἀδικεῖν εἰώθασιν συγγνώμης γὰρ οἴονται

κοττάβια] On the game of κότταβος, the modes of playing it, and its varieties, see Becker, Charicles, on the Greek Games, Excursus III to Sc. VI, p. 349. Our information upon the subject is principally derived from Athen. XI 58, p. 479 C—E, and XV I, 665 seq., and Pollux VI 109. We learn from Athenaeus, on the authority of Dicaearchus (479 D) that it was a Sicilian invention and most fashionable in that country, (cf. XV 666 B), ή τῶν κοττάβων εῦρεσις Σικελική ἐστι παιδιά, ταύτην πρώτων εὐρόντων Σικελών. Further we are told that the winner at the game received a prize, 667 D, ὅτι δὲ ἀθλον προῦκειτο τῷ εὖ προεμένω τὸν κότταβον προείρηκε μὲν καὶ ὁ ᾿Αντιφάνης・ ϣὰ γάρ ἐστι καὶ πεμμάτια καὶ τραγήματα. Similarly from Hegesander, 479 D, τοσαύτη δὲ ἐγένετο σπουδή περὶ τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα ώστε εἰς τὰ συμπόσια παρευφέρειν ἀθλα κοττάβια καλούμενα. From Gaisford's observation that the form κοττάβεια occurs in at least three verses, in Ath. XV 666 E, 667 F, it seems that both this and κοττάβιον were in use. Gaisford unnecessarily infers from it that there was only one, and that κοττάβειον.

§ 31. And those to whom the wrong can be readily compensated, or more than compensated by just acts, because such wrongs admit of an easy cure;—an instance of this is the saying of Jason of Pherae, that we are bound to commit some wrongs in order that we may have the opportunity of doing justice on a larger scale. The saying itself is to be found in somewhat different words in Plutarch, πολ. παραγγέλμ. 817 F (Buhle), it was always applied, ἐφ' οἶς ἐβιάζετο καὶ παρηνώχλει τινὰς ἀεὶ λεγομένην, to his various acts of oppression and annoyance, ὡς ἀναγκαῖον ἀδικεῖν τὰ μικρὰ τοὺς βουλομένους τὰ μέγαλα δικαιοπραγεῖν. This is in fact Robin Hood's plea, that he robbed the rich to give to the poor. This topic may be further illustrated by Bassanio's appeal to the judge, Merchant of Venice, Act IV. Sc. 1, line 209, And I beseech you, Wrest once the law to your authority: To do a great right do a little wrong, And curb this cruel devil of his will.

§ 32. Victorius observes that we here enter upon a new division of the chapter. The analysis has been hitherto confined to persons prone to wrong and liable to wrong: it is now applied to certain classes of things or circumstances which increase the liability to wrong. These are kinds of $\partial \delta \omega \eta \mu a \tau a$. It is in fact a transition to the subject of the next chapter. Such are offences of very common occurrence; men are tempted to commit such because they think they shall meet with indulgence; people have become so familiar with the offence by constant association ($\sigma u v \eta \theta e l q$) that it has lost its repulsive character; and also they may argue that if 'all or many' are guilty of it, it must be a human infirmity, and being a natural defect is hardly to be called a vice.

33 τεύξεσθαι. καὶ τὰ ράδια κρύψαι τοιαῦτα δ' ὅσα ταχὺ ἀναλίσκεται, οἶον τὰ ἐδώδιμα. ἢ τὰ εὐμετά34 βλητα σχήμασιν ἢ χρώμασιν ἢ κράσεσιν, ἢ ἃ πολλαχοῦ ἀφανίσαι εὕπορον τοιαῦτα δὲ τὰ εὐβάστακτα
35 καὶ ἐν μικροῖς τόποις ἀφανιζόμενα. καὶ οἷς ἀδιάφορα καὶ ὅμοια πολλὰ προϋπῆρχε τῷ ἀδικοῦντι. καὶ ὅσα αἰσχύνονται οἱ ἀδικηθέντες λέγειν, οἷον γυναικῶν οἰκείων ὕβρεις ἢ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἢ εἰς νίεῖς. καὶ ὅσα φιλο-

§ 33. Crimes and the products of them that are easy to conceal, especially in the case of stealing, which is here most prominent in the author's thoughts. Such are things that are soon consumed, as eatables, or things that can be easily changed (in their appearance, without losing their value; so that they shall not be recognized, and the theft escape detection), in respect of their shape (as plate and coin by melting), or colour (cloth or silk by dyeing), or mixture (as liquids of all kinds). Victorius refers to Cic. de Fin. v 25. 74, of the Stoics, Atque ut reliqui fures earum rerum quas ceperunt signa commutant, sic illi ut sententiis nostris (sc. Academicorum) pro suis uterentur nomina tanquam rerum notas mutaverunt. There is about the same amount of resemblance in this topic to that of § 8, as we found in § 28 (q. v.) to that of § 14; the circumstance is nearly the same, the application different.

§ 34. Or things that are easy to make away with, put out of sight (effacer, cause to disappear) in many different ways; such are things portable, which can be hid away in holes and corners (lit. small places).

§ 35. And things (stolen goods), like others, of which the thief has already a good many in his possession, either exactly like (with no difference at all between them) or nearly like (bearing a general resemblance, and so not easy to distinguish). The first is the case of coins or medals, and in general, things that are made in sets, one exactly like another.

ἀδιάφορος, which in the sense here assigned to it seems to be a ἄπαξ λεγόμενον, is not to be confounded either with the logical signification of it—Anal. Post. II 13, 97 b 31, ἐν τοῖς καθόλου ἢ ἐν τοῖς ἀδιαφόροις, Τορ. Α 7, ἀδιάφορα τὸ εἶδος, ἄνθρωπος, ἵππος; this is 'without specific difference', 'an individual'—or with the meaning it bears in the Stoic philosophy, things 'indifferent', without any moral differences, neither good nor bad; from which our sense of the word is derived.

'And things which the injured party is ashamed to reveal: as any outrage committed upon the women of one's own family, or one's self or one's children'. Victorius quotes Lysias, c. Simon. § 3, μάλιστα δ' ἀγανακτῶ, ὧ βουλή, ὅτι περὶ τοιούτων πραγμάτων εἰπεῖν ἀναγκασθήσομαι πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐγὼ αἰσχυνόμενος, εἰ μέλλοιεν πολλοί μοι συνείσεσθαι, ἢνεσχόμην ἀδικούμενος.

καὶ ὅσα φιλοδικεῖν] ὅσα cognate accusative for ὅσαs δίκας; or pe the local accus., 'the cases in which (as the seat of them) the lit spirit is shewn', Appendix B, note 1, at the end of this Book. δικείν δόξειεν αν ό έπεξιών τοιαῦτα δὲ τά τε μικρα

καὶ ἐφ' οἷς συγγνώμη.

ω΄ς μὲν οὖν ἔχοντες ἀδικοῦσι, καὶ ποῖα καὶ ποίους CHAP. XIII.
 καὶ διὰ τί, σχεδὸν ταῦτ΄ ἐστίν τὰ δ΄ άδικήματα
 Ρ. 1373 δ.
 πάντα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διέλωμεν, ἀρξάμενοι πρῶτον ἐντεῦθεν. ὥρισται δὴ τὰ δίκαια καὶ τὰ ἄδικα
 πρός τε νόμους [δύο] καὶ πρὸς οὕς ἐστι, διχῶς. λέγω δὲ νόμον τὸν μὲν ἴδιον τὸν δὲ κοινόν, ἴδιον μὲν τὸν

'And all cases in which prosecution would seem to indicate a litigious spirit in the prosecutor'; that is, where the offence is trifling, or, again, in the case of acts that deserve indulgence—some of which are mentioned in c. 13. 16, 17. Victorius refers to Lysias, κατὰ Θεομνήστου Α § 2, ἐγὼ δ', εἰ μὲν τὸν ἐαυτοῦ με ἀπεκτονέναι ἡτιᾶτο, συγγνώμην ἃν εἶχον αὐτῷ τῶν εἰρημένων' οὐδ' εἶ τι ἄλλο τῶν ἀποβρήτων ἤκουσα, οὐκ ἃν ἐπεξῆλθον αὐτῷ, ἀνελεύθερον γὰρ καὶ λίαν φιλόδικον εἶναι νομίζω κακηγορίας δικάζεσθαι.

The chapter concludes with a summary enumeration of its contents. So now of the characters and dispositions that incline men to crime, the several kinds of those crimes, the characters that invite crime, and the motives that incite to crime, we have given a tolerably complete $(\sigma \chi \epsilon \delta \acute{\nu} \nu)$

account', or analysis.

CHAP. XIII.

A connected sketch of the contents of the following chapter, a particular account of ἐπιείκεια or equity, and of the relations of the different kinds of 'law', will be found in the Introduction, p. 187—193, and on

p. 239 (Appendix E to chap. XIII).

It analyses and classifies actions right and wrong, first from the strictly legal, and secondly from the equitable or moral point of view. Equity is the principle of merciful consideration, that indulgent view of men's actions which makes allowance for human infirmities, looks rather to the intention than the act, and thus mitigates or corrects $(\hat{\epsilon}_{\pi\alpha\nu\rho\rho}\theta\sigma\hat{\epsilon})$ the strict rigour of the 'written law'.

§ 1. 'In distinguishing or analysing wrong and right acts, let us commence with the following consideration' (or, let us take the following for our starting-point). On δικαίωμα here 'an unjust act', the opposite of ἀδίκημα, and its various senses, see note on I 3. 9, p. 56. 'Accordingly the definition of justice and injustice has reference to two kinds of "law" (§ 2), and two kinds of persons (§ 3)'. The divisions of just and unjust depend upon their relation to two kinds of law, and two kinds of persons: πάντα ὁρίζεται τῷ τέλει.

§ 2. 'I distinguish therefore two universal; and by special, I mea people or nation (separately or which has for each class of per referred to themselves,) by their opinions, form of government, ?

d the h t έκάστοις ώρισμένον πρός αὐτούς, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν μέν άγραφον τὸν δὲ γεγραμμένον, κοινὸν δὲ τὸν κατὰ φύσιν. ἔστι γάρ, ὁ μαντεύονταί τι πάντες, φύσει κοινὸν δίκαιον καὶ ἄδικον, κᾶν μηδεμία κοινωνία πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἡ μηδὲ συνθήκη, οἶον καὶ ἡ Σοφοκλέους Άντιγόνη φαίνεται λέγουσα, ὅτι δίκαιον ἀπειρημένον θάψαι τὸν Πολυνείκη, ὡς φύσει ὅν τοῦτο δίκαιον

οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κάχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε ζη τοῦτο, κοὐδεὶς οἶδεν ἐξ ὅτου φάνη. καὶ ὡς Ἐμπεδοκλης λέγει περὶ τοῦ μη κτείνειν τὸ

in explanation of this, Introd. Appendix E p. 242—244); 'and by universal law, the "law of Nature".' For there is, as all are instinctively convinced, a natural and universal notion of right and wrong, quite independent of any mutual communication (association, intercourse) or compact, such as Sophocles' Antigone evidently alludes to, when she says that it is just, (right), though forbidden, (by the *positive* law of Creon's enactment) to bury Polynices, implying (&s, on the supposition that) that this is naturally right.

Not of today nor yet of yesterday Is this, but everlasting is its life,

And none doth know what time it came to light.

And, as Empedocles says about killing living animals; for this is not right for some and not right for others, 'but this same law for all (this universal law) spreads without break or flaw' (ψυεκίως, usually διηνεκώς, 'continuously') 'over the wide ruling sky and again over the boundless earth'.

Law universal of no human birth

Pervades the sovereign sky and boundless earth.

On the distinction of the κοινός and ίδιος νόμος here taken, compare Eth. N. V 10 (Eth. Eud. IV 10) 1134 b 18 seq. quoted in Introduction, p. 241. The same distinction is found supra I 10. 3. On 'natural law' see Whewell, Elements of Morality, § 380 seq. Duke of Argyll, Reign of Law, Definitions of Law, c. 2.

μαντεύονται] of a presentiment or foreboding, or as here an instinctive conviction, a sort of divination; see note on 1 9, 40, καταμαντεύεσθαι.

'Αντιγόνη...λέγουσα] Soph. Antig. 456.

'Εμπεδοκλής λέγει] Empedocles, Fragm. lines 404—5. Karsten ad loc. p. 281 says, 'Scaliger ad vocabulum αὐγής in margine annotavit lect. αὖ γής. Codices variant (the best including A° appear to give αὐγής); hoc perperam recepit Bekkerus, quem plures sunt secuti, qui loci sensum parum habuerunt perspectum.' Spengel follows Bekker in reading αὖ γής. In illustration of the doctrine alluded to in the lines quoted, Karster Diogenes Laertius, de Pythag. VIII 13, qui dicit, eum vetare â τῶν ζώων, κοινὸν δίκαιον ἡμῶν ἐχόντων τῆς ψυχῆς; and Sextus E adv. Math. IX 127, who says that the entire school of Pythag.

έμψυχον τοῦτο γὰρ οὐ τισὶ μὲν δίκαιον τισὶ δ οὐ δίκαιον,

άλλὰ τὸ μὲν πάντων νόμιμον διά τ' εὐρυμέδοντος αἰθέρος ηνεκέως τέταται διά τ' ἀπλέτου αὖ γης. 3 καὶ ως ἐν τῷ Μεσσηνιακῷ λέγει ἀλκιδάμας...πρὸς οθς δέ¹, δίχα ὥρισται ἡ γὰρ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἡ πρὸς ἕνα p. 46.

Empedocles, and all the Italians, assert that we have intercourse not only with the Gods and one another, but that this extends also to irrational animals; ἐν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ παντὸς τοῦ κόσμου διῆκου ψυχῆς τρόπου, τὸ καὶ ἐνοῦν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἐκεῖναι διόπερ καὶ κτείνουτες αὐτὰ... ἀσεβοῦμεν. On the interpretation of αὐγῆς Karsten has this note, 'Ergo commune illud ins pertinet διά τ' αἰθέρος i. e. per aerem (cf. annot. ad v. 105) quo omnes animantes vescuntur, διά τ' αὐγῆς per lucidum caelum (ut vs. 127) in quo Dii degunt'. The verse cited by Karsten in support of his interpretation of αὐγῆς seems insufficient for its purpose; the word there seems to have no other meaning than its ordinary one, 'sunbeam or sunlight'; I doubt if αὐγῆ could stand for 'heaven'; and perhaps it may be better to accept Bekker's reading.

On Alcidamas, see the article on the Sophistical Rhetoric, in the Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Philology, Vol. III. No. 9, p. 263 seq. and on the Μεσσηνιακός λόγος, ib. p. 257. It is quoted again, II 23. I. Vater, and Spengel (Artium Scriptores p. 175), cite the anonymous Scholiast, who supplies the missing quotation thus; ἐλευθέρους ἀφῆκε πάντας ὁ Θεός, οὐδένα δοῦλον ἡ φύσις πεποίηκεν. It seems to be totally inapplicable to the topic which it professes to illustrate, and if it comes from the speech at all is at all events quite out of place here. Spengel (Praef. ad Rhet. Gr. I vi) says of it, fictum non verum: but being as it is so utterly inappropriate, it can hardly have been 'manufactured' for an occasion to which it is not suitable.

Of the 'Messeniac declamation' the Schol. says that it was a μελετή ύπερ Μεσσηνίων ἀποστησάντων Λακεδαιμονίων καὶ μὴ πειθομένων δουλεύειν. Conf. Sauppe, ad Alcid. Fragm. 1, Oratores Attici III 154. [Vahlen, der Rhetor Alkidamas, (Sitzungsberichte der Kaiserlichen Academie der Wissenschaften, Vienna, 1863, pp. 491—528, esp. p. 505). S.]

§ 3. πρὸς οὖς δὲ διώρισται, διχῶς διώρισται, Vulg.—δίχα ὤρισται Α^c, adopted by Bekker and Spengel [ed. 1867], omitting the first διώρισται: in Rhetores Graeci [1853] he reads [διώρισται] διχῶς διώρισται, in conformity with § 1. (I do not myself see why the first διώρισται need be omitted without manuscript authority.) 'In respect of the persons to whom it is referred, this division of law is twofold, for the right and wrong, justice and injustice, in acts, are referred to (see really determined by, divided in relation to his hardhards acciety in the substitute of the persons to whom

n individual member of it. nto two classes, according a individual, or the comes or wrongs to the indiτῶν κοινωνούντων, ὰ δεῖ πράττειν καὶ μὴ πράττειν. διὸ καὶ τάδικήματα καὶ τὰ δικαιώματα διχῶς ἔστιν ἀδικεῖν καὶ δικαιοπραγεῖν ἢ γὰρ πρὸς ἕνα καὶ ὡρισμένον ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινόν ὁ γὰρ μοιχεύων καὶ τύπτων ἀδικεῖ τινὰ τῶν ὡρισμένων, ὁ δὲ μὴ στρατευόμενος τὸ κοινόν.

4 άπάντων δη των άδικημάτων διηρημένων, καὶ των μὲν ὄντων πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν των δὲ πρὸς ἄλλον ἡ πρὸς ἄλλους, ἀναλαβόντες τί ἐστι τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι, λέγωμεν

viduals, refusal to serve, or desertion, is a wrong to the entire community or nation'. This is the basis of the distinction in Attic jurisprudence between the $\delta l \epsilon \eta$, the private civil action or suit of man against man, and the $\gamma p a \phi \dot{\eta}$, or public, criminal prosecution; since the latter is a state offence, common to the whole community, a public prosecution may be conducted by $\delta \beta o \nu \lambda \dot{\delta} \mu \epsilon \nu o s$, 'any one that pleases', provided, that is, he be a qualified Athenian citizen. See further on this subject, in Introd. 1 13, p. 187, and Meier u. Schömann, Der Attische Process, Bk. III. § 2. Butt-

mann ad Dem. Med. § 9.

Accordingly ὁ τύπτων is liable to a δίκη αἰκίας; ὁ μὴ στρατευόμενος, one that either declines to serve altogether, and so fails in his duty to society and his country, or a deserter, to a γραφὴ ἀστρατείας οτ λειποταξίου. μοιχεία is here included with αἰκία in the class of wrongs that are the subject of a δίκη or δίκη ἰδία; under the ordinary classification it exposed the offender to a γραφή, a criminal prosecution, which, as it could be carried on by the husband or one of the near relations, might also properly be called ἰδία. Meier u. Schömann, u. s., p. 163—4, 327 seq. In this case the state, as well as the husband, considered itself aggrieved as the guardian of public morals. In illustration of this twofold aspect of a crime, Victorius quotes Cic, in Verrem, V (III) 69, 161, quibus in rebus non solum filio, Verres, sed etiam reipublicae fecisti iniuriam: susceperas enim liberos non solum tibi sed etiam patriae.

§ 4. 'After this division, or classification, of wrong acts, some of which are directed against the entire community, and the others against one or more *individuals*, let us first repeat our definition of τὸ ἀδικείσθαι, that we may know what being treated unjustly, or suffering wrong, is.

and then proceed to the rest'.

The introduction of allows here leads to a new distinction: a civil action between parties in their private capacity may be brought either against one or several, as when an action is brought against a club or commercial company or the partners in a firm: in either case the offence which is the subject of it is private and particular, and directed against individuals, and both of them are distinguished from st offences.

ἀναλαβόντες] to repeat or resume (take up again) seems to be a re ence to I 10.3, where ἀδικείν, the exact opposite of ἀδικείσθαι, was defi-

5 τὰ λοιπά. ἔστι δὴ τὸ άδικεῖσθαι τὸ ὑπὸ ἐκόντος τὰ ἄδικα πάσχειν τὸ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν ὥρισται πρότερον 6 ἐκούσιον εἶναι. ἐπεὶ δ' ἀνάγκη τὸν ἀδικούμενον βλάπτεσθαι καὶ ἀκουσίως βλάπτεσθαι, αὶ μὲν βλάβαι ἐκ τῶν πρότερον φανεραί εἰσιν τὰ γὰρ ἀγαθὰ καὶ τὰ κακὰ διήρηται καθ' αὐτὰ πρότερον, καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια, ὅτι ἔστιν ὅσα εἰδότες. ώστ' ἀνάγκη πάντα τὰ ἐγκλήματα ἢ πρὸς τὸ κοινὸν ἢ πρὸς τὸ

and the latter can readily be inferred from the former. This may be called a resumption, or, in a sense, a repetition of the preceding definition, or at all events of the same subject; and this seems to be confirmed by the reference, in the next sentence, to this very definition. On the entire question of the voluntary character of ddinqua and ddinia see Eth. Nic. v 11 (Bekk.): and that of vice in general is discussed in the same work, III 7 (Bekk.). The conclusion in the two chapters of the Ethics is that which is here assumed to be the fact.

§ 5. 'To be wronged then is to be unjustly treated by a voluntary agent, for to do wrong has been previously defined to be voluntary', I 10. 3. And since 'doing' and 'suffering', action and passion, are opposites, and opposites fall under the same γένος, we may infer at once that if doing wrong is voluntary, suffering wrong is voluntary too—not in the patient of course, but in the agent. Comp. Eth. Nic. V 10, I135 a 15, δυτων δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ ἀδίκων τῶν εἰρημένων ἀδικεῖ μὲν καὶ δικαισπραγεῖ ὅταν ἐκών τις αὐτὰ πράττη' ὅταν δ' ἄκων οὕτ' ἀδικεῖ οὕτε δικαισπραγεῖ ἀλλ' ἡ κατὰ συμβεβηκός ... ἀδίκημα δὲ καὶ δικαισπράγημα ὥρισται τῷ ἐκουσίφ καὶ ἀκουσίφ... ὥστ' ἔσται τι ἄδικον μὲν, ἀδίκημα δ' οὕπω, ἐὰν μὴ τὸ ἐκούσιον προσῆ.

§ 6. 'Now injury, and injury against one's will, being both of them necessary to the notion of injustice or wrong, it will be clear from what has preceded, what the injuries are (ai βλάβαι the injuries of different kinds which are contained in the notion); for things good and bad in themselves (as opposed to the comparative goods of c. 7) have been previously analysed (in c. 6), and of things voluntary it has been stated (c. 10 § 3) that they are things done with the full knowledge' (of the special circumstances of the case. Eth. Nic. 111 2). Spengel has adopted

elograt from MS At, for dipograt the Vulg., which Bekker retains,

§ 7. 'So that all charges (accusations, complaints of wrong) of every kind must be referred to two different distinctions, the first that of the persons offended, whether individuals and private persons, or the community at large; and the second (\$\tilde{\tau}\$ rai, 'or again'), in the nature of the act, whether it was done in ignorance or unintentionally (i.e. under compulsion, by a superior external force), or intentionally and with full knowledge; and of these last (**ioros rai elboros*) either with deliberate purpose, malice prepense, or nature the influence of passion or excited feeling'. Bekker and Speaged has been supposed as with MSS Q, Yb, Zb, before

ίδιον είναι, καὶ ἢ ἀγνοοῦντος καὶ ἄκοντος ἢ ἐκόντος καὶ εἰδότος, καὶ τούτων τὰ μὲν προελομένου τὰ δὲ διὰ 8 πάθος. περὶ μὲν οὖν θυμοῦ ῥηθήσεται ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰ πάθη, ποῖα δὲ προαιροῦνται καὶ πῶς ἔχοντες, 9 εἴρηται πρότερον. ἐπεὶ δ' ὁμολογοῦντες πολλάκις πεπραχέναι ἢ τὸ ἐπίγραμμα οὐχ ὁμολογοῦσιν ἢ περὶ

1 n kal dyvoouvros n infra.

άγνοοῦντος, or rather changed the order of ή καί into καὶ ή, and substituted καί for η after αγνοούντος. This is certainly unnecessary, though perhaps preferable. The sense is perfectly good as I have translated, following MS A', which appears to give the vulg. reading. The first kal is 'again', the second distinction: ή άγνοοῦντος of course corresponds to ή έκόντος: dyνοοῦντος ή ἄκοντος is quite defensible, the two don't always go together; τὸ ἀκούσιον includes other things besides ignorance, ὅντος τοῦ ἀκουσίου τοῦ Bla Kai di' ayvotav, Eth. N. III 3 init., the involuntary is due to external force or compulsion as well as to ignorance. This does not apply to έκόντος καὶ είδότος, because knowledge and voluntary action always do go together; voluntary action implies full knowledge of the circumstances of the case, τὸ ἐκούσιον δάξειεν αν είναι οὖ ή άρχη ἐν αὐτῷ εἰδάτι τὰ καθ έκαστα έν οἶς ή πράξις. Eth. N., u. s., and see the preceding chapter on ignorance as the justification of an act. Of the two last classes of acts liable to εγκλήματα, τὰ προελομένου and τὰ διὰ πάθος, the former are acts done with προαίρεσις, the deliberate purpose or enlightened and deliberate intention which alone gives them their virtuous or vicious character, and stamps them as morally good or bad; the latter are acts due to the two impulses, here called $\pi \dot{a} \theta o s$, appetite and desire ($\dot{\epsilon} \pi \iota \theta v \mu \dot{a} a$), and 'passion', any sudden and violent, especially angry, excitement (θυμός). Acts of this latter kind cannot properly be said to be involuntary, οὐ καλῶς λέγεται ἀκούσια είναι τὰ διὰ θυμὸν ή δι' ἐπιθυμίαν, Eth. N. 111 3, 1111 a 24, because though they are done in ignorance (αγνοῶν πράττει), or in the temporary blindness of a fit of passion, they are not due to ignorance, δι' ἄγνοιαν, ignorance is in no sense the cause of them, and therefore no justification, Ib. 111 2. These are in fact the four degrees of criminality of Eth. Nic. V 10, on which, and on this subject in general, see Introd. p. 181-9. They are afterwards reduced to the ordinary three in § 16, infra.

§ 8. Of $\theta \nu \mu \dot{\rho} \dot{\rho}$ we shall have to speak when we come to treat of the $\pi \dot{a} \theta \eta$ or emotions in II 2—II, where the second chapter gives the analysis of $\dot{\rho} \rho \gamma \dot{\eta}$, as it is there called. The motives and incentives to crimes and the intentions and dispositions of the criminals have been already dealt

with (in cc. 10 and 12).

§ 9. On this and the two following sections, which refer to what were subsequently called στάσεις, status, the legal issues of cases, and by Aristotle ἀμφισβητήσεις, see Introd. p. 189, 190.

'But whereas it frequently happens that men when called to account for an imputed criminal act, admit the fact, but refuse to admit either the title, or name that has been applied to it' (by the prosecutor namely, who ο το ἐπίγραμμα, οἷον λαβεῖν μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ κλέψαι, P. 1374καὶ πατάξαι πρότερον ἀλλ' οὐχ ὑβρίσαι, καὶ συγγενέσθαι ἀλλ' οὐ μοιχεῦσαι, ἣ κλέψαι ἀλλ' οὐχ ἱεροσυλῆσαι (οὐ γὰρ θεοῦ τι), ἣ ἐπεργάσασθαι μὲν ἀλλ' οὐ

has had it registered under a certain name or title whereby it is referred to a certain class of crimes, and some particular tribunal, and has a special penalty attached to it: this is the στάσις όρική, status finitivus, nomen, or finitio, of the subsequent classifications), 'or that which is contained under the title' (that is, the description of the act which is supposed to correspond to the title, but may not actually do so): 'a man may say, for instance, that he 'took' the thing but did not 'steal' it, or that he struck the first blow but was not guilty of wanton outrage, or that there was intercourse but no adultery, or that he was guilty of theft but not of sacrilege (because the thing stolen belonged to no god), or that he had committed a trespass but not on public lands, the state domains, or had conversed (held communication) with the enemy but was guilty of no treachery-from the frequent occurrence of these and similar distinctions it becomes necessary that it should be determined what theft is, and what υβρις, and what adultery, and so on; in order that if we want to prove that the fact is so, or the reverse, we may be able to set in a clear light the real merits or rights (To dikator) of the case'.

The distinction of the επίγραμμα and περί ο τὸ ἐπίγραμμα I have already indicated. The one is the στάσις όρική, the name or title by which the act should be designated, which determines the court that it shall be tried in, and is represented in all the examples given except the case of trespass: the other is the description given of the act, as may be seen in the instance that illustrates it, the trespass (the name) is acknowledged, but the detailed account described it as a trespass upon the public land, which is denied. This, if it corresponds to any of the στάσεις when they were regularly classified (on which see Introd. p. 397 seq. in Appendix E to Book 111), must be the στάσις of quality, ποιότης, quale: but it seems certain that in Aristotle's time they had not yet been systematised and arranged under constant technical names. At all events, in this passage in the two last cases it seems that no very clear distinction is made out; or apparently intended, as appears from the mixing up together of the examples of both. Quint. 111 6.49, where Aristotle's division of ordoess is noticed, must be referred, not to this passage, but to Rhet. III 16.6, and

πατάξαι πρότερον] to be the aggressor in an affray. It is otherwise termed ἄρχειν χειρῶν ἀδίκων, 11 24.9, Rhet. ad Alex. 26 (37). 39.

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δημόσια, ή διειλέχθαι μεν τοῖς πολεμίοις άλλ' οὐ προδοῦναι, διὰ ταῦτα δέοι ᾶν καὶ περὶ τούτων διωρίσθαι, τί κλοπή, τί ὕβρις, τί μοιχεία, ὅπως ἐάν τε ὑπάρχειν ἐάν τε μὴ ὑπάρχειν βουλώμεθα δεικνύναι, ἔχωμεν 10 ἐμφανίζειν τὸ δίκαιον. ἔστι δὲ πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα περὶ τοῦ ἄδικον εἶναι καὶ φαῦλον ἡ μὴ ἄδικον¹ ἡ ἀμ-

1 + mepl of libri deteriores.

for the right of inter-cultivation of land, just like ἐπινομία the right of mutual pasturage, as on a border territory. But here ἐπεργάσασθαι must mean to encroach or trespass, otherwise it is no offence: and so the word is used by Aeschines, Ctesiph. § 113, of the Locrians of Amphissa who 'encroached upon' the sacred soil of Crissa, by cultivating, Thucyd. 1 139, and elsewhere; as well as ἐπινομία and ἐπινέμειν, for a similar trespass on the pasturage of some one else. The primary sense must be no doubt that of reciprocal right or occupation, the interchange of cultivation. Perhaps the notion of going backwards and forwards over a border to cultivate land may have suggested the notion of trespassing, by extending the original signification to cases where there was no such right existing, or only in the trespasser's imagination.

I will add some instances of similar formations which are not given in

the New Cratylus.

ἐπαλλάττει, Eur. Heracl. 836, ποῦς ἐπαλλαχθεὶς ποδί, 'interchanged, interlaced': common in Aristotle, Pol. 1 6 (quoted by Donaldson), c. 9, 1257 ὁ 35, ἐπαλλάττει ἡ χρῆσις κ.τ.λ. Ib. VI (IV) 10, 1295 α 9, διὰ τὸ τὴν δύναμιν ἐπαλλάττειν πως αὐτῶν, Ib. VII (VI) 1, 1317 α 1, ποιεῖ τὰς πολιτείας ἐπαλλάττειν. Parva Naturalia, de longitate et brevitate vitae, c. 1, 464 ὁ 28, ἐπηλλάττει τὰ νοσώδη τὴν φύσιν σώματα τοῖς βραχυβίοις, de ortu anim. II 1, 732 ὁ 15, ἐπάλλαξις, 733 α 27, ἐπαλλάττουσιν ἀλλήλοις κ.τ.λ. de insomniis 11 18, 460 ὁ 20, καὶ τἢ ἐπαλλάξει τῶν δακτύλων τὸ ἐν δύο φαίνεται, Theophr. Hist. Pl. 1 3, 2.

ἐπιμίσγεσθαι, Thucyd. I 2 and 13, ἐπιμιγνύντες, ἐπιμισγόντων; Herod. I 68, ἐπιμιξίη; Thuc. V 78, Xen. Cyr. VII 4. 5, Ar. Pol. IV (VII) 6, 1327 a 39: ἐπέρχεσθαι, Thucyd. IV 120, ἐπήρχοντο, 'were going backwards and forwards paying one another visits': ἐπικοινωνεῖν, ἐπικοινωνία, Plat. Gorg. 464 C, Soph. 251 D, 252 D, ἐπικοινοῦσθαι, Protag. 313 B, Ar. Top. Δ 2, 123 a 6, ἐπικοινωνοῦσι γὰρ οἱ τόποι, Anal. Post. A II, 77 a 26, ἐπικ. πάσαι αἰ

ἐπιστημαι άλλήλαις, Rhet. ad Alex. 5 (6). 5.

§ 10. 'In all such cases the issue (the dispute, question in dispute, disputed point) turns upon this, whether namely (the accused party) is criminal and vicious or not; for the vice and injustice (of the act) lies in the deliberate purpose or intention, and names of this kind, such as wanton outrage and theft, connote (signify in addition to their direct and literal meaning) the deliberate intention or purpose; for the act of striking is not in every case (co-extensive with) wanton outrage, but only if i was done with a particular object or purpose, of insulting the other instance, or for his own gratification (the wanton pleasure in the ins itself and in the humiliation it inflicts, $\delta \pi \omega s \dot{\eta} \sigma \theta \ddot{g}$, Rhet. II 2. 5). Nor

φισβήτησις έν γὰρ τῆ προαιρέσει ή μοχθηρία καὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα τῶν ὀνομάτων προσσημαίνει τὴν προαίρεσιν, οἷον ὕβρις καὶ κλοπή οὐ γὰρ εἰ ἐπάταξε, πάντως ὕβρισεν, ἀλλ' εἰ ἕνεκά του, οἷον τοῦ ἀτιμάσαι ἐκεῖνον ἢ αὐτὸς ἡσθῆναι. οὐδὲ πάντως, ρ. 47.

surreptitious appropriation in every case theft, but only if the theft was for the injury of the other and for the thief's own private use and advantage. And so the same rule that applies to these cases holds in like manner of all the rest'.

περὶ οὖ. These words, suspected from Victorius downwards, omitted by A° and three other MSS, and finally rejected by Bekker and Spengel, were probably inserted by some transcriber or commentator who was doubtful about the construction. If they are omitted, the accusative, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα, will be, as Victorius says, equivalent to κατὰ πάντα, 'in all such cases'; which is thus grammatically to be explained. The accusative here follows the analogy of that class of accusatives which indicate the local seat of any 'affection' in its widest sense, and follow passive and neuter verbs and adjectives, (τερφθείς τοῦτο, Eur. Ion 541, ὧτα κατεαγότες, Plat. Gorg. 515 Ε, τὰ ώτα κατάγνυνται, Protag. 342 Β, άλγεῖν τὴν κεφαλήν, νοσείν όφθαλμούς, βοήν άγαθος Μενέλαος, πόδας ώκθς 'Αχιλλεύς) and are themselves probably nothing but extensions of the ordinary cognate accusative; which passes first from the direct expression of the same notion as that in the verb, μαίνεσθαι μανίαν, τέρπεσθαι τέρψιν, to the indirect and general and indefinite neuter, μαίνεσθαι τάθε, τέρπεσθαι τοῦτο or ταῦτα (see Wunder on Oed. R. 259), and secondly into the expression of any equivalent notion almost without limit, of which the seat of the affection is one form. This is the explanation of Kühner [§ 410 anmerk. 5 of and ed.], Jelf, Gr. Gr. §§ 545, 6, and I think probably the true one. Here therefore πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα 'all such instances' are represented locally as the seats of the several ἀμφισβητήσεις, the points on which each case turns, or legal issues: in them the points in dispute or issue are said to reside.

έν γὰρ τῆ προαιρέσει ἡ μοχθηρία] See note on I I. 14, and the passage there cited. One of them is Top. Z 12, 149 b 29, οὐ γὰρ ὁ λάθρα λαμβάνων ἀλλ' ὁ βουλόμενος λάθρα λαμβάνειν κλέπτης ἐστίν. Add Eth. Nic. III 4, init. περὶ προαιρέσεως...οἰκειότατον γὰρ εἶναι δοκεῖ τῆ ἀρετῆ καὶ μᾶλλον τὰ ἤθη κρίνειν τῶν πράξεων. Ib. III2 a 2, τῷ γὰρ προαιρεῖσθαι τἀγαθὰ ἡ τὰ κακὰ ποιοί τινές ἐσμεν. Ib. V 10, 1135 b 25, οὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη. ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός. 1136 a 1, ἃν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως βλάψη ἀδικεῖ. Rhet. I 14. I, 5 (implied).

προσσημαίνει] περὶ έρμηνείας c. 3, 16 b 5, βῆμα δέ ἐστι τὸ προσσημαῖνον χρόνον. Ib. lines 8, 9, 13, 18, 24; ubi Ammonius, προσσημαίνειν δὲ τὸ πρὸς τῷ τρώτως δτὶ ἄλλο τι συνεμφαίνειν. Eth. Eudem, 11

passan

εὶ λάθρα ἔλαβεν, ἔκλεψεν, άλλ' εἰ ἐπὶ βλάβη καὶ σφετερισμῷ ἐαυτοῦ. ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἔχει, ὥσπερ καὶ περὶ τούτων.

11 ἐπεὶ δὲ τῶν δικαίων καὶ τῶν ἀδίκων ἦν δύο εἴδη (τὰ μὲν γὰρ γεγραμμένα τὰ δ' ἄγραφα), περὶ ὧν μὲν οἰ νόμοι ἀγορεύουσιν εἴρηται, τῶν δ' ἀγράφων δύο 12 ἐστὶν εἴδη· ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' ὑπερβολὴν

υφετερισμός is 'the making a thing one's own', appropriating it to one's self, and one's own use. Plato has σφετερίζεσθαι, and Arist. Pol. VIII (V) 11 sub fin. 1315 b 2, σφετεριστής. The meaning of the genitive έαυτοῦ, which looks as if it meant 'appropriation of oneself', must be interpreted by the opposite βλάβη ἄλλου, with which it is contrasted. As ἄλλου after βλάβη is the objective genitive, injury to another, so έαυτοῦ after σφετερισμός is the appropriation to yourself and your own benefit,

appropriation for your own use and advantage.

§ 11. $\vec{\eta}_{\nu}$] 'there are, as we said', viz. in § 2. This however was not 'said' precisely as it is here; there, laws were divided into universal and special, and then the special subdivided into written (or positive law) and unwritten: and we now learn that the universal law is also unwritten, and that the special branch of the unwritten law, which must now be distinguished from the other, is to be found in that spirit of fairness and mercy and consideration, which consists in an inclination to relax the unnecessary rigour of the written code arising from its own imperfections, and at the same time to make due allowance for human errors and infirmities: all which is contained in the principles of equity, the unwritten law which prescribes such a course of conduct in matters of doubt. I have observed in the Introduction p. 244 that we are probably to extend this subordinate kind of ἄγραφοι νόμοι so as to include all the prevailing feelings and opinions as to propriety and right and wrong in general which prevail in each special state (and are therefore a kind of ίδιος νόμος, distinguished from the universal): of which indeed the views and feelings represented by equity form a very considerable part.

§ 12. The two kinds of unwritten law are, first the universal law, the precepts of which suggest higher considerations and higher duties than mere legal obligations to pursue virtue and avoid vice, (this is what is meant by the 'excess, or higher degree, of virtue and vice above the legal standard, expressed in καθ' ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας, quod eximiam virtutem aut vitium inde continet, Victorius), obedience to which law is rewarded by praise and honour and gifts (the two kinds of rewards; the 'gifts' in this case being conferred of course not for their value as a pecuniary compensation, but in so far as they are signs of moral approbation) and the breach or violation of it punished by (not fine or imprisonment or any personal penalty, as the violation of a legal enactment, but by) censure, reproach, dishonour (not deprivation of civil rights, which is a legal penalty): of such precepts examples are, gratitude to benefactors, the return or repayment of obligations (differing from the feeling of gratitude),

άρετης και κακίας, έφ' οίς όνείδη και έπαινοι και άτιμίαι και τιμαι και δωρεαί, οίον το χάριν έχειν τωρ ποιήσαντι εὖ και ἀντευποιεῖν τὸν εὖ ποιήσαντα και βοηθητικὸν εἶναι τοῖς φίλοις και ὅσα ἄλλα τοιαῦτα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ ἰδίου νόμου και γεγραμμένου ἔλλειμμα. 13 τὸ γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δοκεῖ δίκαιον εἶναι, ἔστι δὲ ἐπιεικὲς

the inclination and readiness to aid and defend one's friends, and such like. It is remarkable that amongst the precepts of the universal law which we are all bound to obey Aristotle should have here omitted the duty of interring and paying honour to the dead, so strikingly exemplified by the appeal of Antigone against Creon's tyrannous proclamation in the play to which he himself had just called our attention (comp. Eur. Suppl. 16—19, 526, 538), and still more so perhaps in the trial of the eight generals after Arginusae.

The second kind of unwritten law is that which belongs to law special, and is what is omitted by (i. e. intended to supply the deficiencies of) the

written law.

Some of these universal principles of the popular morality are occasionally mentioned by the poets and other non-scientific writers: they are the most general rules of conduct which every one everywhere is supposed to recognise and obey. A short list of the most fundamental of them is given in the Rhet. ad Alex. c. 1 (2). 6, 7, which almost coincides with Aristotle's in the Rhetoric, δίκαιον μέν οδυ έστὶ τὸ τῶν ἀπάντων ἢ τὸ τῶν πλείστων έθος άγραφον, διορίζον τὰ καλὰ καὶ τὰ αίσχρά. τοῦτο δ' έστὶ τὸ γονέας τιμάν καὶ φίλους εὖ ποιείν καὶ τοῖς εὖεργέταις χάριν ἀποδιδόναι' ταῦτα γὰρ καὶ τὰ τούτοις δμοια οθ προστάττουσι τοις ανθρώποις οι γεγραμμένοι νόμοι ποιείν, άλλ' εὐθὺς ἀγράφω καὶ κοινώ νόμω νομίζεται. Eurip. Antiope, Fragm. XXXVIII (Dind.), τρείς είσιν άρεται τας χρεών σ' άσκείν, τέκνον, θεούς το τιμάν, τούς τε φύσαντας γονείς, νόμους τε κοινούς Έλλάδος. Comp. Xen. Memor. IV 4. 19-24, where the same are mentioned with one or two additions. On the unwritten law in general, see Plato, Legg. VII 793 A, B, C; he says inter alia, ούς πατρίους νόμους έπονομάζουσιν, δεσμοί ούτοι πάσης είσι πολιτείας μεταξύ πάντων όντες των έν γράμμασι τεθέντων τε καί κειμένων καί των έτι τεθησομένων, άτεχνώς οἶον πάτρια καὶ παντάπασιν άρχαῖα νόμιμα, ὁ καλώς μέν τεθέντα καὶ έθισθέντα πάση σωτηρία περικαλύψαντα έχει πρός τους γραφέντας νόμους, and he finally classes with the unwritten law the εθη καὶ έπιδεύματα, Aristotle's second class of αγραφοι νόμοι, as I have mentioned in p. 243 of the Introduction.

§ 13. On what follows, see Introd. pp. 191—2, on equity; and the 14th chapter of the Nic. Eth. Book v. 'For equity appears to be just (or a kind of justice), and it is the supplement to the written law that is equity (equitable)'. Comp. Eth. Nic. v 14, 1137 δ 8, τό τε γὰρ ἐπιεικὲς δικαίου τινὸς δν βέλτιόν ἐστι δίκαιον, καὶ οὐχ ὡς ἄλλο τι γένος δν βέλτιόν ἐστι τοῦ δικαίου. Ib. line 12, τὸ ἐπιεικὲς δίκαιον μέν ἐστιν, οὐ κατὰ νόμον δέ, ἀλλ' ἐπανόρθωμα νομίμου δικαίου. Line 26, καὶ ἔστιν αὕτη ή φύσις ή τοῦ ἐπιεικοῦς, ἐπανόρθωμα

νόμου, ή έλλείπει διά τὸ καθόλου.

τὸ παρὰ τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον δίκαιον. συμβαίνει δὲ τοῦτο τὰ μὲν ἀκόντων τὰ δὲ ἐκόντων τῶν νομοθετῶν, ἀκόντων μὲν ὅταν λάθη, ἐκόντων δ΄ ὅταν μη δύνωνται διορίσαι, ἀλλ' ἀναγκαῖον μὲν ἢ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, μη ἢ δέ, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. καὶ ὅσα μη ράδιον διορίσαι δι' ἀπειρίαν, οἶον τὸ τρῶσαι σιδήρω πηλίκω καὶ ποιῷ τινί. ὑπολείποι γὰρ ἂν ὁ αἰων 14 διαριθμοῦντα. ἂν οὖν ἢ ἀδιόριστον, δέη δὲ νομοθετήσαι, ἀνάγκη ἀπλῶς εἰπεῖν, ὥστε κᾶν δακτύλιον

'This is done sometimes unintentionally, sometimes intentionally, on the part of the legislators, unintentionally when the omission escapes their notice, intentionally when they find it impossible to define or determine every thing (to provide by their definitions or determinations for all possible cases in detail), and are therefore obliged to lay down the rule as absolute (to pronounce universally), though it is not so in fact, but only true and fair for the most part'; and so fail to provide for exceptional cases. Eth. Nic. V 14, 1137 b 15, έν οίς οὖν ἀνάγκη μεν εἰπεῖν καθόλου, μή οδόν τε δε όρθως, το ώς έπὶ το πολύ λαμβάνει ο νόμος, ούκ άγνοων το άμαρτανόμενον. καὶ ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἦττον ὁρθῶς' τὸ γὰρ ἀμάρτημα οὖκ ἐν τῷ νόμφ οὐδ' ἐν τῷ νομοθέτη ἀλλ' ἐν τῆ φύσει τοῦ πράγματός ἐστιν' εὐθὺς γὰρ τοιαύτη ή τῶν πρακτῶν ὕλη ἐστίν. Pol. III 11, 1282 b 2, so in the administration of government, and in enforcing obedience to the laws of the state, the sovereign power assumes the office of equity in the administration of justice; δεί τοὺς νόμους είναι κυρίους κειμένους δρθώς, τὸν ἄρχοντα δέ, ἄν τε είς αν τε πλείους ώσι, περί τούτων είναι κυρίους περί όσων έξαδυνατούσιν οί νόμοι λέγειν ἀκριβώς διὰ τὸ μή ράδιον είναι καθόλου δηλώσι περί πάντων. Ιη Magna Moralia, II I, the author, in treating of ἐπιείκεια, says, α γὰρ ὁ νομοθέτης έξαδυνατεί καθ' έκαστα ακριβώς διορίζειν, αλλά καθόλου λέγει, ο έν τούτοις παραχωρών, και ταθθ αίρούμενος α ό νομοθέτης έβούλετο μέν τώ καθ έκαστα διορίσαι, ούκ ήδυνήθη δέ, ὁ τοιούτος ἐπιεικής, and concludes, τῶν μεν γαρ φύσει και ώς άληθως όντων δικαίων ούκ έλαττούται, άλλα των κατά νόμον, å ὁ νομοθέτης εξαδυνατών ἀπελιπεν. On the defects of the written law, see also Rhet. I 1. 7.

And not only is the legislator unable to provide for all exceptional cases to general rules, but also the infinity of particular circumstances which distinguish human actions and crimes precludes the possibility of his enumerating in detail all those varieties which in justice should have different degrees of punishment apportioned to them; as for instance, in enacting the prohibition of 'wounding with an iron instrument', to define the size and the kind of instrument in every case; for life is too short, and would fail a man in the attempt to reckon them all up in detail (on this case, which is given also by Quintilian, VII 6. 8, see Introd. p. 191).

§ 14. If then it be thus impossible to determine all these particula and exceptional cases, and yet there is a necessity for legislation, the law must be expressed in general terms; so that if a man wearing an iro

ἔχων ἐπάρηται τὴν χεῖρα ἢ πατάξη, κατὰ μὲν τὸν γεγραμμένον νόμον ἔνοχός ἐστι καὶ ἀδικεῖ, κατὰ δὲ Γ. 1374.6. 15 τὸ ἀληθὲς οὐκ ἀδικεῖ, καὶ τὸ ἐπιεικὲς τοῦτο ἐστίν. εἰ δ΄ ἐστὶ τὸ εἰρημένον τὸ ἐπιεικές, φανερὸν ποῖά ἐστι τὰ ἐπιεικῆ καὶ οὐκ ἐπιεικῆ, καὶ ποῖοι οὐκ ἐπιεικεῖς ἄν-16 θρωποι ἐφ' οἶς τε γὰρ δεῖ συγγνώμην ἔχειν, ἐπιεικῆ ταῦτα, καὶ τὸ τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα μὴ τοῦ ἴσου ἀξιοῦν, μηδὲ δὲ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ ἀτυχή-

ring lift his hand (to threaten) or strike another, by the written law (the letter of the law) he is liable (to the penalty), and has committed a crime, but in truth and in fact he is not guilty of a crime, and herein (rovro, in

this fair interpretation of the act) lies equity'.

§ 15. 'If then equity be such as we have described it, it is plain what sort of things (i.e. charges, imputed crimes) are equitable (i.e. suitable for equitable treatment), and the reverse, and what sort of men are not equitable'. And hence to the end of the chapter we have an analysis of the popular objects of equitable treatment, and the characteristics of it, or of the absence of it, the negative which may be inferred from the

positive, in these subjects.

§ 16. '(The first of these), the kinds of actions which are suitable objects of equity are such as these. Cases which ought to be treated with indulgence, and mistakes or errors (implying ignorance in particulars, Eth. Nic. III 2, on involuntary ignorance) and mere misfortunes, accidental, which should be carefully distinguished from actual crimes, and not visited with equal penalties: the latter of the two, accidental misfortunes, are such acts as are sudden and unexpected, or beyond calculation, and do not spring from a vicious habit or evil intention; errors are such as are not accidental, in the sense of unexpected and beyond calculation, and yet do not proceed from vice (in the same sense as before); but crimes are acts that are not without calculation (i.e. deliberate), and are prompted by a vicious habit or inclination, because all wrong acts that are due to desire, proceed from this depraved will and moral judgment'. This is the usual classification of the degrees of criminality in actions; for acts, of which the mischievous consequences are purely accidental, and therefore altogether beyond our own control, and for mischievous acts committed under some mistake as to the particular circumstances of the case (not of general moral principles, for which we are responsible), as when a man is killed with a gun that was not known to be loaded, we are not responsible: what makes us responsible for an act is not only the harm or injury that is its consequence, but the deliberate intention or purpose with which it was done (and in all cases where the wrong was prompted by desire, this is sure to be an evil one, τὰ γὰρ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν ἀπὸ πονηρίας) and full knowledge of all the circumstances of the case. In the treatment of this subject in Eth. Nic. v 10, a fourth degree is introduced between

ματα· ἔστι δ' ἀτυχήματα μὲν ὅσα παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ μοχθηρίας, ἀμαρτήματα δὲ ὅσα μὴ παράλογα καὶ μὴ ἀπὸ πονηρίας, ἀδικήματα δὲ ὅσα μήτε παρά-λογα ἀπὸ πονηρίας τ' ἐστίν· τὰ γὰρ δι' ἐπιθυμίαν

17 ἀπὸ πονηρίας. καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγινώσκειν ἐπιεικές. καὶ τὸ μὴ πρὸς τὸν νόμον ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸν νομοθέτην σκοπεῖν, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀλλὰ πρὸς p. 48.

τὴν διάνοιαν τοῦ νομοθέτου, καὶ μὴ πρὸς τὴν πρᾶξιν

18 ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὸ ὅλον, μηδὲ ποῖός τις νῦν, ἀλλὰ ποῖός

This is the case of a wrong act, as a homicide, done in a fit of passion $\delta \theta \nu \mu \hat{\phi} \pi \sigma \iota \hat{\omega} \nu$, $\delta \delta \rho \gamma \iota \hat{\sigma} as$: this being done by a spontaneous impulse, and not after deliberation with malice prepense ($\delta \iota \nu \kappa \epsilon \kappa \pi \rho \rho \nu \sigma \iota as$), is only an $\delta \delta \iota \kappa \eta \mu a$, a wrong no doubt, and a thing which ought not to have been done, but not punishable like the deliberate act; a homicide not a murder. Compare the treatment of this topic in Rhet. ad Alex. 4 (5). 9—II. It seems to have been one of the stock topics of the rhetorical books. The degrees of criminality are there, as here, only three.

§ 17. καὶ τὸ τοῖς ἀνθρωπίνοις συγγινώσκειν] 'the indulgent consideration of human accidents and infirmities', especially errors, in mitigation of the application of the strict letter of the law. On τὰ ἀνθρώπινα, see note on 1 2.7, p. 34. These human errors and infirmities in the culprit should be met by a corresponding humanity on the part of the judge, the opponent, and indeed men in general. Victorius quotes 'Ter. Adelph. III 4. 24, persuasit nox amor vinum adolescentia: humanum est.' τὸ δ' ἐξαμαρτεῖν καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἀτυχεῖν οὐ μόνον εἶναι αὐτῷ ἴδιον (φάθι), ἀλλὰ καὶ κοινὸν καὶ τῶν δικαζόντων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ἀνθρώπων, Rhet. ad Alex. u. s. § 10.

§§ 17-18. 'And to look (in interpreting the offence and the amount of the penalty), not to the law, but to the legislator, and not to the mere words (the letter) of the law, but to the mind (the intention) of the legislator'; (όταν οὖν λέγη μὲν ὁ νόμος καθόλου, συμβη δ' ἐπὶ τούτου παρὰ τὸ καθόλου, τότε όρθως έχει ή παραλείπει ό νομοθέτης και ημαρτεν άπλως είπων έπανορθοῦν τὸ ἐλλειφθέν, ὁ κᾶν ὁ νομοθέτης αὐτὸς οῦτως ᾶν εἶποι ἐκεῖ παρών, καὶ εἰ μόδει ἐνομοθέτησεν ἄν. Eth. Nic. V 14, 1137 b 20); 'and (to look) not to the act (of the accused) but to the deliberate purpose or intention, and not to the part but to the whole' (i. e. not to take a narrow view of the criminality of the act by confining yourself to the consideration of the bare naked fact, or of some particular part or circumstance of it, which gives it a specially vicious appearance; but to look at it as a whole, to take into account the general character of the doer and all the attendant or surrounding circumstances which will throw light upon the intention of it, the purpose with which it was done), 'and not merely to the present character of the offender but to the constant or usual character that he bore (to what sort of man he was, always or usually)'.

τις ἢν ἀεὶ ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ. καὶ τὸ μνημονεύειν μᾶλλον ὧν ἔπαθεν ἀγαθῶν ἢ κακῶν, καὶ ἀγαθῶν ὧν ἔπαθε μᾶλλον ἢ ἐποίησεν. καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον. καὶ τὸ μᾶλλον λόγφ ἐθέλειν κρίνεσθαι ἢ ἔργφ.

19 καὶ τὸ εἰς δίαιταν μᾶλλον ἢ εἰς δίκην βούλεσθαι ἰέναι ὁ γὰρ διαιτητὴς τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ὁρᾶ, ὁ δὲ δικαστὴς τὸν νόμον καὶ τούτου ἕνεκα διαιτητὴς εὐρέθη, ὅπως τὸ ἐπιεικὲς ἰσχύη.

περί μεν ούν των επιεικών διωρίσθω τον τρόπον

§ 18. 'And to remember rather the good than the ill treatment you may have received, and the benefits that you have received rather than those that you have conferred'.

μᾶλλον ἡ (ὧν, attracted, or å) ἐποίησεν.—τὸ δίκαιον, strict justice, the letter of the law, requires an even balance of benefits on both sides, on the reciprocal (retaliatory, tit for tat, par part) principle, τὸ ἀντιπεπονθός, Eth. N. v 8.—ἐπιείκεια, merciful indulgent consideration, remembers only the benefits and forgets the injuries; remembers kindnesses received, forgets those that it has bestowed. ἐγὰ νομίζω τὸν μὲν εὖ παθόντα δεῖν μεμνῆσθαι τὸν πάντα χρόνον τὸν δὲ ποιήσαντα εὐθὺς ἐπιλελῆσθαι, εἰ δεῖ τὸν μὲν χρηστοῦ τὸν δὲ μὴ μικροψύχου ποιεῖν ἔργον ἀνθρώπου. τὸ δὲ τὰς ἰδίας εὐεργεσίας ὑπομιμνήσκειν καὶ λέγειν μικροῦ δεῖν ὅμοιόν ἐστι τῷ ὀνειδίζειν. Dem. de Cor. p. 316. Victorius.

καὶ τὸ ἀνέχεσθαι ἀδικούμενον κ.τ.λ.] 'and to put up with injury or injustice', to endure it without retaliation, 'and, the disposition or inclination, to have a matter decided rather by word than deed'.

λόγφ κρίνεσθαι] to decide a dispute by an amicable settlement, by talking the matter over with the opposite party, or reasoning with him, rather than proceed $\tilde{\epsilon}\rho\gamma\varphi$, appeal, that is, to the ultima ratio, the voie du fait, and actually fight out the quarrel: or (in the case to which Victorius would confine it, that of a quarrel between two neighbouring states) an appeal to arms. 'Omnia prius consilio experiri quam armis sapientem decet. Ter. Eun. IV 7. 19. Apoll. Rhod. III 185.' Victorius.

§ 19. 'Or again'—a particular case of the same kind of general disposition—'to be more inclined to refer a matter to arbitration than to a court of law: for the arbitrator always takes the equitable view of the case, whereas the judge looks to the law' (the letter, or literal interpretation of the law, which he is bound by oath strictly to carry out and interpret to the best of his judgment). 'In fact the very motive or intention of the invention of arbitration (the introduction of it into jurisprudence and social relations in general) was that equity should prevail'.

διωρίσθω] note on εἴρησθω, I II. 29 ult.

'And so let this manner' (this rough, hasty, popular sketch or outline) of describing (marking out the boundaries in detail, determining the boundaries of the whole and the several parts, defining, analysing,

1 τοῦτον, ἀδίκημα δὲ μεῖζον, ὅσῷ ᾶν ἀπὸ μείζονος ἢ char. ἀδικίας διὸ καὶ τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα, οἶον ὁ Μελα-νώπου Καλλίστρατος κατηγόρει, ὅτι παρελογίσατο

describing, $\delta \iota opi(\xi \epsilon \sigma \theta a \iota)$ equity suffice' for the occasion; for the use, that is, of the rhetorician, who requires no scientific treatment of the subject.

CHAP. XIV.

This chapter, a continuation of the preceding, contains the application of the 'common topic' of degree, 'greater and less', to the offences or crimes which formed the subject of the other.

§ I. 'The magnitude of a wrong varies with the degree of the injustice that prompts it'. There is here the same distinction taken between dδίκημα, a wrong done—an abstract wrong, regarded independently of the motive or intention—and the confirmed habit (the bad έξις), depraved will and disposition implied in άδικία. The deliberate purpose, προαίρεσις, is the measure of moral worth, and distinguishes virtue from vice, Eth. Nic. V 10, 1135 b 20, ὅταν δὲ είδως μὲν μὴ προβουλεύσας δὲ (πράττη τις), ἀδίκημα, οἶον ὅσα τε διὰ θυμὸν καὶ ἄλλα πάθη, ὅσα ἀναγκαῖα ἡ φυσικά, συμβαίνει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις' ταῦτα γὰρ βλάπτωτες καὶ ἀμαρτάνοντες ἀδικοῦσι μέν, καὶ ἀδικήματά ἐστιν, οὐ μέντοι πω ἄδικοι διὰ ταῦτα οὐδὲ πονηροί· ωὐ γὰρ διὰ μοχθηρίαν ἡ βλάβη ὅταν δ' ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἄδικος καὶ μοχθηρός.

'And therefore (sometimes) the smallest things are greatest', acts apparently most trifling are sometimes indicative of the worst intentions and dispositions, 'as is exemplified in Callistratus' charge against Melanopus, that he cheated the temple-builders of three consecrated half-obols'. Such a charge subjected the offender to a γραφή ἱερῶν χρημάτων, Dem. de Fals. Leg. § 335 [= p. 435 § 293]. The exact nature of the offence imputed to Melanopus cannot be ascertained: it was probably some fraud (possibly an error construed as a crime,) in the settlement of accounts between himself and the persons charged with the building or restoration of a temple, the ναοποιοί.

The word ναοποιοί appears to be an ἄπαξ λεγόμενον. Stephens, Thesaurus s. v., gives no other example. On the same analogy are formed τειχοποιός, μηχανοποιός, ἀγαλματοποιός. The office is described in Pol. VII (VI) 8, 1322 b 19, οἶον ἱερεῖς καὶ ἐπιμεληταὶ τῶν περὶ τὰ ἱερὰ τοῦ σώζεσθαὶ τε τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ ἀνορθοῦσθαι τὰ πίπτοντα τῶν οἰκοδομημάτων καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσα τέτακται πρὸς τοὺς θεούς. The word ἱεροποιοί, which follows immediately, in line 24, is referred by Stahr (erroneously however) to this office of curator of sacred buildings, where he translates it 'tempel-baumeister'.

The magnitude of the vice is argued in this case from the trifling amount of the profit; if a man would commit so great a sin as sacrilege for three halfpence, how great must be the depravity of his character and intentions. Melanopus and Callistratus, as Victorius notes, are mentioned together as ambassadors to Thebes by Xenoph., Hellen. VI 2 and 3; and by Plutarch, Vit. Demosth. (p. 851 F), represented as political rivals and opponents. On Callistratus, see note on 1 7.13.

παρελογίσατο] This verb has two different applications in conformit with the double sense of λογίζεσθαι and λογισμός; the two senses, thou closely connected and often identified, are at all events distinguishable

τρία ήμιωβέλια ίερα τους ναοποιούς έπι δικαιοσύνης δε τουναντίον. έστι δε ταυτα έκ του ένυπάρχειν τη δυνάμει ο γαρ τρία ήμιωβέλια ίερα κλέψας καν ότιουν άδικήσειεν. ότε μεν δη ούτω το μείζον, ότε δ' έκ

(1) 'reasoning' and (2) 'calculation'; the παρά, which conveys the imputation of fraud (παρά, amiss, awry, wrong), being common to both. Here (as in Dem. c. Aphob. a', p. 822. 25, where it stands for simple 'misreckoning', and Isocr. Panath. § 243, for 'cheating', 'fraudulent miscalculation' in accounts) it has the latter sense. Elsewhere, and usually, (at all events in Aristotle, as Rhet. I 9. 29, II 23. 3, 25. 10 bis, III 12. 4, et passim,) it denotes 'wrong, fallacious, false, reasoning', a 'fallacy' in argument. Lastly leρά means 'consecrated to sacred uses; devoted to the service of the gods or religion'.

'In the case of justice, the opposite is true'. That is, the magnitude or strength of the just and virtuous disposition, inclination, resolution, is shewn, not now in the trifling character of the temptation or motive by which it is led astray, but in the greatness of the temptation which it withstands. 'Ut qui ingentem vim auri, apud se nullo teste depositam, cum infitiari impune possit, reddidit, iustior sit necesse est quam si idem in exigua pecunia fecit.' Victorius. Injustice varies inversely with the magnitude of the profit or advantage to be derived from it, the less the temptation the greater the sin; justice directly, the greater the profit and the consequent temptation to do wrong, the higher the virtue in foregoing it: as, the greater the deposit, the greater the justice in restoring it.

'The reason of this' (ταῦτα is τὸ τὰ ἐλάχιστα μέγιστα εἶναι) 'is, that (the greater crime) is virtually latent (in the less); for one who could steal (lit. stole) three half-obols consecrated to religious uses would be capable of any other iniquity whatsoever'. The δύναμις, the indefinite latent capacity of vice, is tacitly opposed to the ἐνέργεια, any possible enormity, to which it may, or may not, be developed. If a man will commit a crime which may be interpreted as sacrilege for such a trifle as three half-obols, he is plainly 'capable' of sacrilege in any degree of atrocity, where the profit and temptation are greater.

On the subject of δύναμις and ἐνέργεια, physical, moral, and metaphysical, the fundamental and all-pervading antithesis of the Aristotelian Philosophy, a commentary on Rhetoric is not the place to enter. It is explained by Trendelenburg, Comm. on de Anima, II I, Elem. Log. Arist. § 6, p. 61. δύναμις is treated in Metaph. Θ 1—5, and ἐνέργεια, ib. 6—9, on which consult Bonitz's Commentary. Grant, Essays on Ethics, Essay IV, pp. 181—201, 1st [or 2nd] ed., gives a full and clear account of the relation between them, and the doctrine in general, especially in its application to Moral Philosophy. Aristotle himself nowhere gives a complete and intelligible and its bearings, but assumes the kr

'Now son may be d' by the (parative criminality, ecided, or estimated, ... if 'from', means

τοῦ βλάβους κρίνεται. καὶ οὖ μή ἐστιν ἴση τιμωρία, 2 ἀλλὰ πᾶσα ἐλάττων. καὶ οὖ μή ἐστιν ἴασις· χαλε-πὸν γὰρ τὸ ἀδύνατον . καὶ οὖ μὴ ἔστι δίκην λαβεῖν τὸν παθόντα· ἀνίατον γάρ· ἡ γὰρ δίκη καὶ κόλασις 3 ἴασις. καὶ εἰ ὁ παθών καὶ ἀδικηθεὶς αὐτὸς αὐτὸν μεγάλως ἐκόλασεν· ἔτι γὰρ μείζονι ὁ ποιήσας δίκαιος κολασθῆναι, οἶον Σοφοκλῆς ὑπὲρ Εὐκτήμονος συνηγο-

² Coniecit F. Portus. χαλεπον γάρ και αδύνατον infra cum libris. that the decision or estimate of the amount of criminality proceeds or is derived from the comparison of the injury or consequences resulting from the two acts.

§ 2. 'And when there is no punishment (in use) equal or adequate (to the offence), but any one (that exists or can be devised) is too slight for it'; supply ἀδίκημα μεῖζόν ἐστι.

'And where the mischief done is incurable: for it is hard (or grievous), or indeed impossible'. To fill up the sense either repeat lâσθαι, 'to find any adequate remedy or compensation'; or, from οὖ μὴ ἴση τιμωρία, 'to devise any adequate punishment'. Otherwise it may be supposed (though it is unnecessary) that Aristotle wrote ἀδύνατον, having ἀμήχανον or some similar adjective in his mind, meaning 'a helpless, hopeless, irremediable' case.

'And again crimes for which no legal redress is to be obtained by the injured party: for such a wrong is incurable: because 'justice' (trial and sentence) and punishment are so many remedies'. On this doctrine of punishment, and the difference between κόλασις and τιμωρία, see above I 10.17, and Introd. p. 232. Cf. Ar. Eth. Nic. II 2, 1104 b 16, μηνύουσι δὲ καὶ αὶ κολάσεις γινόμεναι διὰ τούτων ἱατρεῖαι γάρ τινές εἰσιν, αἱ δὲ ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων πεφύκασι γίνεσθαι.

'And if (in consequence of the wrong done) the sufferer and the victim of the wrong inflicted some heavy punishment on himself; for the perpetrator of the act deserves a still severer punishment (than that which he thus unintentionally brought upon his victim): as Sophocles, in pleading the cause of Euctemon—after he had killed himself in consequence of the outrage he had sustained—said that he would not lay the penalty at a less amount than the sufferer had estimated it at for himself', i. e. Euctemon by his suicide had virtually fixed the penalty of the offence at death.

§ 3. δίκαιος κολασθηναί] On this idiomatic usage of δίκαιος, and similar constructions—in which the adjective, instead of being expressed impersonally in the neuter, as δίκαιο ἐστι, is attracted as it were to the subject of the sentence—especially with δηλος and its compounds, φανερός, γελοῖος, and such like, see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 297, comp. 549. 5. It is to observed that the case of δίκαιος is peculiar; this takes the whereas all the rest are construed with the participle. T examples add ἄξιος, similarly constructed in Thuc. I 70. νομίζομεν εἶναι τοῖς πέλας ψόγον ἐπενεγκεῖν; some Plat

ρῶν, ἐπεὶ ἀπέσφαξεν ἐαυτὸν ὑβρισθείς, οὐ τιμήσειν P. 1375. 4 ἔφη ἐλάττονος ἢ οὖ ὁ παθὼν ἐαυτῷ ἐτίμησεν. καὶ ὃ

Stallbaum's note on Gorg. 448 D; Soph. Aj. 634, κρείσσων γὰρ "Αιδα κεύθων, and Lobeck's note; the proverb μὴ κίνει Καμάριναν, ἀκίνητος γὰρ ἀμείνων: Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 641, ἡδίους ἔσεσθε ἀκούσαντες; Arist. Nub. 1241, Ζεὺς γελοῖος ὀμνύμενος: Ar. Eth. Nic. IV 7, 1123 ὁ 34, γελοῖος φαίνοιτο ὁ μεγαλόψυχος μὴ ἀγαθὸς ὧν: Pl. Phaedrus 236 D, γελοῖος ἔσομαι... ἰδιώτης αὐτοσχεδιάζων.

Σοφοκλης] Not the poet, but a statesman and orator advanced in life at the close of the Peloponnesian war. He was one of the ten πρόβουλοι, Rhet. III 18. 6, appointed by the Athenians, after the Sicilian disaster in 413 B.C., to devise measures for the public safety, Thuc. VIII 1, Grote's Hist. Gr. Pt. II, ch. 61, Vol. VII, p. 499, and note: and afterwards one of the thirty tyrants, Xen. Hellen. II 3. 2. This Sophocles is doubtless the same who is again mentioned, Rhet. III 15. 3. He is there described as an old man, which agrees with the statement of Thucydides, u. s., that the πρόβουλοι were an ἀρχη πρεσβυτέρων ἀνδρών; and the 'charge' brought against him (Rhet. I. c.) was probably connected with his conduct as a member of 'the thirty'.

τιμήσειν, ετίμησεν] In all causes civil as well as criminal which could be brought before an Athenian law-court, one point to be considered in the judgment was the τίμημα or estimate, assessment, either of the kind or amount of the penalty in criminal prosecutions, or of the damages in civil actions. This gives rise to the division of all legal processes into dyώνες ατίμητοι and τιμητοί. In the former of these the penalty and damages are already fixed by law or by previous private arrangement (C. R. Kennedy), and are therefore 'unassessable' by the judges; in the τιμητοὶ ἀγῶνες of all kinds, the amount of the damages or penalty to be awarded is at the discretion of the judges, who τιμώσιν, estimate, assess, or fix the amount. This is the explanation of Harpocration, and Ulpian, followed by Meier & Schömann, Attischer Process, p. 171 note, Böckh Publ. Econ. Bk. III, c. II (p. 371 Engl. Transl.), and Hermann Pol. Antig. § 143.7—12. Suidas, and other ancient writers, invert this distinction, and make τιμητοὶ ἀγῶνες the cases in which the penalty is already fixed, and ariunto those in which it is open to adjudication. See Meier & Schömann, u. s., p. 171 note.

On the whole subject see Meier & Schömann u. s. et seq. and Mr C. R. Kennedy's article in Smith's *Dict. Antiq.* p. 970 (1st ed.) [p. 1131, 2nd ed. and cf. note on Dem. *Select Private Orations*, Part II, Or. 55 § 18. s.]

The accuser in a criminal process, where the penalty was not already fixed by law, himself in the first instance assessed its amount, which the judges confirmed or not as they thought proper. The first was called ruparba, the second rupar, in accordance with the usual distinction of the active and middle voice, as marking by their contrasted significations the first was and the parties in the case, δικάζειν and δικάζεσθαι, the one administering justice and deciding the

the one administering justice and deciding the **ret** this done for them' by the intervention of neglected this ordinary distinction, for the As far as the phrase ὁ παθὼν ἐτίμησεν

μόνος ή πρωτος ή μετ' ολίγων πεποίηκεν. καὶ τὸ πολλάκις τὸ αὐτὸ ἀμαρτάνειν μέγα. καὶ δι' ὁ ᾶν ζητηθή καὶ εὐρεθή τὰ κωλύοντα καὶ ζημιοῦντα, οἷον ἐν "Αργει ζημιοῦται δι' ὁν ᾶν νόμος τεθή καὶ δι' οὺς τὸ

is concerned, the reason might be, that the accuser is supposed to represent the estimate by the deceased of his own wrongs as of equal authority with a judicial decision: but this will not apply to $\tau\iota\mu\eta\sigma\epsilon\iota\nu$, Sophocles' own estimate. At the same time as $\tau\iota\mu\hat{a}\nu$ and $\tau\iota\mu\eta\mu$ a may denote an 'estimate' in general, the use of the verb here must be regarded rather as a departure from ordinary usage, than as a solecism, or violation of the laws of the language.

On the συνήγοροι, see Schneider's note on Pol. VI 5. 10, vol. II, p. 391, and addenda, pp. 502—4. συνηγορών here is not technical: there is no reason to suppose that it denotes one of the public συνήγοροι, appointed

by the state.

Lastly, the entire topic, καὶ εἰ ὁ παθών—ἐτίμησεν, is thus illustrated by Schrader: 'Sexti Tarquinii flagitium ideo maius est, quod illius foeditate inducta Lucretia sibi ipsi vim intulit. (This is suggested by Victorius.) Et Appii Claudii decemviri sceleratum de L. Virginii filia iudicium eo sceleratius est, quoniam pater illo commotus filiam interfecit (Liv. III 48).'

§ 4. 'And any crime that is unique, or the first of its class (that has been committed), or has been seldom paralleled'. These three cases of especial prominence have been already applied to acts as topics of praise,

1 9.38. See in illustration the references there given.

'And the frequent commission of the same offence magnifies it': because this shews the depraved *habit*, or confirmed state, the 'Es which constitutes vice. 'Nec enim is casu aut affectu, sed habitu et pravitate

animi, delinquit.' Schrader.

'And any crime for which any checks and preventives or penalties have been sought and found (invented or discovered), as, for instance, at Argos a penalty is incurred by any one on whose account a law has been enacted (i.e. one of the κωλυτικοί, or (if I may coin a word for the occasion) ζημιωτικοί, νόμοι), or on whose account the prison was built': supply εζημιώθησαν. This same topic has been already employed in the opposite sense, to heighten the praise due to an action, c. 9 § 38. Schrader quotes in illustration Lysias, Or. XXII § 16 (κατὰ τῶν σιτοπώλων), ούτω δὲ πάλαι περὶ τῆς τούτων πανουργίας καὶ κακονοίας ἡ πόλις ἔγνωκεν, ὥστ' ἐπὶ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις ὧνίοις ἅπασι τοὺς ἀγορανόμους ψύλακας κατεστήσατε, ἐπὶ δὲ ταύτη μόνη τῆ τέχνη χωρὶς σιτοφύλακας ἀποκληροῦτε; the appointment of a special board of officers for the control of the corn-market signalizes the special rascality of the dealers.

§ 5. 'And the more brutal the crime is, the worse'; that is, the nearer approach it makes to the conduct and instincts of a mere animal or brute, who is incapable of virtue and self-control; and the more cruel, savage, 'inhuman' it is, more degraded below the level of humanity.

There are three degrees in the scale of natures, moral and intellectual, (1) the beast, (2) the man, and (3) the god. Thus, Pol. I 2, 1253 a 27, it is

5 δεσμωτήριον ψκοδομήθη. και το θηριωδέστερον άδί-

said of a man that is incapable of society, or is in want of nothing, being all-sufficient to himself, that he is $\hat{\eta}$ $\theta\eta\rho iov$ $\hat{\eta}$ $\theta\epsilon \dot{o}s$: in respect of this complete independence he is either below or above all the various wants, instincts, affections, desires, aims, and aspirations that characterize humanity. Precisely the same view appears in the little disquisition on $\theta\eta\rho i\dot{o}\tau\eta s$ at the opening of Book VII of the Nicom. Ethics, except that here the distinction between the three natures is made to rest solely upon intellectual and moral virtue: this is human, whereas the beast and the god are alike incapable of it, the beast, from the defects already stated, being below the human standard, the gods above it.

On this superiority of the gods to the practice of moral or human virtue and their entire independence of it, see Eth. Nic. x 8. A fine fragment of Cicero's lost dialogue de Philosophia sive Hortensius, quoted by Augustine, de Trinitate XIV c. 9, is manifestly borrowed, not translated, from this passage of Aristotle. It is printed in Nobbe's edition of Cicero, p. 1171, fragm. 35.

Here therefore 'brutality' consists in the absence of all capacity for virtue, moral and intellectual, and is consequently opposed to την ύπέρ ήμᾶς ἀρετήν, ήρωικήν τινα καὶ θείαν. This brutal nature, like the divine, is extremely rare amongst mankind. (This statement is qualified in Pol. III ΙΙ, 1281 δ 19, καίτοι τί διαφέρουσιν ένιοι των θηρίων ως έπος είπειν; άλλά περί τι πλήθος οὐδὲν εἶναι ἀληθὲς κωλύει τὸ λεχθέν). It is found chiefly in 'barbarians'. 'Barbarous' and 'barbarity' in fact express pretty nearly the same notion of character.) Again, the absence of all moderation in the indulgence of our desires and emotions and general want of selfcontrol is characteristic of the 'brutal' nature; Ib. c. 6, 1148 b 34, τὸ μὲν οιν έχειν έκαστα τούτων έξω των όρων έστι της κακίας, καθάπερ και ή θηριότης. And again, 1149 a 4, πασα ύπερβάλλουσα καὶ ἀφροσύνη καὶ δειλία καὶ ἀκολασία καὶ χαλεπότης αἱ μὲν θηριώδεις αἱ δὲ νοσηματώδεις εἰσιν. And these are then illustrated, ὁ μὲν γὰρ φύσει τοιοῦτος οἶος δεδιέναι πάντα, κᾶν ψοφήση μῦς. θηριώδη δειλίαν δειλός...καὶ τῶν ἀφρόνων οἱ μὲν ἐκ Φύσεως ἀλόγιστοι καὶ μόνον αἰσθήσει ζώντες θηριώδεις. (αἴσθησις is the characteristic of 'animal life' in general: that which distinguishes animals from plants. de Anima.) Brutal 'tastes' or instincts are illustrated a little earlier in the same chapter, 1048 b 20 seq. Brutal (or animal) pleasures are those which we have in common with the lower animals, the pleasures of feeling and taste; in the over-indulgence of which, this form of bestiality lies, III 13, 1118 a 23-b 4. Gaisford refers to Magna Moralia II 5 init., ἔστι δὲ ή θηριότης ύπερβάλλουσά τις κακία όταν γάρ τινα παντελώς ίδωμεν φαθλον οὐδ' ανθρωπόν φαμεν είναι άλλα θηρίον, ώς οδσάν τινα κακίαν θηριότητα. ή δ' αντικειμένη άρετη ταύτη έστην άνώνυμος, έστι δε ή τοιαύτη ύπερ ανθρωπον οδσα, olor ipount Tes nal Bela: expe vas directly taken from the passages of

Eth. N. vII just quotes, in an always unde our nature, the lower in appetitive.

instinctive ὀρέξεις (θυμός and ture, and are therefore not where the divine part of τος, is contrasted with re, the emotional and

κημα μείζον. καὶ ὁ ἐκ προνοίας μᾶλλον. καὶ ὁ οἱ ἀκούοντες φοβοῦνται μᾶλλον ἢ ἐλεοῦσιν. καὶ τὰ μὲν ρητορικά ἐστι τοιαῦτα, ὅτι πολλὰ ἀνήρηκε δίκαια ἢ p. 49. ὑπερβέβηκεν, οἷον ὅρκους δεξιὰς πίστεις ἐπιγαμίας.

'And when it arises from or is due to malice aforethought'. προνοία is the 'forethought', the deliberate vicious purpose which constitutes 'malice prepense', aggravates a wrong act in proportion to its intensity and the length of time during which the evil intent has been nursed; and converts an act otherwise innocent into a crime. The $\pi \rho \rho \nu \rho i a$ is that which distinguishes murder from homicide. It is in fact the moral mpoaipeous, distinctive of vice and virtue, of which an account has been already given in the first note on this chapter. See the passage of Eth. Nic. v 10, there quoted. Comp. Rhet. I 13.10. There ex mpovoias is identified with the (in Ethics) more ordinary έκ προαιρέσεως. ὅταν δὲ ἐκ προαιρέσεως (ἡ βλάβη) άδικος καὶ μογθηρός. διὸ καλώς τὰ ἐκ θυμοῦ (actions which are done in a state of violent excitement, under the impulse of overpowering passion, are considered as involuntary, and exempted from the penalty of crimes) οὐκ ἐκ προνοίας κρίνεται. The case quoted by Schrader from Magna Moralia I 17, of a woman who had caused the death of her lover by a. love-potion which she had sent him only with the view of inflaming his passion, and was consequently acquitted by the court of Areopagus on the charge of murder, because the act was done without deliberate malevolent intent, is a case of ἀμάρτημα (one of those in which the wrong done does not amount to a crime), in which the mischief is done without due knowledge of the circumstances of the case. In Demosth. c. Aristocr. p. 634, there is a similar distinction between two kinds of ardoodoría: in one sense the name is applied επ' ἀκουσίφ φόνφ, and to acts of this kind 'a wise and humane law', νόμος ανθρωπίνως και καλώς κείμενος, does not apply the name of murder; from this are immediately afterwards distinguished οἱ ἐκ προνοίας (φονεύσαντες). Aeschines c. Ctesiph. § 212, είληφε τραύματος έκ προνοίας γραφάς γραφόμενος. Dinarch. c. Demosth. § 6, τών er προνοίας φόνων. Compare Cic. de Off. I 8, sub fin. Sed in omni iniustitia permultum interest utrum perturbatione aliqua animi, quae plerumque brevis est et ad tempus, an consulto et cogitata fiat iniuria. Leviora enim sunt quae repentino aliquo motu accidunt quam ea quae meditata ac praeparata inferuntur.

'And any act, or wrong done, which inspires the hearers rather with terror than compassion'. An act which tends to consequences which inspire terror, the stronger emotion, in those who may be exposed to the like treatment, must plainly be more striking in its character and important in its social effects, more noxious and prejudicial, and worse in general, than one which excites mere pity or sympathy with the sufferer, without raising alarm on account of what may follow to oneself. That which excites terror must be terrible; formidable and dangerous to the individual or society. An atrocious crime makes men tremble, and fear expels pity; the stronger emotion overpowers the weaker. Comp. Rhet. II 8. 5 and 12, 'Amasis shed no tears when he saw his son led away to

6 πολλών γὰρ ἀδικημάτων ὑπεροχή. καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα οὖ κολάζονται οἱ ἀδικοῦντες, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ ψευδο-

death, but wept when his friends asked an alms': τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ ἐλεεινόν, ἐκείνο δὲ δεινόν' τὸ γὰρ δεινὸν ἔτερον τοῦ ἐλεεινοῦ καὶ ἐκκρουστικὸν τοῦ ἐλέου καὶ πολλάκις τῷ ἐναντίῳ χρήσιμον. Victorius quotes Cic. Tusc. Qu. III 27, Constabat eos qui concidentem vulneribus Gn. Pompeium vidissent, quum in illo ipso acerbissimo miserrimoque spectaculo sibi timerent quod se classe hostium circumfusos viderent, nihil tum aliud egisse nisi ut remiges hortarentur, et ut salutem adipiscerentur fuga: posteaquam Tyrum venissent tum afflictari lamentarique coepisse.

'And the rhetorical artifices or exaggerations' (such as αὐξήσεις, δεινώσεις, rhetorical tricks for giving extra importance and interest to a subject; or for magnifying, exaggerating, intensifying the atrocity, enormity, of a crime), 'for instance, that the accused (whose crime you desire to magnify) has subverted many principles (or obligations) of justice at once, or transgressed them; for instance, oaths, the right hand' (pledge of faith, καὶ δεξιαὶ ἢς ἐπέπιθμεν, Il. B 341), 'all confidence or good faith, all the laws of intermarriage, and the rest; for this is an excess of many crimes over the one which has really been committed'; or 'a multiplication of one crime into many'.

The exaggeration of this rhetorical fallacy lies in the enumeration, and apparent accumulation, of offences by division of the single offence into its parts, or the repetition—as in the instance—of the same offence under different names, which seems thus to swell its bulk and magnify its enormity. This is the reverse application of the same rhetorical artifice of exaggeration as has been already referred to in 1 7.31 (see note), the methods of διαίρεσιε εἰε τὰ μέρη, συντιθέναι, and ἐποικοδομεῖν applied to the 'amplification' of good things; the object and use of them being stated in nearly the same words, πλειόνων γὰρ ὑπερέχειν φαίνεται.

ἀναιρεῖν, 'to take up, so as to remove, annul, or destroy'; here tollere, subvertere. The simple verb, as well as the phrase ἀναιρεῖν ἐκ μέσου—comp. Lat. de medio, e medio tollere (Cic., Liv.) is common in Demosth., Aesch. and the Orators, and occurs occasionally in other writers, as Plato and Xenophon, with words like νόμους, τὸ δίκαιον, διαθήκην, ὑποθέσεις (Plato), οτ πόλιν, πολιτείαν, ὀλιγαρχίας (Xenoph.).

Gaisford illustrates the various forms of pledges or guarantees here mentioned by a corresponding passage in Arist. Acharn. 306, πῶς δ' ἔτ' ἃν καλῶς λέγοις ἄν, εἴπερ ἐσπείσω γ' ἀπαξ οἴσιν οῦτε βωμὸς οῦτε πίστις οῦθ ὅρκος μένει.

intyapia, ins connubii, the right of intermarriage between different states, together with the rules and obligations which it entails, which are here in question. On the 'reciprocal' em, 'inter', see note on exepyáσασθαι I 13, 9, p. 251.

§ 6. καὶ τὸ ἐνταῦθα (ἀδικνῖν) οδ καὶ very place where offenders are punished nality; 'which is the case with perjumould a man not commit a crime if I court of justice?' This is the arguments.

• a crime in the of the crimiwhere e very μαρτυροῦντες· ποῦ γὰρ οὐκ ἄν ἀδικήσειεν, εἴ γε καὶ ἐν τῷ δικαστηρίῳ; καὶ ἐφ' οἷς αἰσχύνη μάλιστα. καὶ εἰ τοῦτον ὑφ' οὖ εὖ πέπονθεν· πλείω γὰρ ἀδικεῖ, ὅτι η τε κακῶς ποιεῖ καὶ ὅτι οὐκ εὖ. καὶ ὃ παρὰ τὰ ἄγραφα δίκαια· ἀμείνονος γὰρ μὴ δι' ἀνάγκην δίκαιον εἶναι·

maius continet in se minus. 'Hinc P. Clodii culpam amplificavit Cicero, cum insidiis Gn. Magnum per servum tollere eum voluisse pro Milone dicens criminatus est: Insidiator erat in foro collocatus, atque in vestibulo ipso senatus' [pro Milone § 19], Victorius. (Victorius has forgotten the still more striking Etiam in senatum venit, &c. of the first speech against Catiline, § 2.) The sanctity of the place converts theft into sacrilege. The atrocity of the murder of 'Zacharias the son of Barachias' was heightened by the circumstance of its occurrence 'between the temple and the altar' (Matth. xxiii. 35).

'Another aggravation of an offence is, where it is attended by disgrace (to the victim); and this in proportion to its amount (μάλιστα)'. This, together with the wantonness, the unprovoked character of the aggression, is what converts a mere assault, alκία, into an act of ΰβρις, a wanton outrage. See Rhet. II 2. 5, definition of ΰβρις, and I 13.10; also note on I 12.26, p. 239. The wound inflicted on a man's pride and sense of dignity, the injury to his feelings and honour, constitute a great aggravation of the offence. ΰβρις is, τὸ βλάπτειν καὶ λυπεῖν ἐψ' οἶς αἰσχύνη ἐστὶ τῷ πάσχοντι κ.τ.λ. In II 6. 2, αἰσχύνη is defined, λύπη τις ἡ ταραχὴ περὶ τὰ εἰς ἀδοξίαν φαινόμενα φέρειν τῶν κακῶν ἡ παρόντων ἡ γεγονότων ἡ μελλόντων...ἐπὶ τοῖς τοιούτοις τῶν κακῶν ὅσα αἰσχρὰ δοκεῖ εἶναι ἡ αὐτῷ ἡ ὧν φροντίζει.

καὶ εἰ τοῦτον (ἡδίκηκέ τις)] 'and another is, when the victim of his wrong has been his benefactor; for his offence is thereby multiplied; in that he not only does what is wrong (positive wrong, a sin of commission), but also fails, omits, to do what is right (negative wrong, a sin of omission). The last explanatory clause is thus illustrated by Victorius from Cicero's criticism of the third Stoic Paradox, § 25 ὅτι τοα τὰ ἀμαρτήματα καὶ τὰ κατορθώματα. Illud tamen interest quod in servo necando, si adsit iniuria, semel peccatur; in patris vita violanda multa peccantur; violatur is qui procreavit; is qui aluit: is qui erudivit; is qui in sede ac domo atque in republica collocavit: multitudine peccatorum praestat (ὑπερέχει), eoque poena maiore dignus est.

§ 7. 'And an offence against the unwritten laws of right' (is worse than the violation of a written or positive law): 'because it is indicative of a better character and disposition, of a higher degree of virtue, to do right without compulsion'. (Any external force destroys the voluntary character of an act, and therefore its virtue. And if this voluntary obedience to the unwritten law implies a more virtuous disposition than that which is enforced by the positive enactments which have power tecompel it, then the opposite is true, an act of disobedience to the a written law is a worse offence, and a sign of a more vicious disposition



τὰ μὲν οὖν γεγραμμένα ἐξ ἀνάγκης, τὰ δ' ἄγραφα οὔ. ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον, εἰ παρὰ τὰ γεγραμμένα ὁ γὰρ τὰ φοβερὰ ἀδικῶν καὶ τὰ ἐπιζήμια καὶ τὰ μὴ ἐπιζήμια ἀδικήσειεν ἄν.

περὶ μὲν οὖν ἀδικήματος μείζονος καὶ ἐλάττονος ι είρηται, περὶ δὲ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων CHAP. XV.

than the violation of the other.) 'Now the written laws are compulsory, the unwritten are not'.

'From another point of view', (in another way of arguing or looking at the case; Rhetoric συλλογίζεται τάναντία, I § 12) the crime is worse 'if it be a breach of the written law: for (it may be argued) if a man does wrong when it is dangerous (fearful) and liable to penalty, (a fortiori) he would do it when it is not'. This again is by the rule omne maius continet in se minus; the greater and more powerful inclination to wrong necessarily involves the less.

φοβερά] acts fearful, alarming, formidable, from the probable consequences. Supply the cogn. accus. αδικήματα.

ἐπιζήμια] Note on I 4.9, ἐπίδοξον, p. 66.

είρηται] 'so much for', 'enough of', 'no more of': note on εἰρήσθω, I II. 29.

CHAP. XV.

The general sense and connexion of the contents of this chapter upon the ἄτεχνοι πίστεις of the practice of Rhetoric, those adjuncts of proof and external supports of the case, which consist in the various kinds of evidence which can be adduced by the pleader in confirmation of his statements and arguments, have been already given in the Introduction to this Commentary, pp. 193—207, to which I now refer and which I need not here repeat. They are called 'unartistic' or 'inartificial' because they are not due to the artist's inventive skill, but are supplied to him from the outside, as it were, of his art; and all that he has to do is to use them to the best advantage. Rhet. I 2.2. It is this distinction of two kinds of proof or modes of persuasion which explains the application of the term inventio by the Latin rhetoricians to that part of the art to which Aristotle first gave the name of intervol πίστεις, and the title of one of Cicero's rhetorical treatises, the de Inventione. The author himself, L.c., applies the term espeir to the intervol πίστεις.

In commenting therefore upon this chapter we shall have to occupy ourselves principally with the details of language, argument, and allusion, and so fill up the outlin as been sketched out in the Introduction.

§ 1. 'Next to the subject the logic 'we have the ur appropriate mmary of) what are called because' (γάρ, this is the

έχόμενον έστι των είρημένων έπιδραμεῖν ἴδιαι γὰρ 2 αὖται των δικανικων. εἰσὶ δὲ πέντε τὸν ἀριθμόν, 3 νόμοι μάρτυρες συνθῆκαι βάσανοι ὅρκος. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν περὶ νόμων εἴπωμεν, πως χρηστέον καὶ προτρέποντα καὶ ἀποτρέποντα καὶ κατηγοροῦντα καὶ ἀπο-4 λογούμενον. φανερὸν γὰρ ὅτι, ἐὰν μὲν ἐναντίος ἢ οἱ γεγραμμένος τῷ πράγματι, τῷ κοινῷ νόμῷ χρη-5 στέον καὶ τοῖς ἐπιεικέσιν ως δικαιοτέροις. καὶ ὅτι forensic branch of Rhetoric, and 'these are peculiar to law proceedings (or forensic practice)'. On the treatment of these ἄτεχνοι πίστεις by other writers on the subject see Introd. 205—207.

περί δε των ατέχνων...επιδραμείν] See note on 1 9.14; on the redundant

use of περί, ὑπέρ, &c.

έχόμενον] with genit. partitive, 'holding, hanging, on by (lit. to a part of,)', 'clinging to', 'connected with', 'in succession to', 'following'.

Very frequent in Herodotus.

ἐπιδραμεῖν] 'to run over', commonly in its literal signification takes the accusative, sometimes the dative. Here we may suppose that περὶ τῶν ἀτέχνων καλουμένων πίστεων is substituted for the accusative: as it is also in pseudo-Demosth. περὶ τῶν πρὸς 'Αλέξανδρον συνθηκῶν, 217. 7, μικρὰ ἐπιδραμοῦμαι περὶ αὐτῶν πολλῶν ὅντων. This passage and Xen. Oecon. XV I are the only two instances that are given by the Lexicons of the metaphorical sense in which it occurs here. [Cf., however, Pol. III 15, 1286 a 7, θεωρῆσαι καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας ἐπιδραμεῖν τὰς ἐνούσας, Index Aristotelicus. S.] Compare a similar use of ἐπελθεῖν σί 'pursuing an inquiry' or 'going over, reviewing, a subject'. Pol. I 13, 1260 b 12, ἐν τοῖς περὶ τὰς πολιτείας ἀναγκαῖον ἐπελθεῖν. Ib. VI (IV) 2, ult. πειρατέον ἐπελθεῖν τίνες φθοραί κ.τ.λ. et passim.

§ 3. χρηστέον προτρέποντα] i.e. πῶς δεῖ τινα χρῆσθαι αὐτοῖς προτρέποντα. The verbal adjective can be resolved into δεῖ with an indefinite object, with which the participle is made to 'agree'. Demosth. Olynth. β. 21, 24, πολλὴν δὴ τὴν μετάστασιν καὶ μεγάλην δεικτέον τὴν μεταβολὴν

εἰσφέροντας έξιόντας. Other examples in Matth. Gr. Gr. § 447. 4.

It appears from the addition of προτρέποντα and ἀποτρέποντα that the first of the ἄτεχνοι πίστεις, the laws, are not confined to forensic practice, but can also be used by the deliberative orator in addressing a public assembly: and this is true also of some kinds of witnesses, viz. the 'authorities' appealed to in support of a statement, which may be as serviceable in enforcing considerations of public policy, the συμφέρον ἡ ἀσύμφορον, as the δίκαιον ἡ ἄδικον of a legal process in a court of justice; see § 16. The original statement therefore of § 1, ἴδιαι γὰρ αὖται τῶν δικανικῶν, requires modification.

§ 4. ἐναντίος τῷ πράγματι] 'opposed to the facts on our side, to our view of the case'. Comp. infr. § 12.

§ 5. With στι here, and in the following topics, λεκτέον or something similar must be supplied from χρηστέον, §§ 3—4.

τὸ γνώμη τῆ ἀρίστη τοῦτ' ἐστί, τὸ μὴ παντελῶς 6 χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις. καὶ ὅτι τὸ μὲν ἐπιεικὲς ἀεὶ μένει καὶ οὐδέποτε μεταβάλλει, οὐδ' ὁ κοινός (κατὰ φύσιν γάρ ἐστιν), οἱ δὲ γεγραμμένοι πολλάκις. ὅθεν εἴρηται τὰ ἐν τῆ Σοφοκλέους 'Αντιγόνη' ἀπολογεῖται γὰρ ὅτι ἔθαψε παρὰ τὸν τοῦ Κρέοντος νόμον, ἀλλ' οὐ παρὰ τὸν ἄγραφον'

οὐ γάρ τι νῦν γε κὰχθές, ἀλλ' ἀεί ποτε. ταῦτ' οὖν ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔμελλον ἀνδρὸς οὐδενός.

P. 1375 b.

7 καὶ ὅτι τὸ δίκαιόν ἐστιν ἀληθές τι καὶ συμφέρον, ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν· ώστ' οὐ νόμος ὁ γεγραμμένος· οὐ γὰρ

τὸ γνώμη τῆ ἀρίστη] Supply κρίνειν οτ δικάζειν; the former is expressed in Rhet. II 25. 10, τὸ γνώμη τῆ ἀρίστη κρίνειν. This was the dicasts' oath, taken when they entered the court. The usual form was γνώμη τῆ δικαιστάτη. Dem. c. Aristocr. 652 sub fin. γνώμη τῆ δικαιστάτη δικάσειν ὀμωμόκασιν (οἱ δικασταί), ἡ δὲ τῆς γνώμης δόξα ἀφ' ὧν ἃν ἀκούσωσι παρίσταται... πῶς γὰρ ὁ μήτε δὶ ἔχθραν μήτε δὶ εὕνοιαν μήτε δὶ ἄλλην ἄδικον πρόφασιν μηδεμίαν, παρ' ἃ γιγνώσκει, θέμενος τὴν ψῆφον εὐσεβεί...ἀλλ' εἴ τις εἰδώς ἐκείνους προδέδωκεν ἡ ἐξαπατᾳ, οὖτος ἐστ' ἔνοχος τῆ ἀρὰ c. Boeot. de Nom. 1006. 27, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὧν γ' ἄν μὴ ὧσι νόμοι γνώμη τῆ δικαιστάτη δικάσειν ὀμωμόκατε. adv. Lept. 493. I. Ar. Pol. III 16, 1287 α 25, ἀλλὰ μὴν ὅσα γε μὴ δοκεί δύνασθαι διορίζειν ὁ νόμος, οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος ἃν δύναιτο γνωρίζειν. ἀλλ' ἐπιτηδὲς παιδεύσας ὁ νόμος ἐφίστησι τὰ λοιπὰ τῆ δικαιστάτη γνώμη κρίνειν καὶ διοικείν τοὺς ἄρχοντας, which explains the meaning and object of the oath.

The form of the oath is found in Pollux VIII 10 [ὁ δ' ὅρκος ἢν τῶν δικαστῶν περὶ μὲν ὧν νόμοι εἰσί, ψηφιεῖσθαι κατὰ τοὺς νόμους, περὶ δὲ ὧν μὴ εἰσί, γνώμη τῆ δικαιστάτη]; see Meier & Schömann, Attischer Process, p. 128; comp. p. 135.

τὸ μὴ παντελῶς χρῆσθαι τοῖς γεγραμμένοις] The meaning of the oath is, 'that the judges are not to employ, i.e. to enforce, to its full extent, in its strict and literal interpretation, the rigour of the written statute'.

§ 6. 'And that equity and the universal law are constant and unchangeable, like the laws of nature whose operation is uniform; to which the appeal is made in Sophocles' Antigone (line 450 seq.); for her defence is, that the burial (of her brother) was indeed against Creon's law, but not against that which is unwritten'. οὐδ' ὁ κοινὸς (μεταβάλλει).

§ 7. ἀλλ' οὐ τὸ δοκοῦν] δί something real, genuine, and (the lette

cas

" And therefore the written law, the tsometimes—and this is one of the the law', which is to do substant, that which seems to be,

ποιεῖ τὸ ἔργον τὸ τοῦ νόμου. καὶ ὅτι ώσπερ ἀργυρογνώμων ὁ κριτής ἰστιν, ὅπως διακρίνη τὸ κίβδηλον
8 δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἀληθές. καὶ ὅτι βελτίονος ἀνδρὸς τὸ
τοῖς ἀγράφοις ἢ τοῖς γεγραμμένοις χρῆσθαι καὶ ἐμ9 μένειν. καὶ εἴ που ἐναντίος νόμω εὐδοκιμοῦντι ἢ καὶ
αὐτὸς αὐτῷ· οἷον ἐνίοτι ὁ μὲν κελεύει κύρια εἶναι ἄττ ρ. 50.
ἂν συνθῶνται, ὁ δ' ἀπαγορεύει μὴ συντίθεσθαι παρὰ

but is not justice. On the superiority of natural justice to positive enactments, see Cicero, de Legg. I 15, referred to in Introd. p. 194.

'And we may further argue that the judge is like an assayer of coin and appointed for the purpose of distinguishing base justice from

ἀργυρογνώμων] Moeris, Lex. Attic. (p. 50, ed. Koch) ἀργυραμοιβοί, 'Αττικώς κολλυβισταί (money-changers, who change large coin for small, κόλλυβος), Έλληνικώς. άργυρογνώμονες, 'Αττικώς' δοκιμασταί, Έλληνικώς, and Pierson's note, who refers to the pseudo-Platonic dialogue $\pi \epsilon \rho l$ doe $\pi \hat{n} s$. 378 D (Zurich ed. p. 867), άλλα μήν και περί το χρύσιον και το άργύριον είσιν ήμιν δοκιμασταί, οίτινες όρωντες κρίνουσι τό τε βέλτιον και το χείρον; Εἰσίν. Τίνας οὖν τούτους καλεῖς; 'Αργυρογνώμονας. Pollux, VII § 170. Το the same family of words belong προβατογνώμων Agam. 768 (see Blomfield's Glossary) a 'discerner of the flock', one that can distinguish the several sheep of a flock; hence 'a judge of character'; iππογνώμων in the same metaphorical sense, Aesch. Fragm. Tox. 224 Dind. Cf. φυσιογνώμων, Ar. de Gen. Anim. IV 3. 32, and on φυσιογνωμονείν, as an art (the study of character from the indications of the features and other external peculiarities), see Anal. Pr. II 27, 70 b 7-38; and the treatise φυσιογνωμονικά, printed with Aristotle's works, Bekk. Vol. II. p. 805. Compare Cic. de Fato, 5, 10 (quoted in Blomfield's note, as 'De Nat. Deor. 18'), Quid? Socratem nonne legimus, quemadmodum notarit Zopyrus, physiognomon, qui se profitebatur hominum mores naturasque ex corpore oculis vultu fronte pernoscere? Compare, lastly, the simple γνώμων, Xen. Memor. I 4.5 (ap. Blomfield), of the tongue as distinguishing between sweet and bitter, and Agam. 1099, θεσφάτων γνώμων ἄκρος.

§ 8. See Introd. p. 194. Correct there the second line of the quotation, Hor. I Ep. 16, 52, which should be, tu nihil admittes in te formidine poenae: 'tu' is addressed to men in general, and therefore the second line speaks as generally as the first. Schrader appears to refer this topic to c. 7 § 12, καὶ δυοῦν ἀρχαῦν τὸ ἀπὸ τῆς μείζονος μεῖζον, for its authority; the topic of § 16, καὶ ἀρετὴ μὴ ἀρετῆς...τὸ μὲν γὰρ τέλος, τὸ δ' οὐ τέλος, is equally applicable.

§ 9. 'Or if the (written) law (which is against us) chance (we) to be contradictory, either to any other law of repute, or to itself; example, in some cases one law enacts the validity of all contrasoever, whilst the other (of the two opposite laws) forbids the of any engagement contrary to the law (except those that the On this Victorius, 'Exemplum hoc est legis legi repugnan

10 τον νόμον. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος, ώστε στρέφειν καὶ όρᾶν ἐφ' ὁποτέραν τὴν ἀγωγὴν ἢ τὸ δίκαιον ἐφαρ11 μόσει ἢ τὸ συμφέρον, εἶτα τούτω χρῆσθαι. καὶ εἰ τὰ μὲν πράγματα ἐφ' οἶς ἐτέθη ὁ νόμος μηκέτι μένει, ὁ δὲ νόμος, πειρατέον τοῦτο δηλοῦν καὶ μάχεσθαι ταύτη
12 πρὸς τὸν νόμον. ἐὰν δὲ ὁ γεγραμμένος ἢ πρὸς τὸ

autem id vocatur. Alterius vero exemplum, cum lex aliqua secum ipsa discordat, omisit, ut rei sua vi satis notae'.

§ 10. This very elliptical sentence must apparently be thus filled up. καὶ εἰ ἀμφίβολος (ὁ νόμος, χρηστέον αὐτῷ from § 3, 4, οτ λεκτέον), ώστε (so as to, in such a way as to...) στρέφειν (αὐτόν) καὶ ὁρậν κ.τ.λ. 'and if the law (which we have to interpret) be ambiguous, (we must deal with it, treat it, or interpret it) in such a way as to wrest (twist) it (in either direction according as it suits our purpose) and to see to which of the two constructions either strict justice (the letter of the law) or expediency, i. e. equity, (whichever of the two we are arguing for) will adapt itself, and then employ that'. τὸ συμφέρον here stands for 'equity', because by accommodating itself to the varying circumstances of particular cases it is more 'generally serviceable' than the stiff unbending letter of the law. ἀγωγή (τοῦ νόμου) 'leading', 'guiding' of the law. This 'leading of the law' represents the law itself as leading those who have to use it by the 'interpretation' or 'construction' that may be put upon it in one or another direction, and corresponds exactly to ductus in the phrase ductus litterarum. The following passage of the Politics, VI (IV) 5, 1292 b 12, throws light upon this use of ἀγωγή, and as they mutually illustrate one another I will quote it entire. οὐ δεῖ δὲ λανθάνειν ὅτι πολλαχοῦ συμβέβηκεν ώστε την μέν πολιτείαν την κατά τούς νόμους μη δημοτικήν είναι, διά δε το ήθος καί την άγωγην πολιτεύεσθαι δημοτικώς, όμοίως δὲ πάλιν παρ' άλλοις την μὲν κατά τους νόμους είναι πολιτείαν δημοτικωτέραν, τῆ δ' άγωγῆ και τοις ἔθεσιν όλιγαρχεῖσθαι μάλλον. Here again the ἀγωγή is τοῦ νόμου, the leading, direction given to, or interpretation put upon the law in the actual practice of the society. The difference which sometimes arises between the theory of the constitution as laid down in the laws, and the actual administration and conduct of the government, is accounted for, first, by the character and habits of the people, either natural to them or as cultivated and formed by education; and secondly, by the 'direction' they give to, or the 'interpretation' they put upon, the actually existing laws, in accordance with the character which they wish to give to the practical administration of the government. Compare καθ' αύτοὺς ἄγουσι τὴν πολιτείαν, C. II, 1296 a 26, and Thuc. II 65, of Pericles' direction of the state policy, kai ouk ήγετο μάλλον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ (τοῦ πλήθους) ἡ αὐτὸς ήγε.

ἀμφίβολοτ] III 5. 4, ἀμφίβολα, 'ambiguous phrases'. Rhet. ad Alex. 25 (26) **ένων τὸ ἀμφίβολον**, opposed to οἰκεῖα ὀνόματα. Ib. 36 (37).

15. 4.

lensed contents of this section, which gives the irguments for the treatment of laws, shewing

πράγμα, τό τε γνώμη τη ἀρίστη λεκτέον ὅτι οὐ τοῦ παρὰ τὸν νόμον ἔνεκα δικάζειν ἐστίν, ἀλλ' ἴνα, ἐὰν ἀγνοήση τί λέγει ὁ νόμος, μὴ ἐπιορκῆ. καὶ ὅτι οὐ τὸ ἀπλῶς ἀγαθὸν αἰρεῖται οὐδείς, ἀλλὰ τὸ αὐτῷ. καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν διαφέρει ἡ μὴ κεῖσθαι ἡ μὴ χρῆσθαι. καὶ ὅτι ἐν ταῖς ἄλλαις τέχναις οὐ λυσιτελεῖ παρασοφίζεσθαι τὸν ἰατρόν οὐ γὰρ τοσοῦτο βλάπτει ἡ ἀμαρτία τοῦ ἰατροῦ ὅσον τὸ ἐθίζεσθαι ἀπειθεῖν τῷ ἄρχοντι. καὶ ὅτι τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητεῖν εἶναι, τοῦτ ἐστὶν ὁ ἐν τοῖς ἐπαινουμένοις νόμοις ἀπαγορεύεται.

13 καὶ περὶ μὲν τῶν νόμων οὕτω διωρίσθω· περὶ δὲ μαρτύρων, μάρτυρές εἰσι διττοί, οὶ μὲν παλαιοὶ οὶ δὲ πρόσφατοι, καὶ τούτων οὶ μὲν μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου οὶ δ' ἐκτός. λέγω δὲ παλαιοὺς μὲν τούς τε

how to argue when the written law is in our favour, have been developed in extenso in the Introd. p. 195—6, and we may now proceed to the details. πρὸς τὸ πρᾶγμα] 'in favour of our case' as τῷ πράγματι § 4.

τὸ ἀπλῶς, τὸ αὐτῷ] Ι 7. 35, καὶ τὸ αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπλῶς, and note there.

παρασοφίζεσθαι] 'to attempt to outdo (to go beyond, παρά) the physician (note the generic τόν; one of the two uses of the definite article, to mark the member of a class) in skill and subtlety, ingenuity and cleverness'. The proverb, 'to be wiser than your physician', is applied to lδιώται who pretend to rival the professors, τεχνίται οτ σοφοί, men of special knowledge, skill, and experience in any art or science. In Athen. p. 137 F, quoted by Victorius, the verb stands for 'over refining' in the art of cookery, τὸν δὲ ἐν τῷ Λυκείῳ κρέας ταριχηρὸν εἰς τάριχος διασκευάσσωντα μαστιγωθῆναι, ὡς παρασοφιζόμενον πονηρῶς.

τὸ τῶν νόμων σοφώτερον ζητείν είναι κ.τ.λ.] Comp. Cleon ap. Thuc. III 37, οἱ μὲν γὰρ τῶν τε νόμων σοφώτεροι βούλονται φαίνεσθαι...καὶ ἐκ τοῦ τοιούτου τὰ πολλὰ σφάλλουσι τὰς πόλεις: and a little before, πάντων δὲ δεινότατον εἰ...μηδὲ γνωσόμεθα ὅτι χείροσι νόμοις ἀκινήτοις χρωμένη πόλις κρείστων ἐστὶν ἢ καλῶς ἔχουσιν ἀκύροις, ἀμαθία τε μετὰ σωφροσύνης ἀφελιμότερον ἡ δεξιότης μετ' ἀκολασίας, κ.τ.λ. Bacon, de Augmentis, Lib. VIII. Aphor. 58 (Vol. I. p. 816, ed. Ellis and Spedding), quotes this maxim as proverbial, 'licet enim non male dictum sit, neminem oportere legibus esse sapientiorem;' on which Ellis has this note, 'Bacon refers perhaps to D'Argentré's maxim, Stulta videtur sapientia quae lege vult sapientior videri. In the passage from which these words are taken he is condemning the presumption of judges who depart from the text pretence of equity—which is precisely what the advocate is supp be doing here,'

§ 13. διωρίσθω] See on 1 11. 29, p. 224.

ποιητὰς καὶ ὅσων ἄλλων γνωρίμων εἰσὶ κρίσεις φανεραί, οἶον Ἀθηναῖοι Ὁμήρω μάρτυρι ἐχρήσαντο περὶ Σαλαμῖνος καὶ Τενέδιοι ἔναγχος Περιάνδρω τῶ Κορινθίω πρὸς Σιγειεῖς. καὶ Κλεοφῶν κατὰ Κριτίου

κρίσεις φανεραί] 'decisions, judgments, published, or notorious'. Quint. V 11. 36, Adhibetur extrinsecus in causam et auctoritas. Haec secuti Graecos, a quibus κρίσεις dicuntur, iudicia aut iudicationes vocant ...si quid ita visum gentibus, populis, sapientibus viris, claris civibus, illustribus poetis (all γνώριμοι,) referri potest.

οίον 'Αθηναίοι 'Ομήρω μάρτυρι έχρήσαντο περί Σαλαμίνος] Quint. u. s. § 40 (as an instance of the appeals to 'authorities' mentioned in § 36), Neque est ignobile exemplum, Megareos ab Atheniensibus, quum de Salamine contenderent victos Homeri versu, qui tamen ipse non in omni editione reperitur, significans Aiacem naves suas Atheniensibus iunxisse. The 'versus' or rather two verses here in question are, Il. B 557-8, [Αΐας δ' έκ Σαλαμίνος ἄγεν δυοκαίδεκα νήας, στήσε δ' ἄγων, ϊν' 'Αθηναίων ϊσταντο φάλαγγες] which were quoted by Solon (and said to have been interpolated by him in the text of Homer for that purpose, Diogenes Laertius, Vit. Sol. § 48) as an 'authority' in favour of the Athenian claim to the possession of Salamis. See Heyne, Paley, and Trollope's notes on the passage of Homer, Plut. Vit. Sol. c. 10, Strabo, Attica, IX 1. Plutarch says that the current opinion in his time attributed the interpolation of the line (the second of the two) to Solon, though the Athenians denied it: in Strabo's time it was condemned by the critics: he enters at length into the question, and gives the reasons for rejecting the verse. Another well-known instance of the authority of a γνώριμος, or distinguished man, is the proverbial αὐτὸς ἔφα, ipse dixit, of the disciples of Pythagoras.

καὶ Τενέδιοι ἔναγχος κ.τ.λ.] Of this event, 'recent' at the time of Aristotle's writing, nothing more is known than we learn from this passage. 'Ex verbis his colligo', says Victorius, 'Tenedi insulae incolas cum Sigeensibus disceptantes usos et ipsos prisco teste Periandro: qui, quamvis multis antea saeculis mortuus esset, poema reliquerat quo praecepta quaedam ad beate vivendum, ὑποθῆκαι vocatae a Graecis, continebantur. Laertius qui vitam ipsius scripsit hoc narrat: in eo autem, ut suspicari licet, aliquid fuit quod causam Tenediorum adiuvaret.'

κλεοφῶν] a mischievous profligate demagogue, who took a leading part in public affairs at Athens during the latter years of the Peloponnesian War. He was tried and condemned by the Council during the siege of Athens in 405 E.C. One of the results of the political rivalry between him and Critias, one of the leaders of the opposite party, was this charge which he brought against him, at some time not ascertained. The various references to him in Aristophanes.

The various references to him in Sasishi and the Orators, will be found in the article on him in Sasishi in Meineke, Fragm. Com. Graec. I bearing his name, which Plato the

p. 171 seq., in 1 Comic poet w Korriou

was the well-known oli-

τοῖς Σόλωνος ἐλεγείοις ἐχρήσατο, λέγων ὅτι πάλαι ἀσελγης ἡ οἰκία· οὐ γὰρ ἄν ποτε ἐποίησε Σόλων εἰπεῖν μοι Κριτία πυρρότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν.

garchical leader, one of the thirty tyrants, maternal uncle of Plato the philosopher, and great-grand-nephew of Solon, Plat. Charm. 155 A. He was son of Callaeschrus, ibid. 153 C, who was the son of another Critias, son of Dropides, brother of Solon. Comp. Tim. 20 E.

Cleophon, in his accusation, took occasion to quote 'as from an authority' some elegiac verses of Solon from whose family he was descended, to shew that reckless licentiousness was hereditary in the race.

ἀσελγής Hesychius ἀκόλαστος, ἀκάθαρτος. Gram. ap. Bekk. Anecd. I 451, άσελγές, πῶν τὸ σφοδρὸν καὶ βίαιον. καὶ ἀσέλγεια ή μετ' ἐπηρεασμοῦ καὶ θρασύτητος βία. καὶ ἀσελγὴς ὁ ἀνάγωγος (intractable, unmanageable, like 'unbroken' horses and dogs, Xenophon, from ayeir, 'to train or educate'). Δημοσθένης (c. Mid. 521. 2), καὶ ὁ κωμικός. "Ωσπερ ἀνέμου εξαίφνης ἀσελγους γενομένου (Eupolis, Fr. Inc. XXV. Meineke, Vol. II. p. 558). οίον αὐτόπνιγος (or τὸ πνίγος) ώς ἀσελγής (Pherecr. Fragm. Inc. XXIX. Meineke, II 348). ἀσελγες σκώμμα, Eupolis, bis. Hence it appears that the primary sense of the word is 'untamed or untameable', from a and $\theta \in \lambda y \in \mathcal{U}$ (on the analogy of αμιγής 'unmixed', one who cannot be soothed, charmed, tamed; hence violent, extravagant, excessive—Arist. Plut. 559, παρὰ τῶ μέν (πλούτφ) γάρ ποδαγρώντες καὶ γαστρώδεις καὶ παχύκνημοι καὶ πίονές εἶσιν ασελγώς, 'extravagantly fat'--and specially in the indulgence of the appetites and passions, reckless in character and conduct; licentious, profligate to excess. Arist. Pol. VIII (V) 5, sub init. διὰ τὴν τῶν δημαγωγῶν ἀσέλγειαν, 'license' in conduct; ib. c. 6, 1305 b 40, γίγνονται δὲ μεταβολαὶ τής ολιγαρχίας καὶ όταν ἀναλώσωσι τὰ ίδια ζώντες ἀσελγώς, 'by a life of reckless extravagance'. Plat. Rep. IV 424 E (the word is rare in Plato). Demosth. Olynth. II 23. 19, Phil. IV. 131. 11, c. Mid. 521. 2 u. s., ap. eundem ἀσελγῶς ζην, διακείσθαι, διάγειν τὸν βίον, χρησθαί τινι.

elπeiν μοι] This, and the following line of Solon's elegy, is quoted, with two variations from Aristotle's version, by Proclus ad Tim. 20 E,

εἰπέμεναι Κριτίη ξανθότριχι πατρὸς ἀκούειν' οὐ γὰρ ἁμαρτινόῳ πείσεται ἡγεμόνι,

the father of Critias being Solon's brother, Dropides. These verses, which were probably intended by the author as a compliment to the father, are misconstrued by the malicious Cleophon into a reflection on the son, whose recklessness and licentiousness had brought upon him his father's displeasure: the authority of Solon is appealed to to shew that the grandson inherited his grandfather's vices. Whether $\pi \nu i p i \sigma r \chi i$ is another malicious perversion of Cleophon, on the hypothesis that red hair implies a licentious disposition, or depravity in general—as seems to have been the opinion of the Normans, who had the proverb, entre poil roux et félonie s'entreportent grant compagnie, (Wace, Roman de Rou, quoted by Sir F. Palgrave, Hist. of Norm. II 721)—or from memory, has misquoted, more suo, cannot neall events it is unlikely that Solon intended any tias' character, whatever may have been the 4

14 περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν γενομένων οἱ τοιοῦτοι μάρτυρες, P. 1376.
περὶ δὲ τῶν ἐσομένων καὶ οἱ χρησμολόγοι, οἷον
Θεμιστοκλῆς, ὅτι ναυμαχητέον, τὸ ξύλινον τεῖχος
λέγων. ἔτι καὶ αἱ παροιμίαι, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, μαρ-

Critias is evidently considered as a boy or very young man from the tone of the address or message, and Victorius shews from Theocr. Id. VIII. 3, ἄμφω τώγ' ήτην πυρροτρίχω, ἄμφω ἀνάβω, that red hair in a boy in the eyes of the Greeks was a beauty and not a deformity. It seems to me that Solon wrote ξανθότριχι, as Proclus gives it, and that the other reading is due either to Cleophon's malice if we interpret it in deterius, or to Aristotle's want of memory, if we take it as synonymous with ξανθότριχι. The evidence of Critias' do exysta derived from the verses is plainly a false inference of Cleophon and not really contained in the original: the statement in Plat. Charm. 157 E, that Solon wrote Elegies in praise of 'the house of Critias', and spoke of its members as 'distinguished by personal beauty and virtue and all other so-called happiness', is altogether against any such supposition. Victorius, who regards the inference drawn by Cleophon as justified by the language of the verses, endeavours to reconcile this with the eulogistic character of the elegy, by the remark that Critias may have been an exception to the general good character of his family. Bergk, Poet. Lyr. Gr. p. 331, follows Proclus' version. The other variation, είπεῖν μοι, and εἰπέμεναι, may be either another slip of Aristotle's memory, or elmeiv μοι a mere false reading of ελπέμεναι, the one being very easily mistaken for the other.

Lastly, μol , if it were retained, would be a good example of the *dativus ethicus* corresponding in Greek to the familiar use of 'me' in the earlier English writers: as Shakespeare, Rob me the treasury; He smiled me in the face (Dame Quickly of Falstaff); See how this river comes me cranking in (Hotspur). [Abbott's *Shaksp. Gr.* § 220. S.]

§ 14. χρησμολόγοι] amongst whom Themistocles is included as the interpreter of an oracle which referred to future events, περὶ τῶν ἐσομένων, here denotes not merely professional soothsayers, but amateurs also who followed the diviner's craft. Herod., VII 141, gives the oracle here quoted: the verses run thus, τείχος Τριτογενεί ξύλινον διδοί εὐρύοπα Ζεὺς μοῦνον ἀπόρθητον τελέθειν, τό σε τέκνα τ' ὀνήσει. c. 143 gives Themistocles' interpretation. The professional interpreters of the oracles are called χρησμολόγοι by Herodotus.

ai παροιμίαι, ὅσπερ εἴρηται] These words will not bear the ordinary interpretation of ὅσπερ εἴρηται, 'as has been already said', because this is not true. Therefore Victorius and Vater propose to render ὅσπερ as if it were οἴαπερ, huiuscemodi, 'proverbs are also used as evidence, such as has been mentioned', viz. evidence of the future: and Muretus proposed καὶ τὸ ὅσπερ εἴρηται, "and the 'as has been said'," any general remark that has been habitually made, whether proverbial or not. We may

'ictorius in his explanation, without however supposing that in any but its literal and proper meaning 'proverbs are way that has been stated', evidence (that is) of the future.

τυρια έστίν· οἷον εἴ τις συμβουλεύει μὴ ποιεῖσθαι φίλον γέροντα, τούτω μαρτυρεῖ ἡ παροιμία, μήποτ εὖ έρδειν γέροντα.

p. 51.

καὶ τὸ τοὺς υίοὺς ἀναιρεῖν ὧν καὶ τοὺς πατέρας, νήπιος ὸς πατέρα κτείνας παῖδας καταλείπει.

15 πρόσφατοι δ' όσοι γνώριμοί τι κεκρίκασιν· χρήσιμοι γὰρ αἱ τούτων κρίσεις τοῖς περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἀμφισβητοῦσιν· οἷον Εὔβουλος ἐν τοῖς δικαστηρίοις ἐχρήσατο

μήποτ' εὖ ἔρδειν γέροντα] Suidas, s. vv. ἄχρηστα et μήποτ' εὖ ἔρδειν, quotes the proverb at length, in two different forms, both of them corrupt. The proverb conveys the maxim εἰς ἄχρηστα μὴ ἀναλίσκειν. Gaisford from the materials supplied by Suidas has put together the following lines, μήποτ' εὖ ἔρδειν γέροντα, μηδὲ παίδα βάσκανον μὴ λαλητικὴν γυναῖκα,

μηδέ γείτονος κύνα μη κυβερνήτην Φίλυπνον, μη λάλον κωπηλάτην.

νήπιος δς πατέρα κτείνας παίδας καταλείπει] The verse is taken from Stasinus' Cypria: quoted by Clemens, Strom. VI 747. Düntzer, Fragm. Epic. Gr. p. 16. It is repeated II 21. II. Herod. I 155, Cyrus to Croesus, on hearing of the revolt of the Lydians, ὁμοίως γάρ μοι νῦν γε Φαίνομαι πεποιηκέναι, ὡς εἶ τις πατέρα ἀποκτείνας τῶν παίδων αὐτοῦ φείσαιτο. Liv. XL 3, of Philip king of Macedon, father of Perseus, Postremo negare propalam coepit satis tutum sibi quicquam esse nisi liberos eorum, quos interfecisset, comprehensos in custodia haberet, et tempore alium alio tolleret (Victorius). Eur. Androm. 518, καὶ γὰρ ἀνοία μεγάλη λείπειν ἐχθροῦς ἐχθρῶν, ε'ξὸν κτείνειν καὶ φόβον οἶκων ἀφελέσθαι. Comp. Toup. Emend. in Suid. II 185 (G.). Comp. Heracl. 1005, where it is put in the mouth of Eurystheus; and Herc. Fur. 168, in that of Lycus. Plutarch has the proverb, νεκοὸς οὖ δάκνει.

§ 15. Είβουλος] 'Αναφλύστιος (ψήφισμα ap. Dem. de Cor. § 29), a demagogue (so Harpocration and the Schol.), orator and political opponent of Demosthenes, who mentions him very frequently in de Cor., de F. Leg., and elsewhere. This Eubulus is omitted in Smith's Dict. of Biogr.; but Baiter and Sauppe, in their excellent Index Nominum (Orat. Att. III. Ind. Nom. pp. 48, 9), have furnished a complete list of all the references to him from the Greek Orators, Scholiasts, and Lexicographers, which in some degree supplies the place of a biography. See also Ruhnken, Hist. Crit. Or. Gr. p. 146 [and especially Arnold Schaefer. Demosthenes und seine Zeit, I 173-191. S.]. He is attacked and apostrophized by Demosthenes, de F. Leg. §§ 290-293, and a passage of one of his speeches is referred to in § 292. 'Eubulus in the law-court (at the trial) employed against Chares the saying of Plato (the Comic poet) against Archibius, that "the avowal of knavery (rascality) has grown in the city".' Meineke, in his Fragm. Comm. Gr. (Plat. Fragm. Inc. XLI.) Vol. II 692, merely quotes this passage without attempting to restore the verse or explain the allusion. In his Hist. Crit. (Fr. Com. Gr. I 161, note) he had proposed to substitute 'Αγύρριον for 'Αρχίβιον in the text of κατὰ Χάρητος ῷ Πλάτων εἶπε πρὸς ᾿Αρχίβιον, ὅτι ἐπιδέδωκεν ἐν τῆ πόλει τὸ ὁμολογεῖν πονηροὺς εἶναι.

16 καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες τοῦ κινδύνου, ἀν δόξωσι ψεύδεσθαι. οἱ μὲν οὖν τοιοῦτοι τῶν τοιούτων μόνον μάρτυρές εἰσιν, εἰ γέγονεν ἢ μή, εἰ ἔστιν ἢ μή, περὶ δὲ τοῦ ποῖον οὐ μάρτυρες, οἷον εἰ δίκαιον ἢ ἄδικον, εἰ συμ
17 φέρον ἢ ἀσύμφορον οἱ δ᾽ ἄπωθεν καὶ περὶ τούτων πιστότατοι. πιστότατοι δ᾽ οἱ παλαιοί ἀδιάφθοροι γάρ. πιστώματα δὲ περὶ μαρτυριῶν μάρτυρας μὲν μὴ ἔχοντι, ὅτι ἐκ τῶν εἰκότων δεῖ κρίνειν καὶ τοῦτ ἐστὶ τὸ γνώμη τῆ ἀρίστη, καὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατηῦσαι τὰ εἰκότα ἐπὶ ἀργυρίω, καὶ ὅτι οὐχ ἀλίσκεται

Aristotle, an opinion which is afterwards retracted in the other place referred to.

§ 16. καὶ οἱ μετέχοντες...ψεύδεσθαὶ] 'Those who share the danger' (with the person for whom they give evidence, i. e. are liable to the penalties of ψευδομαρτυρία, as the other is to those of the offence with which he is charged) 'if they be suspected of falsehood', sc. πρόσφατοί εἰσι, are reckoned amongst 'recent' or contemporary witnesses. That they are so is shewn by their actual presence in court, and the risk they consequently run. See Introd. p. 196, for the explanation of the remainder of the section. δόξωσιν. 'quia si credantur etiam mendaces falsique, non tantum si fuerint, plectuntur.' Victorius.

With ϵl $\sigma \nu \mu \phi \epsilon \rho \sigma \nu \hbar$ $d\sigma \dot{\nu} \mu \phi \sigma \rho \sigma \nu$, which recognises this kind of $\tilde{a}\tau \epsilon \chi \nu \sigma s$ $\pi i \sigma \tau i s$ as available also in deliberative speaking, comp. § 3, and the note.

§ 17. of $d\pi\omega\theta\epsilon\nu$] i.e., according to the Greek usage, those who give their evidence, not at a distance (as we say) but from a distance, measuring the distance from the object to the subject. See note on I II. 16, p. 213.

πιστότατοι οἱ παλαιοί] Living witnesses may be corrupted, bribed to give false evidence: the ancient witnesses or authorities, appealed to in confirmation of statements or opinions, are inaccessible to corruption, and therefore most to be relied on.

πίστωμα, which seems to occur only in Aeschylus (Pers. 171 γηράλεα πιστώματα, abstr. pro concr., for πιστοὶ γέροντες, and Choeph. 977, Eumen. 214, in the sense of 'pledge, guarantee, assurance') and in Empedocles and Clearchus and one or two late authors, is here no doubt connected with the rhetorical πίστεις, and means the assurances that are produced in the minds of the audience by the rhet

The fa alleged. It can hardly be identifiable with the rie

Some kind is the meaning require

ότι οὐκ ἔστιν ἐξαπατήσαι – περὶ στάσεων (Speng. Rhet. G

τὰ εἰκότα ψευδομαρτυριών έχοντι δὲ πρὸς μη έχοντα, ότι οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν ᾶν ἔδει 18 μαρτυριών, εί έκ των λόγων ίκανον ήν θεωρήσαι. είσὶ δὲ αὶ μαρτυρίαι αὶ μὲν περὶ αὐτοῦ αὶ δὲ περὶ τοῦ άμφισβητούντος, καὶ αὶ μὲν περὶ τοῦ πράγματος αὶ δέ περί τοῦ ήθους, ώστε φανερον ότι οὐδέποτ' έστιν άπορησαι μαρτυρίας χρησίμης εί μη γάρ κατά τοῦ πράγματος η αυτώ όμολογουμένης η τώ άμφισβητοῦντι ἐναντίας, ἀλλὰ περὶ τοῦ ήθους ἡ αὐτοῦ εἰς 19 ἐπιείκειαν ἢ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος εἰς φαυλότητα. τών πραγμάτων έλεγχον άξιοπιστότερον τοῦ διὰ τών μαρτύρων οὖτε γάρ πεπεισμένα τὰ πράγματα οὖτε χαριζόμενά το λέξει ώσπερ οἱ μάρτυρες πολλάκις, άλλ' οδά έστι φύσει, τοιαύτα και έξεταζόμενα φαίνεται. Cic. pro Caelio, c. 9 (quoted by Victorius), Equidem vos abducam a testibus: neque huius iudicii veritatem, quae mutari nullo modo potest, in voluntate testium collocari sinam; quae facillime effingi, nullo negotio flecti ac detorqueri botest. Argumentis agemus; signis omni luce clarioribus crimina refellemus; res cum re, causa cum causa, ratio cum ratione pugnabit. 'Probabilities can't be bribed to cheat (the judges), as witnesses can'.

οὐχ ὑπόδικα τὰ εἰκότα] 'probabilities are not responsible (liable to trial and penalty) like witnesses, and therefore less to be trusted'. ὑπόδικος, formed upon the analogy of ὑπεύθυνος, ὑποίτιος, ὑπόσκιος, ὑπόσπονδος, ὕποσμος (Ar. de Anima, 11 9. 5), ὑπαίθριος, ὑπόστεγος, ὑπόφορος; and following that of ἐπαίτιος, ἐπιζήμιος, ἐπικαίρος οτ -καίριος, ἐπίνοσος, κ.τ.λ. (liable or exposed to so and so); from ὑπό sub, 'under', 'subject to', either literally as ὑπόσκιος, or metaphorically as ὑπεύθυνος, ὑπόδικος. It occurs in the Orators, frequently in Plat. Leges, Aesch. Eumen. 250, ὑπόδικος θέλει γενέσθαι χερών, and Rhet. ad Alex. 4 (5). 6.

§ 18. at $\mu i \nu \pi \epsilon \rho l$ a $\delta i \pi \epsilon \rho l$ $\tau o \hat{v}$ at $\delta i \pi \epsilon \rho l$ $\tau o \hat{v}$ at $\delta i \pi \epsilon \rho l$ $\delta i \pi \epsilon \rho l$ $\delta i \pi \epsilon \rho l$ (may be brought) either for ourselves or against the opposite party'; the indeterminate $\pi \epsilon \rho i$, 'about', 'concerning', takes its specific meaning from the words with which it is immediately joined; like the chameleon its colour from the objects round it. $\pi \epsilon \rho l$ $\tau o \hat{v}$ $\pi \rho \dot{a} \gamma \mu a \tau o s \ldots \pi \epsilon \rho l$ $\tau o \hat{v}$ $\eta \theta o v s$, 'either to facts or character'; to support our own, and to invalidate and depreciate those of the opposite party.

εὶ μὴ γάρ] (εὐπορεῖ τις, or ὁ ἀμφισβητῶν, μαρτυρίας, with which ὁμολογουμένης is supposed to agree). ἀλλά (at any rate, at least) subaudi εὐπορεῖ γε... 'For if we have no evidence as to the fact, either in agreement with our own side of the case, or opposed to that of the adverse party, at all events (we shall be sure to find plenty) as to character, (εἰς, tending to, bearing on,) to establish, that is, either our own respectability or the opponent's worthlessness'. ὁμολογουμένης 'in agreement with', comp. II 22. 15, ὁμολογούμενα and (the opposite) ἀνομολογούμενα. In § 21 of this chapter, the sense is different, 'admitted', as in Plato and Arist. Rhu

δ' άλλα περὶ μάρτυρος η φίλου η έχθροῦ η μεταξύ, η εὐδοκιμοῦντος ἡ ἀδοξοῦντος ἡ μεταξύ, καὶ ὅσαι ἄλλαι τοιαθται διαφοραί, έκ των αθτων τόπων λεκτέον έξ οίων περ καὶ τὰ ἐνθυμήματα λέγομεν.

περί δὲ τῶν συνθηκῶν τοσαύτη τοῦ λόγου χρησίς Ρ. 1376 δ. 20 έστιν όσον αύξειν ή καθαιρείν ή πιστάς ποιείν ή άπίστους, ἐὰν μὲν αὐτῷ ὑπάρχωσι, πιστὰς καὶ κυρίας, 21 έπὶ δὲ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος τοὐναντίον. πρὸς μὲν οὖν τὸ πιστὰς ἡ ἀπίστους κατασκευάζειν οὐδὲν δια- γ. 52. Φέρει της περί τους μάρτυρας πραγματείας όποιοι γαρ αν τινες ωσιν οἱ ἐπιγεγραμμένοι ἢ Φυλάττοντες,

§ 19. ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν τόπων...λέγομεν] '(the arguments on these subjects) must be drawn from the same topics (i.e. the $\epsilon i \delta \eta$) as those from which we derive our enthymemes also'. See Introd. p. 198.

§ 20. περί τῶν συνθηκῶν] On συνθήκαι see note on I I. 9, περί τὰ συναλλάγματα. They are contracts, bonds, engagements, agreements of any kind between two or more parties. They are probably intended to include documentary evidence of all kinds, which is expressed by the Latin tabulae of Cicero and Quintilian. See on this head Quint. v 5.

αὐτωῖ 'for oneself'. Add this to the instances of αὐτοῦ, &c. for αύτοῦ and the rest, in notes on I 1.12; I 7.35; and see the references there given.

'On the subject of contracts, arguments may be so far employed as to magnify or reduce (pull down, met. extenuate, depreciate, disparage (their value and importance), or (in other words) confirm or destroy their credit (or trustworthiness); if we have them (to produce) (χρησίς ἐστι ποιείν) we must argue for their credit and validity (κυρίας, their authoritative character); in the case of (if they apply to, are on the side of) the opposite party, the reverse'.

§ 21. κατασκευάζειν] is a technical term of dialectics, denoting the constructive process and object of argumentation or syllogism, viz. to establish some positive conclusion, to maintain or confirm a thesis; and opposed to ἀνασκευάζειν, which represents the 'subversive', 'destructive' (ἀνασκευάζειν 'to undo', comp. λύειν 'to break up, or dissolve a thing into its elements'), 'refutative' syllogism or reasoning which proves a negative. On these terms see further in Introd. p. 268, and note (on p. 267) on the same page.

'Now in regard of establishing their credit or discrediting them, the treatment of this in no respect differs from that of the witnesses: for according to the character of those whose names are attached to, subscribed to. *Lyonyua, the title of a crime or a legal prosec r contract, or who have it in their ke

t ar trustworthiness of the contract acts made trustworthy)'.

τούτοις αἱ συνθηκαι πισταί εἰσιν. ὁμολογουμένης δ' εἶναι τῆς συνθήκης, οἰκείας μὲν οὕσης αὐξητέον· ἡ γὰρ συνθήκη νόμος ἐστὶν ἴδιος καὶ κατὰ μέρος, καὶ αἱ μὲν συνθῆκαι οὐ ποιοῦσι τὸν νόμον κύριον, οἱ δὲ νόμοι τὰς κατὰ τὸν νόμον συνθήκας. καὶ ὅλως αὐτὸς ὁ νόμος συνθήκη τις ἐστίν, ὥστε ὅς τις ἀπιστεῖ ἡ ἀναι-22 ρεῖ συνθήκην, τοὺς νόμους ἀναιρεῖ. ἔτι δὲ πράττεται τὰ πολλὰ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων καὶ τὰ ἑκούσια κατὰ

τούτοις πισταί] is a somewhat irregular expression, meaning τοσούτφ πιστοτέραι είσὶν αι συνθηκαι οτ τοιαῦται και αι συνθηκαι τῷ πισται είναι.

The degree of integrity of those who have the document in their custody is a measure of the probability of its having been tampered with or not.

'The existence of the contract being admitted, if the document be our own (§ 26), we must magnify it (cry it up; increase, exaggerate, its value and importance); for the contract (we may say) is a law, special and partial; and it is not the contracts that give authority, or validity, to the law, but the laws to the contracts which are made in conformity with them (legally)'. Either of these arguments may be urged to shew that a covenant has the sanction of law, and shares its authority. 'And, speaking generally, the law itself is a kind of contract, and therefore any one who violates (disobeys) the provisions (understand συνθήκη after ἀπιστεί) of a contract or makes away with it, is in fact subverting, doing away with, the laws'. This doctrine has already been stated in other words, c. 13. 2, νόμον...ἴδιον μὲν τὸν ἐκάστοις ὡρισμένον πρὸς αὐτούς. This is therefore the positive, written, local or national law, varying in different societies, and enacted by each of them severally for mutual convenience, under an implied contract to observe and maintain them.

Analogous to this view of law as a contract is the theory, in Politics, of the Social Contract, which has been maintained by Locke, Rousseau. and many others. This view of the origin of the social organization and of government, is founded upon the natural freedom and equality of men; and assumes a common agreement amongst the members of a state to live and act together for purposes of self-defence and mutual advantage in obedience to laws and an executive authority which the theory supposes to have emanated originally from themselves, and to be invalid without their consent. Similar to this are the 'laws of war', which give the conqueror certain rights over the conquered, amongst them that of enslaving, and result from a sort of international compact, or universal agreement. Polit. I 6, sub init. ὁ γὰρ νόμος ὁμολογία τίς ἐστιν, ἐν ος τὰ κατὰ πόλεμον κρατούμενα τῶν κρατούντων είναι φασίν. Compare also Pol. III-9. 1280 b 10 seq. καὶ ὁ νόμος συνθήκη, καὶ καθάπερ ἔφη Λυκόφρων ὁ σοφιστής, έγγυητής άλλήλοις των δικαίων, άλλ' ούχ οίος ποιείν άγαθούς καὶ δικαίους τούς πολίτας.

§ 22. ἔτι δὲ πράττεται κ.τ.λ.] Transl. in Introd. p. 199. πράττεται 'are transacted'. On συναλλάγματα, 'the ordinary dealings' of men with

between this

συνθήκας, ώστε ακύρων γιγνομένων αναιρείται ή πρός άλλήλους γρεία των άνθρώπων. καὶ τάλλα δὲ όσα 23 άρμόττει, έπιπολης ίδειν έστιν. άν δ' έναντία ή καί

one another, especially in trade and exchange of commodities, see note on I 1.9.

καὶ τὰ ἐκούσια] 'all voluntary transactions', in general, is added because συναλλάγματα may include τὰ ἀκούσια, frauds, crimes, offences, which may arise in men's dealings with one another: Eth. Nic. v 5 sub fin., 1131 a 2, των μεν γάρ συναλλαγμάτων τὰ μεν εκούσιά εστι τὰ δ' ακούσια έκούσια μέν τα τοιάδε, οδον πρασις, ώνή, δανεισμός, έγγύη, χρησις, παρακαταθήκη, μίσθωσις έκούσια δε λέγεται, ὅτι ἡ ἀρχὴ τῶν συναλλαγμάτων τούτων έκούσιος, των δ' έκουσίων τὰ μέν λαθραΐα, οἶον κλοπή, μοιχεία, φαρμακεία, προαγωγεία, δουλαπατία, ψευδομαρτυρία, τὰ δὲ βίαια, οἷον αἰκία, δεσμός, θάνατος, άρπαγή, πήρωσις, κακηγορία, προπηλακισμός.

χρεία] 'usus' as χρησθαι 'uti', 'intercourse', the use that men make of one another.

έπιπολης ίδειν έστιν] This phrase occurs again, Rhet. II 16. 1, and Hist. Anim. IX 38. 2, ή μέν οὖν μυρμήκων έργασία πᾶσίν έστιν έπιπολης ίδειν. In Rhet. II 23. 30, τὸ ἐπιπολης είναι expresses 'superficiality'. It seems to be said of things that 'lie on the surface, things prominent and conspicuous, so as to be seen by every one', ωστε τινά or πάντας ίδεῖν αὐτά. This explanation is confirmed by the substitution of εὐθεώρητα, to express the same notion, in § 25 infra (so Victorius). If this be so, the verb should be written ἐστιν, and not ἔστιν (for ἔξεστιν) as in Bekker's text.

έπιπολής] is the genitive of a substantive ἐπιπολή 'a surface', only used by later and non-Attic writers; 'veteribus illis... ἐπιπολῆs adverbii vicem fuit, Herod. I 187, Arist. Plut. 1207, Eccles. 1108, Thucyd. VI 96, et compluries Xenophon. Neque eius substantivi alius tum casus in usu fuit'. Lobeck ad Phryn. p. 126-7. It is an adverb of place or position, after the analogy of 'Aθηνων' at Athens', λαιᾶς χειρός (Aesch. P. V. 720) 'on the left hand', &c.; see Matth. Gr. Gr. § 377: (this seems to be omitted in Jelf's Grammar, though there are articles on the 'genitive of position'; §§ 524—528, which however is illustrated only by the genitive of relative position, not that which expresses place itself. The genitive, it is to be presumed, is in both cases partitive, denoting a point in space;) it is also after the analogy of the local adverbs, οὖ, ὅπου, ὁμοῦ, οὐδαμοῦ, ποῦ and πού, άγχοῦ, τηλοῦ, πανταχοῦ. ἐπιπολή itself not being in use, the substantive 'surface, superficies' is formed by the addition of the definite article, as Plat. Phileb. 46 D, (ὁπόταν) τὸ...ἐπιπολῆς μόνον διαχέη. Ατ. περὶ ἐνυπνίων 2. 8, τὸ ἐπιπολης τοῦ ἐνοπτροῦ, 'the surface of the mirror'. Its derivatives ἐπιπολαίος and ἐπιπολάζειν (to be on the surface), have three different senses all arising from the properties attributable to things on the surface; either (1) 'popular', 'prevalent', 'fashionable', 'current', like things that come to the top, come uppermost, and the rest, as δόξαι μάλιστα ἐπιπολάζουσαι, Arist. Eth γελοίου, ib. IV. 14, 1128 a 13, Hist. Ani most abundant κε αλ καθάρσεις

kind', VI 37. 2, de G ώσπερ ανθρώποις: α

μετά των άμφισβητούντων, πρώτον μέν, άπερ αν τις προς νόμον έναντίον μαχέσαιτο, ταῦθ' ἀρμόττει άτοπον γαρ εί τοις μεν νόμοις, αν μη ορθως κείμενοι ωσιν άλλ' έξαμάρτωσιν οἱ τιθέμενοι, οὐκ οἰόμεθα δεῖν πεί-24 θεσθαι, ταις δέ συνθήκαις αναγκαίον. είθ' ότι τοῦ δικαίου έστὶ βραβευτής ὁ δικαστής οὔκουν τοῦτο σκεπτέον, άλλ' ώς δικαιότερον. καὶ τὸ μὲν δίκαιον οὐκ ἔστι μεταστρέψαι οὔτ' ἀπάτη οὕτ' ἀνάγκη (πεand the preceding) 'conspicuous', 'prominent', compared with such as are deep down, or buried, out of sight; Rhet. bis, Hist. Anim. quoted above on ἐπιπολη̂s: and (3) 'superficial', opposed to βαθύs; either literally, de Insomn. (περὶ ἐνυπνίων) 2. 12, οὐχ ὁμοίως εἰσδύεται ἡ κηλὶς ἀλλ' ἐπιπολαιότερου, or metaph., as Rhet. III 11. 10, άληθες καὶ μη επιπόλαιου. II 23. 30, above referred to. III 10. 4, τὰ ἐπιπόλαια τῶν ἐνθυμημάτων, followed by the explanation, ἐπιπόλαια γὰρ λέγομεν τὰ παντὶ δῆλα, καὶ α μηδὲν δεῖ ζητῆσαι, is doubtful; for an enthymeme may be too easy to follow and therefore unacceptable, either because it is intellectually 'superficial' (this I think is the more probable meaning, because more applicable to an intellectual process) or because it is 'prominent and conspicuous', saute aux yeux, and therefore is δηλον πάσιν, Top. A I, 100 b 27. Similarly in Pol. III 3, 1276 a 19, ή μεν οὖν ἐπιπολαιστάτη τῆς ἀπορίας ζήτησις (the most obvious and apparent, the clearest and plainest) περί τον τόπον και τούς ανθρώπους ἐστίν, and again, ib. c. 12, 1282 b 30, ή τοῦτο ἐπιπόλαιον τὸ ψεῦdos; (evident on the surface). In these two last instances the literal sense of the word is uppermost.

§ 23. 'But if the contract or document be opposed to us, and (on the side) of the adverse party, first of all, the same arguments are suitable as may be used in contending against an adverse law'. ὅπερ is a cognate accusative extended by analogy from the direct cogn. acc. ἡνπερ μάχην μάχουτο, for which the neuter plural, expressing the details of the contention, or the arguments employed in it, is substituted. 'For it is absurd to suppose that we are not bound to obey the laws, if their constitution is defective and the framers of them have been led into error, and yet that (in like cases) contracts are necessarily binding (that it is necessary to obey or observe them)'. [For κείμενοι...τιθέμενοι compare note on I I. 7, p. 10. S.]

§ 24. εἶθ' ὅτι] The gist of the topic is to be found in Introd. p. 200. βραβευτής] the umpire in the games, who awards the prize to the successful candidate, i. e. to the most deserving, is here used as an image of the judge who dispenses justice to the competitors in a court of law. It is he that is to be appealed to, not a mere contract, which has no regard for the general principles of justice. Justice (ὡς δικαιότερον) must prevail over contracts when they are in conflict. Dem., Cl. III 36. 7, has the verb in the same sense, τὰ τῶν ἄλλων δίκαια βραβεύειν. βραβευτής is the prose form; βραβεύς belongs to the Poets.

τοῦτο] is 'what we are talking about', 'that which is before us', δεικτικῶs; the contract, namely, and its contents.

25 φυκός γάρ έστιν), συνθήκαι δὲ γίγνονται καὶ έξαπατηθέντων καὶ ἀναγκασθέντων. πρὸς δὲ τούτοις σκοπεῖν εἰ ἐναντία ἐστί τινι ἢ τῶν γεγραμμένων νόμων ἢ
τῶν κοινῶν, καὶ τῶν γεγραμμένων ἢ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἢ
τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις, ἔπειτα εἰ ἄλλαις συνθήκαις ὑστέραις
ἢ προτέραις: ἢ γὰρ εἰ ὕστεραι κύριαι, ἄκυροι δ' αἰ
πρότεραι, ἢ αἰ πρότεραι ὀρθαί, αἱ δ' ὕστεραι ἠπατήκασιν, ὁποτέρως ἂν ἢ χρήσιμον. ἔτι δὲ τὸ συμφέρον ὁρᾶν, εἰ πη ἐναντιοῦται τοῖς κριταῖς, καὶ ὅσα
ἄλλα τοιαῦτα: καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα εὐθεώρητα ὁμοίως.

αί δε βάσανοι μαρτυρίαι τινές είσιν, έχειν δε δοκοῦσι τὸ πιστόν, ὅτι ἀνάγκη τις πρόσεστιν. οὕκουν χαλεπὸν οὐδε περὶ τούτων εἰπεῖν τὰ ἐνδεχόμενα, ἐξ ὧν ἐάν τε ὑπάρχωσιν οἰκεῖαι αὕξειν ἔστιν,
ὅτι ἀληθεῖς μόναι τῶν μαρτυριῶν εἰσὶν αὖται ἐάν τε P. 1377.
ὑπεναντίαι ὧσι καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ἀμφισβητοῦντος, διαλύοι ἄν τις τάληθη λέγων καθ ὅλου τοῦ γένους τῶν

§ 25. 'And again, justice cannot be perverted (have its nature altered) by fraud or compulsion like a contract, because it is natural (constancy and uniformity are characteristic of nature); whereas contracts are undertaken, entered into, under the influence of deceit (under false pretences) and compulsion.' The two genitives in construction follow $\sigma \nu \nu \nu \theta \hat{\eta}$ - κa_{i} , 'contracts of men deceived are made'.

οἰκείοις ή ἀλλοτρίοις] 'domestic or foreign'.

τὸ συμφέρου] In arguing against the validity of a contract, you may take into account the consequences of carrying its provisions into effect, so far as they affect the judges, whose 'interest' or 'advantage' (or the reverse) may be involved in them: when these results happen to be adverse to the judges' interest, arguments from this source may be employed to invalidate the contract; 'and all other topics of the same kind, (may be used) (which need not be enumerated) because they are equally easy to observe (with the preceding)', too clear to need enumeration.

§ 26. oikeiai] 'of one's own', 'on our side', supr. § 21.

διαλύοι αν τις] or λύειν and διαλύειν, see Introd. p. 267 note.

τὰληθῆ λέγων] These words have been variously interpreted. Muretus omitted τὰληθῆ, as contrary to Aristotle's opinion on the subject of torture—which however must be gathered from the words of the text, and not assumed a priori, and the text altered in conformity with the hypothesis—evidently supposing that if retained with δίαλύοι and not with λέγων. There is right, and that the words do express

βασάνων· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦττον ἀναγκαζόμενοι τὰ ψευδῆ λέγουσιν ἢ τὰληθῆ, καὶ διακαρτεροῦντες μὴ λέγειν τάληθῆ, καὶ ῥαδίως καταψευδόμενοι ώς παυσόμενοι θᾶττον. δεῖ δ' ἔχειν ἐπαναφέρειν ἐπὶ τοιαῦτα γεγενημένα παραδείγματα ὰ ἴσασιν οἱ κρίνοντες.

27 περὶ δ' ὅρκων τετραχῶς ἔστι διελεῖν· ἢ γὰρ δίδωσι καὶ λαμβάνει, ἣ οὐδέτερον, ἣ τὸ μὲν τὸ δ' οὔ,

 $[1 + \delta \epsilon i \delta \epsilon \lambda \epsilon \gamma \epsilon u \omega s ο i κ είσιν άληθείς αι βάσανοι πολλοί μεν γάρ παχύφρονες οι και λιθοδέρμοι και ταῖς ψυχαῖς δντες δυνατοί γενναίως εγκαρτεροῦσι ταῖς ἀνάγκαις, οι δε δείλοι και εὐλαβεῖς πρό τοῦ τὰς ἀνάγκας ίδεῖν αὐτῶν καταθαρροῦσιν ὥστε οὐδέν έστι πιστὸν ἐν βασάνοις. <math>\Lambda^{\epsilon}$].

torture, by asserting the truth and right of the arguments directed against the use of it. [On 'torture' see C. R. Kennedy's *Demosthenes*, Vol. IV., pp. 382-391, appendix. s.]

διακαρτερούντες] (thoroughly, διά,) obstinately, resolutely, persisting,

(holding out).

καὶ ραδίως καταψευδόμενοι] 'and ready to make false accusations (κατά

'against others') in the expectation of a speedier release'.

On the passage which in MS Ae concludes this section, and is printed in the note of the Oxford reprint of Bekker's 1st ed., see in Introd. p. 201, and the note. It is omitted by Bekker. Spengel, On the Rhetoric, in Bav. Trans. 1851, p. 51, thinks that it is an extract from some other treatise on Rhetoric, introduced by the transcribers. The last sentence at all events must be corrupt, being as it stands devoid of meaning and connexion with the preceding. Brandis in his tract in Schneidewin's Philologus, IV i. p. 43, informs us that his Anonymous Annotator found the passage in the MSS that he used, though he thinks that Victorius was right in rejecting it as an interpolation. Victorius, a man whose judgment is to be relied on, writes thus. 'Delevi autem quia adulterinos putavi; aut enim ex alio scriptore artis haec pars sumta est (so Spengel), aut Scholion olim fuit quod importune post in contextum verborum Aristotelis translatum sit;...Qui accurate quae supra a philosopho iam tradita erant perpendit ipsius haec non esse manifesto intelligit; cuncta enim ille quae ad quaestiones pertinentia dicere voluerat iam explicaverat; sententia vero quae his viribus exponitur superioribus continetur; vox etiam iuncta illic est quae sermonem Aristotelis non redolet, viz. λιθόδερμος (this applies still more strongly to καταθαβρείν); et omnis denique haec locutio, e. c. ταις ψυχαις οντες δυνατοί, locutionis Aristotelicae dissimilis videtur'.

§ 27. $\pi\epsilon\rho$ ì $\delta\rho\kappa\omega\nu...\delta\iota\epsilon\lambda\epsilon\hat{\imath}\nu$] On $\pi\epsilon\rho l$, and other prepositions, redundant in the later Greek writers, see note on 19.14, 'oaths admit of a fourfold division'.

On oaths, see the corresponding chapter of Quintilian, v 6. Rhet. ad Alex. c. 17 (18). A full explanation of the connexion and general meaning of this and the following sections to the end of the Chapter will be found in the Introd. pp. 202—205, to which the reader is

καὶ τούτων ἢ δίδωσι μὲν οὐ λαμβάνει δέ, ἢ λαμβάνει μὲν δίδωσι δ' οὔ. ἔτι ἄλλως παρὰ ταῦτα, εἰ ὀμώ28 μοσται οὖτος ἢ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἢ ὑπ' ἐκείνου. οὐ δίδωσι μὲν οὖν, ὅτι ῥαδίως ἐπιορκοῦσιν, καὶ διότι ὁ μὲν ὀμόσας οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι, τοὺς δὲ μὴ ὀμόσαντος οἴεται καταδικάσειν. καὶ ὡς οὖτος ὁ κίνδυνος κρείττων ὁ ἐν
29 τοῖς δικασταῖς τοῖς μὲν γὰρ πιστεύει τῷ δ' οὔ. οὐ λαμβάνει δ', ὅτι ἀντὶ χρημάτων ὅρκος. καὶ ὅτι εἰ ἦν φαῦλος, κατωμόσατο ἄν κρεῖττον γὰρ ἕνεκά του

that we may confine ourselves here as before to the *details* that require notice. One puzzling circumstance which pervades this Chapter, tending to confusion, and adding to the difficulties arising from the extreme brevity of the expression ('brevis esse laborat obscurus fit', is especially true of Aristotle here, as indeed in most of his writings,) it may be worth while to draw attention to; and that is, that throughout it both plaintiff and defendant are made to argue in the third person; to avoid this, you may may be substituted for Aristotle's he to designate the person who is in immediate possession of the argument, whichever side of the case he may be at the time maintaining.

On the technical expressions belonging to δρκοι, see note in Introd. p. 202, διδόναι δρκον, in Aristotle and the Orators, is to offer or tender an oath, λαμβάνειν (or δέχεσθαι, in the Orators), to accept, or take it.

el ὀμώμοσται οὖτος] 'when this (the oath above mentioned) has been already taken by one or other of the two parties'. ὀμώμοσται here is represented by γεγενημένος in § 32.

§ 28. οὐκ ἀποδίδωσι] Supply τὰ χρήματα (the deposit, or something else which the opponent is unjustly withholding), which is added in three MSS, apparently from a marginal gloss.

The case is: you refuse to tender the oath to the adverse party because it is of no use; he is so little embarrassed by scruples of conscience that he will take the oath and keep the money, so that you gain nothing by your motion. $\tau \circ \circ s \circ \epsilon$ but the judges, you think, if he do not swear, will decide against him'.

Another reason, or topic, for refusing to tender the oath is, that 'this form of risk', the risk that one runs by leaving the matter to, by throwing oneself upon, the judges (δ κίνδυνος οὖτος δ $\dot{\epsilon}$ ν τοῖς δικασταῖς), is to be preferred (κρείττων), viz. to the risk incurred of losing your suit by tendering oath to the adversary, who will probably perjure himself: you therefore refer your case to the decision of the judges, because you can trust them, but not the other.

§ 29. ἀντὶ χρημάτων] is, setting a pecuniary value upon the oath (estimating it against money, at so much money value), which is degrading to the dignity and sanctity of the oath, and therefore it is that you refuse to take it, and not from any baser motive.

κατωμόσατο] κατομνύναι (όρκον) occurs in Arist. Ran. 305, 306, appa-

φαῦλον είναι ἡ μηδενός ομόσας μεν οὖν έξει, μη ομόσας δ' οὖ. οὕτω δε δι' ἀρετὴν ᾶν εἴη, ἀλλ' οὐ δι' ἐπιορκίαν τὸ μή· καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους ἀρμόττει, ὅτι οὐκ ἴση πρόκλησις αὕτη ἀσεβεῖ πρὸς εὐσεβῆ, ἀλλ' ὁμοῖα καὶ εἰ ἰσχυρὸς ἀσθενῆ πατάξαι ἡ πληγῆναι

1 of infra. 3 μh. infra.

rently as a mere synonym of the simple verb, Δ . καΐθις κατόμοσον. Ξ . νη Δ ι $^{\circ}$; Δ . δίμοσον. Ξ . νη Δ ι $^{\circ}$ α. With δρκον and a second accus. of the thing sworn by, Eur. Hel. 835, ἀλλ άγνὸν δίμκον σὸν κάρα κατώμοσα. The middle voice is found again in Herod. VI 65, but in a different sense 'to swear against', with a genitive following. Here, and in the two other cases quoted above, the κατά seems to have an intensive force, expressing the 'binding force' of an oath. This sense of κατά comes from the original, physical, notion of 'keeping down'.

For the interpretation of this obscure topic, see Introd. p. 203. The obscurity is a little heightened by Bekker's punctuation, and may be very slightly cleared up by reading $\mu \dot{\eta} \dot{\partial} \mu \dot{\delta} \sigma \sigma s \dot{\delta}$ (with colon instead of full stop) and at the end of the next clause $\tau \dot{\delta} \mu \dot{\eta}$. (with full stop instead of colon). There is a considerably closer connexion between the two clauses which he separates by a full stop, than there is between the two which are divided only by a colon.

The intention of the topic is to shew the purity and disinterestedness of the speaker's motives in refusing to take the oath.

καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους] Xenophanes of Colophon, the founder of the Eleatic school of Philosophy (Plat. Soph. 242 D, τὸ δὲ παρ' ἡμῖν Ἐλεατικὸν ἔθνος, ἀπὸ Ξενοφάνους...ἀρξάμενον)—of which Parmenides his follower was the most distinguished representative, who converted the theological conception of universal being, represented by Xenophanes as God, into the metaphysical conception of the Universe as One, &v To ovappears to have conveyed his philosophical doctrines in hexameter verse. an example subsequently followed by Parmenides and Empedocles. He also wrote elegies and iambics, the latter directed against Homer and Hesiod, whose manner of speaking about the Gods he disapproved, Diog. Laert. IX 2. 18. The verse quoted here is a trochaic tetrameter; on which Mullach remarks, Fragm. Phil. Gr. Xenoph. Fr. 25, p. 106, note, cuius versiculi hiatus in voce αυτη caesurae excusationem habet, prima autem syllaba in ἀσεβεί producitur ad aliorum nominum velut ἀθάνατος similitudinem'. So Karsten, Xenophanes, p. 79. The work which contained this verse is unknown. Mullach and Karsten agree in the opinion that this verse is all that belongs to Xenophanes in Aristotle's reference; the succeeding illustration is his own. All that is repeated in the converse of Xenophanes' maxim, § 30, is what is contained in the verse itself. I have no doubt they are right. On Xenophanes and his philosophy, besides the two works already referred to, which contain collections of the surviving fragments, see the histories of Greek Philosophy, by Brandis, Zeller, Ritter, Butler, with Dr Thompson's notes and the rest; also Grote's Plato, Vol. 1. pp. 16-19.

30 προκαλέσαιτο. εἰ δὲ λαμβάνει, ὅτι πιστεύει αὐτῷ, ἐκείνῳ δ' οὔ. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ξενοφάνους μεταστρέψαντα φατέον οὕτως ἴσον εἶναι ἂν ὁ μὲν ἀσεβὴς διδῷ, ὁ δ' εὐσεβὴς ὀμνύη· δεινόν τε τὸ μὴ θέλειν αὐτόν, ὑπὲρ ὧν 31 ἐκείνους ἀξιοῖ ὀμόσαντας δικάζειν. εἰ δὲ δίδωσιν, ὅτι εὐσεβὲς τὸ θέλειν τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιτρέπειν, καὶ ὅτι οὐδὲν δεῖ αὐτὸν ἄλλων κριτῶν δεῖσθαι· αὐτῷ γὰρ δίδωσι 32 κρίνειν. καὶ ὅτι ἄτοπον τὸ μὴ θέλειν ὀμνύναι περὶ ὧν

ἀλλ' ὁμοία καὶ εἰ] In this illustration of Xenophanes' dictum, the parallel case proposed by Aristotle, the strong man is the unscrupulous or godless man, who is ready to swear anything, true or false; he has the same advantage over the scrupulous, godfearing man, in a challenge to swear, as the strong man would have over the weak in a challenge to swear, as the strong man would have over the weak in a challenge to swear, as the strong man would have over the weak in a challenge to swear, as the strong man would have over the weak in a challenge to swear.

lenge to fight.

πατάξαι ἡ πληγῆναι] These forms are in general use in Attic Prose as the aorist active and passive of τύπτω. Eth. N. v 5. 4, p. 1132 b 28, εἰ ἀρχὴν ἔχων ἐπάταξεν, οὐ δεῖ ἀντιπληγῆναι, καὶ εἰ ἄρχοντα ἐπάταξεν οὐ πληγῆναι μόνον δεῖ ἀλλὰ καὶ κολασθῆναι. Ib. V 4. 4, p. 1132 a 8, ὅταν ὁ μὲν πληγῆ ὁ δὲ πατάξη, ἡ καὶ κτείνη ὁ δ᾽ ἀποθάνη. de Anima, B, 8, p. 419 b 15, τὰ τύπτον καὶ τὸ τυπτόμενον followed by ἀν πληγῆ, ib. p. 420 a 24, τυπτόμενον καὶ τύπτον followed by ἐὰν πατάξη. For further illustrations see Dem. Select Private Orations, II. pp. 207—211, Excursus on the defective verb τύ-

πτω, S.]

§ 30. ὅτι πιστεύει αὐτῷ, ἐκείνῳ δ' οὖ] 'that he can trust himself (not to swear to what he knows to be false), but not the other'. (In this case, if you accept the oath, or consent to swear) 'Xenophanes' dictum may be inverted (turned round to the other side), and you may say, that this is the fair way of proceeding, for the godless man to tender the oath, and the godfearing to take it'; (because the latter won't perjure himself, the other will). μεταστρέψαι, in § 25, was used in a somewhat different sense 'to pervert' justice; 'and (you may add) it is monstrous for you to refuse to take it yourself, in a matter in which (ὑπὲρ ὧν) you¹ require those gentlemen (the judges, namely,) to take an oath before they decide'. The judges were sworn upon entering the court to decide 'according to the best of their judgment', § 5, supra.

§ 31. 'If you tender the oath, (you argue) that to entrust the case to the decision of heaven is an act of piety; and that (your opponent) ought to require no other judges than himself; and therefore (lit. you say this because, yap) you offer him the decision of the matter'. Comp. Quint. V 6. 4, At is qui defert alioqui agere modeste videtur quum litis adversarium iudicem faciat, et eum cuius cognitio est onere liberat, qui profecto alieno iureiurando stari quam suo mavult. Victorius thinks that this is

borrowed from Aristotle,

¹ I have translated this 'the adversary' in the Introd. p. 203, but I now think that it should rather be referred to the same person as αὐτόν.

ἄλλους ἀξιοῖ ὀμνύναι. ἐπεὶ δὲ καθ' ἔκαστον δηλον πῶς λεκτέον, καὶ συνδυαζόμενον πῶς λεκτέον δηλον, οἶον εἰ αὐτὸς μὲν θέλει λαμβάνειν διδόναι δὲ μή, καὶ εἰ δίδωσι μὲν λαμβάνειν δὲ μὴ θέλει, καὶ εἰ λαμβάνειν καὶ διδόναι θέλει εἴτε μηδέτερον ἐκ γὰρ τῶν εἰρημένων ἀνάγκη συγκεῖσθαι, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς λόγους ἀνάγκη συγκεῖσθαι ἐκ τῶν εἰρημένων. ἐὰν δὲ ἢ γεγενημένος ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐναντίος, ὅτι οὐκ ἐπιορκία ἐκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν, τὸ δ' ἐπιορκεῖν ἀδικεῖν ἐστί, 33 τὰ δὲ βία καὶ ἀπάτη ἀκούσια. ἐνταῦθα οὖν συνακτέον καὶ τὸ ἐπιορκεῖν, ὅτι ἔστι τὸ τῆ διανοία ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ στόματι. ἐὰν δὲ τῷ ἀντιδίκῳ ἢ ὀμωμοσμένος, ὅτι

§ 32. ὑπ' αὐτοῦ] 'by yourself', supra, § 20, note on I I. 12, I 7. 35. ἐκούσιον γὰρ τὸ ἀδικεῖν] On the 'voluntary' and 'involuntary' as affecting the character of actions, see Eth. Nic. III cc. I, 2, 3, where the subject is thoroughly discussed; and on the degrees of criminality, and the distinction of wrong actions done with malice prepense, ἐκ προνοίας, or with deliberate purpose, προαιρέσει, and those which are due to accident, mistake, ἀπατή, or the momentary blindness of passion, see Eth. N. V 10, both of which passages have already been more than once referred to. On βία as a supposed source of action, I 10. I4, and the Appendix 'On the seven sources of action', Introd. p. 225.

The term 'injustice' or 'criminality' can only be applied to actions voluntary in the proper sense of the word: the pleader who has executed two contracts, one conflicting with the other, and thus violated his engagements, argues that this was done in one or the other instance, either by force or fraud, compulsion or mistake, and that this exempts him from responsibility.

§ 33. συνακτέον] συνάγειν like συλλογίζεσθαι, συλλαμβάνειν, συλλέγειν, συνορậν, συνιδείν, συνιέναι, &c., and similarly comprehendere, colligere, all convey the notion of 'gathering' facts together, for the purpose of comparison, and so drawing a conclusion of some kind. συνάγειν and συλλογίζεσθαι are to 'draw logical inferences', from facts or premisses which you put together, and so by comparison are led to infer some general conclusion respecting them.

τὸ τῆ διανοία ἀλλ' οὐ τῷ στόματι] This is the famous ἡ γλῶσσ' ὀμώμοχ' ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος, Eur. Hippol. 612. The success of Aristophanes, and the vulgar misapprehension arising chiefly therefrom, have brought on Euripides a most baseless charge of immorality, so far at least as it is grounded upon this line. Cicero, de Off. III 29, has seen and exposed the fallacy. All the moralists without exception admit that the essence of a lie resides not in the words, but in the intention and moral purpose; and the verse when properly interpreted asserts no more than this.

πάντα αναιρεῖ ὁ μὴ ἐμμένων οἶς ὤμοσεν διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς νόμοις χρώνται ὀμόσαντες. καὶ "ὑμᾶς μὲν ἀξιοῦμεν ἐμμένειν οἶς ὀμόσαντες δικάζετε, αὐτοὶ δ' οὐκ ἐμμενοῦμεν." καὶ ὅσα ἄν ἄλλα αὕξων τις εἴπειεν.

[περὶ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀτέχνων πίστεων εἰρήσθω τοσαῦτα.]

See Paley's note. It seems to me that the Hippolytus in its second and altered form, as we now have it, is, with the exception of the one fatal blot of Phaedra's false charge which brings about the death of the hero, one of the most moral and high-toned, as it certainly is one of the very best, of the extant tragedies of Euripides.

αναιρεί] supra § 21, αναιρείν συνθήκην, τοὺς νόμους.

καὶ τοῖς νόμοις χρῶνται ὀμόσαντες] 'the laws also (as well as other things) are not enforced till an oath has been taken', 'the laws in particular are only enforced after an oath has been taken'.

καὶ ὑμᾶς μέν] On the explanation of this topic, and of the var. lect. ἐμμενοῦμεν and ἐμμένουσιν, see Introd. pp. 204—5. MS A has ἐμμένουσιν; the rest ἐμμενοῦμεν, which Bekker retains.

 $\epsilon l \rho \dot{\eta} \sigma \theta \omega$ See on I II. 29.

APPENDIX (A)

ON

A 11 § 17.

στοργή, έρως, φιλείν, άγαπάν.

[The following Appendix has already appeared as an article in the Journal of Philology, Vol. 1 No. 1 (1868), pp. 88—93. s.]

There are four terms in Greek which represent different states or degrees of affection, fondness, liking, love, in its most general acceptation. Of these $\sigma\tau\rho\rho\gamma\dot{\eta}$ and $\epsilon\rho\omega$ s are co-ordinate terms, in this respect, that they both designate what Aristotle calls $\pi\dot{\alpha}\theta\eta$, instinctive affections, implanted in sentient beings by nature.

στοργή is the natural and instinctive affection that subsists between parent and child; irrational, but moral; an ἄλογον πάθος, but ήθικόν. ήδύ γε πατήρ τέκνοισιν εί στοργήν έχοι, Philem. ap. Stob. Meineke, Fr. Comm. Gr. IV 63. Fr. Inc. 108. στέργειν, Oed. R. 1023, εστερξεν of parental affection, Oed. Col. 1529. Plat. Legg. VI 754 B, καθάπερ παις...στέργει τε και στέργεται υπό των γεννησάντων. Ar. Eth. N. IX 7, 1168 α 2, στέργοντες ώσπερ τέκνα: ib. line 7, στέργει δή τὸ έργον, τοῦτο δὲ φυσικόν, which describes an instinctive feeling, though not here the specially parental; comp. VIII 14, 1161 b 18, οἱ γονεῖς μὲν γαρ στέργουσι τὰ τέκνα...τὰ δὲ τέκνα τους γονείς: and line 25, οἱ μὲν γαρ εὐθὺς γενόμενα στέργουσιν, for which immediately afterwards φιλείν is twice substituted, lines 27, 28. But the verb is by no means confined to this special sense, and passes readily into the more general signification of 'liking' in the modified form of 'acquiescence' and 'toleration' (to acquiesce in, put up with, as αἰνεῖν and ἀγαπῶν); and is even applied to the sexual affection, as Xen. Symp. viii 14 and 21; and in Ar. Eth. N. VIII 5, 1157 a 29, it is used to express the instinctive liking or love which children feel for one another, δι ήδονην αλλήλους στέργοντας, ώσπερ οἱ παίδες: ἔρως, again, the other form of instinctive or animal affection, is sometimes substituted for στοργή, as Eur. Fragm. Erecth. 19 (Dind.), ap. Stob. 77, p. 454, ἐρᾶτε μητρὸς παίδες ὡς οὐκ έστ' έρως τοιούτος άλλος, οίος ήδίων έραν.

έρως differs from the preceding only in respect of its special direction and the absence of moral character: otherwise it is an αλογος ὄρεξις, a natural, animal impulse; the sexual form of ἐπιθυμία, or natural appetite. ὅτι ἐπιθυμία τις ὁ ἔρως παντὶ δήλον, Plat. Phaedrus 237 D. ήδονή καὶ λύπη μεμιγμένον (the characteristic of ἐπιθυμία) έρωτα, Tim. 42 A; and though it is doubtless applied metaphorically, in the sense of a 'passionate desire' similar to the animal appetite, to represent intellectual and moral desires, as when Plato says ἐρᾶν μαθήσεως, φρονήσεως, τῶν καλῶν, yet I believe that when directly and literally applied to its object, it seldom or never means anything else. Arist. Eth. N. IX 10, 1171 a 12, έραν... ὑπερβολή γάρ τις είναι βούλεται φιλίας, τοῦτο δὲ πρὸς ἔνα, is an exception; here ἐρậν is said to be a kind of φιλία: the individual passion opposed to 'affection' or 'love' in general. The reverse of this—the ordinary distinction of the two words-appears in Pl. Phaedrus, 231 C, τούτους μάλιστά φασι φιλεῖν ὧν αν ἐρῶσι, that is, they feel the highest (moral) affections for those who have inspired them with the sensual passion. Comp. 255 E, καλεί δὲ αὐτὸν καὶ οἴεται οὐκ ἔρωτα άλλὰ φιλίαν εἶναι. Symp. 179 C, ὑπερεβάλετο τη φιλία διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα, where ἔρως represents the στοργή, or natural affection. Ib. 182 C, φιλίας, δ δή μάλιστα φιλεί ὁ έρως έμποιείν. Ar. Polit. II 4, 1262 b 12, ώς των ερώντων δια το σφόδρα φιλειν επιθυμούντων συμφύναι, Eth. N. IX 5, 1167 a 3, έοικε δή άρχη φιλίας είναι, ώσπερ τοῦ ἐρᾶν, ή διὰ τῆς ὄψεως ήδονή. The distinction of ἔρως and φιλία appears very clearly in Eth. Nic. IX I, sub init., 1164 a 3 seq., èv bè τη ἐρωτική κ.τ.λ. The application of the word to a higher and purer love, in such passages as Eur. Fragm. Dict. VIII (Dind., Wagner), ἀλλ' έστι δή τις άλλος έν βροτοίς έρως, ψυχής δικαίως σώφρονός τε κάγαθής, καὶ χρην δέ...των εὐσεβούντων οἶτινές γε σώφρονες έραν: and Fragm. Oedip. III (Dind.), VII (Wagn.), ένος δ' έρωτος όντος οὐ μι' ήδονή οἰ μεν κακών έρωσιν, οί δε των καλών ό δ' είς το σώφρον έπ' άρετην άγων έρως ζηλωτός ανθρώποισιν. This is no exception, for here it is still the animal impulse which is represented as sublimed and purified, and transformed (by a metaphor) into a moral appetite, just as the tows in Plato's Phaedrus and Symposium is converted by the same process into a passion of philosophical enthusiasm.

φιλεῖν and φιλία are designations of 'love' in its widest and most comprehensive sense. The verb may even stand as a synonym of ἐρᾶν, as Topic. A 15, 106 b 2, τῷ μὲν κατὰ τὴν διάνοιαν φιλεῖν τὸ μισεῖν ἐναντίον, τῷ δὲ κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν οὐδέν, where the τὸ φιλεῖν κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἐνέργειαν is of course equivalent to ἐρᾶν. It also includes the whole family of likings and fondnesses, natural and acquired, which are attached to special and particular classes of objects, expressed by compound adjectives; as φιλοτοιοῦτος, 'one

who is fond of so and so', φίλοινος, φίλιππος, φιλότιμος, φιλόνικος, φιλέταιρος, φίλαυτος, &c. In the eighth and ninth books of the Nic. Eth. φιλία embraces every kind of moral and intellectual affection, instinctive or acquired, and is identified both with στέργειν (VIII 14, 1161 α 27, 28) and αγαπαν—see for example VIII 3, where all three are employed as equivalent terms (1156 a 14,16), ¿pâv, the sensual appetite being expressly distinguished from them by its own name. b 2, 4. In Plato, Phaedrus 241 C, D, it comprehends even έρως, τὸν έραστοῦ φιλίαν, followed by ως παίδα φιλοῦσιν έρασταί: and in the same verse αγαπαν is used in the same sense (ως λύκοι ἄρν) άγαπῶσ', ὧς παίδα φιλοῦσιν ἐρασταί). In the Ethics therefore it expresses every shade and variety and gradation of the feeling of love in its moral and intellectual aspects from the instinctive affection of the parent, to the highest and ideal form of love; which according to the Greek notion was not that which subsists between the two opposite sexes, but that between two members of the superior sex; and again within that the friendship of two good men. The definition of φιλία in the Rhetoric, II 4. 2, is 'the wishing any one what you think good, for his sake and not for your own' (this is repeated from the Ethics), 'and the inclination or tendency to do such things to the best of your power'. This is disinterested affection, love in its moral aspect, and also in some degree intellectual, in so far as it implies choice: and in this respect corresponds with the Latin diligere, or deligere, to choose the object of your affection, which implies a judgment of his value. The analysis as well as the definition of the $\pi \dot{a} \theta o_s$ in the Rhetoric excludes all consideration of $\epsilon \rho \omega s$, and in fact it is treated rather as friendship than as love.

We next come to the distinction between φιλεῖν and ἀγαπῷν. Döderlein, Lat. Syn. p. 103, and Rost and Palm in their Lexicon, connect ἀγαπῶν with the root of ἄγαμαι and its congeners: this would make the distinctive character of ἀγαμῶν an intellectual form of love derived from 'admiration' or a high estimate of the merits of the person loved. Whether this be the true derivation of the word or not, this notion of selection or affection, conceived, on the ground of admiration, respect, and esteem, certainly enters into its meaning. Xen. Mem. II 7. 9 is decisive on this point. Speaking of the relations of a master to his female servants, Socrates says, ἐὰν δὲ προστατήσης ὅπως ἐνεργοὶ ῶσι, σὲ μὲν ἐκείνας φιλήσεις ὁρῶν ὡφελίμους σεαυτῷ οὖσας ἐκεῖναι δέ σε ἀγαπήσουσι αἰσθόμεναι χαίροιτά σε αὐταῖς. The same conception of value (estimation) and hence esteem, as the foundation of love—complete φιλία—appears in a passage of Plato's Lysis, 215 A, B, τὰ δὴ τοιαῦτα πῶς ἄν ὑπ᾽ ἀλλήλων ἀγαπηθείη μηδεμίαν

ἐπικουρίαν ἀλλήλοις ἔχοντα (the service rendered or benefit conferred is the ground of the esteem and affection); ὁ δὲ μή του δεόμενος οὐδέ τι ἀγαπψη ἄν. ὁ δὲ μὴ ἀγαπψη οὐδὶ ἄν φιλοῦ.

I have looked over, with the help of an index, the instances of the word which occur in the Nicomachean Ethics, and find that in every case it may, and in many must, have this sense of an acquired affection, founded upon the judgment or intellectual faculty, which is indicated by the term 'esteem', and thereby distinguished from the irrational appetite $\xi \rho \omega s$, and the purely emotional, and usually moral affection, φιλία. In 1 3, init. 1095 b 17, the esteem which the vulgar have for a life of sensual enjoyment is represented as the result of a judgment about pleasure: and the same is the case with δι' αύτα αγαπάται at the end of the Chapter, 'they are valued, prized. esteemed, in and for themselves'. In III 13, 1118 b 4, it is distinguished from xaípew, the instinctive affection, in the sense of to 'estimate or prize'; and at the end of c. 14 there is a very marked and decisive exemplification of this sense of the word, o yao outws έχων μαλλον αγαπά τας τοιαύτας ήδονας της αξίας, where the αξία, 'their value', shews clearly what determines the particular character of the affection. In further illustration of this I will merely refer to other places of the Ethics. In IX 7, from 1167 b 32 onwards, four examples of the word in this signification occur nearly together: in one of them it is actually contrasted with φιλεῖν: and x 7, 1177 b 2, and 9, 1179 a 28, where it is placed in juxtaposition with τιμώντας. another word which conveys the notion of 'value', are two clear instances. αγαπαν therefore as contrasted with εραν and φιλειν represents the Latin diligere as opposed to amare 1.

It may be questioned whether this is the primary and original sense of $\partial \gamma a\pi \hat{a}\nu$, since the meaning that appears most prominently and conspicuously in the Homeric use of it and $\partial \gamma a\pi \hat{a}\zeta \epsilon \nu$ is that of the external manifestations and signs of affection shewn in 'welcoming's a friend or stranger, or in fondling and caressing as a father his child, Odys. π' 17: and the word is the precise counterpart of $\partial \sigma \pi \hat{a}\zeta \epsilon \sigma \theta a \nu$. See the examples in Damm's Lexicon, which all have this character; except Odys. ϕ' 289, where it bears the sense, common in the later language, and shared with $\partial \nu \epsilon \nu$ and $\partial \tau \epsilon \rho \gamma \epsilon \nu$, of acquiescing in, putting up with, contentment. But as it seems easier and simpler to derive the notion of the external indications of

¹ Ernesti, Clav. Cic. s.v. diligere magis ad iudicium, amare vero ad intimum animi sensum pertinet. See Döderlein, Lat. Syn. p. 97 seq., and Trench, New Test. Syn. p. 43 seq.

² Dr Lightfoot in Cambridge Journal of Classical and Sacred Ph. Vol. III (1857) p. 92, regards this usage of Homer as d and original sense of the word.

welcome from an internal sense or judgment, previously acquired, of the worth or value of one whom you receive so kindly, than the reverse process, the derivation of the feeling, whether it be esteem or affection, from the external manifestations of it, I prefer regarding the intellectual judgment as the basis of the distinction between it and the other forms of affection, and 'esteem' as its primary and original signification. If Döderlein's derivation from $\tilde{a}\gamma a\mu a\iota$, and words of that family, could be depended upon, no doubt would be left upon this question.

In common usage, however, it is, like φιλεῖν, by no means confined to a single sense. In Plato's Sympos. 180 B, it takes the place of ἐρᾶν in the representation of the lowest and most sensual form of the passion or appetite of love, ὅταν ὁ ἐρωμενος τὸν ἐραστὴν ἀγαπῷ ἢ ὅταν ὁ ἐραστὴς τὰ παιδικά. In Lucian, Ver. Hist. II 25, we find similarly, ἐπιμανῶς ἀγαπῶσα τὸν νεανίσκον.

We therefore arrive at the conclusion in respect of these terms, expressive of different kinds of love or affection, that, although they are all of them more or less interchangeable in the ordinary language, yet in the strict and proper application of them they may be thus distinguished:—

στοργή and έρως are alike in that they are natural, spontaneous, and instinctive; but έρως is properly a sensual appetite, and στοργή a moral affection.

φιλία, the most comprehensive (in its ordinary use) of the four, belongs to the *emotional* part of our nature, includes all grades of the natural instinctive affection from a liking for wine to the perfect friendship (the highest form of love) between good man and good man; and in this its highest and normal sense acquires a *moral* aspect.

 $d\gamma a\pi \hat{q}\nu$ ($d\gamma a\pi \eta$ does not appear in any writers earlier than those of [the Septuagint and] N. T.) gives the *intellectual* aspect of love, in the shape of esteem; no longer a mere *emotion*, but an affection acquired and conceived after an exercise of judgment, consisting in a valuation or estimate formed of the *worth* of the object of preference.

APPENDIX (B)

ON

A 12 § 22.

On an irregular formation of the Greek passive verb.

[The following Appendix has, like the last, already been allowed to appear in the *Journal of Philology*, Vol. 1 No. 1 (1868), pp. 93—97. The additions in square brackets are taken from the margin of Mr Cope's own copy of the Journal, now in Mr Sandys' possession. s.]

φθονεῖσθαι, φθονούμενοι, is an example of the irregular formation of the passive, which is not seldom found in other Greek authors, but is so much more frequent in Aristotle's writings that it may perhaps be regarded as one of the characteristics of his style. In the Greek Grammars that I have consulted, with the exception of that of Dr Donaldson, who only bestows on it a passing observation¹, it is left unnoticed, and I will therefore illustrate it by some examples that I have collected.

The best account of it that I have found is given in Madvig's Latin Grammar, Ch. III. on the dative case, § 244 b, and Obs. 3, 4, Engl. Transl.; his explanation of the Latin usage will apply equally well to the Greek.

The transitive verb, which expresses a direct action of subject on object—the relation of the two being inverted in the passive, in which agent becomes patient and patient agent, I strike A, A is struck by me—is the only kind that according to strict grammatical rule admits of the passive formation: verbs neuter, in which the action ends in itself, to walk, to run, and verbs which transmit the action, but indirectly—these are verbs which in Greek and Latin 'govern' other cases than the accusative (the case which expresses the direct action)—cannot, properly speaking, be converted into passives.

¹ Greek Gram. § 431. Obs. h h, ii.

Speaking of the dative case, 'the object of reference', in Latin, Madvig says, § 244 b, "this cannot, like the proper object, become the subject with the passive, and such verbs (like those that are intransitive) can only be used impersonally in the passive, invidetur, nemini nocetur." (I am not sure that there is any exact analogy to this in Greek, άμαρτάνεται is a doubtful case.) Obs. 4 gives a few exceptions. "To make such a dative the subject, and to use the verb of it personally in the passive, is a rare irregularity; invideor, Horace, A. P. 56, credor, Ov. Trist, III 10. 25, medendis corporibus, Liv. VIII 36," add regnari, Tac. Hist. I 16, virginibus bacchata Lacaenis Taygeta, Virg. Georg. 11 487, regnata, Hor. Od. 11 6. 11, 111 29. 27, Ovid. Heroid. x 69. 2, imperor, Hor. Ep. 1 5. 21. Heusinger ad Cic. de Off. II 4 gives a list of neuter verbs which become passives, but does not make the necessary distinctions: most of those which he quotes are used as impersonals. [On Latin participles of this formation, see Munro, on Lucr. II 156, 363.]

Obs. 2, "Some few verbs are used both with the accusative and the dative (in applying this to the Greek, for dative, must be substituted, 'some other case with or without a preposition',) without any perceptible difference in their signification, adulor, aemulor, despero, praestolor." In Greek θορυβεῖσθαι (ἡμᾶς θορυβεῖτω, Plat. Phaedr. 245 Β), ἀμελεῖσθαι (ἀμελεῖν with accus. Herod. VII 163) are analogous.

In English a similar license is admitted, particularly in verbs which are constructed with prepositions, 'do as you would be done by', or 'done unto', Locke, Essay, Bk. I ch. 3, §§ 4 and 7, 'to be sent for', 'gone for', 'looked for', 'to be relied upon' (hence the vulgar reliable, unaccountable, and similar irregularities). See an observation on this subject in Marsh's Lect. on the Engl. Language, Lect. xvIII § 14. "The rejection of inflexions, and especially the want of a passive voice, have compelled the use of some very complex and awkward expressions...such a thing has been gone through with, to be taken notice of, to be lost sight of, are really compound, or rather agglutinate, passives, &c." [See Thring, Exercises in Grammar, p. 3, 'I am told'.]

I subjoin some instances of this irregular passive from various Greek authors. Euripides, Ion 87, Παρνησιάδες δ' ἄβατοι κορυφαὶ καταλαμπόμεναι, ib. 475, χορευομένω τρίποδι, Iph. Taur. 367, αὐλεῖται δὲ πᾶν μέλαθρον.

Thuc. I 126, ἐπιτετραμμένοι τὴν φυλακήν, ("even the dative or genitive of the person, which had formed the object of the active verb, may become the subject of the passive. Thuc. I 126. Xen. Anab. II 6. I, ἀποτμηθέντες τὰς κεφαλάς¹,&c." Donaldson, Gr. Gr. u. s.).

¹ I rather think that this is not the right explanation of the construction in these two cases; at all events it may be otherwise explained. The verbs $\epsilon \pi \iota \tau \rho \epsilon$ -

The deponents αἰρεῖσθαι and ωνεῖσθαι are converted into passives in Xen. Memor. 111 2. 3, Ar. Pol. VI (IV) 45, 1299 a 19, αἰροῦνται δὰ καὶ πρεσβευταί (this may possibly be justified by the transitive use of alpelv, but in a different sense, the middle being necessary to the notion of 'choosing', or 'taking for oneself'). Plat. Phaedr. 69 B (in Ast's note several other examples of ωνείσθαι pass. from Xenoph. and Plat.) sim. ἀπαρνεῖσθαι, passive, Ar. Anal. Pr. 1 32, 47 b 2, 3, 4. ἀναβα- $\theta \epsilon i$ s, Xen. de re equestr. III 4, of a horse that is mounted (the regular constr. is αναβαίνειν εφ' ιππον, οτ εφ' ιππου). αναβαίνειν in Hom. with the accus. has a diff. sense, 'to go up to'.) απειλείσθαι, Conv. IV 31. χαλεπαίνεισθαι, to be regarded, or treated, with angry feeling, Plat. Rep. 1 337 A. σπουδάζεσθαι, to be eagerly pursued, (several other examples in Ast's Lexicon s. v. ἐσπουδασμένους, Isocr. Panath. § 1 44) ib. VI 485 E, αμελείσθαι (see above) VIII 551 A, καταφρονείσθαι, ib. 556 D, καταγελασθήναι, Euthyphro. 3 C, πλημμελείσθαι, Phaedr. 275 E, Dem. de Cor. § 155, (in a law). σπουδάζεσθαι, καταφρονείσθαι, Ar. Rhet. II [2. 16], 3. 7, υπερέχεσθαι, Rhet. 1 7. 2, 3, and Eth. N. IV 8, 1124 b 10, (ὑπερέχειν τι or τινά do occur, but rarely). θορυβείσθαι, I 2. 10, II 23. 30, Topic. A 12, 105 a 16, Isocr. Panath. ἐπηνημένος καὶ τεθορυβημένος (on θορυβεῖσθαι see above). βοηθείσθαι, Rhet. II 6. 6, ἐπικεχείρηται, III 1. 3. ἐπιβουλεύεσθαι, Pol. VIII (V) 10, 1311 b 35, φθονείσθαι, ib. 11, 1313 a 23, πιστεύεσθαι, ib. 10, 1310 b 16. Xen. Symp. IV 29, Isocr. c. Demon. § 30, πιστευθέντες, π. εἰρήν. § 76, Dem. c. Aristocr. p. 622, § 4. μετέχεσθαι, 'to be participated in', Arist. Metaph. A 9, 990 b 30, Top. Δ 121 a 12, τοῦ μετεχομένου λόγου, 126 a 18 and 21, Eth. Eud. 1 8. 2. προστάττεσθαι, Τορ. Ε 129 α 14, ἐπιτάττεσθαι, Metaph. A 2, 982 a 18. ἐνυπάρχεσθαι (an unusually strange form), Anal. Post. 1 4, 73 b 18. (Waitz ad loc.) κατηγορείσθαι passim ap. Arist. (Waitz ad Anal. Pr. 47 b 1.) [$\beta o \eta \theta \epsilon \hat{i} \sigma \theta \alpha i$, Rhet. II 6. 6; $\pi \alpha \rho \eta \mu \epsilon \lambda \eta \mu \epsilon \nu o s$, Eth. N. x 4, 1175 a 10; Plato, Crat. 404; ἐντεθυμημένος (Heindorf) Phaedrus, 246 c (with Thompson's note); ἀνάσσεται, Soph. Phil. 140; Homer, Od. IV 177; παραλογίζεται, de Soph. Elench. 165 a 169. κεχαρίσθω in Plato, Phaedrus, 250 C, τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, Rep. 11. 375 A.]

πειν and dποτέμνειν are both transitive, and therefore the passive form is regular. The accusative is the local accusative, which expresses the seat of any affection or quality, and follows adjectives and verbs neuter and passive; Jelf (Kühner), Gr. Gr. § 545. 6, supposes with great probability that this is a mere extension of the ordinary cognate accusative and its varieties, ἀγαθὸς τὴν ψυχήν, τὰ πολιτικά, ἀρετήν, &c. (Hat.), καλὸς τὸ πρόσωπον, ἀλγεῖν τὴν κεφαλήν, τὰ ὅμματα, δέρεσθαι τὸ νῶτον, τῶν τὰ ἄτα κατεαγότων; Gorg. 515 Ε. βοὴν ἀγαθὸς Μενέλαος, πόδας ἀκὸς 'Αχιλλεύς, and so on. By the same rule, τὴν φυλακήν after ἐπιτετραμμένοι expresses the seat of, the place as it were in which it is deposited or lodged; the trust (viz. the watch) committed to them. [Similarly πιστεύεσθαί τι, to be entrusted with something, the thing being the local seat of the trust, that in which the trust resides.]

άμαρτάνεσθαι certainly occurs as a pass., frequently in Sophocles and Plato, Eurip. Troad. 1028, Ar. Eth. Nic. IV 9, 1125 a 19, in the form juapryuévos; and in some other forms which are undoubtedly passive; Xen. Mem. 1 2. 9, aμαρτανόμενα, bis, Arist. Eth. Nic. III 3, IIII a 35, $a\mu a \rho \tau \eta \theta \epsilon \nu \tau a$, (also $a\mu a \rho \tau a \nu \epsilon \tau a$, as II 5, II06 b 26, and elsewhere, which in this place from the opposition to κατορθοῦται, line 30, seems more likely to be passive than middle): but in those cases where the choice between passive and middle is open, and the form does not determine it, as αμαρτόνεται αμαρτανόμενος, it is often difficult to decide between the two. Homer certainly employs the middle, Od. IX 512, αμαρτήσεσθαι; and there seems no positive objection to the interpretation of some of the forms employed by Plato and Aristotle as middle. (Ast in his Lexicon ranks all of them in Plato amongst the passives.) If the forms in question, αμαρτάνεσθαι &c., are regarded as passive, the accusative, which in this case becomes the nomin. to the passive verb, is the cognate, and not the direct, accusative. The object of the erroneous proceeding is the mistake that is made, αμαρτάνειν αμάρτημα; which becomes the subject to the passive.

APPENDIX (C)

ON

A 15 § 23.

On ei où.

Hermann on Viger, p. 833, n. 309, followed by Matthiae on Eur. Med. 87, defends this combination of εἰ with the direct negative instead of μή against Elmsley, who holds it to be inadmissible, on the ground that, when it occurs, the negative does not belong to the hypothetical conjunction, but is attached closely to the word which it negatives, so as to combine with it one negative notion; as in Soph. Aj. 1131, εἰ τοὺς θανόντας οὐκ ἐῆς θάπτειν παρών; where οὐκ ἐῆς is equivalent to κωλύεις: in which cases the direct and not the hypothetical form of the negative is properly used to express an abstract negation.

But this explanation, though it is well adapted to the passage of the Ajax¹ quoted in support of it, is not universally applicable, and requires therefore to be supplemented by another and a different solution. For example, in Plat. Phaedo 62 A, we have in two consecutive sentences, first εἰ οὐδέποτε, and secondly εἰ μὴ ὁσιόν ἐστι, and both after the same word θαυμαστόν. Now according to Hermann's rule this μὴ ὁσιον should be οὐχ ὁσιον, because the negative here is just as much an abstract negation of ὁσιον as οὐκ ἐậν is of ἐậν in the Ajax, the one 'unhallowed' as the other 'to forbid': the same rule ought to be equally applicable to both; but it is not, and therefore this explanation of the distinction in this case breaks down.

The explanation, that I would add, as more generally applicable, is this. It is universally acknowledged that & does not always pre-

¹ Eur. Ion, 388,

ώς εἰ μὲν οὐκέτ' ἔστιν, δγκωθŷ τάφω, εἰ δ' ἔστιν, ἔλθη μητρὸς εἰς ὅψιν ποτέ, can doubtless be explained on this principle. And the same may ¹ εἰ δ' οὐκ ἦν, quoted by Herm on Med. 348 (on Elms.) from Antiphr III 99 A.

serve its hypothetical force, but may be put in the place of on or ws to express a simple fact; or of ἐπεί, 'since', as a hypothetical consequence, where however no doubt is implied; or of πότερον 'whether', as an alternative, after έρωτῶν and similar verbs of questioning. See Matth. Gr. Gr. § 617. 2; Viger, p. 504, c. VIII § 6. 3, and the passages quoted by Hoogeveen and Zeune in the note; Jelf (Kühner), Gr. Gr. § 804. 9; Buttm. Ind. to Mid. el pro ou post είδέναι, αἰσχύνεσθαι (Buttm. does not mean that the usage is confined to these two verbs, but merely that these happened to be the only two instances of it in this speech of Dem.); Id. in Ind. ad Plat. dial. IV 'el in re certa, et citra hypothesin, valet siquidem (da) Men. c. 3. d (p. 72 A) εἰ ἀνεύρηκα.' Now it seems to me that whenever & is used in this non-hypothetical sense, it naturally and properly is construed with the direct negative, just as on and ws, or ened or πότερον, would be, and in the same sense. And I appeal again to the passage of the Phaedo, where, as I think, in default of this explanation, there is no reasonable way of accounting for the variation of ov and μή in the two cases after the same word, θαυμαστόν. In the first sentence the hypothesis is altogether discarded, and the translation is, 'perhaps it will be surprising to you that this alone...and that it never happens, &c.': in the second, the hypothetical form is retained, though the sense is lost, and & is still 'if'; 'it seems perhaps surprising if (as is the fact nevertheless, of which however there is no doubt) it is not allowed to these same men to do themselves a service'. Now there is a special class of words, like αἰσχρόν, δεινόν, ἄτοπον, θαυμαστόν, θαυμάζειν, which are habitually followed (especially in the Orators) by ϵi in the sense of $\delta \tau i$, and are sometimes accompanied by its attendant of: still, although exact accuracy seems to require the direct negative in these cases, the ordinary fondness for indefinite and hypothetical expressions, which has been noticed as characteristic of Greek habits of thought and speech (the use of the indefinite μή, with relatives for instance, α μή ποιεί, ὅτε δὲ τοῦτο μή ποιοῦσιν. Dem. c. Lept. 464, et sim.), prevails so far that in the great majority of cases the $\mu\eta$ is retained. In Medea 87 (one of the lines on which Herm. writes his note) εὶ τούσδε γ' εὐνης οὖνεκ' οὐ στέργει πατήρ; εὶ is certainly equivalent to emei, and où technically correct (though Hermann's rule might also apply; as is εἶπερ in the verse quoted Rhet. II. 23. 1, εἶπερ γὰρ οὐδέ κ.τ.λ. This is so clear, that Elmsley, who condemns εἰ οὐ altogether, proposes to read here ἐπεί for εἶπερ. (Note ad Med. 87.) Hermann's example from Thucyd. 1 121, δεινον αν είη. εἴ οἱ μὲν...οὐκ ἀπεροῦσιν, ἡμεῖς δὲ...οὐκ ἄρα δαπανήθομεν, which, according to him, are equivalent to καρτερήσουσιν and φεισόμεθα, is much more reasonably and naturally explained on the other principle; of the two verbs, the first being in fact no part of the hypothesis at all, and with the second or being justified by the meaning of ϵi , which is

equivalent to ore. Herm. adds, however (note on Elms. Med. 87), "Obiter adicimus, etiam ubi ei an significat ('whether or no', a common signification of the particle; where again no hypothesis is implied, not merely an alternative) recte sequi où, ut apud Plat. Protag. 341 B, si nulla est negationis ad affirmationem oppositio." εὶ οὐκ αἰσχύνομαι. On Elms. Med. 348, he quotes, as exemplifying his rule, Hom. Od. β' 274, εἰ δ' οὐ κείνου γ' ἐσσὶ γονός καὶ Πηνελοπείης. This seems to me no instance of it at all; and as it is equally unexplained on my principle, it must be regarded as an exceptional case, and remain without explanation. All the rest of the examples quoted by Herm. l. c. from Herodotus and the Orators, in illustration of his theory, (with one exception) are instances of εί 'that' after δεινόν. The exception is Andoc. περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων § 33, εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν ἡμάρτημαι ενώ κ.τ.λ. How this can be brought under Hermann's rule I am quite at a loss to perceive; but on the other principle the explanation is most clear and satisfactory. Andocides is defending himself, and offers an alternative; εὶ μέν τι ἢσέβηκα ἢ...ἀποκτείνατέ με. εἰ δὲ οὐδὲν ἡμάρτηταί μοι κ.τ.λ. Who can doubt that in the latter member of the alternative the speaker means to represent this as no admissible hypothesis—in fact he says so himself, καὶ τοῦτο ὑμῖν ἀποδείκνυμι σαφώς—and therefore no hypothesis at all? It is therefore to be rendered, 'but the fact being that I have committed no offence', and is a signal example of the inapplicability of Hermann's rule.


In Dem. c. Mid. 581. 1, we have εἰ δὲ καταγνοῦς ἀδικεῖν τότε δια ταῦτ' οὐχ ὑπήκουσε κ.τ.λ., where οὐχ ὑπήκουσε forms no part of the supposition, but is stated as a fact of past time, and contrasted with what he may possibly do at present. The same applies to Aesch. c. Ctesiph. § 250, ἢ οὐ δεινὸν δοκεῖ ὑμῖν...οὐ παρὰ τῶν τυχόντων...ταῦτά τινες οὐκ ἐξαρνοῦνται κ.τ.λ. Arist. Pol. II II, 1273 b 3, ἄτοπον γὰρ εἰ πένης μὲν ὧν...φαυλότερος δ' ὧν οὐ βουλήσεται δαπανήσας.


I will conclude this note with two examples of a parallel case in which $\mathring{a}\nu$ with the optative is found following $\epsilon \emph{i}$, contrary to the ordinary rule of Greek grammar. One occurs in Dem. c. Lept. p. 475, $\epsilon \emph{i}$ μέλλοντες μὲν $\epsilon \emph{i}$ πάσχειν συκοφάντην $\mathring{a}\nu$ τὸν ταῦτα λέγοντα ἡγοῦσθε, $\epsilon \emph{πὶ}$ τῷ δ' ἀφελέσθαι κ.τ.λ., where the contrasted μέν and δέ (on which Buttm. Gr. Gr. and Index to Mid.) shew that the first of the two members is independent of the supposition: the other in Aesch. c. Timarch. § 85, ἄτοπον $\mathring{a}\nu$ εἶη, \mathring{a} 'Αθηναῖοι, $\epsilon \emph{i}$ μηδὲν μέν...καὶ μὴ γενομένης μὲν κρίσεως περὶ τοῦ πράγματος ἦλω $\mathring{a}\nu$ κ.τ.λ.

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